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Issue #39/2026
24 September 2026

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CASE SPOTLIGHTS

WEE KU WING v. AMIRA UMAIRA TENG ABDULLAH [2026] 8 CLJ 687
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
SUPANG LIAN JCA
SHAHNAZ SULAIMAN JCA
AMARJEET SINGH SERJIT SINGH JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: D-01(NCVC)(A)-550-08-2024]
23 JULY 2026

(i) The application of the Distribution Act 1958 ('DA') is determined by the religion of the deceased rather than that of the beneficiary. A legitimate child, regardless of his/her religious status, remains entitled to inherit under the DA where the estate is that of a non-Muslim deceased, as the DA contains no provision excluding a Muslim child from inheriting a non-Muslim parent's estate; (ii) Uncodified religious principles, including hadiths and fatwas, cannot override clear statutory provisions enacted by Parliament or the State Legislatures. In matters concerning the distribution of a non-Muslim deceased's estate, the civil courts are bound to apply the relevant written law, namely the DA, as the subject matter falls within civil succession and not Islamic personal law.

SUCCESSION: Distribution of estate - Entitlement - Intestate estate of non-Muslim deceased - Muslim child, being legitimate child of deceased, excluded as beneficiary of deceased's estate - Whether Distribution Act 1958 ('DA') precluded Muslim child from inheriting non-Muslim deceased parent's estate - Whether applicability of DA determined by religion of deceased or beneficiary - Whether exclusion of beneficiary from small estate proceedings rendered distribution order liable to be set aside - Whether other beneficiaries entitled to be heard in application to set aside distribution order

ISLAMIC LAW: Legislation - Validity - Hadith and fatwa - Hadith and fatwa issued by Mufti of Federal Territories stating Muslims could not inherit from non-Muslims and vice versa - Whether hadith and fatwa codified into Malaysian law - Whether uncodified religious principles could override clear statutory provisions enacted by Parliament - Whether such principles applicable in civil proceedings concerning distribution of non-Muslim deceased's estate


JUDICIAL QUOTES

“And I further order that the defendants shall pay the plaintiff general damages of RM600,000, being RM15,000 per day for 40 days of unlawful detention, and exemplary damages of RM75,000. Interest at 5% per annum on the general and exemplary damages shall run from the date of filing of the writ on 10 January 2023 until the date of full realisation.”

“This case is a sobering reminder of how easily fundamental liberties can be extinguished by institutional carelessness or, worse, by institutional arrogance.”

“Simon Adavize Momoh came to Malaysia lawfully. He married a Malaysian and built a life here, raising two children. He committed a traffic offence, for which he was tried, convicted, and punished: one day in prison and a fine of RM12,000. He paid in full. What happened next should not have happened. He was held for 40 more days under a legal framework that did not apply to him, without ever being brought before a judge or a Magistrate, under the cover of a COVID-19 story that was not true, and cut off from his family and his lawyer. The law was clear. The Constitution was clear. Both were ignored.” - Per Jamhirah Ali in Simon Adavize Momoh v. Ketua Pengarah, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia & Ors [2026] CLJU 2984

LATEST CASES

Legal Network Series

[2026] CLJU 104

PATRICK PAUL RAJ v. YEOGASH NARAYANAN

The act of transferring property into a party's name is a strong indicative of an intention to effect a disposition of ownership and is therefore wholly inconsistent with a mere loan arrangement. The conduct of the subsequent owner in servicing a bank loan relating to the property while the former owner relinquished legal title of the said property shows that the subsequent owner has assumed the obligations ordinarily associated with ownership.

LAND LAW: Ownership - Claim for - Vacant possession - Property transferred to plaintiff - Informal sale arrangement - Allegation that monies advanced was for personal loan - Whether monies paid by plaintiff constituted payment for purchase of property - Whether property transferred to plaintiff merely as part of loan arrangement - Whether there was any documentary evidence to support assertion that payments were intended to constitute a loan - Whether plaintiff assumed obligations ordinarily associated with ownership

  • For the plaintiff - John Aloysius Skelchy & Ahmad Aiman Farique Rusli; M/s James Monteiro
  • For the defendant - In Person

[2026] CLJU 107

ASIA PACIFIC EDUCATION HOLDINGS SDN BHD v. KETUA PENGARAH HASIL DALAM NEGERI

Existence of a statutory right of appeal under s. 18 of the Real Property Gains Tax Act 1976 does not operate as an absolute bar to judicial review. Mere availability of a statutory appeal does not render a judicial review application an abuse of process.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Principles and procedures - Application to quash notice of assessment issued by Director General of Inland Revenue ('DGIR') - Jurisdiction - Domestic remedy - Appeal mechanism under s. 18 of Real Property Gains Tax Act 1976 - Whether application for judicial review was properly maintainable - Whether DGIR's approach raised a prima facie issue of reliance on an irrelevant consideration and misdirection in law going to jurisdiction - Whether threshold requirements for judicial review were met

  • For the appellant - Vijey M Krishnan & William Wong; M/s Raja, Darryl & Loh
  • For the respondent - Ashrina Ramzan Ali, Surani Che Ismail & Nik Amyrah Syarinie Mohd Dusuki; Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia

[2026] CLJU 112

PP v. MOHAMAD RASHID SAHUTI

Inferences of knowledge is derived from the surrounding circumstances of the case. The act of an accused carrying a sling bag with impugned drugs in it together with his identity card and his restless and aggressive behaviour when the raiding officer introduced himself as a police clearly shows that the accused has knowledge of the impugned drugs.

CRIMINAL LAW: Dangerous drugs - Trafficking - Drugs were discovered from a sling bag carried by accused - Accused alone when police raided scene of incident - Investigating officer not called due to poor health condition - Accused defensive during raid - Whether accused so situated with drugs that he had power to deal with drugs - Whether accused had custody and control and knowledge of impugned drugs - Whether accused had possession of dangerous drugs

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Defence - Denial - Allegation that raiding officer framed accused - Trafficking dangerous drugs - Allegation that prosecution failed to exclude possibility of access by others - Whether defence of involvement of other characters an afterthought - Whether evidence of defence witnesses lacked truthfulness - Whether presumption under s. 37(da) of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 rebutted - Whether accused raised any reasonable doubt on prosecution's case

  • For the prosecution - Mohd Firdaous Mohamed Idris, Deputy Public Prosecutor
  • For the accused - Shahrul Syazwan Salehin & Muhammad Firdaus Danial Tan

[2026] CLJU 127

PP v. SHATHIS RAO KRISHNAN & ANOR

The presumption under s. 135(2) of the Customs Act 1967 does not arise automatically upon mere physical presence of goods, but only after the prosecution has first proved the foundational elements of possession and control in law. The element of possession is not established when contents of the alleged uncustomed goods were not verified in the presence of the accused, and when there were material inconsistencies between the raiding and investigating officers as to how and when the alleged uncustomed status of the goods was ascertained. Where the foundational facts remain in doubt, the statutory presumption under the said s. 135(2) cannot be used to fill evidential gaps in the prosecution's case.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal against acquittal and discharge - Appeal by prosecution - Charge under s. 135(1)(d) of Customs Act 1967 and s. 74(1)(a) of Excise Act 1976 - Prosecution's case was confined to licensing irregularities - Status of alleged uncustomed goods was not ascertained in presence of accused - Whether trial judge had erred in law or fact in finding that prosecution failed to establish possession and knowledge - Whether trial judge had erred in declining to invoke statutory presumption under s. 135(2) of Customs Act 1967 - Whether trial judge had erred in finding that integrity and chain of custody of seized items were not proven - Whether prosecution failed to establish prima facie case on essential elements of possession, knowledge, and evidential integrity

  • For the appellant - Syazwani Zawawi
  • For the respondents - T. Manoharan; M/s Ong & Partners

[2026] CLJU 140

FNC CORPORATE PLT & ANOR v. EZHAM ABD WAHID

In defamation cases, the onus of proving publication lies firmly on the plaintiff. Where the alleged defamatory words are published in an online platform, the plaintiff must prove that the account in which the alleged defamatory words were published is owned or controlled by the defendant at the material time. In cases where the identity of the publisher is disputed, and the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, then the Court must be satisfied that there is an irresistible conclusion that the defendant published the words. The circumstances must form a chain so comprehensive that there is no escaping the conclusion that the defendant, and no one else, committed the tort.

TORT: Defamation - Libel - Online publication - Series of messages published in telegram and facebookFacebook - Allegations concerning plaintiff's conduct in managing commissions for insurance agents - Whether defendant had business association with plaintiff and its agents - Whether impugned words in substance concerned an allegation that plaintiff wrongfully withheld commission or payments - Whether defendant was publisher of impugned words proven - Whether presumption under s. 114A of Evidence Act 1950 was applicable - Whether prima facie case of defamation established

  • For the plaintiffs - Bharathi Sinnathamby; M/s Bharathi & Associates
  • For the defendant - Amalia Marsita Hamdan; M/s Amalia Rose Masuri The Law Office

CLJ 2026 Volume 8 (Part 4)

(i) Where an agreement provides a precise, conditional timeframe for a party to exercise a contractual option following a lawful termination for default, that option automatically lapses if it is not exercised within the strictly stipulated contractual terms. Such a time-bound right cannot be retroactively created, extended, or revived through court pleadings subsequent to its expiration, thereby extinguishing any derivative entitlement to a refund of milestone payments; (ii) While accrued liquidated damages are recoverable up to the point of termination, overlapping delay claims covering identical periods will be struck down to prevent an impermissible double recovery; (iii) In a fixed-price, milestone-based contract, a contractor's right to payment is strictly contingent upon the absolute completion and sign-off of each discrete contractual milestone; consequently, where a termination for default is lawful, uncompleted milestone works are rendered immaterial, and claims for wasted expenditure under s. 74 of the Contracts Act 1950 must be dismissed.
Liberty Technology Resources Sdn Bhd v. Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia [2026] 8 CLJ 493 [CA]

CONTRACT: Termination - Agreement - Delay and non-performance - Project to develop, configure, and implement comprehensive system for administration of companies - Failure to complete project within stipulated timeframe - Notice of default issued affording 30 days to rectify - Whether there was failure to remedy default within prescribed remedy period - Whether contract lawfully terminated

CONTRACT: Breach - Agreement - Delay and non-performance - Project to develop, configure, and implement comprehensive system for administration of companies - Failure to complete project within stipulated timeframe - Termination of contract - Whether respondent entitled to refund of milestone payments - Whether there was double recovery of liquidated ascertained damages ('LAD') - Whether LAD award ought to be reduced - Legal effect of lawful termination on partially completed milestones - Whether appellant entitled to claim for work done - Whether appellant entitled to recover third-party software fees

 

 

Nazlan Mohd Ghazali FCJ
Faizah Jamaludin JCA
Ismail Brahim JCA

  • For the appellants - Robert Low, Goik Kenwayne, Foong Kar Yee, Karen Yong & Jessy Wan; M/s Dennis Nik & Wong
  • For the respondents - Chong Boon Leong, Bryan Wang Yung, Michelle Ng Li Wen & Abd Azim Abd Razak; M/s Rahmat Lim & Partners

While the High Court possesses the discretionary power, under O. 34 r. 1(3) of the Rules of Court 2012, to strike out an action for non-compliance with pre-trial case management directions, this ultimate sanction must be strictly proportionate to the nature and consequences of the breach. The court must explicitly evaluate factors of proportionality, including, inter alia, the availability of lesser sanctions, the absence of prior warnings or 'unless orders,' and whether a fair trial remains achievable, before shutting a party out of the justice system.
Ng Bee Hui & Ors v. Nanopac Innovation Ltd & Ors [2026] 8 CLJ 511 [CA]

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Case management - Pre-trial case management - Long history of non-compliance with directions of High Court despite many hearing dates fixed and adjourned - Failure to file witness statements on time - High Court struck out claims - Whether power under O. 34 r. 1(3) of Rules of Court 2012 includes dismissing action - Whether sanction proportionate to breach - Whether lesser sanctions or strict terms ought to be considered - Whether there was prejudice

 

 

Mohamed Zaini Mazlan JCA
Faizah Jamaludin JCA
Aliza Sulaiman JCA

  • For the appellants - Chew Chun Wei, Phang Soon Mun & Wong Chen Jie; M/s CP Ngoo & Co
  • For the 1st, 2nd, 3rd & 4th respondents - Fredric Kong Yat Sen; M/s SP Ng & Assocs
  • For the 6th respondent - Krishnaaveni Muniandy; M/s Ho-Noecker & Pragasam

(i) A cross-appeal must be directly connected to or arise from the substance of the appellant's notice of appeal. Where an appellant appeals against the entirety of the court's decision, a cross-appeal by the respondent seeking to vary the quantum, as in this case, is validly connected and maintainable without requiring a separate notice of appeal; (ii) A private medical institution cannot evade liability for the negligence of its attending doctors by merely classifying them as independent contractors, particularly where the hospital derives a direct financial and institutional benefit from their services; (iii) By virtue of the saving provisions under s. 6 of the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 2019, claims instituted prior to 1 September 2019 remain governed by the pre-amended s. 28A of the Civil Law Act 1956. Consequently, a claimant who was 56 years old at the time of filing is statutorily barred from claiming loss of future earnings under the former 55-year statutory threshold.
Pusat Pakar Tawakal Sdn Bhd v. Datin Nor Rizam Abdul Wahab & Ors And Other Appeals [2026] 8 CLJ 526 [CA]

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TORT: Negligence - Medical negligence - Standard of care - Surgical procedure and post-operative management - Patient underwent elective nasal surgery and suffered hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy resulting in vegetative state and eventual death - Premature discharge from recovery room to ward - Failure to monitor respiratory status - Delayed emergency response and incorrect intubation during code blue resuscitation - Whether there was absence of necessary emergency equipment in ward - Whether operating surgeon, anaesthesiologist, and private hospital owed duty of care - Whether there was non-delegable duty of care of private medical institution

TORT: Negligence - Medical negligence - Claim for damages - Claim by estate - Loss of earnings - Claimant 56 years old at time action commenced - Claim for general and special, pre-trial, and aggravated damages - Whether entitled to loss of earning capacity - Whether statutory bar applied - Whether maintainable where injured victim died prior to conclusion of trial - Civil Law Act 1956, s. 7(3A)

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Appeals - Cross-appeal - Claim premised on tort of negligence - Medical negligence - Appeal against decision of High Court - One party appealed while another cross-appealed - Whether cross-appeal dealt with issues beyond scope of notices of appeal - Whether cross-appeal validly connected - Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994

 

Ravinthran Paramaguru JCA
Azhahari Kamal Ramli JCA
Ahmad Fairuz Zainol Abidin JCA

(Civil Appeal No: W-02(NCvC)(W)-903-05-2024)
  • For the appellant - Felix Raj & Ahmad Aizek Busu; Felix Raj Chambers
  • For the 1st respondent - Manmohan S Dhilion, Aaika Zulaika Mohd Yusop, Muhammad Luqman Firdaus Md Yunus & Adrian Ashwin V Balasagaran; PS Ranjan & Co
  • For the 2nd respondent - Navamalar Ganesan & Leena Subramaniam; M/s Anad & Noraini
  • For the 3rd respondent - Barvina Punnusamy & David Timothy; M/s Jayadeep Hari & Jamil
(Civil Appeal No: W-02(NCvC)(W)-932-06-2024)
  • For the appellant - Navamalar Ganesan & Leena Subramaniam; M/s Anad & Noraini
  • For the 1st respondent - Manmohan S Dhillon, Aaika Zulaika Mohd Yusop, Muhammad Luqman Firdaus Md Yunus & Adrian Ashwin V Balasagaran; M/s PS Ranjan & Co
  • For the 2nd respondent - Felix Raj & Ahmad Aizek Busu; M/s Felix Raj Chambers
  • For the 3rd respondent - Barvina Punnusamy & David Timothy; M/s Jayadeep Hari & Jamil
(Civil Appeal No: W-02(NCvC)(W)-933-06-2024)
  • For the appellant - Barvina Punnusamy & David Timothy; M/s Jayadeep Hari & Jamil
  • For the 1st respondent - Manmohan S Dhillon, Aaika Zulaika Mohd Yusop, Muhammad Luqman Firdaus Md Yunus & Adrian Ashwin V Balasagaran; M/s PS Ran Jan & Co
  • For the 2nd respondent - Felix Raj & Ahmad Aizek Busu; M/s Felix Raj Chambers
  • For the 3rd respondent - Navamalar Ganesan & Leena Subramaniam; M/s Anad & Noraini

(i) A local planning authority lacks the statutory power, under ss. 5 and 6 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1976, to grant planning permission for land reclamation within the territorial sea. This is because the territorial sea along with its seabed/subsoil, is owned by the Federal Government and does not constitute part of the local planning authority's territorial jurisdiction area; (ii) The lack of objection by the Attorney General's Chambers to the grant of leave, or the absence of an appeal against such grant, cannot cure a time-barred judicial review application; the parties' consent, waiver, or conduct cannot confer substantive jurisdiction on a court to hear a matter filed out of time.
Zakaria Ismail & Ors v. Pengarah Jabatan Perancangan Bandar Dan Desa Pulau Pinang & Ors [2026] 8 CLJ 561 [CA]

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Leave - Absence of objection by Attorney General's Chambers ('AGC') to leave prayer - Land reclamation from territorial sea - Planning permission for reclamation announced via public press statement by Chief Minister - Objection by local fishermen and environmental groups to project - Challenge against planning permission - Whether there was failure to appeal against grant of leave - Whether absence of objection by AGC could confer jurisdiction on High Court to hear time-barred substantive application - Rules of Court 2012, O. 53 r. 3(6)

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judicial review - Application for - Time limitation and extension of time - Commencement of time - Land reclamation from territorial sea - Planning permission for reclamation announced via public press statement by Chief Minister - Objection by local fishermen and environmental groups to project - Challenge against planning permission - Whether time began to run from date of press statement - Whether application filed out of time - Rules of Court 2012, O. 53 r. 3(6)

LOCAL GOVERNMENT: Local Authority - Town planning - Jurisdiction - Land reclamation from territorial sea - State Government planned massive land reclamation project - Local planning authority granted planning permission for reclamation - Whether local planning authority had power to regulate, control, and plan development of territorial sea owned by Federal Government - Town and Country Planning Act 1976, ss. 5(1), (2), 6(1)(a) & 22(3) - Territorial Sea Act 2012, s. 1(2)

Azimah Omar FCJ
Wong Kian Kheong JCA
Ismail Brahim JCA

  • For the appellants - M Thayalan, Meenakshi Raman, Jessica Ram Binwani, Theivanai Amarthalingam & A Lalith Kumar; M/s Theiva Lingam
  • For the 1st respondent - Aliza Jamaluddin; SFC & Amirul Hisyam Azedi Noor; FC
  • For the 2nd & 3rd respondents - Wan Nor Sakina Saad, Charanjit Singh Mahinder Singh & Siti Zuhairah Zulkifli; AG's Chambers
  • For the 4th & 5th respondents - Yeoh Cho Kheong & Chai Chin Wuen; M/s Ranjit Singh & Yeoh

(i) In complex medical negligence claims, lay testimony and non-contemporaneous photographic evidence alone are legally insufficient to establish a breach of the standard of care or clinical misconduct. In the case at hand, the failure to adduce independent expert medical evidence to define the requisite benchmark of care meant that the plaintiff failed to establish a case in law, thereby justifying the success of the defendant's submission of 'no case to answer'; (ii) A significant, unexplained delay by a patient, in acting upon a specialist medical referral issued by a practitioner, constitutes a novus actus interveniens, thereby breaking the chain of causation and severing the legal nexus between the practitioner's initial management and the alleged injury.
AB v. Ilham Fitri Murad & Ors [2026] 8 CLJ 594 [HC]

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TORT: Negligence - Medical negligence - Circumcision procedure - Minor claimant suffered persistent bleeding, delayed healing and fibrous layer obstructing urinary outlet - Claim against medical assistants, registered medical practitioner, and clinic - Failure of claimant to call independent expert medical witness - Alleged tortfeasors submitted no case to answer - Whether expert medical evidence mandatory to establish breach of standard of care and clinical conclusions - Whether lay testimonies and non-contemporaneous photographs legally sufficient - Whether medical negligence established

TORT: Negligence - Res ipsa loquitur - Application of - Circumcision procedure - Minor claimant suffered persistent bleeding, delayed healing, and fibrous layer obstructing urinary outlet - Claim against medical assistants, registered medical practitioner, and clinic - Allegations of unsterile physical environment and contaminated surgical instruments - Identical procedures performed successfully on others at same premises with same facilities - Whether res ipsa loquitur shifted legal burden of proof under s. 101 of Evidence Act 1950 - Whether mere occurrence of adverse medical outcome or mishap sufficient to invoke res ipsa loquitur

TORT: Negligence - Causation - Chain of causation - Novus actus interveniens - Circumcision procedure - Minor suffered persistent bleeding, delayed healing, and fibrous layer obstructing urinary outlet - Claim against medical assistants, registered medical practitioner, and clinic - Medical practitioner recommended specialist referral - Delay of 44 days in acting upon referral - Whether protracted inaction by patient broke chain of causation - Whether legal nexus between practitioner's diagnosis and alleged injury dispelled

EVIDENCE: Burden of proof - Medical negligence - Standard of care - Circumcision procedure - Minor claimant suffered persistent bleeding, delayed healing, and fibrous layer obstructing urinary outlet - Claim against medical assistants, registered medical practitioner, and clinic - Failure of claimant to call independent medical expert witness - Whether adverse inference under s. 114(g) of Evidence Act 1950 triggered

 

Johan Lee Kien How J

  • For the plaintiff - Brijnandan Singh Bhar Gurcharan Singh; M/s Brijnandan Singh Bhar & Co
  • For the defendants - Muhamad Aiman Mohd Nahzeri; M/s Omayah Nawal & Partners

The court may grant a bankrupt's discharge, under s. 33(3) of the Insolvency Act 1967, where the continuation of the bankruptcy serves no practical purpose, particularly when a massive debt stems from a corporate guarantee for a bona fide business venture rather than personal extravagance. In balancing commercial morality against individual rehabilitation, the court must heavily weigh a bankrupt's advanced age, severe illness, retiree status, and consistent compliance with stipulated monthly payments. Absent a criminal conviction or a proven bankruptcy offence under the Act, the total quantum repaid is immaterial. Furthermore, the court must accord significant deference to the Director General of Insolvency's lack of objection and thorough investigations showing no hidden assets or misconduct. A creditor cannot successfully oppose a discharge based on minor asset valuation uncertainties or on defaults exacerbated by the creditor's own undue administrative delays.
Sia Beng Kim v. Malayan Banking Bhd [2026] 8 CLJ 617 [HC]

BANKRUPTCY: Discharge - Application for - Whether judgment debtor committed offence under Insolvency Act 1967 relevant to discharge application - Whether Director General of Insolvency's report insufficient, incomplete, and inaccurate - Consideration of bankrupt's age, financial standing and inability to pay - Whether bankruptcy arose from personal debt or from acting as guarantor for bona fide business venture of borrower - Whether continuation of bankruptcy served no useful purpose - Whether there were relevant circumstances favouring discharge - Whether discharge ought to be granted - Insolvency Act 1967, ss. 33(3)

 

 

Wong Mee Ling J

  • For the judgment debtor - Mohan Sankaran; M/s Mohan Sankaran & Assocs
  • For the judgment creditor - Amni Humaira Rosma; M/s Shook Lin & Bok
  • For the Insolvency Department - Kodesviary Ramanaidu; FC

 


ARTICLES

CLJ Article(s)

  1. WHAT DOES THE BENCH EXPECT FROM YOUNG COUNSEL [Read excerpt]
    Speech By YAA Chief Justice Of Malaysia Tun Wan Ahmad Farid Wan Salleh At The East Coast National Young Lawyers Conference Organised By The State Bar Of Kelantan Perdana Hotel, Kota Bharu, On 1 August 2026 [2026] 8 CLJ(A) xi

  2. [2026] 8 CLJ(A) xi
    MALAYSIA

    WHAT DOES THE BENCH EXPECT FROM YOUNG COUNSEL

    Speech By YAA Chief Justice Of Malaysia Tun Wan Ahmad Farid Wan Salleh At The East Coast National Young Lawyers Conference Organised By The State Bar Of Kelantan Perdana Hotel Kota Bharu On 1 August 2026

    Assalamualaikum and a very good evening.

    Let me begin by extending my sincere gratitude to the Kelantan Bar Committee for this invitation to be here.

    When I was asked to speak on 'What the Bench Expects from Young Counsel', my first thought was to make this a very short speech. But the problem is, I have come all the way from Putrajaya, having spending my night in Kuantan en route. And to think that some of you have travelled from Pahang and Terengganu, I believe that you deserve a longer speech.

    Since this is the final segment of the programme, please try not to sleep.

    Standing at the Bar as a young lawyer can feel like walking into a lion's den, armed only with a bundle of authorities and a prayer. I know that feeling. I have been there. We on the Bench know that feeling. But today, I want to let you in on a judicial secret, straight from the horse's mouth: the Bench is not your enemy. We never were. We are your partners in our common mission - to achieve justice.

    I can give you this assurance. We do not wake up in the morning plotting how to ruin a counsel's day. In fact, when a young counsel steps up to address the court, well-prepared and clear-headed, the entire courtroom takes a collective sigh of relief. We want you to do well. Because when you do well, our job becomes infinitely easier.

    . . .

  3. BUILDING A REPUTATION THAT LASTS: REFLECTIONS ON WHAT THE BENCH EXPECT FROM YOUNG LAWYERS [Read excerpt]
    by S Saravana Kumar* [2026] 8 CLJ(A) xvii

  4. [2026] 8 CLJ(A) xvii
    MALAYSIA

    BUILDING A REPUTATION THAT LASTS:
    REFLECTIONS ON WHAT THE BENCH EXPECT FROM YOUNG LAWYERS


    by
    S Saravana Kumar*

    Author's Acknowledgement

    On 1 August 2026, I had the privilege of being part of the East Coast National Young Lawyers Conference, which was ably organised by the Kelantan State Bar Committee. The Right Honourable Tun Wan Ahmad Farid bin Wan Salleh, Chief Justice of Malaysia, delivered the closing keynote address entitled "What Does the Bench Expect from Young Counsel?" It was an insightful and deeply practical address that resonated with every member of the audience.

    What struck me most was that His Lordship's observations were not theoretical ideals or abstract principles of advocacy. I find them to be practical lessons forged through his decades of experience, as a Deputy Minister, a lawyer managing his own law firm, a judge for many years and now as the Head of the Malaysian Judiciary. That unique perspective gave his remarks a rare authenticity. They reflected not merely what the law expects of advocates, but what experience has taught one of Malaysia's most distinguished lawyers and judges.

    This article is inspired by His Lordship's address. I do not intend to reproduce or summarise His Lordship's paper. Rather, I hope to reflect upon the themes that His Lordship raised through the lens of my own experience over my 20 years in practice. In doing so, I hope to reinforce some timeless lessons that define not merely competent lawyers but exceptional ones.

    Although the Chief Justice addressed young lawyers, these lessons apply to every member of our profession. Whether one has been called to the Bar for two years or 20 years, the qualities that earn the confidence of judges, clients, and fellow practitioners remain remarkably constant.

    . . .

    * Partner, RDS Partnership sara@rdslawpartners.com

LNS Article(s)

  1. A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STANDING ORDERS OF DEWAN RAKYAT: CATEGORISATION AND FUNCTIONAL INSIGHTS [Read excerpt]
    by Irfan bin Mohamad Fairus[i] Sheila Ramalingam[ii] [2026] CLJU(A) xc

  2. [2026] CLJU(A) xc
    MALAYSIA

    A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STANDING ORDERS OF DEWAN RAKYAT:
    CATEGORISATION AND FUNCTIONAL INSIGHTS


    by
    Irfan bin Mohamad Fairus[i]
    Sheila Ramalingam[ii]

    ABSTRACT

    This study presents a quantitative analysis of the Standing Orders of the Dewan Rakyat, the lower house of the Malaysian Parliament, with the aim of systematically categorising each procedural rule into one of three functional domains: Order of Business, Administration of Proceedings, and Conduct of Members. Motivated by the recent Speaker rulings that reveal a dichotomy between procedural rigidity and interpretive flexibility, the research disaggregates the Standing Orders into their constituent paragraphs and subparagraphs to capture the full scope of their regulatory authority. The findings show that over 60 per cent of the Standing Orders pertain to administrative procedures, while only a small fraction govern Members' conduct. This distribution reflects a structural emphasis on procedural control and helps explain the Speaker's cautious approach to procedural rulings, contrasted with broader discretion in matters of Members' behaviour. By offering a replicable framework for classifying parliamentary rules, this study contributes to the fields of legislative studies and parliamentary governance, and lays the groundwork for future research on institutional authority and procedural reform in Malaysia.

    . . .

    [i] Master of Legal Studies Candidate, Faculty of Law, Universiti Malaya. Email: s2199082@siswa.um.edu.my.

    [ii] Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Universiti Malaya; Advocate & Solicitor, High Court in Malaya (non-practising). Email: sheila.lingam@um.edu.my.

  3. DIGITAL IMPERSONATION IN MALAYSIA: CRIMINAL-LAW GAPS AND THE NEED FOR SPECIFIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK [Read excerpt]
    by Norazuan Amiruddin[i] Manique Cooray[ii] Dennis WK Khong[iii] [2026] CLJU(A) xci

  4. [2026] CLJU(A) xci
    MALAYSIA

    DIGITAL IMPERSONATION IN MALAYSIA: CRIMINAL-LAW GAPS AND THE NEED FOR SPECIFIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK

    by
    Norazuan Amiruddin[i]
    Manique Cooray[ii]
    Dennis WK Khong[iii]

    ABSTRACT

    Digital technology has advanced rapidly, so it is easier to assume or misuse another person's name, image, voice or other identifying attributes. Such activity may facilitate fraud, harassment, reputational damage and various other forms of harm. However, Malaysian criminal law does not currently recognise digital impersonation as an offence. Rather, the relevant law is dispersed across several statutes and generally imposes liability only when impersonation is accompanied by a separate prohibited act or consequence. Although the Online Safety Act 2025 and the Cybercrime Bill 2026 are significant legislative developments, gaps remain where the conduct does not involve inducement, financial or property loss, prohibited communications or unauthorised access to a computer system. This article consequently considers the creation of a specific offence addressing the intentional and unauthorised appropriation of another person's digital identity, accompanied by an intention to cause harm or a sufficient likelihood that harm will occur. The approaches adopted in selected jurisdictions, the article identifies principles that may guide the development of a more coordinated Malaysian legal framework for digital impersonation.

    . . .

    [i] Corresponding author; Faculty of Business, Multimedia University, Jalan Ayer Keroh Lama, 75450 Melaka, Malaysia. Email: norazuan.amiruddin@mmu.edu.my

    [ii] Faculty of Law, Multimedia University, Jalan Ayer Keroh Lama, 75450 Melaka, Malaysia. Email: manique.cooray@mmu.edu.my.

    [iii] Faculty of Law, Multimedia University, Jalan Ayer Keroh Lama, 75450 Melaka, Malaysia. Email: wkkhong@mmu.edu.my.

LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTS

Principal Acts

Number Title In force from Repealed Superseded
ACT 885 National Trust Fund Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -
ACT 884 Johor Bahru-Singapore Rapid Transit System Link Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -
ACT 883 Records (Disposal) (Sarawak) Act 1955 (Revised—2026) 15 June 2026 revised edition pursuant to paragraph 6(1)(xxiii) of the Revision of Laws Act 1968 [Act 1]; Revised up to 5 June 2026; First enacted in 1955 as Sarawak Ordinance No 14 of 1955; First Revision - 1958; First Reprint - 1966 - -
ACT 882 Government Procurement Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -
ACT 881 International Settlement Agreements Resulting From Mediation Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -

Amending Acts

Number Title In force from Principal/Amending Act No
ACT A1797 Witness Protection (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 696
ACT A1796 Employment Insurance System (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 800
ACT A1795 Sexual Offences Against Children (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 792
ACT A1794 Road Transport (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 333
ACT A1793 Environmental Quality (Amendment) Act 2026 31 July 2026 [PU(B) 258/2026] ACT 127

PU(A)

Number Title Date of Publication In force from Principal/ Amending Act No
PU(A) 325/2026 Ministers of The Federal Government (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2026 15 September 2026 1 January 2025 - Subsubparagraphs 2(a)(i) dan 2(c)(i); 14 January 2026 - Subsubparagraphs 2(a)(ii) dan subparagraph 2(h); 1 December 2025 - Subsubparagraph 2(a)(iii); 1 March 2026 - Subsubparagraphs 2(b)(iii) dan 2(b)(v); 1 October 2025 - Subsubparagraph 2(c)(ii); 1 April 2026 - Subparagraph 2(e) dan subsubparagraphs 2(f)(ii) dan 2(f)(iii); 25 Julai 2007 - Subparagraph 2(g) PU(A) 27/2023
PU(A) 324/2026 Development Financial Institutions (Export-Import Bank of Malaysia Berhad) (Exemption) Order 2026 11 September 2026 7 August 2025 ACT 618
PU(A) 323/2026 Development Financial Institutions (Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Berhad) (Exemption) Order 2026 11 September 2026 7 August 2025 ACT 618
PU(A) 322/2026 Constitution of The High Courts (Judicial Commissioner) (No. 2) Order 2026 9 September 2026 10 September 2026 ACT 000
PU(A) 321/2026 Customs Regulations 2019 - Corrigendum 8 September 2026   PU(A) 397/2019

PU(B)

Number Title Date of Publication In force from Principal/ Amending Act No
PU(B) 337/2026 Notification of Value of Crude Petroleum Oil Under Section 12 17 September 2026 18 September 2026 to 1 October 2026 ACT 235
PU(B) 336/2026 Notice To Third Parties 15 September 2026 16 September 2026 ACT 613
PU(B) 335/2026 Appointment of Assistant Registrar of Fishermen's Associations 14 September 2026 4 June 2026 ACT 44
PU(B) 334/2026 Appointment of Lock-Up To Be A Place of Confinement 11 September 2026 12 September 2026 ACT 537; ACT 235; ACT 438; ACT 176; ACT 806; ACT 807
PU(B) 333/2026 Appointment and Revocation of App Ointment of Members of The Consultative Council 11 September 2026 15 September 2026 to 31 March 2029 ACT 872

Legislation Alert

Updated

Act/Principal No. Title Amended by In force from Section amended
AKTA 613 Akta Pencegahan Pengubahan Wang Haram, Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan, Pencegahan Pembiayaan Aktiviti Terhad Dan Hasil Daripada Aktiviti Haram 2001 PU(A) 320/2026 9 September 2026 Jadual Kedua
ACT 613 Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 PU(A) 320/2026 9 September 2026 Second Schedule
PU(A) 397/2019 Peraturan-Peraturan Kastam 2019 PU(A) 310/2026 31 Ogos 2026 Peraturan 26
PU(A) 397/2019 Customs Regulations 2019 PU(A) 310/2026 31 August 2026 Regulation 26
ACT 422 Ports (Privatization) Act 1990 PU(A) 301/2026 1 September 2026 Schedule

Revoked

Act/Principal No. Title Revoked by In force from
PU(A) 93/2026 Perintah Mesin Cetak Dan Penerbitan (Kawalan Hasil Penerbitan Tidak Diingini) (No. 12) 2026 [Dibatalkan Oleh PU(A) 266/2026] PU(A) 266/2026 17 July 2026
PU(A) 93/2026 Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) (No. 12) Order 2026 [Revoked By PU(A) 266/2026] PU(A) 266/2026 17 July 2026
PU(A) 69/2026 Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) Order 2026 [Revoked By PU(A) 265/2026] PU(A) 265/2026 17 July 2026
PU(A) 69/2026 Perintah Mesin Cetak Dan Penerbitan (Kawalan Hasil Penerbitan Tidak Diingini) 2026 [Dibatalkan Oleh PU(A) 265/2026] PU(A) 265/2026 17 Julai 2026
PU(A) 283/2023 Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) (No. 4) Order 2023 [Revoked By PU(A) 264/2026] PU(A) 264/2026 16 July 2026

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