| Print this page | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Issue #14/2026
02 April 2026
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Subscribe now to make the most of this legal bulletin and have full access to judgments and other documents. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
New This Week
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
CASE SPOTLIGHTS
TAN SRI RAZARUDIN HUSAIN v. WAN MUHAMMAD AZRI WAN DERIS [2026] 3 CLJ 830 (i) While freedom of opinion and expression is guaranteed under the Federal Constitution, it must be exercised within the bounds of the law. Although freedom of speech is a constitutional right, it is subject to the laws of defamation and contempt of court. Article 10(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution is not a license to slander, profit from slander, or twist court-tendered apologies into content for sensational online videos; (ii) Failure to comply with a court order constitutes plain contempt. Once a contemnor undertakes to purge their contempt via a statement of apology, that apology must be unreserved and remorseful. Any subsequent act that repudiates the apology undermines the dignity and integrity of the court, rendering the contempt unpurged. CIVIL PROCEDURE: Contempt of court - Committal proceedings - Proceedings based on postings on social media platforms in breach of earlier injunction against contemnor - Contemnor agreed to post apology on same social media platforms - Whether contempt purged as per court order - Whether postings of apology at unreadable speed and addition of song with intention to ridicule negated apology - Whether choice of words showed total lack of remorse - Whether insincere in apology and attempted to trick court to avoid punishment for contempt - Whether sentence ought to reflect seriousness of offence - Whether warranted sentence of imprisonment JUDICIAL QUOTES“The true nature and context of the Derbyshire principle is res ipsa loquitur from the parties of the English case itself. The case of Derbyshire involved a Local Authority (not an individual person) claiming for defamation. There are no fact, context, and reason for the House of Lords in Derbyshire to consider whether or not any individual person holding governmental office may or may not maintain a defamation action. The House of Lords was posed with the question, whether or not a Government (the Derbyshire County Council) as an elected body can sue its own electorate for defamation. And the House of Lords answered that question in the negative (in that a governmental body cannot sue its citizens for defamation). Somehow, over the years, and through many attempts at legal acrobatics, the true and simplistic essence of the Derbyshire principle had been lost in translation. On the extreme contrary to this misconception, the House of Lords made a clear and express finding that the inhibition against governmental bodies does not apply to prohibit individuals in governmental offices from maintaining a defamation action: A publication attacking the activities of the authority will necessarily be an attack on the body of COUNCILLORS which represents the controlling party, or on the EXECUTIVES who carry on the day-to-day management of its affairs. If the INDIVIDUAL reputation of any of these is wrongly impaired by the publication any of these can HIMSELF bring proceedings for defamation. (emphasis added)” “However, in the same manner the House of Lords in Derbyshire was aware some 33 years ago, we are equally aware that attacks against the Government can at times fall or slip into ad hominem and personal attacks against persons in office (not just the Government), be it on personal matters or in his or her exercise in office. Especially considering the sensationalist journalism and the boom of social media and the internet in modern times (coupled with Malaysia's decades of political divide and politicking on race, ethnicity, and religion), it is infinitely more compelling for prominent individuals from competing political spectrums to throw underhanded jabs against persons in office and for the Malaysian people to receive and spread the same attacks like wildfire. Thus, aside from the importance of freedom of speech and the liberty to criticise the Government, it is equally important that the court must remain vigilant to not allow loose-lipped defamation and slander to be thrown at the faces of individuals in governmental positions or offices.” - Per Azimah Omar FCJ in Yeoh Tseow Suan v. Musa Hassan [2026] 3 CLJ 593; [2026] CLJU 82 LATEST CASESLegal Network Series
CLJ 2026 Volume 3 (Part 4) (i) The prosecution satisfies its evidentiary burden to trigger the statutory presumption under s. 50(1) of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 upon proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the factum of receipt of the gratification. Once the physical receipt of the gratification is established, whether directly or through an intermediary, the law presumes that such gratification was received corruptly as an inducement or reward for the matters stipulated in the charge; (ii) Where gratification is received through a third-party intermediary, circumstantial evidence may be relied on to establish the factum of receipt by the principal, ie, bank withdrawal records, the proximity of the parties and the timing of the delivery. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | CRIMINAL LAW | EVIDENCE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal by prosecution - Appeal against acquittal and discharge - Public body officer received RM3.09 million in bribes as reward - Bribes delivered in cash through intermediary - Public body officer convicted on nine bribery charges under s. 16(a)(A) of Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 and sentenced to six years' imprisonment for each charge and fine of RM15,450,000 - Court of Appeal overturned High Court's conviction and acquitted and discharged public body officer - Whether conviction and sentence safe CRIMINAL LAW: Offence - Corruption - Receiving gratification - Public body officer received RM3.09 million in bribes as reward - Bribes delivered in cash through intermediary - Whether elements of offence established - Whether factum of receipt through intermediary proven - Whether gratification received as reward - Whether gratification received corruptly - Whether proof of receipt of money sufficient to trigger statutory presumption - Whether mere denial or claim of non-receipt sufficient to discharge burden on balance of probabilities - Whether defence's version reasonable or probable - Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009, ss. 16(a)(A) & 50(1) EVIDENCE: Witness - Credibility - Public body officer received RM3.09 million in bribes as reward - Bribes delivered in cash through intermediary - Use of code word as solicitation of bribe - Intermediary unable to recall exact number of times code word used - Whether there was material discrepancy in testimony - Whether discrepancy fatal to prosecution's case - Whether intermediary's testimony corroborated by other witnesses and circumstantial evidence - Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009, ss. 16(a)(A) & 50(1) Nordin Hassan FCJ
(i) Actual possession and knowledge of dangerous drugs are established when an accused is the sole occupant of a specific space, ie, room, house or vehicle, and demonstrates custody and control, by identifying and personally handing over the incriminating items to the police. Proximity to the drugs and the accused's own admission are sufficient to prove these elements; (ii) Under s. 134 of the Evidence Act 1950, the evidence of a single credible witness does not legally require corroboration to secure a conviction, except in specific cases such as those involving child witnesses. CRIMINAL LAW | CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | EVIDENCE
CRIMINAL LAW: Offences - Drug trafficking - Methamphetamine found in gear panel of vehicle driven by accused - Whether accused had possession and knowledge of drugs - Whether accused had custody and control of drugs - Whether conviction and sentence safe - Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, s. 39B(1)(a) CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Accused found guilty for trafficking in dangerous drugs - Methamphetamine found in gear panel of vehicle driven by accused - Accused convicted for offence and sentenced to life imprisonment and 12 strokes of whipping - Whether conviction and sentence safe - Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, s. 39B(1)(a) EVIDENCE: Witness - Corroboration - Methamphetamine found in gear panel of vehicle driven by accused - Whether accused had possession and knowledge of drugs - Whether accused had custody and control of drugs - Whether corroboration of evidence required - Whether evidence corroborated - Evidence Act 1950, s. 134 EVIDENCE: Adverse inference - Failure to call material witness - Methamphetamine found in gear panel of vehicle driven by accused - Accused found guilty, convicted for offence and sentenced to life imprisonment and 12 strokes of whipping - Whether vehicle driven by accused belonged to him - Whether prosecution failed to call vehicle's owner - Whether there was failure by prosecution to call material witness - Whether adverse inference ought to be invoked - Evidence Act 1950, s. 114(g) Azman Abdullah JCA
A common law duty of care is owed by the police to a person held under remand or in detention, to protect them from harm or injury, whether inflicted by others or themselves. The position in Malaysia indicates a broader duty of care in light of the statutory duties that extend to all prisoners. The Police Act 1967 and the Lockup Rules 1953 make no distinction between remand prisoners who are known or perceived to be suicide risks, as they have put in place certain safeguards to prevent suicide. The existence of these safeguards or preventive measures would adequately address concerns that a more onerous duty is placed if the duty were to extend to all detainees. The presence of such safeguards refutes any contention that the risk of suicide is too remote or not reasonably foreseeable. POLICE | TORT
POLICE: Tortious liabilities - Negligence - Duty of care - Police - Death of detainee in lock-up - Detainee committed suicide - Whether duty of care only arose if detainee suicide risk - Whether there was broader duty of care in light of statutory duties extended to all prisoners - Existence of safeguards or preventive measures - Whether there was failure to comply with legal and statutory obligations - Whether detainee's suicide made possible by breach of common law duty of care - Whether misfeasance in public office proved - Whether defendants negligible and liable for damages - Whether Government vicariously liable for detainee's death - Federal Constitution, art. 5 - Police Act 1967, s. 20 - Lockup Rules 1953, r. 10 - Government Proceedings Act 1956, ss. 5 & 6 TORT: Damages - Quantum of damages - Negligence - Breach of duty of care - Police - Death of detainee in lock-up - Whether detainee's suicide made possible by breach of statutory duties and common law duty of care - Whether tortfeasors negligent and liable for damages - Dependency claim - Whether quantum ought to be increased - Whether there was egregious conduct to justify grant of aggravated damages - Whether negligence by itself gave rise to award of aggravated damages
Azimah Omar FCJ
Defamation is established even if the claimant is not explicitly named, provided the tortfeasor subtly juxtaposes the claimant's identity with defamatory groups or uses thinly-veiled references that lead a reasonable person to identify the claimant. TORT
TORT: Defamation - Slander - Statements made by Inspector General of Police against politician/Minister in speech during forum - Statements involving allegations of ties with Jews, intentions to destroy Islam, and Christianisation of Malaysia - Politician/Minister claimed against Inspector General of Police - Whether public official possessed capacity to maintain action for defamation in personal capacity - Derbyshire principle - Whether defamation established TORT: Defamation - Slander - Identification of claimant - Statements made by Inspector General of Police against politician/Minister in speech during forum - Statements involving allegations of ties with Jews, intentions to destroy Islam, and Christianisation of Malaysia - Impugned statements referred to 'mereka' - Whether statements referred to claimant - Whether defamatory imputations established - Whether defamation established TORT: Defamation - Defences - Justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege - Statements made by Inspector General of Police against politician/Minister in speech during forum - Statements involving allegations of ties with Jews, intentions to destroy Islam, and Christianisation of Malaysia - Whether defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege available to tortfeasor
Azimah Omar JCA
Legal fees incurred by a liquidator post-winding up for services that assist in the realisation or augmentation of the company's assets – specifically litigation and asset recovery – constitute 'costs and expenses of the winding-up' and are entitled to priority payment under s. 292(1)(a) of the Companies Act 1965 (now s. 527(1)(a) of the Companies Act 2016). COMPANY LAW | LEGAL PROFESSION
COMPANY LAW: Liquidation - Winding-up - Legal fees incurred by solicitors post-liquidation under authority of liquidator - Litigation and asset recovery actions resulting in realisation and augmentation of assets - Whether legal fees constituted 'costs and expenses of the winding up' - Whether entitled to priority of payment - Whether fees should rank pari passu with unsecured creditors - Whether 'salvage principle' applicable in Malaysia - Companies Act 1965, s. 292(1)(a) - Companies Act 2016, s. 527(1)(a) LEGAL PROFESSION: Fees - Post-liquidation services - Priority of payment - Recovery of assets for benefit of estate - Whether fees subject to taxation under r. 165 of Companies (Winding-Up) Rules 1972 or s. 128(2) of Legal Profession Act 1976
Saheran Suhendran JC
The State's duty of care toward detainees is absolute and non-delegable; any failure to provide medical care, document health conditions, or notify family, compounded by a lack of transparency in a subsequent investigation, renders the authorities liable for negligence and misfeasance. TORT | POLICE
TORT: Negligence - Duty of care - Death in custody - Detainee/deceased under police and prison authorities - Negligence and breach of statutory duty by police and prison officers - Non-delegable duty of custodial authorities to ensure health and safety of detainees - Deceased suffered from necrotising fasciitis resulting in amputations - Failures of custodians to conduct initial health screening, provide timely medical intervention, monitor deceased and maintain record - Whether duty of care breached - Whether negligence established TORT: Liability - Vicarious liability of Government - Death in custody - Detainee/deceased under police and prison authorities - Negligence and breach of duties by police and prison officers - Deceased suffered from necrotising fasciitis resulting in amputations - Whether Government liable for acts of servants in course of employment - Whether vicarious liability established - Police Act 1967 - Government Proceedings Act 1956, ss. 5 & 6 - Prison Regulations 2000 POLICE: Duties - Investigation - Death in custody - Failure of investigating officer to secure material evidence - Omission to obtain CCTV footage and take post-mortem photographs - Whether there was breach of statutory duties - Police Act 1967
Moses Susayan J
ARTICLESLNS Article(s)
LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTSPrincipal Acts
Amending Acts
PU(A)
PU(B)
Legislation Alert Updated
Revoked
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|