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Issue #44/2025
30 October 2025
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CASE SPOTLIGHTS
SAYYID SHAH ABDULLAH v. (i) The National Registration Regulations 1990 ('Regulations') only allows for a change from a person's original name to a new one, but not for reverting to the original name. The Regulations forbids using a former name once a new identity card has been issued; (ii) While there is no general duty for a decision-maker to give reasons when the relevant statute is silent, this duty may be implied on a case-by-case basis based on fairness and openness. However, in straightforward cases where the decision is clear, the failure to provide reasons is not a valid ground to quash the decision. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Appeal - Challenge against decision of Director General of National Registration Department ('DGNRD') - Applicant citizen of Malaysia - Applicant born Hindu - Applicant converted to Islam and changed name - Applicant faced difficulties with passport issued under new name - Applications made to DGNRD to change name to original name dismissed - Interpretation of reg. 14 of National Registration Regulations 1990 - Whether applicant entitled to be informed of reasons for decision made by DGNRD STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Construction of statutes - National Registration Regulations 1990 - Whether envisages change in name from original name to new assumed name but does not envisage change in name back to original name - Implications and consequences that ensue once change of name is effected - Whether requirements for changing name satisfied JUDICIAL QUOTES“We find that the High Court's decision in holding that the breath test or blood or urine test under s. 45C of the RTA is mandatory for offences under ss. 44 and 45 involving intoxicating liquor and s. 45A for driving or being in charge of a motor vehicle with alcohol concentration above the prescribed limit, and the High Court's setting aside of the respondent's conviction under s. 45A(1) of the RTA were plainly wrong and warrants this court's appellate intervention.” “Although the DPP during the hearing of this appeal orally informed us that he is not proceeding with the appeal against the respondent's acquittal, he did not withdraw the appeal against the acquittal. Additionally, the fact that the respondent's acquittal was based on the High Court's wrong construction and interpretation of the RTA, means that the acquittal was unsafe.” “Therefore, the High Court's decision is set aside. The Magistrate's conviction of the respondent under s. 45A(1) of the RTA is restored.” - Per Faizah Jamaludin JCA in PP v. Kannan Letchumanan [2025] CLJU 1507 LATEST CASESLegal Network Series
CLJ 2025 Volume 9 (Part 3) (i) A 'registered manufacturer', under the Sales Tax Act 2018, is defined by its activity of manufacturing 'taxable goods'. Therefore, a manufacturer who produces both taxable and tax-exempted goods is only eligible for the sales tax exemption on imported raw materials under Item 1, Schedule C of the Sales Tax (Persons Exempted From Payment of Tax) Order 2018 if those materials are used to manufacture 'taxable finished goods'; (ii) In Malaysia, a tax relief or exemption provision should be interpreted differently from a tax-charging provision. In a tax relief provision, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving they fall within the scope of the exemption. Ambiguity in such a provision should not be construed in favour of the taxpayer, and a literal interpretation that leads to an absurd outcome should be avoided in favour of a purposive interpretation. This approach aligns with the principles of statutory interpretation in the UK and Australia. REVENUE LAW | STATUTORY INTERPRETATION | WORDS & PHRASES
REVENUE LAW: Income tax - Sales tax - Exemption - Whether registered manufacturer of both taxable and tax-exempted goods entitled to claim sales tax exemption on imported raw materials used to manufacture tax-exempted goods - Sales Tax Act 2018 - Sales Tax (Persons Exempted From Payment of Tax) Order 2018 - Sales Tax (Goods Exempted from Tax) Order 2018 - Sales Tax (Goods Exempted from Tax) (Amendment) Order 2018 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Statutes - Taxing statutes - Relief/exemption provisions - Distinction between tax-charging provision and provision providing relief - Literal and purposive interpretation - Whether tax relief provision should be interpreted in favour of taxpayer in case of ambiguity - Application of English principles of statutory interpretation in Malaysia - Sales Tax Act 2018 - Sales Tax (Persons Exempted From Payment of Tax) Order 2018 - Sales Tax (Goods Exempted from Tax) Order 2018 - Sales Tax (Goods Exempted from Tax) (Amendment) Order 2018 WORDS & PHRASES: Interpretation of - 'Registered manufacturer', 'Taxable goods' - 'Tax exempted goods', 'Finished goods' - Sales Tax Act 2018 - Sales Tax (Persons Exempted From Payment of Tax) Order 2018 - Sales Tax (Goods Exempted from Tax) Order 2018 - Sales Tax (Goods Exempted from Tax) (Amendment) Order 2018 Zabariah Mohd Yusof FCJ
(i) The power of the Attorney General ('AG'), under art. 145(3) of the Federal Constitution, to institute 'any proceedings for an offence' is limited to criminal prosecutions and does not extend to civil actions, such as those brought by the Securities Commission ('SC') under s. 90A(5) of the Securities Industry Act 1983 ('SIA'). Consequently, the SC does not require the consent of the AG to initiate a civil action for insider trading under the said provision; (ii) For a person to be held liable for insider trading under s. 89E of the SIA, it must be proven that he knew or ought reasonably to have known that the information was not generally available. The law does not impose strict liability or require proof of an intention to use or improper use of the information; (iii) The courts may determine the materiality of the information by considering facts and circumstances at and after the time of the alleged trade. Post-event information, including the subsequent effect on share price, can be used to prove the information's materiality. SECURITIES | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SECURITIES: Shares - Insider trading - Lawyer appointed by bank with respect to corporate exercise of privatisation of listed company - Lawyer bought shares in listed company - Shares disposed of after public announcement - Securities Commission instituted proceedings against lawyer for insider trading - Whether power given solely to Attorney General ('AG') to institute 'any proceedings for an offence' under art. 145(3) of Federal Constitution extended to civil action brought under ss. 90 and 90A(5) of Securities Industry Act 1983 - Whether consent of AG required SECURITIES: Shares - Insider trading - Lawyer appointed by bank with respect to corporate exercise of privatisation of listed company - Lawyer bought shares in listed company - Shares disposed of after public announcement - Whether s. 89E of Securities Industry Act 1983 imposed strict liability - Whether, in addition to 'knows or ought reasonably to know', mens rea in s. 89E(1)(b) also require 'intention to use' inside information that is not generally available - Relevant point in time at which court is required to assess whether information in possession of insider is material under s. 89E CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Attorney General - Powers - Securities Commission instituted proceedings against lawyer for insider trading - Whether power given solely to Attorney General ('AG') to institute 'any proceedings for an offence' under art. 145(3) of Federal Constitution extended to civil action brought under ss. 90 and 90A(5) of Securities Industry Act 1983 - Whether consent of AG required
Hasnah Mohammed Hashim CJ (Malaya)
An order issued by the Public Prosecutor or an investigating officer, to release seized funds to a third party, is an administrative act and is therefore subject to judicial review. Under the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001, the power to determine legal ownership of seized property, particularly when such ownership is in dispute, belongs to the civil courts, not the investigating officer or the Public Prosecutor. If a seized property is not forfeited, it must be returned to the person from whom it was seized. The investigating officer and the Public Prosecutor do not have the authority to unilaterally decide that a third party is lawfully entitled to the property, especially when there is a pending civil dispute regarding ownership. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW | COURTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Fundamental liberties - Right to property - Applicant's bank accounts seized following investigation for criminal breach of trust - Company obtained Mareva injunction against seized accounts while investigation was ongoing - Applicant not charged with any crime - Police/Public Prosecutor issued notices of release and instructed bank to release portion of seized funds to company - Whether decision to release funds violated applicant's fundamental right to property - Whether power to determine legal ownership of forfeited property in hands of police/Public Prosecutor - Whether s. 60(1) of Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 constitutional - Federal Constitution, art. 13(1) COURTS: Civil courts - Jurisdiction - Applicant's bank accounts seized following criminal investigation for criminal breach of trust - Company obtained Mareva injunction against seized accounts while criminal investigation was ongoing - Applicant not charged with any crime - Police/Public Prosecutor issued notices of release and instructed bank to release portion of seized funds to company - Applicant not notified before release of funds - Whether civil courts had jurisdiction to hear matter as notices of release were issued pursuant to decision made in criminal matter/proceeding
S Nantha Balan JCA
The Moneylenders Act 1951 ('MLA') is a special and specific Act for the regulation and control of the business of moneylending not only for the protection of borrowers but also matters connected therewith. A licensed moneylender's demand for an amount computed in breach of the statutory formula prescribed by s. 17 of the Moneylenders Act 1951, amounts to a cause to the contrary so as to disentitle the moneylender to an order for sale of the property charged to the moneylender as security. MONEYLENDERS | LAND LAW
MONEYLENDERS: Interest - Charging of interest under loan agreement - Loan secured by charge over land - Application for order for sale upon default on repayment of loan - Computation of interest - Whether provision of statutory formula under s. 17(1) of Moneylenders Act 1951 to be strictly complied with - Whether imposition of interest contravened statutory formula - Whether lender charged interest in excess of what was entitled - Whether demand in excess of statutory formula amounted to cause to contrary LAND LAW: Order for sale - Application for - Loan secured by charge over land - Application for order for sale upon default on repayment of loan - Computation of interest - Whether provision of statutory formula under s. 17(1) of Moneylenders Act 1951 to be strictly complied with - Whether imposition of interest contravened statutory formula - Whether lender charged interest in excess of what was entitled - Whether demand in excess of statutory formula amounted to cause to contrary under s. 256(3) of National Land Code
Su Tiang Joo J
(i) The inclusion of a document in Part A of a common bundle of documents does not prevent a party from challenging the validity of such a document (ii) An insurance certificate can be voided ab initio if the proposer makes material misrepresentations in the proposal form. The materiality of a misrepresentation is determined by its significance to the insurance operator's risk assessment. Misrepresenting income and business status, which are central to assessing risk, constitutes a material breach of the duty of utmost good faith. INSURANCE | CIVIL PROCEDURE
INSURANCE: Claims - Misrepresentation - Claim for benefits under certificate issued by insurer upon death of deceased - Claim declined by insurer - Whether there were misrepresentations and/or non-disclosure of material facts by deceased in proposal form - Whether inclusion of certificate in Part A of common bundle of documents precluded insurer from challenging validity - Whether insurer failed to investigate/verify deceased's information before issuing certificate - Whether insurer entitled to avoid certificate ab initio and refuse all claims - Islamic Financial Services Act 2013, para. 15(1) of sch. 9 CIVIL PROCEDURE: Documents - Common bundle of documents - Whether inclusion of documents in Part A of common bundle of documents precludes challenge of validity
Atan Mustaffa Yussof Ahmad J
(i) In a joint and several guarantee agreement that establishes a single relationship in which the guarantor assumes the obligations of a guarantor, with the enhanced liability of a primary obligor, the guarantor cannot claim the protections intended for traditional sureties under the law. The provisions of ss. 92 and 94 of the Contracts Act 1950 are designed to protect traditional sureties, not primary obligors who have contractually assumed direct liability; (ii) Where a party's conduct demonstrates a pattern that constitutes an abuse of process, and the legal and factual deficiencies in the case are manifest and cannot be cured by amendment or further evidence, the 'plain and obvious' test for striking out is clearly satisfied. Prolonged litigation would serve no useful purpose and would only impose unnecessary costs and delay on the parties and the judicial system. BANKING | CIVIL PROCEDURE
BANKING: Guarantor - Primary obligor - Whether joint and several guarantee agreement established single legal relationship - Whether plaintiff contracted as guarantor with primary obligor status under agreement - Whether merger doctrine could be used to escape contractual obligations forming foundation of original claim - Whether plaintiff assumed enhanced liability precluding reliance on traditional surety protections - Whether ss. 92 and 94 of Companies Act 1950 applicable CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Application for - Statement of claim - Whether disclosed reasonable cause of action - Whether prolonged acquiescence to enforcement proceedings abuse of process - Principles of res judicata and issue estoppel - Whether applicable - Whether action time barred under s. 6 of Limitation Act 1953 - Whether claim sustainable - Whether 'plain and obvious' case for striking out - Rules of Court 2012, O. 18 r. 19
Arziah Mohamed Apandi JC
ARTICLESLNS Article(s)
LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTSPrincipal Acts
Amending Acts
PU(A)
PU(B)
Legislation Alert Updated
Revoked
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