CASE SPOTLIGHTS
LIM KIEN HUAT v. HO SHEN LEE (M) SDN BHD (IN LIQUIDATION) & ORS [2026] 3 CLJ 186
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
CHE MOHD RUZIMA GHAZALI JCA; AZHAHARI KAMAL RAMLI JCA; EVROL MARIETTE PETERS JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: B-02(A)-1132-07-2024]
22 DECEMBER 2025
Professional misconduct under the Legal Profession Act 1976 requires proof of personal culpability. A partner in a legal firm cannot be found guilty of misconduct merely based on vicarious liability for the acts of another partner or staff member. While they may share civil liability arising from partnership principles, it would be unreasonable to equate such liability with disciplinary guilt.
LEGAL PROFESSION: Professional discipline - Misconduct - Appeal against decision of Disciplinary Board ('DB') - Partner of legal firm found to have committed professional misconduct due to act of legal associate - Whether High Court erred in upholding DB's decision - Whether appellate interference warranted - Whether personal culpability on part of partner ought to be proven - Applicable standard of proof for establishing professional misconduct - Whether beyond reasonable doubt
APPEAL UPDATES
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Iem Sa v. Flowbird Malaysia Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2025] CLJU 3493 overruling in part the High Court case of Flowbird Malaysia Sdn Bhd v. Alain Taher Osterlind & Ors [Civil Suit No.: WA-22NCVC-197-04/2020]
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Tang Ser Chiew & Anor v. Lee Mei Kim & Another Appeal [2025] CLJU 3695 overruling the High Court case of Tang Ser Chiew & Anor lwn. Lee Mei Kim [2024] CLJU 1866
LATEST CASES
Legal Network Series
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[2025] CLJU 272
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OSK CAPITAL SDN BHD v. LEE KAM KOAK
1. The primary duty of the Court hearing an application for order for sale of a charged property is to determine if indeed the chargor has succeeded or failed to meet the requisite legal test of what amounts to a cause to the contrary. The Court is merely concerned with the very narrow question of whether the material produced by the chargor constitutes cause to the contrary.
2. Allegations pertaining to violations of numerous provisions of the Moneylenders Act 1951 is not a proper issue to be dealt with in the foreclosure proceeding. The proper forum to determine such issue would be the Civil Courts. Hence, in an application for an order for sale of a charged property, the court in that foreclosure proceeding should not be concerned with the issue pertaining to the validity and enforceability or otherwise of the moneylending agreement..
LAND LAW: Charge - Order for sale - Cause to the contrary - Moneylending agreement - Dispute as to validity of moneylending agreement - Allegation of increases in interest rate - Whether validity of moneylending agreement should be determined in a separate action - Whether chargor had established any cause to the contrary - Whether material produced by chargor constitutes cause to the contrary
- For the plaintiff - Chuah Chen Yean; M/s Sidek Teoh Wong & Dennis
- For the defendant - Manpal Singh Sacdev Manjit Singh & Gary Au Kar Meng; M/s Manjit Singh Sachdev Mohammad Radzi & Partners
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[2025] CLJU 274
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GIIB HEALTHCARE PRODUCTS SDN BHD v. GLOMAXES LATEX GLOVE MANUFACTURER SDN BHD & OTHER CASES
1. If a matter is raised in the payment claim and the payment response or, in the absence thereof, an adjudication response, and the adjudicator decides it, then he has acted within his/her jurisdiction.
2. Attack on merits of adjudication decision cannot constitute either an excess of jurisdiction or a denial of natural justice, which cannot be a ground for setting aside of the said adjudication decision..
CONSTRUCTION LAW: Adjudication - Setting aside - Allegation of denial of natural justice - Whether adjudicator acted in excess of jurisdiction - Whether allegations that claim not under construction contract or construction works an afterthought - Whether adjudicator allowed payment claim against principles under Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 - Whether attack on merits of adjudication decision constituted an excess of jurisdiction or a denial of natural justice - Whether adjudicator made own assumption and conclusion without giving opportunity to applicant to defend
[Originating summons no. WA-24C-153-10/2024]
- For the applicant - G. Nadaraja; M/s Rama & Associates
- For the respondent - Wong Sheng Wei; M/s Kheng Hoe & Lee Yuen
[Originating summons no. WA-24C-162-10/2024]
- For the applicant- Wong Sheng Wei; M/s Kheng Hoe & Lee Yuen
- For the respondent- G. Nadaraja; M/s Rama & Associates
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[2025] CLJU 284
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KL CITY GATEWAY SDN BHD v. AFNISAR GUSTAR & ORS
An important condition for a summary possession of the land is for the plaintiff to show an interest in the land. Land titles which shows the plaintiff as the registered owner of the land is sufficient to establish the plaintiff's interest in the land. In such circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to seek for writ of possession of land against parties who are in occupation of the land..
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments and orders - Setting aside - Order for writ of possession of land - Eviction proceedings - Whether plaintiff had complied with requirements under O. 89 of Rules of Court 2012 before obtaining order - Whether defendants properly served with documents - Whether plaintiff registered owners of land - Whether defendants' occupation in land with plaintiff's consent or licence - Whether defendants trespassers
- For the plaintiff - Bushro Mohamad Anuar, Ashmadi Othman, Nabilah; M/s Zulpadli & Edhamw
- For the defendant - Norazura Mohamed Mokhtar; M/s Azura Mokhtar & Low
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[2025] CLJU 286
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SK INTERNATIONAL (M) SDN BHD v. TALSU POLYMER
1. A party who had consistently reaffirmed its obligations under an agreement and further solidifying the binding nature of the agreement cannot later dispute the validity of the said agreement. Where the evidence demonstrates that parties acted in reliance on the document and performed their obligations, the court may conclude that a binding contract existed, regardless of terminology.
2. The doctrine of frustration applies only in circumstances where an unforeseen event fundamentally alters contractual obligations or renders performance legally or physically impossible. A party asserting Covid-19 pandemic as a basis to rely on doctrine of frustration must demonstrate that the pandemic made it impossible to fulfil its obligation under an agreement. Concrete evidence must be presented to show that the pandemic created an insurmountable obstacle to fulfil such obligations. Mere inconvenience or delay does not constitute frustration under the law..
CONTRACT: Breach - Terms - Memorandum of understanding ('MOU') and business advisory proposal - Failure to deliver specific governmental licences and approval necessary for business operations - Claim for refund of fees paid - Whether MOU legally enforceable - Whether party in breach could enforce rights under same contract while disregarding its own obligations
CONTRACT: Frustration - Agreement - Defendant failed to deliver specific governmental licences and approval necessary for plaintiff's business operations - Allegations that Covid-19 pandemic and movement control order frustrated obligations - Agreement executed two years before pandemic began - Whether delay occurred before any movement restrictions were imposed - Whether defendant's non-performance attributed to pandemic - Whether defendant's reliance on frustration consistent with own representations and conduct
- For the appellant - Shamesh Jeevaretnam; M/s Jeeva Partnership
- For For the respondent - Ang Boon Pin & Toh Kay Yann; M/s BP Ang & Tan
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[2025] CLJU 282
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MOHD KHAIRUL AMALI NAMAN lwn. PP
1. Kanak-kanak adalah saksi yang kompeten untuk memberi keterangan dan selagi tiada keterangan yang boleh menunjukkan sebaliknya, mahkamah boleh menerima keterangan kanak-kanak. Kompetensi saksi kanak-kanak harus dinilai dari segi keseluruhan keterangan yang diberikan.
2. Percanggahan semestinya akan berlaku dalam keterangan seorang saksi lebih-lebih lagi yang berkaitan dengan memori atau daya ingatan mengenai apa yang telah berlaku terutamanya saksi kanak-kanak yang telah melalui satu episod hidup yang tidak indah untuk diingati akan terbatas daya ingatannya. Percanggahan tersebut tidak dapat mematahkan keseluruhan keterangan saksi kanak-kanak tersebut.
PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Rayuan - Rayuan terhadap sabitan dan hukuman - Kesalahan-kesalahan seksual terhadap kanak-kanak - Sama ada mahkamah boleh menerima keterangan kanak-kanak - Sama ada saksi kanak-kanak menzahirkan perbuatan-perbuatan seksual ke atasnya - Sama ada keterangan saksi kanak-kanak jelas menunjukkan pengetahuan bahawaperbuatan yang dilakukan oleh tertuduh terhadapnya adalah salah - Sama ada hakim bicara bersandar kepada keterangan dengar cakap - Sama ada tertuduh menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah
- Bagi pihak perayu - Sarawana Kumar & Mazri Mohamed
- Bagi pihak responden - Natassa Zaini, Mohamad Shahrizzat Amadan & Nik Mohd Fadli Dato' Nik Azlan, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya
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CLJ 2026 Volume 3 (Part 1)
(i) In determining whether the prerequisites in s. 83 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 ('LRA') has been fulfilled, the court must go back to the time when the application for interim relief is made and to evaluate what are the means and needs of the parties. When a petitioner-wife uses a portion of her interim maintenance provisions to pay for expenses that did not fall within the category of the petitioner-wife's needs when the interim maintenance order was pronounced, the said order was thus made due to misrepresentation; (ii) As to whether spousal maintenance for the petitioner-wife can be used for her legal fees during the pendency of the matrimonial proceedings, there is no provision in the LRA that entitles the wife to claim for legal expenses in the maintenance order. Based on the phrase 'on the application of the person in whose favour or of the person against whom the order was made' used by the Legislature in s. 83 of the LRA, the petitioner-wife should have made an application for the variation of the order to incorporate payment for legal expenses as part of the interim relief. A proper application should be made before such payments were made. The petitioner should not use the matrimonial provisions for expenses/purposes not specified in her application.
Ashvin Jethanand Valiram v. Yogita Kishanchand Jethwani [2026] 3 CLJ 1 [CA]
FAMILY LAW
FAMILY LAW: Divorce - Maintenance - Interim maintenance order - Application for variation of interim maintenance order - Whether there was misrepresentation, mistake of fact or material change in circumstances - Whether matrimonial provisions could be used for expenses or purposes not specified - Whether wife entitled to claim for legal expenses in maintenance order - Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, s. 83
S Nantha Balan JCA
Azhahari Kamal Ramli JCA
Ahmad Kamal Md Shahid JCA
- For the appellant - Sumita Gnanarajah, Agnes Loo Tse Ching & Hirasini S Mahandran; M/s Chris Lim Su Heng
- For the respondent - Vasanthi V Sathasivam, Subathra K Sathianathan & Darshana Araventhan; M/s K Sugu & Assocs
The liquidation or bankruptcy of a party does not, by itself, render an arbitration agreement 'inoperative' or 'incapable of being performed', under s. 10 of the Arbitration Act 2005. If the underlying dispute concerns pre-insolvency contractual rights, rather than unique insolvency-specific remedies, the arbitration clause remains valid and binding.
Hashim Abdul Razak & Ors v. Pembinaan PD Jaya Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) [2026] 3 CLJ 22 [CA]
ARBITRATION | COMPANY LAW
ARBITRATION: Agreement - Action against party in liquidation - Parties entered into agreement which contained arbitration clause - Allegations that arbitration agreement inoperative or incapable of being performed - Whether liquidation of party rendered arbitration agreement inoperative - Whether dispute regarding pre-insolvency contractual rights remained arbitrable - Whether arbitration survived insolvency - Arbitration Act 2005, ss. 10 & 49
COMPANY LAW: Liquidation - Winding up - Parties entered into agreement which contained arbitration clause - Action against party in liquidation - Whether arbitration constitutes 'action or proceeding' - Whether leave of court obtained - Effect on stay of court proceedings - Companies Act 2016, s. 471
Mohd Nazlan Ghazali JCA
Alwi Abdul Wahab JCA
Shahnaz Sulaiman JCA
- For the appellants - Ramasamy Ellan; M/s Rama & Assocs
- For the respondent - Abdul Halim Lokman; M/s Amir, Halim & Assocs
A failure to include material and mandatory cause papers crucial to an appeal in its record of appeal is a serious breach of r. 18(4)(a) and (c) of the Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 and the Court of Appeal Practice Direction No 1 of 2017. Such non-compliance can cause serious prejudice or a substantial miscarriage of justice.
Inno-Wangsa Oils & Fats Sdn Bhd v. Raksam Ingridients Private Ltd [2026] 3 CLJ 48 [CA]
CIVIL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Record and notice of appeal - Omission of documents relevant to appeal - Whether non-compliance occasioned serious prejudice or substantial miscarriage of justice - Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994, rr. 3A, 5, 18(4)(a), (c)
Azmi Ariffin JCA
Mohd Firuz Jaffril JCA
Ong Chee Kwan JCA
- For the appellant - Suresh Subramaniam & Azizul Hilmi Zulkifli; M/s S Suresh Law Chambers
- For the respondent - Jeyashankar Sivalingam & Rajeswary Girupai; M/s Rajeswary Girupai & Assocs
The court will decline to exercise its discretion to grant relief in judicial review proceedings where the underlying dispute has become academic due to subsequent agreements between the parties as the resulting decision would have no practical effect on the current legal relationship of the parties or would be rendered obsolete. In the context of industrial relations, if parties execute subsequent collective agreements that adopt the contested terms of a prior award, a challenge to that award becomes spent.
Kesatuan Pekerja-pekerja Perusahaan Logam v. George Kent (Malaysia) Bhd & Anor [2026] 3 CLJ 57 [CA]
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | LABOUR LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Appeal - Challenge against decision of Industrial Court - Certiorari and mandamus - Trade dispute regarding terms of 13th collective agreement ('CA') - Terms regarding salary increments, performance-linked wage systems and bonuses - Subsequent conclusion of 14th and 15th CAs incorporated disputed matters - Effect of subsequent agreements on pending judicial review - Whether relief should be granted where dispute overtaken by subsequent events - Whether application rendered academic and devoid of practical utility - Rules of Court 2012, O. 53 r. 2(3)
LABOUR LAW: Industrial Court - Trade dispute - Trade dispute regarding terms of 13th collective agreement ('CA') - Terms regarding salary increments, performance-linked wage systems and bonuses - Subsequent conclusion of 14th and 15th CAs incorporated disputed matters - Effect of subsequent agreements on pending judicial review
Ravinthran Paramaguru JCA
Wong Kian Kheong JCA
Faizah Jamaludin JCA
- For the appellant - R Chandrasegaran, V K Raj & S P Devi Sangaran; M/s A Rajadurai P Kuppusamy & Co
- For the 1st respondent - Rutheran Sivagnanam & Chong Yi Zhen; M/s R Sivagnanam & Assocs
Where a child is illegitimate, the word 'parents' in s. 2(1)(b) of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 (Selangor) (EN 1/2003) ('ARIE') cannot apply to a father and can only refer to a mother. This is precisely because according to s. 111 of the Islamic Family Law (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 (Selangor) (EN 2/2003), the putative father of an illegitimate child cannot, in law, be considered as the child's father. If a child is born out of wedlock and the mother is a Muslim, then s. 2(1)(b) of the ARIE would be fulfilled and the illegitimate child is considered a Muslim; (ii) As long as one is a Muslim by identification, whether he practices or not, or whether he continues to believe in the faith or not, he is no less legally identified as 'a person professing the religion of Islam'. Any application for a declaration that a person is never a Muslim must necessarily be construed as a request for a declaration that one is no longer a Muslim, which is a renunciation case. In adherence to art. 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution, it is the Syariah Court which has the jurisdiction to hear and determine an application for a declaration that a person is no longer a Muslim, also in accordance with s. 61(3)(b)(x) of the ARIE.
Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia v. Nivethah Thamayandiran & Anor And Another Appeal [2026] 3 CLJ 77 [CA]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW | ISLAMIC LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Jurisdiction - Courts - Determination of religious faith - Illegitimate children born to Hindu father and Muslim mother - Whether s. 111 of Islamic Family Law (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 (Selangor) (EN 2/2003) ('IFLE') applied to deny ascription of paternity - Whether father, and his religion, for all intents and purposes, disqualified - Whether s. 2(1)(b) of Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 (Selangor) (EN 1/2003) ('ARIE') fulfilled when one parent is Muslim - Whether illegitimate children Muslims by virtue of s. 2(1)(b) of ARIE - Whether illegitimate children and mother persons 'professing the religion of Islam' - Whether fell within scope of all laws made by Selangor State Legislative Assembly under Ninth Schedule, State List, List II, item 1 of Federal Constitution, including ARIE and IFLE - Whether application for renunciation of Islam fell within jurisdiction of Syariah Court - Whether civil courts have no jurisdiction to grant declaration that persons were no longer Muslims - Federal Constitution, art. 121(1)(A) - Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 (Selangor) (EN 1/2003), ss. 61(3)(b)(x), 74(2)
ISLAMIC LAW: Jurisdiction - Syariah court - Determination of religious faith - Illegitimate children born to Hindu father and Muslim mother - Whether s. 111 of Islamic Family Law (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 (Selangor) (EN 2/2003) ('IFLE') applied to deny ascription of paternity - Whether father, and his religion, for all intents and purposes, disqualified - Whether s. 2(1)(b) of Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 (Selangor) (EN 1/2003) ('ARIE') fulfilled when one parent is Muslim - Whether illegitimate children Muslims by virtue of s. 2(1)(b) of ARIE - Whether illegitimate children and mother persons 'professing the religion of Islam' - Whether fell within scope of all laws made by Selangor State Legislative Assembly under Ninth Schedule, State List, List II, item 1 of Federal Constitution, including ARIE and IFLE - Whether application for renunciation of Islam fell within jurisdiction of Syariah Court - Whether civil courts have no jurisdiction to grant declaration that persons were no longer Muslims - Federal Constitution, art. 121(1)(A) - Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 (Selangor) (EN 1/2003), ss. 61(3)(b)(x), & 74(2)
Mohd Nazlan Ghazali JCA
Ahmad Fairuz Zainol Abidin JCA
Lim Hock Leng JCA
(Civil Appeal No: B-01(NCvC)(A)-72-01-2024)
- For the appellant - Mohammad Sallehuddin Md Ali; FC
- For the respondents - Gurdial Singh Nijar, Abraham Au Tian Hui & Lim Sze Han; M/s Yeoh Mazlina & Partners
(Civil Appeal No: B-01(NCvC)(A)-100-02-2024)
- For the appellant - Kamaruzaman Arif & Sofiah Omar; M/s Kamaruzaman Arif & Sofiah
- For the respondents - Gurdial Singh Nijar, Abraham Au Tian Hui & Lim Sze Han; M/s Yeoh Mazlina & Partners
Natives can prove native customary rights ('NCR') over lands by relying on customs, traditions and oral history. However, the evidence must be reliable, consistent and persuasive and must not be contradicted by other evidence. Inconsistencies in evidence, the absence of any supporting ground survey and aerial photographic evidence that can put the credibility of the oral history narrated by the native into serious doubt will lead to the native's failure to establish NCR over the disputed lands.
Su'ot Tebari v. Superintendent Of Land And Survey Limbang Division & Ors And Other Appeals [2026] 3 CLJ 103 [CA]
NATIVE LAW AND CUSTOM | LAND LAW
NATIVE LAW AND CUSTOM: Native customary rights - Claim for - Land dispute - Whether plaintiff acquired native customary rights ('NCR') claim over disputed lands - Reliance on oral history - Whether plaintiff's family cultivated disputed lands from period prior to 1 January 1958 - Whether aerial photographic evidence put credibility of oral history narrated by plaintiff into serious doubt - Failure of plaintiff to call licensed surveyor or community mapper - Inconsistencies in evidence and statement of witnesses - Whether plaintiff established his family possessed NCR over disputed lands
LAND LAW: Native customary rights - Disputed lands - Claim for - Whether plaintiff acquired native customary rights ('NCR') claim over disputed lands - Reliance on oral history - Whether plaintiff's family cultivated disputed lands from period prior to 1 January 1958 - Whether aerial photographic evidence put credibility of oral history narrated by plaintiff into serious doubt - Failure of plaintiff to call licensed surveyor or community mapper - Inconsistencies in evidence and statement of witnesses - Whether plaintiff established his family possessed NCR over disputed lands
Ravinthran Paramaguru JCA
Azimah Omar JCA
Noorin Badaruddin JCA
(Civil Appeal No: Q-01(NCVC)(W)-654-11-2021)
- For the appellant - Joshua Parir Baru & Clarice Chan; M/s Baru Bian
- For the 1st & 2nd respondents - Mohd Adzrul Adzlan & Adzharye Johari; AG's Chambers, Sarawak
- For the 3rd respondent - Sim Hui Chuang & Rachel Ho; M/s Reddi & Co
(Civil Appeal No: Q-01(NCVC)(W)-671-11-2021)
- For the appellants - Mohd Adzrul Adzlan & Adzharye Johari; AG's Chambers, Sarawak
- For the respondent - Joshua Parir Baru & Clarice Chan; M/s Baru Bian
(Civil Appeal No: Q-01(NCVC)(W)-672-11-2021)
- For the appellant - Sim Hui Chuang & Rachel Ho; M/s Reddi & Co
- For the respondent - Joshua Parir Baru & Clarice Chan; M/s Baru Bian
An application for an order for sale under the National Land Code is premature and fundamentally flawed if it is filed before the expiry of the statutory period specified in a Form 16D notice. When a chargee issues a subsequent Form 16D notice, they are bound by the timeline stipulated therein, effectively superseding or estopping reliance on prior notices. The right to apply for an order for sale only accrues once the breach remains unremedied after the full statutory period has lapsed.
Hap Seng Credit Sdn Bhd v. Elemac Precision Engineering Sdn Bhd [2026] 3 CLJ 127 [HC]
CIVIL PROCEDURE | LAND LAW
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Originating summons - Order for sale - Land charged as security for banking facilities - Borrower defaulted in repayment - Chargee issued Form 16D notices - Originating summons filed before expiry of one-month remedy period - Which Form 16D notices to be relied on as basis for filing of originating summons - Whether application premature - Whether right to apply for order for sale accrued - Rules of Court 2012, O. 83
LAND LAW: Charge - Order for sale - Application for - Land charged as security for banking facilities - Borrower defaulted in repayment - Chargee issued Form 16D notices - Originating summons filed before expiry of one-month remedy period - Which Form 16D notices to be relied on as basis for filing of originating summons - Whether application premature - Whether right to apply for order for sale accrued - Whether chargee estopped from relying on earlier Form 16D notice - National Land Code, ss. 254 & 256
Anselm Charles Fernandis J
- For the plaintiff - Manpal Singh & Helmi Zaharin; M/s Manjit Singh Sachdev, Mohammad Radzi & Partners
- For the defendant - Amardas Jethanand; M/s K P Ng & Amardas
(i) The parties' objective intention, evidenced through their conduct and correspondence, determines whether a binding contract exists. In this case, the acknowledgment in the revised offer of a sale and purchase of property, coupled with the acceptance of deposit and undertaking to update the agreement, demonstrates a clear contractual intent. There is a concluded contract despite the absence of a formally executed agreement reflecting the revised terms; (ii) A termination is rendered unlawful when it is found to be premature and done without proper notice and when there are no valid grounds for it.
Khairil Annas Jusoh v. Pesuruhjaya Tanah Persekutuan & Ors [2026] 3 CLJ 146 [HC]
CONTRACT
CONTRACT: Termination - Breach - Sale and purchase of property - Whether binding contract formed between parties - Whether there was fundamental breach of specific contractual obligations - Whether there was concluded contract reflecting revised terms - Whether termination premature and unlawful - Whether general damages ought to be awarded to aggrieved party
- For the plaintiff - Zamri Idrus & Phoebe Loi Yean Wei; M/s Thomas Philip
- For the defendants - Muhammad Izzhar Aiman Hamdan; AG's Chambers
ARTICLES
LNS Article(s)
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CHILDREN BY LAW OR BY LOVE: THE STATUS OF STEPCHILDREN AND ADOPTED CHILDREN UNDER SHARIAH LAW AND BENEFITS/RELIEFS UNDER RELEVANT LAWS*
[Read excerpt]
by Teoh Alvare[i]Nan Muhammad Ridhwan Rosnan[ii]Muhammad Shameyl Haikal bin Shahrul Nizam[iii] [2026] CLJU(A) xxiv
[2026] CLJU(A) xxiv
MALAYSIA
CHILDREN BY LAW OR BY LOVE: THE STATUS OF STEPCHILDREN AND ADOPTED CHILDREN UNDER SHARIAH LAW AND BENEFITS/RELIEFS UNDER RELEVANT LAWS*
by
Teoh Alvare[i]
Nan Muhammad Ridhwan Rosnan[ii]
Muhammad Shameyl Haikal bin Shahrul Nizam[iii]
Introduction
As family structures in Malaysia continue to change, more Muslim families are now raising stepchildren or caring for adopted children as part of their households. While these arrangements are widely accepted and supported by law, they raise an important practical question: Are stepchildren and adopted children treated the same way as biological children when it comes to employment-related benefits in Malaysia?
This article examines the position of stepchildren and adopted children from several perspectives such as the principles of Shariah governing lineage, inheritance, and maintenance, as well as the operations of Malaysia's employment and social security laws in practice. These include the Employees Provident Fund ("EPF"), Social Security Organisation ("SOCSO"), tax reliefs, and statutory leave i.e. paternity leave.
The term "employee benefits" is inherently broad and encompasses a wide range of entitlements. For the purposes of this article, the discussion is confined to statutory benefits, including EPF and SOCSO, as well as statutory leave i.e. paternity leave. The applicability of these benefits to adopted children and stepchildren will be examined.
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CHOICE OF LAW AND JURISDICTION IN CROSS-BORDER ONLINE CONTRACTS: CHALLENGES UNDER THE MALAYSIAN LAW
[Read excerpt]
by Piriyankaa Nair Ponniah[i] Dr. Manique Apasara Ephranella Cooray[ii] [2026] CLJU(A) xxv
[2026] CLJU(A) xxv
MALAYSIA
CHOICE OF LAW AND JURISDICTION IN CROSS-BORDER ONLINE CONTRACTS: CHALLENGES UNDER THE MALAYSIAN LAW
by
Piriyankaa Nair Ponniah[i]
Dr. Manique Apasara Ephranella Cooray[ii]
ABSTRACT
In an increasingly digital economy, cross-border online contracts are a fundamental part of international e-commerce. It plays a vital role in business transactions between individuals and commercial companies all over the world. Online cross-border contracts are very common nowadays. They occur on a daily basis, for example, when individuals accept the terms and conditions before purchasing products or services online. Online contracts have made it easy for international companies to conduct business in different countries with consumers. Although online contracts facilitate corporations in e-commerce businesses, the usage of online contracts has its complexity because the formation of contracts and dispute resolutions go beyond territorial borders, usually involving two or more legal systems. Thus, when disputes arise, countries rely on the conflict of laws that provide guidelines, helping courts determine the appropriate law to be applied to resolve issues with foreign elements. This paper examines the challenges the Malaysian court faces in applying appropriate law in disputes regarding online cross-border contracts. Through comparative research, the paper aims to identify the challenges in Malaysia, particularly in relation to choice of law and jurisdiction, where the existing approaches are largely dependent on common law pre-digital principles, which, in the current time, are unaligned with online commercial practice. Using comparative analysis with the United Kingdom and Singapore, the study examines their approaches in cross-border online contract disputes and addresses the legal gaps in the Malaysian legal system. The research, therefore, emphasises these legal gaps and the need for progressive reform to remedy the challenges faced by courts and parties during a dispute in an online cross-border contract.
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LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTS
Principal Acts
Amending Acts
PU(A)
PU(B)
Legislation Alert
Updated
| Act/Principal No. |
Title |
Amended by |
In force from |
Section amended |
| PU(A) 221/2023 |
Peraturan-Peraturan Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia (Sistem Levi Berbeza Berkenaan Dengan Anggota Penanggung Insurans) 2023 |
PU(A) 60/2026 |
Tahun taksiran 2026 dan tahun-tahun taksiran yang berikutnya |
Peraturan-peraturan 2, 3 dan 8; Jadual |
| PU(A) 221/2023 |
Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation (Differential Levy Systems in Respect of Insurer Members) Regulations 2023 |
PU(A) 60/2026 |
Year of 2026 and subsequent assessment years |
Regulations 2, 3 and 8; Schedule |
| PU(A) 564/1996 |
Perintah Jalan-Jalan Persekutuan (Pengurusan Persendirian) (Pungutan Tol) (Lebuhraya Butterworth-Kulim) 1996 |
PU(A) 54/2026 |
6 Februari 2026 |
Perenggan 3 |
| PU(A) 564/1996 |
Federal Roads (Private Management) (Collection of Tolls) (Butterworth�kulim Expressway) Order 1996 |
PU(A) 54/2026 |
6 February 2026 |
Paragraph 3 |
| AKTA 613 |
Akta Pencegahan Pengubahan Wang Haram, Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan, Pencegahan Pembiayaan Aktiviti Terhad Dan Hasil Daripada Aktiviti Haram 2001 |
AKTA A1761 |
1 Mac 2026 [PU(B) 76/2026] |
Tajuk panjang; Seksyen 1, 3, 4, 7A, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 14A, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 28L, 29, 44, 44A, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 52A, 53, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 66A, 66B, 66D, 66E, 66G, 66H, 66I, 66J, 76, 78, 83, 83A, 83B, 83C, 83D, 83E, 86 dan 92 |
Revoked
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