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Issue #23/2026
04 June 2026
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CASE SPOTLIGHTS
DAGANG NET TECHNOLOGIES SDN BHD v. TRIBUNAL RAYUAN PERSAINGAN & ANOR [2026] 5 CLJ 466 (i) The validity of a final decision, under s. 40 of the Competition Act 2010 ('Act'), is not strictly confined to the initial notice of investigation under s. 18(1)(a) of the Act. Provided that the proposed decision clearly details the specific findings and allows the enterprise to make representations, the requirements of procedural fairness and natural justice are satisfied; (ii) There is no automatic right to cross-examine witnesses in competition proceedings. Under s. 38 of the Act and reg. 13 of the Competition (Appeal Tribunal) Regulations 2017, both the Competition Commission and the Competition Appeal Tribunal ('CAT') possess the discretion to determine the manner in which evidence is heard. A denial of cross-examination does not, by itself, constitute a breach of natural justice, as the CAT is the master of its own proceedings. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Application to quash decision of Competition Appeal Tribunal affirming Competition Commission's ('MyCC') finding of infringement - Whether MyCC's final decision exceeded scope of investigation notice - Whether there was breach of natural justice - Whether applicant afforded right to respond - Whether right to cross-examine witnesses absolute - Competition Act 2010, ss. 10(1), 18(1)(a), 36, 38 & 40 - Competition (Appeal Tribunal) Regulations 2017, reg. 13 JUDICIAL QUOTES“The issue before this court is a question of law against the deciding order made by the SCIT. The question is whether the canopy and halide lights qualify as plant expenditure under Sch. 3 of the ITA.” “This court is bound to apply the principles enunciated in Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v. Tropiland Sdn Bhd (2013) MSTC 7701 pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis. Applying the principles, it is the finding of this court that the decision of the SCIT was a decision that a reasonable SCIT similarly circumstanced would not have reached on the law and facts. The finding that the canopy and the halide lights, which are an integral part of the canopy not being “plant” is against the principles expounded in Tropiland.” “The case of Tropiland applied the functional test. To qualify as a building, the canopy, while having a passive role, must have a function in the trader's operation, and if it has, it is prima facie a plant, unless there is a good reason to exclude it from that category.” “It is unrebutted evidence that while the frame of the canopy is made of mild steel, its ceiling is made of a special type of aluminium manufactured by Hunter Douglas called “Luxalon” - a type of aluminium unique to petrol stations as it is non-flammable and reflects light at the same time. The Luxalon ceiling and the halide lights are not easily available in the market. These items are special for the canopy of the petrol filling stations at present times compared to yesteryears.” “The functional aspect of the canopy and the halide lights act more than a mere roof that protects equipment and people from the weather. It has other functions for the everyday business of petrol filling stations. The ceiling of the canopy is non-flammable in view of the petrol filling kiosks below the canopy. The canopy is very high, and the halide lights keep every area beneath the canopy brightly lit. This would attract the customers from a distance, especially for night sales.” - Per Amarjeet Singh Serjit Singh J in Petronas Dagangan Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri & Other Appeals [2026] 4 CLJ 824 LATEST CASESLegal Network Series
CLJ 2026 Volume 5 (Part 2) When all essential terms have been negotiated, agreed upon, and reduced to writing, it confirms that the parties have reached consensus ad idem. Even if the document is labeled as a 'draft' sale and purchase agreement and remains unsigned, if it contains all the essential terms previously settled, it serves merely to formalise an agreement already concluded between the parties. CONTRACT
CONTRACT: Agreement - Validity - Sale and purchase agreement ('SPA') - Enforcement of unsigned SPA - Whether terms of agreement finalised - Whether parties agreed on all essential terms in second draft SPA - Whether essential terms negotiated, agreed and reduced into writing in third draft SPA - Whether third draft SPA merely to formalise concluded agreement - Whether agreement concluded and enforceable CONTRACT: Specific performance - Sale and purchase agreement ('SPA') - Sale and purchase of lands - Whether parties reached consensus ad idem on essential elements of concluded SPA - Subsequent undisclosed sale of lands by owner - Whether rendered decree of specific performance academic - Whether purchaser entitled to damages
Azizah Nawawi JCA
A statement of claim need not specifically label the category of fraud, whether common law or equitable, provided the pleaded facts afford a respondent sufficient notice, as the legal characterisation of such claims is a judicial duty rooted in evidence rather than strict nomenclature. In this instance, a case for equitable fraud is established by demonstrating that the respondent had engaged in unconscionable conduct by diverting company funds despite having acknowledged personal liability. Evidence, including email acknowledgments and personal advances made to facilitate a contract novation, proves that the respondent's failure to repay the appellant after receiving the funds amounted to unconscionable conduct warranting relief. TORT | CIVIL PROCEDURE
TORT: Fraud - Allegations of - Distinction between common law fraud and equitable fraud - Refusal to repay advances despite acknowledgment of entitlement - Diversion of company funds to other creditors while withholding balance due to investor - Whether there was evidence of unconscionable conduct - Whether amounted to equitable fraud CIVIL PROCEDURE: Pleadings - Statement of claim - Particulars - Whether necessary to specifically label category of fraud - Duty of court to determine classification based on pleaded facts and evidence - Equitable fraud - Whether failure to expressly plead 'equitable fraud' fatal to claim - Guidelines in Zung Zang Wood Products Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Kwan Chee Hang Sdn Bhd & Ors
Lim Chong Fong JCA
(i) The Attorney General does not enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability for actions taken in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under art. 145(3) of the Federal Constitution. Consequently, the exercise of prosecutorial power is justiciable in a civil court if it is proven that such power was abused or exercised in bad faith; (ii) A civil claim for misfeasance in public office or malicious prosecution arising from the decision to prosecute is premature and unsustainable if the underlying criminal proceedings have not yet concluded. For a cause of action to be ripe, there must be a final determination establishing whether the prosecution was initiated without reasonable and probable cause or in bad faith. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW | TORT | CIVIL PROCEDURE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Attorney General - Prosecutorial discretion - Attorney General authorised prosecution of claimant for various offences - Claim by claimant against Attorney General for torts of misfeasance in public office, malicious process, negligence and breach of art. 8 of Federal Constitution - Whether Attorney General immune from civil liability - Whether discretion unfettered - Whether exercise of power immunised from civil actions if abused or exercised in bad faith - Federal Constitution, art. 145(3) TORT: Misfeasance in public office - Claim against former Attorney General - Attorney General authorised prosecution of claimant for various offences - Claimant filed civil suit while criminal proceedings still pending - Whether claim founded on decision to prosecute premature - Whether particulars sufficiently particularised TORT: Malicious process - Claim against former Attorney General - Attorney General authorised prosecution of claimant for various offences - Whether malicious process recognised cause of action in Malaysian law - Whether proper cause of action TORT: Negligence - Duty of care - Statements made by former Attorney General against accused after leaving office - Whether duty of care owed in capacity as private citizen - Whether remedy lay in negligence CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Writ and statement of claim - Claim against former Attorney General for misfeasance in public office, malicious process, and negligence - Whether claim premature and unsustainable - Whether plain and obvious case for striking out - Rules of Court 2012, O. 18 r. 19 Ravinthran Paramaguru JCA
A cause of action to recover a debt secured by a property arises at the earliest point of default and demand, regardless of whether an individual title has been issued or a formal charge has been registered under the National Land Code. Where a financier is armed with a deed of assignment by way of security, they possess the immediate right to realise the security. The 12-year limitation period under s. 21(1) of the Limitation Act 1953 begins to run from the date of the initial breach or the last payment made. A financier cannot unilaterally postpone or reset the limitation period by waiting for the registration of a formal charge and issuing a fresh demand years later. LIMITATION
LIMITATION: Cause of action - Accrual - Action to recover money secured by mortgage or charge - Financier and borrower executed facilities agreement and deed of assignment - Default in loan repayment - Failure of financier to take action within 12-year period - Whether cause of action accrued upon issuance of demand or last payment made - Whether subsequent registration of charge and fresh demand created new cause of action - Whether limitation had set in - Whether action time-barred - Limitation Act 1953, s. 21(1)
Lim Chong Fong JCA
To successfully invoke the presumption under s. 114A(3) of the Evidence Act 1950, a claimant must establish two elements regarding the origin of the defamatory publication: (i) that the defendant had custody or control of a particular computer or device at the material time; and (ii) that the publication 'originated' from that specific device. In this context, 'originated' refers to the device from which the matter was sent or disseminated ie, the source of the transmission, rather than the device where the content was merely created or authored. EVIDENCE | TORT
EVIDENCE: Presumption - Presumption of publication - Claim premised on tort of defamation - Poison pen letter in digital form - Origin and proof of origin of poison pen letter - Whether employer had custody or control of computer from which publication originated - Interpretation of word 'originates' - Whether 'originates' refers to device of creation or device of dissemination - Whether claimant proved publication originated from particular laptop supplied by employer - Whether there was forensic evidence to support claim - Whether presumption successfully invoked - Evidence Act 1950, s. 114A(3) TORT: Defamation - Publication - Digital publication - Online dissemination via social media and WhatsApp - Statutory presumption under s. 114A(3) of Evidence Act 1950 - Origin and proof of origin of poison pen letter - Nexus between publication and specific device under alleged tortfeasor's custody or control - Whether mere authorship or creation of digital file sufficient to fix liability on owner of device
Supang Lian JCA
An Erinford injunction should be granted to maintain the status quo where the injunction is necessary to ensure that if the appeal succeeds, the victory is not rendered academic or hollow, ie, nugatory. The court must adopt the course that carries the lower risk of injustice. This involves a balance of convenience where: (i) the appeal is not frivolous; (ii) the injunction does not inflict greater hardship on the defendant than the refusal would on the plaintiff; and (iii) damages are an inadequate or unsuitable remedy for the harm caused. CIVIL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Injunction - Erinford injunction - Application for Erinford injunction to preserve status quo pending appeal - Refusal of mandatory injunction for closure of Telegram channels at first instance - Publication of false, menacing, and offensive content against Government and royal institution - Whether appeal would be rendered nugatory if injunction not granted - Whether greater risk of injustice in refusing application - Whether damages adequate and suitable remedy for harm caused - Whether public interest outweighed private interest
Mahazan Mat Taib J
In an application for taxation of bills of costs, once the invoices issued by the legal firm are confirmed to be detailed bills of costs and not gross sum bills, s. 121(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 ('LPA') is rendered inapplicable. The statutory time periods in the LPA must be strictly adhered to, and where no cogent reasons are provided for the delay in the application for taxation, the court would not exercise its inherent discretion to order taxation. Such application is bound to fail. CIVIL PROCEDURE | LEGAL PROFESSION
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Bill of costs - Taxation - Application for - Legal fees quoted close to hearing at Federal Court - Challenge by client - Whether exorbitant fees - Whether legal fees agreed upon - Whether client raised objection on fees quoted prior to hearing - Whether invoices sent were detailed bills of cost and not gross sum bills - Whether application time-barred - Whether court has inherent jurisdiction to order taxation - Whether issue of taxation applied to counsel not directly instructed on issues at hand - Legal Profession Act 1976, ss. 121(1), (2), 124, 126 & 128 LEGAL PROFESSION: Bill of costs - Taxation - Application for - Legal fees quoted close to hearing at Federal Court - Challenge by client - Whether exorbitant fees - Whether legal fees agreed upon - Whether client raised objection on fees quoted prior to hearing - Whether invoices sent were detailed bills of cost and not gross sum bills - Whether application time-barred - Whether court has inherent jurisdiction to order taxation - Whether issue of taxation applied to counsel not directly instructed on issues at hand - Legal Profession Act 1976, ss. 121(1), (2), 124, 126 & 128
Aliza Sulaiman J
ARTICLESLNS Article(s)
LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTSPrincipal Acts
Amending Acts
PU(A)
PU(B)
Legislation Alert Updated
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