CASE SPOTLIGHTS
HASHIM ABDUL RAZAK & ORS v. PEMBINAAN PD JAYA SDN BHD (IN LIQUIDATION) [2026] 3 CLJ 22
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
MOHD NAZLAN GHAZALI JCA
ALWI ABDUL WAHAB JCA
SHAHNAZ SULAIMAN JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: N-02(IM)(NCVC)-1761-10-2024]
15 DECEMBER 2025
The liquidation or bankruptcy of a party does not, by itself, render an arbitration agreement 'inoperative' or 'incapable of being performed', under s. 10 of the Arbitration Act 2005. If the underlying dispute concerns pre-insolvency contractual rights, rather than unique insolvency-specific remedies, the arbitration clause remains valid and binding.
ARBITRATION: Agreement - Action against party in liquidation - Parties entered into agreement which contained arbitration clause - Allegations that arbitration agreement inoperative or incapable of being performed - Whether liquidation of party rendered arbitration agreement inoperative - Whether dispute regarding pre-insolvency contractual rights remained arbitrable - Whether arbitration survived insolvency - Arbitration Act 2005, ss. 10 & 49
COMPANY LAW: Liquidation - Winding up - Parties entered into agreement which contained arbitration clause - Action against party in liquidation - Whether arbitration constitutes 'action or proceeding' - Whether leave of court obtained - Effect on stay of court proceedings - Companies Act 2016, s. 471
JUDICIAL QUOTES
“The mandatory language of s. 10 of the Arbitration Act 2005 (“AA 2005”) is such that the court could not disregard the terms of the arbitration agreement just because one of the parties thereto was in liquidation. The fact that the debt was not admitted was sufficient for it to come within the meaning of a 'matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement' in s. 10 of the AA 2005, for reference to arbitration. The principle of the court granting a stay of proceedings in favour of arbitration applied equally across the board even when a claimant was already in liquidation and was claiming a disputed debt in litigation and not arbitration.”
“We are of the view that the procedural deadlock caused by the DGI's non-adoption of the arbitration agreement, as raised by the Appellants, does not alter the fundamental character of the underlying dispute as one arising from pre-insolvency rights and obligations.”
“The Appellants' argument that the underlying JVA termination or the Respondent's insolvency renders the arbitration agreement “inoperative” is unsustainable in light of s. 18 of the AA 2005. This section codifies the doctrine of separability, establishing that an arbitration clause is treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract.” - Per Shahnaz Sulaiman JCA in Hashim Abdul Razak & Ors v. Pembinaan PD Jaya Sdn Bhd [2026] 3 CLJ 22; [2025] CLJU 3427
LATEST CASES
Legal Network Series
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[2025] CLJU 251
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THANGAM M PERIYASAMY & ANOR v. ALAGUKKARASAN MOHAN & ANOR
Repayment of monthly bank instalments by a transferee in respect a property amounts to a consideration for transfer of the said property in favour of the transferee. A transfer is valid if it is made voluntarily, out of natural love and affection and in consideration of the monthly instalments paid by the transferee towards the re-payment of loan taken by the transferor. The transferee had acquired indefeasible title to the property when the transferor failed to prove that the property was fraudulently transferred by the transferee into his name.
LAND LAW: Transfer - Validity - Natural love and affection - Allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation - Whether defendants held property on trust for plaintiffs - Whether transfer of property valid - Whether defendant fraudulently misrepresented transfer of property - Whether particulars of fraud properly pleaded - Whether plaintiff knew about transfer of property to defendant - Whether transfer of property made voluntarily out of natural love and affection - Whether monthly instalments paid by defendants towards loan repayment of property amounted to good consideration - Whether plaintiff a bare trustee when property transferred to defendant
LAND LAW: Indefeasibility - Transfer of land - Natural love and affection - Transfer of shares in land from husband to wife - Whether transfer done in accordance with law - Whether transfer of property fraudulent - Whether defendant bona fide purchaser
- For the plaintiffs - Hari Prassaad Rao A Chandrasegaran & Fatimatuz Zahra Suhaimi; M/s Chandra Segaran
- For the defendants - S Dharmanathan Suppiah Saminathan & Ayleswary Bathamanathan; M/s Dharma & Co
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[2025] CLJU 252
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EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF MALAYSIA BERHAD v. IMPIANA SEMINYAK (LABUAN) CO LTD & ANOR
1. Having knowingly accepted the benefits of restructuring arrangements, a principal debtor and guarantor should be estopped from challenging the validity or binding effect of the restructuring arrangements upon them. A principal debtor and guarantor cannot be permitted to adopt inconsistent positions.
2. Section 77 of the Contracts Act 1950 ('CA') defines indemnity as a promise to hold another harmless from loss arising out of a transaction or resulting from the conduct of another. Such a clause offers greater protection to the financial institution in the event of the principal debtor's default, as it imposes liabilities that are more difficult to displace than those arising under a guarantee. Unlike guarantees, indemnity clauses survive the termination or material variation of the underlying contract. Based on s. 78 of the CA, they also provide broader compensation than damages, as they are not necessarily subject to the principle of co-extensiveness, which limits a guarantor's liability to the scope of the principal debtor's obligations.
BANKING: Bank and banking business - Islamic banking - Facility based on tawaruqq - Commodity murabahah - Breach of facility agreement - Failure to comply with facility agreement requirements- Claim for amount due and payable - Claim against principal debtor and guarantor - Whether claim premature - Whether moratorium granted limited to deferral of payment in respect of principal and profit under supplementary letters of offer - Whether defendant continuously breached terms of facility agreement - Whether delay caused waiver of contractual entitlements - Whether plaintiff entitled to impose interest - Whether defendant demonstrated manifest error within certificate of indebtedness - Whether defendant could challenge validity of agreement
- For the plaintiff - Mohd Munzeer Zainul Abidin, Mohammad Zaid Daud @ Daud Yatimee & Muhammad Ali Redha Ahmad Rashidi; M/s Yusfarizal Aziz & Zaid
- For the defendants - Edward Kuruvilla & Rosanne Ignatius Layola; M/s Kuruvilla Yeoh & Benjamin
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[2025] CLJU 289
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MEGALANATHAN MARIAPPAN v. PP
1. When a trial judge calls for an accused to enter his defence, it necessarily means that he has been satisfied that the prosecution has established the elements of the offence that the accused was charged with, which, if unrebutted, would warrant a conviction against the accused. There is no requirement under s. 180 the Criminal Procedure Code for the trial judge to specify reasons or provide grounds for determining a prima facie case.
2. Mere omission of the trial judge in explicitly stating in the judgment that the trial judge had invoked the presumption of possession at the conclusion of the prosecution's case but had only stated so at the end of the defence's case is not detrimental to the accused as the trial judge was not required to inform the accused about the invocation of the presumption when calling for the defence. Ultimately, what matters is that the trial judge was certain in applying the presumption against the accused.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal against conviction - Offence under s. 12(2) of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ('DDA') - Trial judge failed to indicate invocation of presumption under s. 37(d) of DDA at conclusion of prosecution's case - Whether detrimental to accused - Whether trial judge certain in applying presumption against accused - Whether there were appealable errors that warranted appellate intervention
- For the appellant - Paul Krishnaraja Selladurai, Amy Chong & Virochean Stephan Soosai; M/s Paul, Amy Chong & Associates
- For the respondent - Tengku Shahrizam Tuan Lah & Syarifah Khairiah Syed Akmal, Attorney General's Chambers
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[2025] CLJU 294
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LIM POH CHUAN v. LIM POH LEONG
1. Clear evidence of a Chinese customary marriage is required to establish the legitimacy of a marriage. Traditional elements such as betrothal, wedding and tea ceremony, exchange of customary gifts, presence of both families, any wedding feast or celebration, any announcement to the community, and any recognition by the deceased's family is important to establish a legitimacy of marriage in order to claim for inheritance rights over the deceased estate.
2. Sufficient cause is required to revoke letters of administration under s. 34 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959. Letters of administration cannot be revoked in the absence of strong evidence of any misconduct by the administrator of the deceased's estate or when there was no clear proof of inaction of want of diligence, and no evidence of dishonesty or conflict of interest on the part of the administrator.
SUCCESSION: Distribution of estate - Entitlement - Inheritance rights - Claim made long after initial administration of estates - Plaintiff alleged to be biological son of deceased - Whether plaintiff qualified as beneficiary under Distribution Act 1958 - Whether claim barred by limitation - Whether photograph evidencing lunch reception sufficient to establish paternity - Whether plaintiff legitimate child of deceased
SUCCESSION: Letters of administration - Revocation of grant - Whether there was sufficient cause to revoke letter of administration - Whether there was evidence of fraud or impropriety in obtaining letters of administration - Whether administrator discharged duties accordingly - Probate and Administration Act 1959, s. 34
- For the plaintiff - Tan Beng Hong & Wan Sau Shon; M/s Tan Beng Hong
- For the defendant - Kevin Wu Khai Woon & Tan Zu Hao; M/s Kevin Wu & Associates
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[2025] CLJU 253
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NURAZLINA ABD KADIR v. FAUZIAH MOHD YUSOF @ MAT YUSOF
1. Inferen yang bertentangan di bawah s. 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 tidak boleh digunakan secara automatik atau sewenang-wenangnya terhadap defendan jika pihak defendan tidak memanggil saksi-saksi selepas penutupan kes plaintif. Mahkamah masih perlu meneliti adakah saksi-saksi tersebut tidak dipanggil memberi keterangan bagi maksud menyembunyikan keterangan atau menghalang keterangan tersebut daripada dikemukakan. Apabila mahkamah mendapati tiada keterangan yang mencadangkan defendan cuba menyembunyikan atau menghalang saksi-saksi lain daripada mengemukakan keterangan, maka adalah tidak wajar untuk mahkamah menggunakan anggapan di bawah s. 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 terhadap defendan. Penggunaan s. 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 hendaklah ditunjukkan bahawa saksi yang tidak dipanggil itu adalah saksi penting, kehadiran saksi tersebut disembunyikan dan keterangan saksi tersebut tidak ingin dikemukakan yang mana sekiranya ia dikemukakan keterangan itu akan memudaratkan pihak tersebut.
2. Persetujuan pihak-pihak untuk tidak membangkitkan isu tertentu di dalam suatu perbicaraan mahkamah rendah tidak menghalang mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan untuk meneliti dan memutuskan bahawa perbicaraan tersebut adalah tidak teratur mengikut undang-undang. Ini ditambah pula sekiranya perbicaraan tersebut atau dapatan yang dibuat oleh hakim bicara adalah jelas kesilapan yang ketara. Jika mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan mengesampingkan isu perbicaraan yang tidak teratur di bawah undang-undang semata-mata disebabkan ia tidak ditimbulkan oleh pihak-pihak, maka ia adalah satu kegagalan dalam menjalankan amanah oleh mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan daripada mahkamah rendah.
PROSEDUR SIVIL: Rayuan - Rayuan terhadap keputusan mahkamah bicara - Kes kemalangan jalan raya - Rayuan terhadap isu kuantum - Pihak-pihak tidak membangkitkan isu liabiliti di dalam perbicaraan - Sama ada menghalang mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan untuk meneliti isu liabiliti - Sama ada mahkamah rendah melakukan kesilapan yang ketara
TORT: Kecuaian - Kemalangan jalan raya - Defendan dan saksi-saksi defendan tidak memberikan keterangan di mahkamah - Sama ada defendan bertanggungjawab cuai 100% - Sama ada keterangan plaintif wajar dianggap sebagai benar - Sama ada inferen yang bertentangan di bawah s. 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 terpakai
KETERANGAN: Inferen bertentangan - Kegagalan memanggil saksi - Pemakaian s. 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 - Sama ada terpakai secara automatik atas kegagalan memanggil saksi- Sama ada inferen bertentangan di bawah s. 114(g) terpakai bagi kegagalan memanggil saksi penting sahaja
- Bagi pihak perayu - Lim Qi Si & Sufiah Yusoff; T/n Zaid Ibrahim Suflan T H Liew & Partners
- Bagi pihak responden - Ahmad Fadzli Ahmad Munir; T/n Ravi Moorthi, Noriza, Mala & Partners
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CLJ 2026 Volume 2 (Part 6)
Contemporaneous documents, such as powers of attorney, sale and purchase agreements, trust deeds, and statutory declarations, created at the time of the sale transaction, carry greater probative weight than oral testimony given decades later. Where there is a conflict between the two, the court ought to prefer the contemporaneous documents unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise. A failure to properly analyse and give due weight to these contemporaneous documents constitutes insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence, thereby warranting appellate intervention.
Jayandran Subramaniam v. Rajaprakash Raghavan & Ors [2026] 2 CLJ 803 [CA]
CIVIL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal against judgment of High Court - Two friends ('Ramaney and Raghavan') purchase lots of land jointly, with arrangement lots would later be divided equally ('Lots 2259 to 2264') - Lots 2259 to 2261 given to Ramaney, while Lots 2262 to 2264 given to Raghavan - Children of Raghavan ('children') claimed they were sole owners of Lots 2259 to 2261, and argued Ramaney was holding onto them as trustee - High Court ruled in favour of children - Whether appellate interference warranted - Whether there was insufficient judicial appreciation of documentary evidence - Whether undue weight had been placed on oral testimony of witnesses - Whether there was misdirection of standard and burden of proof
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments and orders - Appeal against judgment of High Court - Two friends ('Ramaney and Raghavan') purchase lots of land jointly, with arrangement lots would later be divided equally ('Lots 2259 to 2264') - Lots 2259 to 2261 given to Ramaney, while Lots 2262 to 2264 given to Raghavan - Children of Raghavan ('children') claimed they were sole owners of Lots 2259 to 2261, and argued Ramaney was holding onto them as trustee - High Court ruled in favour of children - Whether appellate interference warranted - Whether there was insufficient judicial appreciation of documentary evidence - Whether undue weight had been placed on oral testimony of witnesses - Whether there was misdirection of standard and burden of proof
Collin Lawrence Sequerah JCA
Faizah Jamaludin JCA
Evrol Mariette Peters JCA
- For the plaintiff/appellant - Jude Alexander I Arulandu; M/s Alexander & Partners
- For the defendants/respondents - Mohammad Izwan Azmi & Muhammad Amir Syazwan Ahmad Fauzy; M/s Izwan Mazniza Kamil & Assocs
The liability of a hospital and its administrators is not always derivative of the doctor's actions. Even if the treating physician is found not to have breached his/her clinical duty of care, the hospital and its administrators can be held personally liable for systemic or administrative failures that materially contributed to the patient's injury.
Nur Fuziatun Mohd Fadzli (Menyaman Melalui Bapa Dan Wakil Litigasi, Mohd Fadzli Jamil) v. Gombak Medical Centre Sdn Bhd & Ors [2026] 2 CLJ 821 [CA]
TORT
TORT: Negligence - Medical negligence - Duty of care - Minor claimant suffering from brain injury and cerebral palsy - Claim against hospital, person in charge of hospital and physician - Duty to ensure operational adequacy - Failure to provide timely access to specialists and neonatal care and to ensure availability of paediatrician - Delay in transferring patient to hospital with neonatal intensive care facilities - Whether administrative and systemic failures constituted breach of duty - Whether negligence against tortfeasors established - Whether hospital management personally liable for operational lapses independent of treating doctor's clinical negligence - Private Healthcare Facilities and Services (Private Hospitals and Other Private Healthcare Facilities) Regulations 2006
TORT: Negligence - Medical negligence - Duty of care - Proximity - Minor claimant suffering from brain injury and cerebral palsy - Claim against person in charge of hospital - Failure to provide timely access to specialists and neonatal care and to ensure availability of paediatrician - Delay in transferring patient to hospital with neonatal intensive care facilities - Whether there was proximity between claimant and person in charge - Private Healthcare Facilities and Services (Private Hospitals and Other Private Healthcare Facilities) Regulations 2006
Azizah Nawawi JCA
Azizul Azmi Adnan JCA
Faizah Jamaludin JCA
- For the appellant - Manmohan S Dhillon, Aaika Zulaikha Mohd Yusop & Abigail Sarah Kumar; M/s PS Ranjan & Co
- For the 1st respondent - Harjinder Singh Sandhu & Izzah Shakirah Mohd Sukor; M/s Akberdin & Co
- For the 2nd respondent - Chrishanthini AR Sebastiampillai & Narandra Kangatharan; M/s S Chrishanthini & Co
- For the 3rd respondent - Riza Makhzan Arifin; M/s Sharifah & Assocs
A property owner's failure to exercise due diligence during renovations can break the chain of causation. Specifically, carrying out extensive works, without professional engineering consultations or compliance with established covenants, constitutes an intervening event. This shifts the legal responsibility for a structural failure from the original builder to the owner's own actions.
Chegne Peck Peng v. HICOM-Gamuda Development Sdn Bhd [2026] 2 CLJ 847 [HC]
TORT
TORT: Negligence - Duty of care - Collapse of retaining wall built by developer - Claim by subsequent purchaser of property against housing developer - Duty imposed on entities designing and constructing buildings - Whether developer owed duty of care to subsequent purchaser despite absence of contractual relationship
TORT: Negligence - Claim - Novus actus interveniens - Claimant carried out extensive renovations to property - Failure to appoint qualified professionals or conduct structural studies - Collapse of retaining wall erected by developer - Whether developer owed duty of care to claimant - Whether developer breached duty of care owed to claimant - Whether acts of claimant in carrying out extensive renovations to property amounted to novus actus interveniens which tantamount to break in chain of causation - Whether res ipsa loquitur applied
- For the plaintiff - Clinton Tan Kian Seng & Harishdeep Singh; M/s Clinton Tan
- For the defendant - Joshua Ho Fung Lym & Nurul Hanan Azamuddin; M/s Raj, Ong & Yudistra
The law on the role of the Attorney General ('AG') vis-a-vis a leave application under O. 53 of the Rules of Court 2012 is trite. The AG functions to sieve out unmeritorious suits, including those that fail to meet procedural requirements or fall short of the established ‘arguable case’ threshold. All that the Attorney General's Chambers is required to do when served with the leave papers is to peruse them and address the court on whether there are grounds to refuse leave or otherwise. Consequently, it is pure conjecture to attribute dishonourable conduct to the AG based solely on a decision to oppose an application, especially where allegations remain unsubstantiated. The consequences of contempt proceedings are serious and the courts would be circumspect to act on mere supposition.
Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Hj Abd Razak v. Tan Sri Ahmad Terrirudin Mohd Salleh [2026] 2 CLJ 876 [HC]
CIVIL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Committal proceedings - Order of committal - Leave to apply for order of committal - Whether Attorney General ('AG') aware of existence of addendum order - Whether open to AG to direct officers to oppose application for leave under O. 53 of Rules of Court 2012 on ground existence of addendum order speculative - Whether tantamount to perverting course of justice - Whether AG breached duty of candour - Whether there was duty for AG to deny or confirm existence of addendum order at leave stage - Whether applicant failed to establish prima facie case of contempt - Whether leave to apply for order of committal ought to be dismissed - Rules of Court 2012, O. 52
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judicial review - Leave - Application for - Proceedings - Functions of Attorney General ('AG') - Whether merely embarks on filtering process through his officers - Whether open to AG to direct officers to oppose application for leave under O. 53 of Rules of Court 2012 on ground existence of addendum order speculative - Whether tantamount to perverting course of justice - Whether AG aware of existence of addendum order - Whether there was duty for AG to deny or confirm existence of addendum order at leave stage
- For the applicant - Muhammad Shafee Abdullah, Muhammad Farhan Shafee, Wan Mohammad Arfan Wan Othman & Syafiqah Sofian; M/s Shafee & Co
- For the respondent - Shamsul Bolhassan, Ahmad Hanir Hambaly & Nurhafizza Azizan; SFCs & Safiyyah Omar, Ainna Sherina Saipolamin & Zulkiefli Sulaiman; FCs
(i) The right to lodge a caveat is not an unfettered one. It is a statutory privilege granted only to persons claiming a registrable interest in the land. A person who has no such interest, or whose claim is defective in law, cannot be permitted to fetter the title of the registered proprietor. The mere fact of being a 'contributor' or shareholder of a company does not confer an individual proprietary interest in a company's land; (ii) The purpose of a caveat is to preserve proprietary or beneficial rights in land. It cannot be used as an instrument of obstruction to frustrate a court-sanctioned transaction. An attempt to use a caveat to protect a commercial grievance or corporate dispute falls outside the scope of s. 323 of the National Land Code. Consequently, a caveat entered mala fide or for an improper purpose is liable to be removed by court order.
DSG Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Looe Chee Keong [2026] 2 CLJ 890 [HC]
LAND LAW | CONTRACT | CIVIL PROCEDURE
LAND LAW: Caveat - Removal - Application for - Whether caveat lodged by private individual without legal or equitable interest - Whether contributor or shareholder of company conferred individual proprietary interest in land - Whether caveat entered mala fide - Whether caveator had no locus standi to lodge or maintain private caveat - Act of lodging caveat without liquidator's authority - Whether contravened ss. 471(i)(b) and 486(1) of Companies Act 2016 - Whether applicant had equitable and registrable right within meaning of ss. 323 and 327 of National Land Code - Whether caveat ought to be removed
CONTRACT: Agreement - Sale and purchase agreement - Whether tainted with illegality - Whether duly executed by parties - Whether part-performance brought contract within saving of s. 31 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 - Whether agreement lawful, valid and enforceable
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments - Consent judgment - Whether terms of judgment endorsed by court - Whether contrary to judicial policy to permit private individual to frustrate judgment by entering caveat - Whether consent judgment valid and binding - Courts of Judicature Act 1964, s. 24
- For the applicant - Ng Keem Foong; M/s Ng Yook Woon, Andrew TC Saw & Co
- For the respondent - C Kaladevi Chandrasekharan; M/s K Devi & Assocs
(i) The role of an independent assessor, pursuant to s. 369B(9) of the Companies Act 2016, is adjudicative and quasi-judicial, rather than merely administrative or procedural. As a scheme of arrangement effectively compromises a creditor's right to pursue claims in court or arbitration, the assessment of a proof of debt must be a robust substitute for those legal forums; (ii) In determining the suitability of an independent assessor, the court must look at the specific nature of the disputed debt. The appointee must possess the specific expertise required to determine the legal rights and liabilities at the heart of the dispute.
KNM Group Bhd & Anor v. Hitachi Zosen Corporation & Ors [2026] 2 CLJ 913 [HC]
COMPANY LAW
COMPANY LAW: Scheme of arrangement - Proof of debt - Appointment of independent assessor - Dispute involving complex legal and construction issues - Application for appointment of independent assessor by court - Criteria for determining suitability of appointee - Whether role of independent assessor adjudicative or merely administrative - Whether legal practitioner or liquidator more suited for role - Companies Act 2016, ss. 366 & 369B(9)
- For the applicant - Isaac Pereira & Amanda John; M/s Alvin John & Partners
- For the respondents - Prabjit Singh; M/s Rahmat Lim & Partners
(i) In considering whether to grant planning permission under the Town and Country Planning Act 1976 ('TCPA'), the local plan is of paramount importance. In directing that a planning permission be issued, the application to the Local Authority ought to be consistent with the local plan, and that there is sufficient quota in that area for the activities intended to be carried out in the property; (ii) The relevant provisions in relation to the granting of planning permission under the TCPA does not make it a requirement that any existing building which stands upon any land must first be certified with a completion and compliance certificate; (iii) An Appeal Board acts within its statutory powers under s. 23(3)(b) of the TCPA when it directs that planning permission be issued subject to conditions imposed by the Local Authority. The effect of this is that the Local Authority retains the discretion to impose its usual conditions when issuing the planning permission.
Majlis Bandaraya Petaling Jaya v. Lembaga Rayuan Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan & Anor [2026] 2 CLJ 930 [HC]
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Certiorari - Application for - Challenge against decision of Appeal Board allowing planning permission to change use of building from residential to temporary nursery - Whether there was usurpation of power or discretion by Appeal Board - Whether granting of planning permission required certificate of completion and compliance - Whether there was deviation from building plans - Whether there was undertaking made in respect of use of building - Whether Appeal Board acted illegally or unreasonably - Whether Appeal Board acted within its statutory power under s. 23(3)(b) of Town and Country Planning Act 1976 - Street, Drainage and Building Act 1974
LOCAL GOVERNMENT: Local Authority - Planning permission - Application for judicial review to challenge decision of Appeal Board allowing planning permission to change use of building from residential to temporary nursery - Whether there was usurpation of power or discretion by Appeal Board - Whether granting of planning permission required certificate of completion and compliance - Whether there was deviation from building plans - Whether there was undertaking made in respect of use of building - Whether Appeal Board acted illegally or unreasonably - Whether Appeal Board acted within its statutory power under s. 23(3)(b) of Town and Country Planning Act 1976 - Street, Drainage and Building Act 1974
- For the applicant - Heidi Saw Ching Ying; M/s Fernandez & Selvarajah
- For the 1st respondent - Hani Aziza Ismail; FC
- For the 2nd respondent - Mohd Saiful Hadi Dowlad Rahuman; M/s Jehan & Co
(i) According to the stipulations of s. 5(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act 1967, it is obligatory for the creditor's petition to be submitted within a period of six months from the commencement of the act of bankruptcy. Courts have no jurisdiction to allow an extension without special circumstances; (ii) The filing of a bankruptcy notice and creditor's petition are two different bankruptcy proceedings and have different implementation timelines. Thus, even when the creditor's petition has expired, the decision to strike out the bankruptcy notice is not automatic.
Re Ng Lee Eng; Ex Parte CSPM Sdn Bhd [2026] 2 CLJ 949 [HC]
BANKRUPTCY
BANKRUPTCY: Creditor's petition - Extension of time - Application for - Whether obligatory for creditor's petition to be submitted within period of six months from commencement of act of bankruptcy - Whether court may exercise discretionary powers to extend and/or abridge time for filing of creditor's petition after last date to file lapsed - Insolvency Act 1967, ss. 5(1)(c) & 93(4)
BANKRUPTCY: Bankruptcy notice - Amendment - Application for - Extension of time for creditor's petition denied - Whether court could automatically cancel bankruptcy notice - Whether decision to strike out bankruptcy notice premature - Whether filing of bankruptcy notice and creditor's petition two different bankruptcy proceedings with different implementation timelines
- For the judgment creditor - Lim Tow Gim; M/s TG Lim & Ranjeet
- For the judgment debtor - Balwant Singh Purba; M/s Balwant Singh & Co
ARTICLES
LNS Article(s)
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'THE FAMILY JUSTICE COURTS: BUILDING ON FIRM FOUNDATIONS'
OPENING ADDRESS AT THE OFFICIAL OPENING OF THE FAMILY JUSTICE COURTS BUILDING+
[Read excerpt]
by Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon* [2026] CLJU(A) xxi
[2026] CLJU(A) xxi
SINGAPORE
'THE FAMILY JUSTICE COURTS: BUILDING ON FIRM FOUNDATIONS'
OPENING ADDRESS AT THE OFFICIAL OPENING OF THE FAMILY JUSTICE COURTS BUILDING+
by
Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon*
Your Excellency Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam, The President of the Republic of Singapore
Mr Masagos Zulkifli, The Honourable Minister for Social and Family Development
Mr Edwin Tong SC, The Honourable Minister for Law and Second Minister for Home Affairs
Mr Murali Pillai SC, The Honourable Senior Minister of State, Ministry of Law and Ministry of Transport
Mr Lucien Wong SC, Attorney-General
Justice Teh Hwee Hwee, Presiding Judge of the Family Justice Courts
My fellow Judges
Distinguished guests
Ladies and gentlemen
1. A very good morning. Thank you very much all for being with us today to witness the official opening of the "Octagon" as the home of the Family Justice Courts ("FJC"). I am particularly grateful to Your Excellency President Tharman for gracing this occasion and for your long-standing support for the work and mission of the Judiciary.
2. For half a century, the "Octagon" has stood as an iconic landmark in our judicial landscape.[1] As the home of the former Subordinate Courts and State Courts, housing the engine room that has powered much of the Judiciary's work, it has literally been the doorway through which countless individuals have gained access to our justice system.[2] Today, we gather to celebrate the refurbishment, repurposing and reopening of this historic building, and with it to launch the next phase of the FJC journey. Allow me to share three reflections this morning on the significance of this milestone with particular emphasis on our work in family justice.
. . .
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SAFEGUARDING THE DIGITAL ATHLETE: TOWARDS A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR SCHOLASTIC ESPORTS IN MALAYSIA
[Read excerpt]
by Nor Fadzlina Nawi[i]Mohamad Imran Nasir Abdullah[ii] [2026] CLJU(A) xxii
[2026] CLJU(A) xxii
MALAYSIA
SAFEGUARDING THE DIGITAL ATHLETE: TOWARDS A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR SCHOLASTIC ESPORTS IN MALAYSIA
by
Nor Fadzlina Nawi[i]
Mohamad Imran Nasir Abdullah[ii]
ABSTRACT
The integration of electronic sports (esports) into Malaysian schools, while aligned with the government's strategic Pelan Strategik Pembangunan Sukan Elektronik and the 2023 National Esports Development Guideline (NESDEG), reveals a critical regulatory deficit. This article identifies a "regulatory lacuna": a fundamental disconnect between the protective principles outlined in policy documents like NESDEG and the enforceable legal standards required to safeguard minors, leaving young participants vulnerable to documented health, psychological, and exploitation risks. Through comparative legal analysis of international regulatory models (Germany, the United Kingdom, Norway, China and South Korea) and doctrinal assessment of Malaysia's existing legislation, this paper demonstrates the insufficiency of the current discretionary administrative framework. Consequently, it proposes a novel, three-tiered statutory solution: (1) an "Esports in Schools (Safeguarding) Act" to codify NESDEG's principles into binding law; (2) an independent National Esports Safeguarding Commission (NESC) operating in a statutory partnership with the Malaysia Electronic Sports Federation (MESF); and (3) mandatory school-level welfare protocols. This integrated framework is presented as the essential legal structure to reconcile Malaysia's digital talent ambitions with a robust, enforceable duty of care, positioning the nation as a leader in responsible scholastic esports governance.
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THE "KNEE-JERK" EXCLUSION: WHY MALAYSIAN LAWYERS SHOULD STOP OPTING OUT OF THE CISG
[Read excerpt]
by Tun Heang Ong* [2026] CLJU(A) xxiii
[2026] CLJU(A) xxiii
MALAYSIA
THE "KNEE-JERK" EXCLUSION: WHY MALAYSIAN LAWYERS SHOULD STOP OPTING OUT OF THE CISG
by
Tun Heang Ong*
INTRODUCTION: THE STANDARD TEMPLATE TRAP
Malaysian advocates and solicitors often follow a standard process when drafting cross-border sale of goods agreements. Most firm templates for international supply contracts include a routine clause: "The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods is hereby expressly excluded." This provision is inserted as automatically as a force majeure or dispute resolution clause, reflecting what can be called the "Knee-Jerk" exclusion.
The primary driver of this practice is not a calculated legal strategy but a deep-seated preference for the familiar. In Malaysia, the Sale of Goods Act 1957 ('SOGA 1957') is the bedrock of commercial transactions. Having been trained in the nuances of "merchantable quality" and "fitness for purpose" under the Malaysian framework, many solicitors view the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) as a foreign, unpredictable interloper. However, this exclusion is often performed without a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. The assumption that SOGA 1957 provides a safer or more certain harbour for Malaysian clients is increasingly detached from the realities of modern global trade.
For Malaysian clients involved in international commerce, the CISG offers a more modern, predictable, and equitable framework than the decades-old domestic law. Since key trading partners such as China, Singapore, and many European countries are Contracting States to the CISG, automatically excluding the Convention may disadvantage Malaysian clients. The Malaysian Bar should move beyond standard exclusions and recognise the CISG as a valuable tool for managing international risk.
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LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTS
Principal Acts
Amending Acts
PU(A)
PU(B)
Legislation Alert
Updated
| Act/Principal No. |
Title |
Amended by |
In force from |
Section amended |
| PU(A) 97/1998 |
Perintah Jalan-Jalan Persekutuan (Pengurusan Persendirian) (Pungutan Tol) (Jambatan Dan Lebuhraya Laluan Kedua Malaysia-Singapura Dan Lebuhraya Perling) 1998 |
PU(A) 50/2026 |
6 Februari 2026 |
Perenggan 3 |
| PU(A) 195/2016 |
Federal Roads (Private Management) (Collection of Tolls) (East Coast Expressway-Phase 2) Order 2016 |
PU(A) 51/2026 |
6 February 2026 |
Paragraph 3 |
| PU(A) 97/1998 |
Federal Roads (Private Management) (Collection of Tolls) (Malaysia-Singapore Second Crossing Bridge and Expressway and Perling Expressway) Order 1998 |
PU(A) 50/2026 |
6 February 2026 |
Paragraph 3 |
| PU(A) 249/2020 |
Peraturan-Peraturan Standard Minimum Perumahan, Penginapan Dan Kemudahan Pekerja (Kadar Sewa Atau Caj Maksimum Bagi Penginapan) 2020 |
PU(A) 49/2026 |
1 Mac 2026 |
Peraturan 2 |
| PU(A) 249/2020 |
Employees' Minimum Standards of Housing, Accommodations and Amenities (Maximum Rental Or Charges For Accommodation) Regulations 2020 |
PU(A) 49/2026 |
1 March 2026 |
Regulation 2 |
Revoked
|
