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Issue #23/2026
04 June 2026

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CASE SPOTLIGHTS

DAGANG NET TECHNOLOGIES SDN BHD v. TRIBUNAL RAYUAN PERSAINGAN & ANOR [2026] 5 CLJ 466
HIGH COURT MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR
ALICE LOKE YEE CHING J
[JUDICIAL REVIEW NO: WA-25-109-03-2024]
12 MARCH 2026

(i) The validity of a final decision, under s. 40 of the Competition Act 2010 ('Act'), is not strictly confined to the initial notice of investigation under s. 18(1)(a) of the Act. Provided that the proposed decision clearly details the specific findings and allows the enterprise to make representations, the requirements of procedural fairness and natural justice are satisfied; (ii) There is no automatic right to cross-examine witnesses in competition proceedings. Under s. 38 of the Act and reg. 13 of the Competition (Appeal Tribunal) Regulations 2017, both the Competition Commission and the Competition Appeal Tribunal ('CAT') possess the discretion to determine the manner in which evidence is heard. A denial of cross-examination does not, by itself, constitute a breach of natural justice, as the CAT is the master of its own proceedings.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Application to quash decision of Competition Appeal Tribunal affirming Competition Commission's ('MyCC') finding of infringement - Whether MyCC's final decision exceeded scope of investigation notice - Whether there was breach of natural justice - Whether applicant afforded right to respond - Whether right to cross-examine witnesses absolute - Competition Act 2010, ss. 10(1), 18(1)(a), 36, 38 & 40 - Competition (Appeal Tribunal) Regulations 2017, reg. 13


JUDICIAL QUOTES

“The issue before this court is a question of law against the deciding order made by the SCIT. The question is whether the canopy and halide lights qualify as plant expenditure under Sch. 3 of the ITA.”

“This court is bound to apply the principles enunciated in Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v. Tropiland Sdn Bhd (2013) MSTC 7701 pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis. Applying the principles, it is the finding of this court that the decision of the SCIT was a decision that a reasonable SCIT similarly circumstanced would not have reached on the law and facts. The finding that the canopy and the halide lights, which are an integral part of the canopy not being “plant” is against the principles expounded in Tropiland.”

“The case of Tropiland applied the functional test. To qualify as a building, the canopy, while having a passive role, must have a function in the trader's operation, and if it has, it is prima facie a plant, unless there is a good reason to exclude it from that category.”

“It is unrebutted evidence that while the frame of the canopy is made of mild steel, its ceiling is made of a special type of aluminium manufactured by Hunter Douglas called “Luxalon” - a type of aluminium unique to petrol stations as it is non-flammable and reflects light at the same time. The Luxalon ceiling and the halide lights are not easily available in the market. These items are special for the canopy of the petrol filling stations at present times compared to yesteryears.”

“The functional aspect of the canopy and the halide lights act more than a mere roof that protects equipment and people from the weather. It has other functions for the everyday business of petrol filling stations. The ceiling of the canopy is non-flammable in view of the petrol filling kiosks below the canopy. The canopy is very high, and the halide lights keep every area beneath the canopy brightly lit. This would attract the customers from a distance, especially for night sales.” - Per Amarjeet Singh Serjit Singh J in Petronas Dagangan Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri & Other Appeals [2026] 4 CLJ 824

LATEST CASES

Legal Network Series

[2026] CLJU 35

TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD v. SIME DARBY PLANTATION BERHAD &

Order 15 r. 6(2)(b) of the Rules of the Court 2012 is the proper mechanism for an interested party to intervene in land reference proceedings. As there is no distinction between paymasters and landowners for purposes of intervention, a paymaster is therefore entitled to attend and participate in the land reference proceedings although he had not filed any Form N to object to the compensation awarded for acquisition of the land.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Parties - Intervention - Application made by pay master -Application to intervene in land reference proceedings - Land acquired by land administrator on behalf of Tenaga Nasional Berhad ('TNB') for construction of transmission line - Owner seeking substantial increase in compensation payable by TNB - TNB did not file Form N - Application filed under s. 43 and 55 of Land Acquisition Act 1960 and O. 15 r. 6(2)(b) of Rules of Court 2012 - Whether TNB had right to participate and be heard in land reference proceedings in order to safeguard interest

  • For the appellant - Steven Thiru, David Ng Yew Kiat & Leah Samuel; M/s Steven Thiru & Sudhar Partnership
  • For the respondent 1 - Raneesha Thayalan & Isabella Cheah Chooi Mun; M/s Zain & Co
  • For the respondent 2 - Hani Aziza Ismail@Aziz, Etty Eliany Tesno & Norfariza Ridzuanhani Aziza; Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor

[2026] CLJU 36

SABAH DEVELOPMENT BANK BERHAD v. GANDA HASRAT SDN BHD

1. Provision of r. 30 of the Companies (Winding Up) Rules 1972 in respect of filing of affidavit in opposition of a winding up petition must be strictly complied with. The court will not exercise its discretion to abridge or extend time for filing of affidavit in opposition when the respondent failed to give any explanation for the non-compliance of r. 30 and the late filing of the said affidavit.

2. Where the court had granted its indulgence and opportunity by allowing adjournments in order to facilitate a possible settlement but the respondent still failed to meet its debts, then any further settlement proposal at the eleventh hour is only an attempt to delay due process of law, which if allowed, would make a mockery of the law.

COMPANY LAW: Winding up - Petition - Inability to pay debt - Debt arising from consent judgment - Respondent failed to make payments despite granting of earlier adjournments - Delay in filing affidavit in opposition - Respondent merely sought indulgence of time for settlement proposal to be considered and accepted by receiver and manager - Whether petitioner entitled to wind up respondent - Whether there was non-compliance of mandatory time frame for filing and service of affidavit in opposition - Whether late filing of affidavit in opposition justified - Whether statutory presumption of inability to pay debts triggered - Whether there were reasonable grounds to oppose petition

  • For the petitioner - Mohd Faizal Rosli; M/s Jal & Lim
  • For the respondent - Azmi Talib; M/s Aidil Effendy Azmi & Co

[2026] CLJU 47

ER MEKATRON MANUFACTURING SDN BHD v. DATARAN SATRIA (M) SDN BHD & ORS

1. Failure to state full grounds for committal in the statement amounts to substantial non-compliance with O. 52 r. 3(2) of the Rules of Court 2012. Merely stating the grounds in the affidavit in support is insufficient for a leave application for committal proceedings.

2. Where the court has dismissed a summary judgment application and direct the issues in the matter to be tried, then it is not open for the plaintiff to commence a committal proceeding to allege that certain statements made in the defendant's affidavit opposing the summary judgment application to be false. The court would not make an inquiry and come to a determination as to whether or not the statements in the defendant's affidavit are true or otherwise when the matter is pending trial.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Committal proceedings - Application for - Leave for order for committal to prison - Allegation that defendant made false statement in affidavit opposing summary judgment - Summary judgment dismissed and matter directed for trial - Plaintiff failed to state full grounds in statement - Whether there were substantial non-compliance with O. 52 r. 3(2) of Rules of Court 2012 - Whether prima facie case of contempt established - Whether false statements in affidavit amounts to an act of contempt - Whether application premature

  • For ER Mekatron Manufacturing Sdn Bhd - Kelvin Ng & Gary Wong Jin Wai; M/s Vin Cheng & Co

[2026] CLJU 54

MOHAMAD SAKIRAN AWANG lwn. SOON FOO BOON

1. Laporan perubatan terkini adalah relevan dan perlu diberi keutamaan berbanding laporan lama kerana laporan perubatan terkini akan menggambarkan keadaan semasa plaintif. Namun demikian, penerimaan laporan terkini tidak semestinya membawa kepada kesimpulan bahawa awad ganti rugi bagi suatu kecederaan diri mesti diturunkan.

2. Dokumen yang dipertikai dan ditanda sebagai dokumen pengenalan (ID) tidak boleh digunakan sebagai asas dapatan tanpa terlebih dahulu dibuktikan keterimaan dan ketulenannya mengikut undang-undang keterangan. Kaedah 'tanda sebagai eksibit lalu kandungan dianggap benar' adalah pendekatan yang salah dan berbahaya. Dokumen pendapatan yang semata-mata diekstrak daripada sistem komputer majikan wajar kekal sebagai dokumen pengenalan (ID) sahaja dan tidak boleh dijadikan asas dapatan terutama apabila majikan gagal dipanggil sebagai saksi untuk memberikan keterangan berkenaan dokumen pendapatan tersebut.

3. Tanpa asas pendapatan yang telah dibuktikan secara teratur dan tanpa bukti risiko pekerjaan yang nyata, mahkamah perlu berhati- hati agar awad bagi kehilangan pendapatan masa hadapan tidak menjadi satu bentuk awad atas kemungkinan yang tidak disokong oleh fakta, kerana ini bertentangan dengan kehendak pembuktian yang menuntut asas munasabah dan bukan spekulasi. Elemen-elemen penting yang lazimnya perlu ditunjukkan termasuk keadaan kerjaya semasa, sifat kecacatan kekal yang menjejaskan kerja, risiko sebenar kehilangan kerja atau penurunan pendapatan, dan impak kepada pasaran pekerjaan.

GANTIRUGI: Ganti rugi am - Kecederaan diri - Kepatahan tibia dan fibula - Laporan perubatan - Plaintif mula bekerja semula - Keadaan osteoarthritis wujud sebelum kemalangan - Sama ada laporan perubatan terkini perlu diberi keutamaan berbanding laporan lama - Sama ada awad RM28,000 berada dalam lingkungan munasabah

GANTIRUGI: Ganti rugi khas - Kehilangan pendapatan - Kehilangan pendapatan masa hadapan - Dokumen pendapatan ditanda sebagai dokumen pengenalan ID - Laporan pakar terkini menyatakan ketidakupayaan sederhana - Sama ada mahkamah perlu menilai semula asas pembuktian bagi awad kehilangan pendapatan - Sama ada terdapat bukti mencukupi untuk menyokong pendapatan dan pengiraan kerugian - Sama ada responden membuktikan kehilangan pendapatan sebenar - Sama ada kehilangan pendapatan masa hadapan wajar ditolak

KETERANGAN: Dokumen - Penerimaan masuk - Dokumen pengenalan (ID) - Dokumen pendapatan ditanda sebagai dokumen pengenalan ID dan kemudian dinaikkan statusnya sebagai ekshibit - Majikan gagal dipanggil sebagai saksi - Sama ada Mahkamah bicara tersilap menerima dokumen pendapatan di bawah s. 73A Akta Keterangan 1950

  • Bagi pihak peguam perayu - Samreet Singh; T/n Lovelace & Hastings
  • Bagi pihak peguam responden - Sarah; T/n Teo & Associates

[2026] CLJU 75

MESSRS NURLINNY, PANNIR MANNAR & CO lwn. PASLA HOLDINGS SDN BHD

Kegagalan responden untuk mempertikaikan dan menafikan andaian berkenaan ketidakupayaan dalam menjelaskan hutang kepada pempetisyen membuktikan bahawa responden adalah syarikat yang tidak berupaya untuk menjelaskan hutangnya. Responden tidak boleh mendakwa wujudnya pertikaian yang bona fide berkenaan dengan hutangnya kepada pempetisyen setelah responden telah mengakui jumlah-jumlah yang tertunggak dan terhutang dan meminta daripada pempetisyen untuk lanjutan masa bagi membayar hutang tersebut.

UNDANG-UNDANG SYARIKAT: Penggulungan - Petisyen - Ketidakupayaan membayar hutang - Responden gagal menyelesaikan hutang kepada pempetisyen - Petisyen difailkan oleh peguamcara terhadap anakguam - Pengakuan keberhutangan oleh responden - Makluman kepada pempetisyen olehresponden bahawa responden tidak mempunyai wang yang cukup dan memohon lanjutan masa - Sama ada responden berjaya mencabar anggapan statutori bahawa responden merupakansyarikat yang tidak berupaya untuk menjelaskan hutangnya - Sama ada terdapat pertikaian yang bona fide berkenaan dengan hutang

UNDANG-UNDANG SYARIKAT: Penggulungan - Petisyen - Petisyen difailkan dalam bahasa Inggeris tanpa terjemahan bahasa Malaysia - Notis tuntutan statutori tidak dipertikaikan - Sama ada petisyen fatal dan memprejudiskan responden

  • Bagi pihak perayu/responden - T/n Vilasiny Gan & Co
  • Bagi pihak perayu/pempetisyen - T/n Shah Aziz

CLJ 2026 Volume 5 (Part 2)

When all essential terms have been negotiated, agreed upon, and reduced to writing, it confirms that the parties have reached consensus ad idem. Even if the document is labeled as a 'draft' sale and purchase agreement and remains unsigned, if it contains all the essential terms previously settled, it serves merely to formalise an agreement already concluded between the parties.
Chia Seong Pow v. Alexma Corporation Sdn Bhd [2026] 5 CLJ 185 [CA]

CONTRACT: Agreement - Validity - Sale and purchase agreement ('SPA') - Enforcement of unsigned SPA - Whether terms of agreement finalised - Whether parties agreed on all essential terms in second draft SPA - Whether essential terms negotiated, agreed and reduced into writing in third draft SPA - Whether third draft SPA merely to formalise concluded agreement - Whether agreement concluded and enforceable

CONTRACT: Specific performance - Sale and purchase agreement ('SPA') - Sale and purchase of lands - Whether parties reached consensus ad idem on essential elements of concluded SPA - Subsequent undisclosed sale of lands by owner - Whether rendered decree of specific performance academic - Whether purchaser entitled to damages

 

 

Azizah Nawawi JCA
Azizul Azmi Adnan JCA
Lim Hock Leng JCA

  • For the appellant - Brian Ernest Cumming & Ashvinpal Kaur; M/s Gideon Tan Razali Zaini
  • For the respondent - M Edmund; M/s Edmund, Saravanan & Babu

A statement of claim need not specifically label the category of fraud, whether common law or equitable, provided the pleaded facts afford a respondent sufficient notice, as the legal characterisation of such claims is a judicial duty rooted in evidence rather than strict nomenclature. In this instance, a case for equitable fraud is established by demonstrating that the respondent had engaged in unconscionable conduct by diverting company funds despite having acknowledged personal liability. Evidence, including email acknowledgments and personal advances made to facilitate a contract novation, proves that the respondent's failure to repay the appellant after receiving the funds amounted to unconscionable conduct warranting relief.
Harvinder Singh Santa Singh v. Pu Say Chiang [2026] 5 CLJ 199 [CA]

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TORT: Fraud - Allegations of - Distinction between common law fraud and equitable fraud - Refusal to repay advances despite acknowledgment of entitlement - Diversion of company funds to other creditors while withholding balance due to investor - Whether there was evidence of unconscionable conduct - Whether amounted to equitable fraud

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Pleadings - Statement of claim - Particulars - Whether necessary to specifically label category of fraud - Duty of court to determine classification based on pleaded facts and evidence - Equitable fraud - Whether failure to expressly plead 'equitable fraud' fatal to claim - Guidelines in Zung Zang Wood Products Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Kwan Chee Hang Sdn Bhd & Ors

 

Lim Chong Fong JCA
Azhahari Kamal Ramli JCA
Ahmad Kamal Md Shahid JCA

  • For the appellants - Balvinder Singh Kenth & Rishipal Singh; M/s Kenth Partnership
  • For the respondents - Adrian Oswald Rajendran & Nursaidatul Athirah Abdul Naim; M/s Adrian, Syuhada, Sia & Assocs

(i) The Attorney General does not enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability for actions taken in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under art. 145(3) of the Federal Constitution. Consequently, the exercise of prosecutorial power is justiciable in a civil court if it is proven that such power was abused or exercised in bad faith; (ii) A civil claim for misfeasance in public office or malicious prosecution arising from the decision to prosecute is premature and unsustainable if the underlying criminal proceedings have not yet concluded. For a cause of action to be ripe, there must be a final determination establishing whether the prosecution was initiated without reasonable and probable cause or in bad faith.
Mohammad Najib Tun Hj Abdul Razak v. Thomas Thomas K Thomas [2026] 5 CLJ 220 [CA]

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Attorney General - Prosecutorial discretion - Attorney General authorised prosecution of claimant for various offences - Claim by claimant against Attorney General for torts of misfeasance in public office, malicious process, negligence and breach of art. 8 of Federal Constitution - Whether Attorney General immune from civil liability - Whether discretion unfettered - Whether exercise of power immunised from civil actions if abused or exercised in bad faith - Federal Constitution, art. 145(3)

TORT: Misfeasance in public office - Claim against former Attorney General - Attorney General authorised prosecution of claimant for various offences - Claimant filed civil suit while criminal proceedings still pending - Whether claim founded on decision to prosecute premature - Whether particulars sufficiently particularised

TORT: Malicious process - Claim against former Attorney General - Attorney General authorised prosecution of claimant for various offences - Whether malicious process recognised cause of action in Malaysian law - Whether proper cause of action

TORT: Negligence - Duty of care - Statements made by former Attorney General against accused after leaving office - Whether duty of care owed in capacity as private citizen - Whether remedy lay in negligence

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Writ and statement of claim - Claim against former Attorney General for misfeasance in public office, malicious process, and negligence - Whether claim premature and unsustainable - Whether plain and obvious case for striking out - Rules of Court 2012, O. 18 r. 19

Ravinthran Paramaguru JCA
Wong Kian Kheong JCA
Nadzarin Wok Nordin JCA

  • For the appellant - Firoz Hussein Ahmad Jamaluddin, Yudistra Darma Dorai, Melody Tham Cheng Yee, Daniel Annamalai, Woo J Enn, Harel Nieryan & Dheveendra Krishna Kumar; M/s Raj, Ong & Yudistra
  • For the respondent - Alan Adrian Gomez, Mervyn Lai Wei Shiung & Haikaldin Mahyidin; M/s Tommy Thomas

A cause of action to recover a debt secured by a property arises at the earliest point of default and demand, regardless of whether an individual title has been issued or a formal charge has been registered under the National Land Code. Where a financier is armed with a deed of assignment by way of security, they possess the immediate right to realise the security. The 12-year limitation period under s. 21(1) of the Limitation Act 1953 begins to run from the date of the initial breach or the last payment made. A financier cannot unilaterally postpone or reset the limitation period by waiting for the registration of a formal charge and issuing a fresh demand years later.
Rajeswary S Muthusamy v. Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Bhd & Anor [2026] 5 CLJ 264 [CA]

LIMITATION: Cause of action - Accrual - Action to recover money secured by mortgage or charge - Financier and borrower executed facilities agreement and deed of assignment - Default in loan repayment - Failure of financier to take action within 12-year period - Whether cause of action accrued upon issuance of demand or last payment made - Whether subsequent registration of charge and fresh demand created new cause of action - Whether limitation had set in - Whether action time-barred - Limitation Act 1953, s. 21(1)

 

 

Lim Chong Fong JCA
Mohd Radzi Abdul Hamid JCA
Muniandy Kannyappan JCA

  • For the appellant - M Rajenthirakumar R Malaiapan, Hiu Yeat Fong & Muthu Suppiah; M/s S Muthu Partnerships
  • For the respondent - Quah Soon Wai, Lim Kon Keen & Nurin Humairah Zulkarnain; M/s Seow & Megat

To successfully invoke the presumption under s. 114A(3) of the Evidence Act 1950, a claimant must establish two elements regarding the origin of the defamatory publication: (i) that the defendant had custody or control of a particular computer or device at the material time; and (ii) that the publication 'originated' from that specific device. In this context, 'originated' refers to the device from which the matter was sent or disseminated ie, the source of the transmission, rather than the device where the content was merely created or authored.
Sundra Rajoo Nadarajah v. Leaderonomics Sdn Bhd [2026] 5 CLJ 280 [CA]

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EVIDENCE: Presumption - Presumption of publication - Claim premised on tort of defamation - Poison pen letter in digital form - Origin and proof of origin of poison pen letter - Whether employer had custody or control of computer from which publication originated - Interpretation of word 'originates' - Whether 'originates' refers to device of creation or device of dissemination - Whether claimant proved publication originated from particular laptop supplied by employer - Whether there was forensic evidence to support claim - Whether presumption successfully invoked - Evidence Act 1950, s. 114A(3)

TORT: Defamation - Publication - Digital publication - Online dissemination via social media and WhatsApp - Statutory presumption under s. 114A(3) of Evidence Act 1950 - Origin and proof of origin of poison pen letter - Nexus between publication and specific device under alleged tortfeasor's custody or control - Whether mere authorship or creation of digital file sufficient to fix liability on owner of device

 

Supang Lian JCA
Choo Kah Sing JCA
Shahnaz Sulaiman JCA

  • For the appellant - Edward Kuruvilla; M/s Kuruvilla, Yeoh & Benjamin
  • For the respondent - HR Dipendra & Tong Joe Jye; M/s Ramesh Dipendra Jeremiah Law

An Erinford injunction should be granted to maintain the status quo where the injunction is necessary to ensure that if the appeal succeeds, the victory is not rendered academic or hollow, ie, nugatory. The court must adopt the course that carries the lower risk of injustice. This involves a balance of convenience where: (i) the appeal is not frivolous; (ii) the injunction does not inflict greater hardship on the defendant than the refusal would on the plaintiff; and (iii) damages are an inadequate or unsuitable remedy for the harm caused.
Malaysian Communications And Multimedia Commission v. Persons Unknown & Ors [2026] 5 CLJ 298 [HC]

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Injunction - Erinford injunction - Application for Erinford injunction to preserve status quo pending appeal - Refusal of mandatory injunction for closure of Telegram channels at first instance - Publication of false, menacing, and offensive content against Government and royal institution - Whether appeal would be rendered nugatory if injunction not granted - Whether greater risk of injustice in refusing application - Whether damages adequate and suitable remedy for harm caused - Whether public interest outweighed private interest

 

 

Mahazan Mat Taib J

  • For the plaintiff - Sankara Nair & Wong Guo Jin; M/s S N Nair & Partners
  • For the 3rd defendant - Abd Shukor Ahmad & Daniel Bock Jr Wei; M/s Shukor Baljit & Partners

In an application for taxation of bills of costs, once the invoices issued by the legal firm are confirmed to be detailed bills of costs and not gross sum bills, s. 121(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 ('LPA') is rendered inapplicable. The statutory time periods in the LPA must be strictly adhered to, and where no cogent reasons are provided for the delay in the application for taxation, the court would not exercise its inherent discretion to order taxation. Such application is bound to fail.
RHB Trustees Bhd v. Messrs Rosley Zechariah Advocates & Solicitors & Anor [2026] 5 CLJ 317 [HC]

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CIVIL PROCEDURE: Bill of costs - Taxation - Application for - Legal fees quoted close to hearing at Federal Court - Challenge by client - Whether exorbitant fees - Whether legal fees agreed upon - Whether client raised objection on fees quoted prior to hearing - Whether invoices sent were detailed bills of cost and not gross sum bills - Whether application time-barred - Whether court has inherent jurisdiction to order taxation - Whether issue of taxation applied to counsel not directly instructed on issues at hand - Legal Profession Act 1976, ss. 121(1), (2), 124, 126 & 128

LEGAL PROFESSION: Bill of costs - Taxation - Application for - Legal fees quoted close to hearing at Federal Court - Challenge by client - Whether exorbitant fees - Whether legal fees agreed upon - Whether client raised objection on fees quoted prior to hearing - Whether invoices sent were detailed bills of cost and not gross sum bills - Whether application time-barred - Whether court has inherent jurisdiction to order taxation - Whether issue of taxation applied to counsel not directly instructed on issues at hand - Legal Profession Act 1976, ss. 121(1), (2), 124, 126 & 128

 

Aliza Sulaiman J

  • For the plaintiff - Anantha Krishnan; M/s Anantha Krishnan
  • For the 1st defendant - Renu Zechariah & Cheryl Kwan Chui Yi; M/s Rosley Zechariah
  • For the 2nd defendant - Vinoshini Saminathan; M/s Isharidah Ho Chong & Menon

 


ARTICLES

LNS Article(s)

  1. 'JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP: NAVIGATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WITH HUMAN WISDOM' KEYNOTE LECTURE AT THE JUDICIAL EXECUTIVE PROGRAMME JUDICIAL EXECUTIVE PROGRAMME 2025+ [Read excerpt]
    by Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon* [2026] CLJU(A) liii

  2. [2026] CLJU(A) liii
    SINGAPORE

    'JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP: NAVIGATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WITH HUMAN WISDOM'

    KEYNOTE LECTURE AT THE JUDICIAL EXECUTIVE PROGRAMME JUDICIAL EXECUTIVE PROGRAMME 2025+


    by
    Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon*

    I. Introduction

    1. I am especially delighted to address this combined audience of participants from the Judicial Executive Programme ("JEP") and the Judicial Perspectives Programme.

    2. To the international participants of the JEP, a particularly warm welcome to Singapore. The JEP is the Singapore Judicial College's ("College") flagship executive leadership programme that we open to the international community of judges as part of our commitment to promoting judicial dialogue and the bonds of judicial families. We curated this out of the need for a programme that brings together current and aspiring judicial leaders from around the world, and which serves as a platform for mutual exchange. Over the years, we have been improving and upgrading the programme, and it has been a very helpful forum for these purposes. The other great draw of the JEP is the opportunity to learn from and build networks with like-minded individuals from around the world. I was therefore delighted to hear that we have, this year, a terrific cohort of 29 judges and court leaders from 11 jurisdictions across Africa, Asia and the Americas.[1] Each of you brings unique and much-valued perspectives on what it means to be a judicial leader, and I very much look forward to hearing from you during the discussion to follow.

    . . .

    +Reproduced with permission of the Singapore Courts: https://www.judiciary.gov.sg/news-and-resources/news/news-details/chief-justice-sundaresh-menon--keynote-lecture-at-the-judicial-executive-programme.

    *Supreme Court of Singapore.

  3. SECTION 112 STATEMENT OF THE OFFERED WITNESS: THE PROSECUTION'S DUTY TOWARDS COURT AND DEFENCE [Read excerpt]
    by Subash Ramasamy* [2026] CLJU(A) liv

  4. [2026] CLJU(A) liv
    MALAYSIA

    SECTION 112 STATEMENT OF THE OFFERED WITNESS:
    THE PROSECUTION'S DUTY TOWARDS COURT AND DEFENCE


    by
    Subash Ramasamy*

    THE SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE

    One of the most important questions in a criminal trial is whether the prosecution is obliged to hand over the statement of the offered witness, recorded under section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to the accused. This article intends to explore the extent to which the section 112 statement must be delivered to the defence once the witnesses are offered to the defence.

    THE WISE OBSERVATION

    Back in 1951, it was noted in Tee Lee Tong v. Rex[1] that:

    "It must be borne in mind, however, that the fact that the prosecution has taken statements from witnesses and has subpoenaed them may place the accused in an awkward position if suddenly faced with the offer of a witness, whose statement he has never seen. This difficulty could probably be met in most cases by supplying to the accused a copy of the statements of the witnesses not called by the prosecution. Where this course appears undesirable or for any other reason has not been followed the Court would no doubt in a proper case grant an adjournment to enable the accused to take statements from such witnesses."

    . . .

    *Advocate & Solicitor, High Court Malaya.

LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTS

Principal Acts

Number Title In force from Repealed Superseded
ACT 882 Government Procurement Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -
ACT 881 International Settlement Agreements Resulting From Mediation Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -
ACT 880 Capitation Grant Act 2026 1 April 2026 - -
ACT 879 Auctioneers Act 1914 (Revised–2026) 25 March 2026 revised edition pursuant to paragraph 6(1)(xxiii) of the Revision of Laws Act 1968 [Act 1]; Revised up to 20 March 2026; First enacted in 1914 as Sabah Ordinance No 1 of 1914; First Revision - 1936 (No 1 of 1914 wef 31 December 1936); Second Revision - 1953 (Cap 9 wef 30 June 1953) - -
ACT 878 Legal Aid and Public Defence Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -

Amending Acts

Number Title In force from Principal/Amending Act No
ACT A1793 Environmental Quality (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 127
ACT A1792 Supplementary Supply (2025) Act 2026 1 May 2026  
ACT A1791 Passports (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 150
ACT A1790 Immigration (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 155
ACT A1789 Rukun Tetangga (Amendment) Act 2026 1 April 2026 [PU(B) 90/2026] ACT 751

PU(A)

Number Title Date of Publication In force from Principal/ Amending Act No
PU(A) 180/2026 Entertainments Duty (Exemption) (No. 20) Order 2026 29 April 2026 30 April 2026 ACT 103
PU(A) 179/2026 Entertainments Duty (Exemption) (No. 19) Order 2026 29 April 2026 30 April 2026 ACT 103
PU(A) 178/2026 Lembaga Kemajuan Ikan Malaysia (Fisheries Complexes, Fisheries Harbours and Fisheries Landing Jetties) (Amendment) Rules 2026 28 April 2026 29 April 2026 PU(A) 103/2010
PU(A) 177/2026 Entertainments Duty (Exemption) (No. 18) Order 2026 3 April 2026 4 April 2026 ACT 103
PU(A) 176/2026 Fees (Digital Advertisement) (Department of Broadcasting Malaysia) Order 2026 14 April 2026 20 April 2026 ACT 209

PU(B)

Number Title Date of Publication In force from Principal/ Amending Act No
PU(B) 178/2026 Notice To Third Parties 20 May 2026 21 May 2026 ACT 613
PU(B) 177/2026 Notification of Value of Crude Palm Oil Under Section 12 20 May 2026 1 June 2026 to 30 June 2026 ACT 235
PU(B) 176/2026 Notification of Value of Crude Petroleum Oil Under Section 12 14 May 2026 15 May 2026 to 28 May 2026 ACT 235
PU(B) 175/2026 Notice Under Section 70 14 May 2026 15 May 2026 ACT 333
PU(B) 174/2026 Notice To Third Parties 13 May 2026 14 May 2026 ACT 613

Legislation Alert

Updated

Act/Principal No. Title Amended by In force from Section amended
AKTA 27 Akta Agensi Persendirian 1971 AKTA A1782 28 April 2026 [PU(B) 147/2026] Seksyen 3, 5, 9, 13 and 18A
ACT 27 Private Agencies Act 1971 ACT A1782 28 April 2026 [PU(B) 147/2026] Sections 3, 5, 9, 13 and 18A
ACT 206 Arms Act 1960 (Revised 1978) PU(A) 94/2026 21 February 2026 Second Schedule
ACT 751 Rukun Tetangga Act 2012 ACT A1789 1 April 2026 [PU(B) 90/2026] Sections 2, 3, 7, 9, 15, 17 and 23
AKTA 751 Akta Rukun Tetangga 2012 AKTA A1789 1 April 2026 [PU(B) 90/2026] Seksyen 2, 3, 7, 9, 15, 17 dan 23

Revoked

Act/Principal No. Title Revoked by In force from
PU(A) 173/2022 Perintah Duti Eksais (Kenderaan Bermotor) (Bayaran) 2022 PU(A) 44/2026 1 Februari 2026
PU(A) 173/2022 Excise Duties (Motor Vehicles) (Payment) Order 2022 PU(A) 44/2026 1 February 2026
PU(A) 317/2025 Federal Roads (East Klang Valley Expressway) Order 2025 PU(A) 32/2026 26 January 2026
PU(A) 384/2021 Customs (Anti-Dumping Duties) (Administrative Review) (No. 3) Order 2021 PU(A) 24/2026 15 January 2026 to 8 October 2026
PU(A) 312/2021 Customs (Anti-Dumping Duties) (Administrative Review) (No. 2) Order 2021 PU(A) 23/2026 15 January 2026 to 19 July 2026

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