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Issue #29/2026
16 July 2026
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CASE SPOTLIGHTS
TAN HOO ENG v. PP [2026] 6 CLJ 969 The statutory authority of an enforcement agency under the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 is limited to the imposition and maintenance of a restraint on property. Once a freezing or seizure order is lifted or expires by operation of law, the enforcement agency's statutory dominion over the property ceases immediately. The agency does not possess continuing supervisory jurisdiction over private contractual or banking arrangements between a financial institution and its customer. Therefore, any disputes regarding accretions, interest, or shortfalls occurring during the seizure period are private civil matters to be litigated between the account holder and the bank. CRIMINAL LAW: Money laundering - Freezing and seizure of bank accounts - Seizure order lifted - Bank failed to release and return full and complete properties due despite cessation of restraint - Whether enforcement authority exercised continuing dominion or supervisory jurisdiction over accounts once order lifted - Whether Public Prosecutor empowered to intervene in internal banking arrangements - Whether matter of private contract - Whether remedy lies in civil proceedings against financial institution - Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments and orders - Committal order - Application for - Freezing and seizure of bank accounts - Seizure order lifted - Non-compliance of prosecution with court order to release and return properties - Prosecution failed to ensure bank released full properties including accretions - Whether there was wilful and contumacious defiance of court order - Whether prosecution had legal authority to instruct bank on private contractual matters JUDICIAL QUOTES“The appellants further contend that the decision was rational because it reflected the policy of the Kedah State Government. That submission again mistakes policy for legality. It does not answer the legal challenge.” “A decision may be motivated by policy and yet be unlawful if the decision-maker acts outside the limits of its powers. It may be sincerely held and yet irrational if it proceeds on a material mistake, ignores the governing constitutional and statutory framework, or treats an irrelevant premise as determinative.” “Here, the decision was unlawful because it deployed local business premises licensing for an impermissible purpose. It was unconstitutional because, in substance and effect, it intruded into the federal field of betting and lotteries. It was irrational because it proceeded, at least in part, on the erroneous basis that the Ministry of Finance would not renew the relevant federal licences and because it failed to confront the legal significance of licences that were in fact renewed under the Pool Betting Act 1967.” - Per Faizah Jamaluddin JCA in Kerajaan Negeri Kedah Darul Aman & Anor v. Lee Bak Chui & Ors And Other Appeals [2026] 6 CLJ 645; [2026] CLJU 1678 APPEAL UPDATES
LATEST CASESLegal Network Series
CLJ 2026 Volume 6 (Part 4) (i) Mere requests for an extension of time to file a defence, whether made by consent or otherwise, alongside a preliminary indication of an intention to file a defence, do not evince an unequivocal intention to proceed with the litigation. Consequently, they do not constitute 'steps in the proceedings' under s. 10(1) of the Arbitration Act 2005. This is especially true when such actions occur before the defendant has gained access to crucial documents; (ii) Serving a notice to produce documents, under O. 24 r. 10 of the Rules of Court 2012, is a purely peripheral procedural machinery intended to facilitate the inspection of documents referenced in the pleadings. Because it does not advance the merits of the case, its deployment, when reasonable, necessary and done in good faith, does not manifest an intention to waive arbitration rights or submit to the court's jurisdiction. ARBITRATION | WORDS & PHRASES
ARBITRATION: Stay of proceedings - Application for - Employer and contractor entered into agreement to refer disputes to arbitration - Allegations of failure and neglect by contractor to fulfil contractual and statutory obligations - Contractor's failures and neglect caused delay in issuance of certificate of completion and compliance - Employer filed writ and statement of claim - Contractor requested extensions of time to file defence by consent - Contractor served notice to produce documents under O. 24 r. 10 of Rules of Court 2012 - Whether contractor's actions constituted 'steps in the proceedings' under s. 10(1) of Arbitration Act 2005 - Whether conduct evinced unequivocal intention to waive arbitral rights and submit to court's jurisdiction - Whether notice to produce documents peripheral or advancing merits of case WORDS & PHRASES: 'steps in the proceedings' - Arbitration Act 2005, s. 10(1) - Test to determine - Whether mere requests for extension of time to file defence or indication of intention to file defence amounted to steps in proceedings - Whether express reservation of rights clause determinative or to be considered in isolation
Hasnah Mohammed Hashim CJ (Malaya)
An application for the summary determination of questions of law under O. 14A of the Rules of Court 2012, where the ultimate objective is to terminate a civil suit summarily without a full trial, carries the same legal effect as a striking out or summary judgment application. Consequently, an appeal against the dismissal of an O. 14A application is strictly caught by the statutory bars under s. 68(1)(e) and (f) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, rendering such an appeal incompetent and liable to be struck out. CIVIL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Interlocutory appeal - Competency - Notice of application seeking summary determination of questions of law - Application under O. 14A of Rules of Court 2012 - Dismissal of application by High Court - Appeal to Court of Appeal - Whether appeal caught by statutory bars against interlocutory appeals - Whether application under Order 14A equivalent to summary judgment or striking out application - Whether appeal incompetent and liable to be struck out - Courts of Judicature Act 1964, s. 68(1)(e) & (f)
Wan Ahmad Farid Salleh CJ
(i) A litigant cannot rely on a witness statement filed only on the morning fixed for trial following a persistent history of non-compliance with case management directions, as civil procedure mandates that testimony be served well in advance to secure procedural fairness, reasonable notice, and adequate time for an opposing party to prepare cross-examinations and trial strategies. Admitting a same-day filing under these circumstances causes severe prejudice and strips judicial directions of their substantive authority; (ii) The dismissal of a main claim does not extinguish an independent counterclaim, which retains its distinct procedural lifespan and is entitled to proceed independently to trial subject to ongoing judicial management. CIVIL PROCEDURE | EVIDENCE
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Trial - Case management - Witness statement - Late filing - Action commenced by writ - Whether plaintiff complied with multiple case management directions for timely filing of witness statement - Statement filed on morning fixed for trial - Whether non-compliance with O. 38 r. 2(4) of Rules of Court 2012 - Whether leave should be granted to rely on late-filed witness statement - Assessment of prejudice to opposing party, compliance history, and integrity of trial process - Whether serious breach of case management directions of substantive content - Whether same-day filing caused procedural unfairness and deprived opposing party of opportunity to prepare cross-examination and trial strategy CIVIL PROCEDURE: Counterclaim - Continued existence and survival - Dismissal of plaintiff's main claim - Effect of dismissal on independent cross-action - Whether dismissal of main claim extinguished or disposed of counterclaim - Whether counterclaim ought to proceed to trial subject to case management directions - Rules of Court 2012, O. 15 r. 2(3) EVIDENCE: Burden of proof - Admissible evidence-in-chief - Exclusion of late-filed witness statement - Consequence of exclusion on plaintiff's claim - Action called for trial with plaintiff left without properly receivable evidence-in-chief - Whether action should be dismissed for non-compliance or failure to prove claim - Whether plaintiff discharged burden of proof - Failure to establish claim by admissible evidence - Whether claim ought to be dismissed
Raja Segaran S Krishnan JC
For a urine specimen to be taken under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ('DDA'), the individual must first be arrested. When a urine specimen is obtained pursuant to s. 31A of the DDA, the requirement to provide the specimen must come from a police officer not below the rank of Sergeant. A urine sample that has been obtained in breach of s. 31A of the DDA may render the evidence inadmissible and could be fatal to prosecution's case. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | EVIDENCE | WORDS & PHRASES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal by prosecution - Charge under s. 15(1)(a) of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ('DDA') - 'Arrested person' - Whether arrest should be referrable to offence under DDA - Whether arrest precondition to taking of urine specimen - Accused person initially arrested for commercial crime - Whether properly arrested under s. 31A of DDA before urine specimen obtained - Whether illegally obtained evidence - Whether admissible under common law rules - Whether non-compliance with s. 31A(1A) fatal to prosecution case EVIDENCE: Admissibility - Urine specimen - Charge under s. 15(1)(a) of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ('DDA') - Whether urine specimen taken in compliance with s. 31A(1A) of DDA - Whether arrest precondition to urine-taking - Whether accused person properly arrested under s. 31A of DDA before urine specimen obtained - Whether illegally obtained evidence - Whether admissible under common law rules - Whether non-compliance with s. 31A(1A) fatal to prosecution case EVIDENCE: Admissibility - Urine specimen - Request for - Police officer not below rank of Sergeant - Whether police officer held rank recognised under First Schedule to Police Act 1967 - Whether authorised under s. 31A(1A) of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 to require accused person to provide urine specimen WORDS & PHRASES: 'arrested person' - Section 31A(1) and (1A) of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ('DDA') - Whether arrest precondition to lawful taking of urine specimen - Whether arrest should be referrable to offence under DDA Atan Mustaffa Yussof Ahmad J
CLJ 2026 Volume 6 (Part 5) (i) A State Government or Local Authority cannot use its local Government licensing powers over business premises as a device to implement a blanket, State-wide prohibition on an activity that falls within the exclusive legislative and executive competence of the Federal Government. Where the Federal Government has lawfully issued or renewed a licence under a Federal statute pursuant to item 4(l) of the Federal List (List I, Ninth Schedule) of the Federal Constitution, a State-wide policy targeting and suppressing the activity itself is ultra vires the Federal Constitution; (ii) An Executive decision does not gain immunity from judicial review simply by being labelled a 'policy decision'. While courts will not review the merits or social desirability of a policy, they retain a constitutional duty to review its legality. If a policy exceeds constitutional boundaries, violates federal law, or constitutes an abuse of power, it is fully justiciable. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Justiciability - Policy decision - State Executive Council's decision to cease renewal of business premises licences for gaming outlets - Powers of court to review decisions exceeding constitutional limits or contradicting Federal law - Whether decision non-justiciable policy matter founded on moral and social considerations - Whether decision resolvable by legal criteria CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Federal and State laws - Conflict of jurisdictions - State-wide policy decision terminating and refusing renewal of business premises licences for pool betting operators - Betting and lotteries falling under Federal List (item 4(l), List I, Ninth Schedule) of Federal Constitution - Local Government and business licensing falling under State List (item 4(a), List II) and Local Government Act 1976 - Whether genuine regulation of premises or disguised prohibition of federally licensed activity - Whether State executive action intruded into Federal field - Federal Constitution, arts. 4(1), 73, 74, 75, 80
Azizah Nawawi CJ (Sabah & Sarawak)
A judicial review of a decision to dismiss a public officer is strictly limited to examining the legality of the decision-making process rather than the substantive merits of the conclusion, provided the disciplinary authority meticulously complies with the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993. As long as these statutory requirements are fully satisfied, the disciplinary authority is under no implied legal duty to provide written reasons for dismissal or to afford the officer an oral hearing. This procedural compliance fully satisfies the requirements of natural justice, as public servants hold office during the pleasure of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under art. 132(2A) of the Federal Constitution ('FC') and possess no absolute constitutional right to employment under art. 5(1) of the FC beyond the specific procedural safeguards explicitly guaranteed under art. 135(2) of the FC. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Disciplinary proceedings - Decision to dismiss police officers for misconduct and insubordination - Failure of Disciplinary Board to provide adequate reasons for decision - Whether decision vitiated by procedural impropriety - Impact on constitutional rights - Right to livelihood - Whether decision amenable to judicial review - Federal Constitution, art. 5(1) - Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993, regs. 4(2)(i), 37 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Public servants - Disciplinary proceedings - Dismissal - Police officers - Charges of insubordination - Arresting foreign citizens without authorisation, failing to report to superiors, and omitting entries in station diary and personal pocket books - Disciplinary Board issued show cause letters and considered written representations - Whether there was failure of Disciplinary Board to provide adequate reasons for decision of dismissal - Whether decision vitiated by procedural impropriety - Impact on constitutional rights - Right to livelihood -Whether decision amenable to judicial review - Federal Constitution, art. 5(1) - Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993, regs. 4(2)(i), 37 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Fundamental liberties - Right to livelihood - Dismissal of public servants - Charges of insubordination against police officers - Disciplinary action resulting in termination - Whether Disciplinary Board failed to give reasons for dismissal - Whether breach of procedural fairness and procedural impropriety directly infringed right to livelihood - Federal Constitution, art. 5(1) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Public servants - Dismissal - Tenure of office - Public officers holding office during pleasure of Yang di-Pertuan Agong - Whether absolute constitutional right to remain in public service exists - Relationship between art. 5(1) and art. 135(2) of Federal Constitution - Specific constitutional safeguards against dismissal or reduction in rank - Extent of right to reasonable opportunity to be heard - Whether compliance with statutory discipline regulations satisfied constitutional requirements - Federal Constitution, arts. 5(1), 132(2A), 135(2)
Azizah Nawawi CJ (Sabah & Sarawak)
Although ss. 4(5), 13, 14 to 16, 18A and 20 of the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 ('SOSMA') modify traditional procedural or evidentiary rules, they do not displace the court's adjudicatory function of the Judiciary. Under these provisions, the court retains judicial oversight in that it retains the inherent power to assess the credibility, weight and relevance of evidence. The Judiciary remains the final arbiter of fact. As these measures allow the detenu a chance to challenge the prosecution's case, they remain consistent with the right to a fair trial and are shielded by the special legislative powers granted under art. 149 of the Federal Constitution. Sections 4(5), 13, 14 to 16, 18A and 20 of the SOSMA also satisfy the principle of proportionality and have a rational nexus with the objective of the SOSMA. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Fundamental liberties - Challenge on constitutionality of ss. 4(5), 13, 14, 15, 16, 18A, 20 and 30 of Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 - Allegations of displacement of judicial oversight, violation of equality of arms and disregard for procedural fairness - Whether provisions constitutional and valid - Whether in contravention of arts. 5, 8, 121(1) and/or 149 of Federal Constitution ('FC') - Whether provisions saved by virtue of special legislative powers under art. 149(1) of FC
Narkunavathy Sundareson J
A driver's actions during a microsleep episode are neither conscious nor voluntary and, as such, cannot support a conviction for dangerous driving under limb (c) of s. 41(1) of the Road Transport Act 1987 ('RTA'). However, liability may arise from the driver's prior conduct, before the microsleep occurred, where the driver failed to take reasonable steps to avoid the risk of a fatal accident. In the present case, liability arose because the driver continued to drive on a hot Ramadhan afternoon without stopping or waiting for the fatigue to subside. Such prior conduct does not meet the higher threshold of dangerous driving under limb (c) of s. 41(1) of the RTA, but is properly classified as careless driving under s. 43(1) of the RTA. ROAD TRAFFIC | CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ROAD TRAFFIC: Accident - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Accused convicted under limb (c) of s. 41(1) of Road Transport Act 1987 ('RTA') - Sentence of five years' imprisonment, fine of RM20,000 in default 12 months' imprisonment, and disqualification from holding or obtaining driving licence for five years - Whether conviction safe - Whether conviction ought to be substituted with conviction under s. 43(1) of RTA - Whether evidence established dangerous driving - Whether microsleep episode sufficient to ground liability under s. 41(1) - Whether prior conduct of accused constituted careless driving under s. 43(1) - Whether sentence manifestly excessive CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Charge - Amended charge - Amendment from limb (a) of s. 41(1) of Road Transport Act 1987 to limb (c) of same section - Amendment effected after cross-examination of seven prosecution witnesses - No opportunity to recall witnesses - Whether timing of amendment caused prejudice to defence - Whether accused deprived of fair opportunity to meet case - Whether conviction unsafe
Yusrin Faidz Yusoff J
Where the lifespan of a seizure order is specifically prescribed by statute, such as the 12-month limit under the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001, the seizure lapses by operation of law if a forfeiture order is not obtained within that timeframe. The court has no inherent jurisdiction or power under s. 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code to grant a stay that would effectively extend a statutory time limit or 'stop the clock' on a seizure that has already expired by operation of law. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Stay of execution - Application for - Properties seized under Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing And Proceeds Of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 - Forfeiture application struck out for non-compliance with directions - Whether striking out order capable of stay under s. 311 of Criminal Procedure Code - Whether stay could extend statutory lifespan of seizure order - Federal Constitution, art. 13
Ahmad Shahrir Mohd Salleh J
Pre-trial delay, potential evidentiary loss and alleged defects in a charge are matters to be tested and resolved by the trial court within the inherent safeguards of the trial process. They do not justify the summary exercise of the court's inherent power to stay or strike out criminal proceedings unless an exceptional abuse of process is strictly proven. The court's inherent jurisdiction to summarily strike out or permanently stay criminal charges to prevent an abuse of process and secure a fair trial is an exceptional remedy of last resort which must be exercised sparingly and only when no alternative course exists. It cannot be used to pre-emptively interfere with the Public Prosecutor's constitutional discretion to prefer charges. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Charge - Application to strike out or permanently stay charges - Substantial delay of 21 years and nine years in preferring charges - Allegation that delay infringed constitutional right to fair trial and personal liberty - Evidentiary lacunae due to death of material witness and loss of historical records - Whether charges defective - Whether exceptional circumstances existed to justify summary intervention - Whether power to strike out or stay should be exercised - Whether matters to be determined by trial judge - Federal Constitution, art. 5(1) - Criminal Procedure Code, s. 158 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Fundamental liberties - Right to fair trial - Accused charged 21 years after alleged offence - Death of material defence witness and loss of archival records during interim - Whether passage of time breached right to fair trial and personal liberty - Whether charges ought to be struck out or permanently stayed - Federal Constitution, art. 5(1)
Mohd Arief Emran Arifin J
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