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Issue #30/2026
23 July 2026

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CASE SPOTLIGHTS

FAZIL FAIZAL v. PP [2026] 7 CLJ 56
HIGH COURT MALAYA, JOHOR BAHRU
ABDUL FAREED ABDUL GAFOOR JC
[CRIMINAL REVISION NO: JA-43-5-04-2026]
10 APRIL 2026

A sentencing court exceeds its jurisdiction and commits an error of law when it imposes a punishment not prescribed by the governing statute, even if that punishment was mistakenly included in the prosecution's charge sheet. Where an accused person is unrepresented, judicial officers bear a strict, non-delegable duty to independently scrutinise the charge sheet to ensure it accurately reflects statutory law, rather than relying mechanically on the drafted charge. Failure to fulfil this judicial responsibility undermines the fairness of the proceedings, rendering any resulting unlawful sentence subject to correction under the High Court's revisionary jurisdiction.

CRIMINAL LAW: Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act 1958, s. 7(1) - Possession of samurai sword without lawful authority - Sentence of whipping imposed in addition to imprisonment - Whether there was erroneous charge sheet misstating law - Whether Sessions Court exceeded jurisdiction - Criminal Procedure Code, s. 325 - Courts of Judicature Act 1964, ss. 31 & 35

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Revision - Legality of sentence - Possession of samurai sword without lawful authority - Sentence of whipping imposed in addition to imprisonment - Whether there was erroneous charge sheet misstating law - Whether Sessions Court exceeded jurisdiction - Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act 1958, s. 7(1) - Criminal Procedure Code, s. 325 - Courts of Judicature Act 1964, ss. 31 & 35

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Charge - Charge sheet - Defective charge - Misstatement of law - Whether duty of court to accurately reflect offence and punishment - Sentencing - Whipping imposed when not prescribed by statute - Whether Sessions Court exceeded jurisdiction - Whether duty of judicial officers to scrutinise charge sheet and ensure compliance with law


JUDICIAL QUOTES

“While it is a trite and cardinal rule that only a legally appointed personal representative may generally sue on behalf of an estate, this rule is not absolute. The Federal Court in Al Rashidy Kassim & Ors v. Rosman Roslan [2007] 3 CLJ 361 carved out a crucial exception, holding that beneficiaries possess “at least an equity in the estate” entitling them to commence legal action when “special circumstances” exist, specifically to protect and preserve the assets of the estate from imminent loss or dissipation.”

“This court also accepts the plaintiffs' submission that the reliance on Dato' Ramesh Rajaratnam (supra) is incomplete as it ignores the crucial second limb of the Federal Court's ruling in Al Rashidy (supra). The Federal Court explicitly held that beneficiaries “have at least an equity in the estate of the deceased to entitle them to seek a declaratory judgment”.

“This court finds that the factual matrix of the present case falls squarely within the Al Rashidy (supra) exception.” – Per Johan Lee Kien How J in Chek Zaharah Awang & Anor v. Yahaya Baharom & Ors [2026] 6 CLJ 840

LATEST CASES

Legal Network Series

[2026] CLJU 80

SAP HOLDINGS BERHAD v. DATO' LER CHENG CHYE & ORS

Section 232(3) of the Companies Act 1965 ('CA 1965') and its equivalent, s. 479(2) of the Companies Act 2016 ('CA 2016'), require that a liquidator's remuneration be approved by the committee of inspection or failing that, by creditors, or failing that, by the court. This structure is deliberate, which means that the parliament did not vest the liquidator with unilateral authority to determine or extract his own remuneration. Further r. 142 of the Companies (Winding-Up) Rules 1972 merely prescribes the scale of fees for quantifying remuneration and it does not confer authority to remove money from the liquidation estate. Rule 142 cannot be invoked to bypass s. 232(3) of the CA 1965 or s. 479(2) of the CA 2016. It follows that the withdrawal of monies from the liquidation estate as remuneration of the liquidators without any statutory approval is a clear a violation of s. 232(3) of the CA 1965 or s. 479(2) of the CA 2016 and, on its face, constitutes misapplication of company property.

COMPANY LAW: Winding up - Liquidator - Restitution - Breach of duty - Misfeasance - Liquidators withdrew huge sum of money as remuneration - Payments made without approval of by a committee of inspection, creditors' resolution or court sanction - Liquidators were subsequently removed and replaced by official receiver - Payments made to a company in which liquidators held personal interests - Conflict of interest - Whether payments made contravened s. 479(2) of Companies Act 2016 - Whether liquidator's conduct amounteds to misfeasance and breach of duty - Whether liquidators had obtained approval before withdrawing remuneration - Whether withdrawal without any statutory approval constituteds misapplication of company property - Whether misfeasance established

  • For the applicant - Joshua Kevin, Ruben, Chow Yee Wan & Ong Yi Ting M/s Lim, Han & Teoh
  • For the respondent - Wilson Lim & Huam Wan Ying; M/s Wilson Lim

[2026] CLJU 102

PATMINDERJIT SINGH RUBA v. SHARIN KAUR RUBA GURUBACHAN SINGH

A caveator challenging validity of a will and opposing an ex parte application for grant of probate must take steps to regularise her challenge through a recognized contentious probate procedure. Once allegations of suspicious circumstances, undue influence and fraud were raised, it was incumbent upon the caveator to formulate and prosecute those allegations through a proper probate action. Requiring the propounder of the will to initiate a probate action would place him in the position of having to plead allegations against his own case, even though those allegations had not been formally instituted or clearly articulated by the caveator.

SUCCESSION: Probate - Will - Grant of probate - Caveat - Caveat lodged against estate - Serious allegations raised by caveator concerning validity of will - Caveator failed to challenge will properly despite multiple opportunities provided - Caveator failed to commence probate action and file citation despite court's express directions - Whether requiring applicant to initiate probate action would be procedurally inappropriate - Whether Rules of Court allowed caveat to be used as procedural device to suspend grant of probate - Whether court could exercise discretion under O. 71 r. 38 of Rules of Court 2012 to dispose of matter summarily

  • For the applicant - Sri Nagavarnan; M/s Rizal Many & Logan
  • For the intervener - Theng Kai Chi; M/s Ling & Theng Book

[2026] CLJU 144

MAYBANK ISLAMIC BERHAD v. MEGA SASA SDN BHD

Communications genuinely aimed at settlement are privileged and inadmissible, whether or not they are expressly labelled "without prejudice". Where affidavit evidence contains privileged, irrelevant, or otherwise inadmissible matter, the court has the discretion, in the interest of fairness and to preserve the integrity of the proceedings, to strike out or expunge only the offending portions, without striking out the affidavit in its entirety.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Affidavits - Expunging of - Paragraphs and exhibits - Privileged communications - 'Without prejudice' letter - Letter relate to discussions on repayment and settlement - Power of court to strike out or expunge affidavit materials - Whether tacit understanding existed between parties that privileged communications would be excluded as evidence in proceedings should settlement fail - Whether entire affidavit should be struck out - Whether court may make consequential directions to ensure proceedings could continue on proper footing

EVIDENCE: Privilege - Privileged communications - 'Without prejudice' letters - Whether inadmissible as evidence - Whether privilege determined objectively by reference to nature and purpose of communication at time it was made

  • For the petitioner - Wong Weng Yew; M/s Sucha Singh & Partners
  • For the respondent - Ian Hannibal Liang Danial Liang; M/s Damien Chan, Hannibal & Ng Chambers

[2026] CLJU 146

RE: NUR SYAFEENAZ FARHANAH ROSMAN; EX-PARTE: KOONG LIN

Every partner in a firm is liable for all debts of the firm which accrued while he is a partner of the said firm. A partner can still be liable for the debts even after the firm had ceased its operations. It follows that a partner of a firm can be liable for the judgment entered against the firm and leave to commence bankruptcy proceedings may be granted against the said partner.

BANKRUPTCY: Bankruptcy notice - Leave to issue - Judgment creditor sought to enforce judgment against partner of a firm - Judgment entered against firm - Firm ceased operations - Leave application was made by summons in chambers - Whether judgment constituted was a final judgment within meaning of s. 3(1) of Insolvency Act 1967 - Whether leave under O. 77 r. 5 of Rules of Court 2012 was required - Whether application was properly made through summons in chambers - Whether partner of a firm was liable for judgment - Whether leave may be granted

  • For the judgment debtor - Aznil Majid; M/s Arief & Iskandar
  • For the judgment creditor - Tan Li Min; M/s Michael Chai & Co

[2026] CLJU 94

PRASARANA MALAYSIA BERHAD & SATU LAGI lwn. LINGKARAN NIKMAT SDN BHD & SATU LAGI

Pindaan kepada pliding boleh dibuat bagi membolehkan kertas-kertas kausa dijadikan teratur mengikut undang-undang. Ini bagi mengelakkan sebarang keputusan atau perintah yang diberikan menjadi tidak sah disebabkan ketidakpatuhan tersebut. Justeru, suatu pindaan kepada writ saman, bertujuan untuk menunjukkan kedudukan sebenar defendan di dalam tindakan, yang dilakukan secara bona fide bagi mematuhi s. 9(c) Akta Pertubuhan 1966 adalah wajar dibenarkan.

PROSEDUR SIVIL: Pliding - Pindaan - Writ saman - Permohonan dibuat bagi membolehkan defendan dinamakan dengan mematuhi s. 9(c) Akta Pertubuhan 1966 - Permohonan pindaan dibuat setelah permohonan pembatalan tuntutan difailkan - Permohonan pembatalan ditolak - Sama ada permohonan pindaan wajar dipertimbangkan - Sama ada permohonan pindaan bona fide - Sama ada defendan akan mengalami sebarang prejudis - Sama ada berlaku penukaran sifat tuntutan jika permohonan pindaan diterima

  • Bagi pihak plaintif-plaintif - Victoria Loi Tien Fen & Kienan Yeo; T/n Shook Lin & Bok
  • Bagi pihak defendan pertama - Tasha Lim Yi Chien & Tze Thung Chin; T/n Gan Partnership
  • Bagi pihak defendan kedua - RK Sharma & Diana Sharma; T/n Rajesh, Chew & Ho

CLJ 2026 Volume 6 (Part 6)

(i) An employer is legally required to draft disciplinary charges with sufficient precision to distinguish between different grades of misconduct. Ambiguity undermines an employee's right to a fair hearing by obscuring the necessary elements the employee must defend against; (ii) An appellate court cannot substitute its own factual inferences for those of the Industrial Court unless there is a clear error of law or principle. Reducing the analysis to a mere technical breach of a company handbook ignores the substantial merits required by law.
Lee Ee Chai v. Kansai Paint Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd [2026] 6 CLJ 831 [CA]

LABOUR LAW: Employment - Dismissal - Misconduct - Stealing or taking company property without permission - Whether charge vague and ambiguous - Whether conflation of distinct offences prejudiced employee - Whether dishonest intention proved - Industrial Relations Act 1967, s. 30(5)

LABOUR LAW: Industrial Court - Dismissal - Employee dismissed from employment due to misconduct of stealing or taking company property without permission - Whether Industrial Court applied correct standard of proof - Whether reference to elements in Penal Code constituted misdirection - Whether High Court substituted own assessment of facts for that of Industrial Court - Whether High Court erred in interfering with findings of fact by Industrial Court

 

 

Azizul Azmi Adnan JCA
Ahmad Fairuz Zainol Abidin JCA
Evrol Mariette Peters JCA

  • For the 1st appellant - Thong Seng Kong, Thong Chee Whei & Ng Chen Hong; M/s Chee Whei, Lee & Co
  • For the respondent - Edward Saw Keat Leong & Jerry Low Kok Kiang; M/s Josephine LK Chow & Co

Lawful beneficiaries have an immediate right to sue to protect threatened estate assets without obtaining letters of administration, as an ancient sale agreement from proper custody - corroborated by decades of uninterrupted physical possession, tax payments, and retention of the original title deed - proves a genuine land sale rather than a loan. Upon the execution of such a contract, the sellers and their heirs hold the legal title merely as constructive bare trustees for the buyer, creating an equitable relationship that bars subsequent property recovery actions. Because heirs who inherit property are legally classified as volunteers rather than bona fide purchasers for value, they take the land subject to all pre-existing equities and cannot claim statutory indefeasibility of title. Consequently, a half-century of total silence and abandonment by the registered owners equitably estops them from invoking strict statutory ownership to unjustly enrich themselves, fully empowering the court to bypass technical procedural errors and directly order the land registrar to rectify the title register.
Chek Zaharah Awang & Anor v. Yahaya Baharom & Ors [2026] 6 CLJ 840 [HC]

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CONTRACT: Agreement - Sale and purchase agreement - Sale and purchase of land - Enforceability - Validity - Whether purchaser took immediate possession and paid part of purchase price - Whether descendants of purchaser continuously occupied and cultivated land for decades - Vendor's successors-in-title attempting to repossess land - Whether ancient sale agreement genuine, valid, and enforceable

CONTRACT: Specific performance - Sale and purchase of land - Executability of remedy - Whether successors-in-title registered as proprietors following full administration of estate - Whether terms of contract crystal clear, precise and unconditional - Whether contract vague or incomplete

LAND LAW: Title - Indefeasibility of title - Successors-in-title - Purchaser in long-standing continuous possession of land and original title deed - Descendants of purchaser seeking specific performance to compel transfer of land - Whether registered title of successors-in-title defeasible

LIMITATION: Action - Cause of action - Action to recover land - Continuous possession by purchaser and beneficiaries - When time begins to run - Whether claim statute-barred under Limitation Act 1953 - Whether barred by doctrine of laches

SUCCESSION: Administration of estates - Action by beneficiaries - Intestacy - Deceased purchaser's beneficiaries commenced action without letters of administration - Whether there was imminent threat and physical encroachment upon ancestral land - Whether there was urgency to preserve status quo and protect estate assets - Whether beneficiaries possessed locus standi to institute action - Rules of Court 2012, O. 15 r. 6A

TRUSTS: Constructive trust - Bare trust - Vendor and purchaser - Sale and purchase of land - Part payment of purchase price and immediate delivery of vacant possession - Whether vendors and successors-in-title held legal title as bare trustees or constructive trustees for purchaser and beneficiaries - Whether limitation applied to action by beneficiaries to recover trust property - Limitation Act 1953, s. 22(1)

Johan Lee Kien How J

  • For the plaintiffs - Noorlaili Aziz & Ang Khoon Cheong; M/s Laili & Co
  • For the 1st-6th defendants - Nurul Shahida Mohd Shukeri & Rafidi Mohamad; M/s Shamsudin Bahari & Rafidi
  • For the 7th defendant - Nurul Liyana Mohammad Nasir; SLA

An order for judgment on admission under O. 27 r. 3 of the Rules of Court 2012 cannot legally stand if the underlying principal debt has been fully settled prior to the court's decision, as courts do not adjudicate in vacuo or grant summary relief over non-existent controversies. Furthermore, the voluntary payment or regularisation of a debt does not automatically equate to a clear, unequivocal admission of a contractual breach within the meaning of O. 27 r. 3, nor does it concede liability for related consequential claims. When residuary claims, such as interest, general damages, and costs, remain heavily disputed, they depend on factors like causation, foreseeability, or supervening legal constraints. Consequently, they present triable issues of law and fact that must be determined through a full trial on the merits rather than being disposed of by a summary mechanism.
FGP Ventures Sdn Bhd v. Subayogan Sinniah [2026] 6 CLJ 862 [HC]

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgment - Judgment on admission - Application for judgment on admission allowed by Sessions Court Judge ('SCJ') despite full settlement of principal sum prior to decision - Whether SCJ erred in entering judgment for principal sum after it was paid and no longer live issue - Whether court adjudicates in vacuo - Whether entry of judgment resulted in manifest injustice - Whether order could stand - Whether triable issues arose - Rules of Court 2012, O. 27 r. 3

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Summary disposal - Judgment on admission - Requirements - High threshold - Respondent relied on subsequent payment of principal sum as admission of liability - Whether payment of principal sum constituted automatic admission of a legally actionable breach - Whether juridical basis for residuary claims remained disputed - Whether all components of cause of action admitted - Whether triable issues arose

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Trial - Issues for trial - Residuary claims for interest, general damages and costs remaining after settlement of principal sum - Delay in payment due to supervening legal constraints - Whether delay legally excusable - Whether residuary claims disclosed triable questions of fact and law requiring adjudication on merits - Whether appropriate for summary mechanism under O. 27 r. 3 of Rules of Court 2012

 

 

Muhammad Adam Abdullah JC

  • For the appellant - Tong Joe Jye; M/s Munhoe
  • For the respondent - Ahmad Musthafi Mohamad; M/s Hashim Amran Tabian Ahmad

The omission of an exact due date does not automatically invalidate a payment claim under s. 5(2)(a) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 if the omission is directly caused by the respondent's own failure to perform a contractual prerequisite. Where a respondent is fully aware of the nature of the claims and faces no ambiguity regarding its payment obligations, it cannot rely on its own contractual default to claim a lack of adjudicator jurisdiction.
Greencon Resources Sdn Bhd v. Exyte Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2026] 6 CLJ 881 [HC]

CONSTRUCTION LAW: Adjudication - Enforcement - Setting aside - Payment claim - Validity - Omission of specific due dates for payment - Whether omission invalidated payment claim and deprived adjudicator of jurisdiction - Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012, ss. 5(2)(a), 15(b), (d), 16(1)(b) & 28

CONSTRUCTION LAW: Adjudication - Jurisdiction - Excess of jurisdiction - Retention sum - Adjudicator allowed claim for release of retention sum post-termination - Whether adjudicator acted in excess of jurisdiction by rewriting contract - Whether adjudicator failed to consider submissions and provide proper reasons - Whether challenge went to merits of adjudication decision - Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012, s. 15(b)

CONSTRUCTION LAW: Adjudication - Stay of execution - Special circumstances - Concurrent arbitration proceedings - Claimant undergoing scheme of arrangement and facing multiple legal actions - Whether special circumstances or clear injustice established to warrant stay - Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012, s. 16(1)(b)

 

 

Azlan Sulaiman J

  • For the plaintiff - Jason Chong; M/s Zhe Chambers
  • For the defendant - Rodney Gomez, Michelle Lim & Esther Khor; M/s Shearn Delamore & Co

(i) A settlement in a road traffic accident suit against a third-party driver does not bar a subsequent medical negligence suit against healthcare providers. The causes of action are distinct because: (a) the parties and the legal relationships are different; (b) separate duties of care (road safety vs. medical diagnosis/treatment); and (c) divisible injuries; (ii) Aggravated damages, in medical negligence cases, require proof of malicious, contumelious, or exceptional behaviour. A good faith clinical error or institutional oversight, no matter how devastating the result, does not meet this threshold.
Muhammad Aliff Ikhmal Jeffry v. Pengarah Hospital Kota Tinggi Johor Bahru & Ors [2026] 6 CLJ 911 [HC]

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TORT: Negligence - Medical negligence - Quantum - Principles of assessment - Amputation of right above-knee - Misdiagnosis and failure to investigate emergency - Amputation avoidable had injury been competently diagnosed - Failure to refer patient to rehabilitation - Whether hospital liable for claimant's failure to adapt to prosthetic limb - Whether award should be at upper end of range

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Res judicata - Estoppel - Consent judgment - Claimant settled claim against driver in road traffic accident suit - Subsequent suit against doctors and hospital for medical negligence - Whether second suit barred by res judicata or estoppel

 

Noradura Hamzah JC

  • For the plaintiff - Hardeep Singh Mann; M/s NM Tiong & Co
  • For the defendants - Suhana Sabil & Nur Najihah Hamidi; SFCs

The supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under O. 53 of the Rules of Court 2012 is strictly governed by mandatory procedural preconditions and a non-curable three-month jurisdictional time-bar. A judicial review application is fundamentally defective and an abuse of process from its inception if it fails to satisfy this statutory framework. Specifically, this occurs when an applicant initiates proceedings via an originating summons, omits express prayers for leave and the mandatory statement of particulars, or fails to seek the necessary prerogative reliefs under the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. Furthermore, the court will not exercise its discretion to extend time after an inordinate delay unless the applicant presents a cogent justification supported by clear evidence. Purely observational, non-determinative administrative documents do not qualify as 'material supervening facts' or 'good reason' capable of displacing the finality of an existing award.
Perbadanan Pengurusan Monet Springtime v. Tribunal Pengurusan Strata & Ors [2026] 6 CLJ 932 [HC]

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Application for leave - Extension of time - Application filed approximately 13 months outside three-month prescribed statutory period - Management corporation challenged Strata Management Tribunal's award revoking stop-work order - Management corporation relied on subsequent Local Authority letter and technical report as material supervening facts altering legal landscape - Whether documents contained findings of breach or conclusions of illegality - Whether documents purely observational and administrative - Whether documents provided cogent justification or good reason to extend time - Whether court should exercise discretion to extend time - Whether delay excessive and unexplained - Whether application procedurally defective and abuse of process - Rules of Court 2012, O. 53 r. 3(6) & (7)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Application for - Mode of commencement - Applicant commenced proceedings by way of originating summons - Failure to seek any prerogative orders enumerated in para. 1 of Schedule to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 - Failure to obtain leave of court - Failure to file statement setting out particulars, relief sought and grounds relied upon - Whether omissions fatal - Whether cumulative effect of defects constituted mere procedural irregularity or failure to satisfy mandatory preconditions - Rules of Court 2012, O. 53 rr. 3(1), (2) & (7) - Courts of Judicature Act 1964, Schedule, para. 1

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Stay of proceedings - Application for stay of enforcement of tribunal award - Presupposition of validly invoked supervisory jurisdiction - Failure to satisfy mandatory procedural pre-conditions and time threshold - Whether court vested with jurisdiction to grant interim relief - Failure to show irreparable prejudice or special circumstances - Whether stay application sustainable - Rules of Court 2012, O. 53 r. 5

STRATA PROPERTY: Tribunal - Award - Challenge against award - Management corporation seeking extension of time to apply for leave for judicial review - Management corporation challenged Strata Management Tribunal's award revoking stop-work order - Challenge mounted 13 months out of time based on subsequent technical reports - Whether enforcing tribunal award would compel management corporation to act unlawfully - Strata Management Act 2013

 

Nixon Kennedy Kumbong JC

  • For the applicant - JD Kumaran; M/s Rasvin Sodhi & Co
  • For the respondents - Crystal Yong Qian Yin & Wai Chong Khuan; M/s Low & Partners

An application under s. 53 of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001, requires judicial scrutiny and the court must be satisfied that the property to be seized falls within one of the statutory categories. That satisfaction must rest on some objective material, albeit less than what is required for forfeiture. Otherwise, the safeguard of judicial oversight is hollow. As a restraining order under s. 53 is an interlocutory mechanism that severely impairs fundamental property rights pending final determination, the threshold of the preservatory stage requires the prosecution to establish a prima facie case, demonstrating on a balance of probabilities that a clear link exists between the impugned assets and the alleged unlawful activity. It is insufficient for the prosecution to rely on, inter alia, alleged intelligence reports, affidavits and assertions of unexplained wealth, without resorting to cogent evidence sufficient to establish the requisite causal and derivational nexus.
PP v. Kinbrace Properties Ltd & Ors [2026] 6 CLJ 946 [HC]

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CRIMINAL LAW: Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 ('AMLA') - Sections 4(1) and 53 - Application to restrain disposal or any dealing of properties - Evidentiary threshold under ss. 4(1) and 53 of AMLA - Alleged predicate unlawful activities under s. 113 of Income Tax Act 1967 and s. 36 of Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 - Whether prosecution established property derived or obtained from tax evasion - Whether making false declaration generated proceeds and produced instrumentalities - Whether requisite causal and derivational nexus established between alleged predicate offences and targeted assets - Whether mere suspicion could substitute objective proof

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Prosecution - Gap in evidence - Application to restrain disposal or any dealing of properties - Evidentiary threshold under ss. 4(1) and 53 of Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 - Whether precise statutory limb identified - Whether court 'satisfied' that property fell within defined statutory categories - Whether omission rendered application defective

 

Mohd Arief Emran Arifin J

  • For the prosecution - Mahadi Abdul Jumaat, Siti Amirah Muhammad Ali & Wan Nur Iman Wan Ahmad Afzal; DPPs
  • For the respondents - Gurdial Singh Nijar, Abraham Au Tian Hui, Vam Shir Mooi, Nurul Najwa Zainuddin, Syed Afiq Syed Albakri & Muhammad Adib Musa; M/s Zharif Nizamuddin

The statutory authority of an enforcement agency under the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 is limited to the imposition and maintenance of a restraint on property. Once a freezing or seizure order is lifted or expires by operation of law, the enforcement agency's statutory dominion over the property ceases immediately. The agency does not possess continuing supervisory jurisdiction over private contractual or banking arrangements between a financial institution and its customer. Therefore, any disputes regarding accretions, interest, or shortfalls occurring during the seizure period are private civil matters to be litigated between the account holder and the bank.
Tan Hoo Eng v. PP [2026] 6 CLJ 969 [HC]

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CRIMINAL LAW: Money laundering - Freezing and seizure of bank accounts - Seizure order lifted - Bank failed to release and return full and complete properties due despite cessation of restraint - Whether enforcement authority exercised continuing dominion or supervisory jurisdiction over accounts once order lifted - Whether Public Prosecutor empowered to intervene in internal banking arrangements - Whether matter of private contract - Whether remedy lies in civil proceedings against financial institution - Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments and orders - Committal order - Application for - Freezing and seizure of bank accounts - Seizure order lifted - Non-compliance of prosecution with court order to release and return properties - Prosecution failed to ensure bank released full properties including accretions - Whether there was wilful and contumacious defiance of court order - Whether prosecution had legal authority to instruct bank on private contractual matters

 

Abdul Wahab Mohamed J

  • For the applicant - Gurbachan Singh Bagawan & Aashwini Rajan; M/s Sandeep Gobindeep & Co
  • For the respondent - Zalizan & Muhamad Anas; DPPs

 


ARTICLES

CLJ Article(s)

  1. BERJAYA TIMES SQUARE: A DE FACTO ABROGATION? [Read excerpt]
    by Ranjan Chandran* Kanchana Chandran** Kalpana Chandran*** [2026] 6 CLJ(A) xvii

  2. [2026] 6 CLJ(A) xvii
    MALAYSIA

    BERJAYA TIMES SQUARE: A DE FACTO ABROGATION?

    by
    Ranjan Chandran*
    Kanchana Chandran**
    Kalpana Chandran***

    Introduction

    The Federal Court of Malaysia, in Lim Swee Choo & Anor v. Ong Koh Hou & Another Appeal ('Lim Swee Choo')[1], declared that Berjaya Times Square Sdn Bhd v. M-Concept Sdn Bhd ('Berjaya Times Square')[2] 'can no longer be regarded as a good law'[3], without any express pronouncement that the decision had been overruled. This, then, explains the title.

    Berjaya Times Square has, as noted by the apex court, stood the test of time 'for more than a decade in our jurisprudence'[4], having been cited with approval in several subsequent cases, including by our apex court.

    Is this statement in Lim Swee Choo, that Berjaya Times Square is no longer to be regarded as good law[5], to be understood as an implied overruling of that decision? This understanding is, however, somewhat negated by the caveat included in the apex court's judgment in Lim Swee Choo, namely that its 'analysis of Berjaya Times Square is based solely on the face of the grounds of judgment', and that the court was 'not privy to what transpired during the hearing'[6]. The court expressed the following sentiments:

    We feel it right to record as part of this judgment that our analysis of Berjaya Times Square is based solely on the face of the grounds of judgment. As with other judicial scrutiny expected of our role, we are not privy to what transpired during the hearing as the matter was decided before our time.[7]

    . . .

    * Consultant, Hakem Arabi & Associates

    ** Advocate & Solicitor (Malaya), Barrister (Inner Temple), Solicitor (England & Wales) (non-practising); Centre for Commercial Law and Justice, Sunway University.

    *** Advocate & Solicitor (Malaya), Barrister (Inner Temple) and Solicitor (England & Wales) (non-practising).

LNS Article(s)

  1. STATUTORY CONCLUSIVENESS OF REGISTERED TITLE AND UNREGISTERED PRIVATE AGREEMENTS: REVISITING CO-PROPRIETORSHIP TERMINATION IN LEONG WAI CHOONG v. MAH GUAT ENG [Read excerpt]
    by Tan Guan You[i] Dr. Nur Atheefa Sufeena M Suaree[ii] [2026] CLJU(A) lxx

  2. [2026] CLJU(A) lxx
    MALAYSIA

    STATUTORY CONCLUSIVENESS OF REGISTERED TITLE AND UNREGISTERED PRIVATE AGREEMENTS:
    REVISITING CO-PROPRIETORSHIP TERMINATION IN LEONG WAI CHOONG v. MAH GUAT ENG


    by
    Tan Guan You[i]
    Dr. Nur Atheefa Sufeena M Suaree[ii]

    ABSTRACT

    This article provides a critical evaluation of the Malaysian Court of Appeal decision in Leong Wai Choong v. Mah Guat Eng, examining the jurisprudential conflict between the statutory conclusiveness of the Torrens registry and the equitable enforcement of unregistered private family agreements. Centred on a multi-generational property dispute involving a commercial building in Kuala Lumpur, the case highlights the tension between statutory requirements of the Torrens system and equitable claims arising from a longstanding family arrangement. The majority judgment affirmed the supremacy of section 89 of the National Land Code ('NLC'), ruling that unrecorded contractual arrangements cannot permanently bind undivided shares or strip co-proprietors of their absolute statutory right to seek a judicial termination of co-proprietorship. Conversely, the dissenting opinion invoked section 206(3) of the NLC, arguing that decades of continuous possession and internal family arrangements may give rise to equitable interests capable of protection despite the absence of formal registration. This article examines the scope and application of section 206(3), the legal status of unregistered subdivisions, and the role of the courts in resolving disputes arising from long-standing informal land arrangements. Ultimately, the decision reaffirmed the primacy of the Torrens register in determining proprietary rights, demonstrating the need for families to formalise partition arrangements through the statutory procedures prescribed under the NLC rather than relying on prolonged informal arrangements.

    . . .

    [i] Undergraduate Law Student, Faculty of Law, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

    [ii] Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTS

Principal Acts

Number Title In force from Repealed Superseded
ACT 884 Johor Bahru-Singapore Rapid Transit System Link Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -
ACT 883 Records (Disposal) (Sarawak) Act 1955 (Revised—2026) 15 June 2026 revised edition pursuant to paragraph 6(1)(xxiii) of the Revision of Laws Act 1968 [Act 1]; Revised up to 5 June 2026; First enacted in 1955 as Sarawak Ordinance No 14 of 1955; First Revision - 1958; First Reprint - 1966 - -
ACT 882 Government Procurement Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -
ACT 881 International Settlement Agreements Resulting From Mediation Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -
ACT 880 Capitation Grant Act 2026 1 April 2026 - -

Amending Acts

Number Title In force from Principal/Amending Act No
ACT A1793 Environmental Quality (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 127
ACT A1792 Supplementary Supply (2025) Act 2026 1 May 2026  
ACT A1791 Passports (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 150
ACT A1790 Immigration (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 155
ACT A1789 Rukun Tetangga (Amendment) Act 2026 1 April 2026 [PU(B) 90/2026] ACT 751

PU(A)


PU(B)

Number Title Date of Publication In force from Principal/ Amending Act No
PU(B) 235/2026 Notice To Third Parties 9 July 2026 10 July 2026 ACT 613
PU(B) 234/2026 Notification of Value of Crude Petroleum Oil Under Section 12 9 July 2026 10 July 2026 to 23 July 2026 ACT 235
PU(B) 233/2026 Notice To Third Parties 9 July 2026 10 July 2026 ACT 613
PU(B) 232/2026 Notice of Contested Election Legislative Assembly For The State of Johore - Corrigendum 6 July 2026   PU(B) 229/2026
PU(B) 231/2026 Appointment and Revocation of Appointment of Assistant Registrars of Fishermen's Associations 6 July 2026 Appointment - Specified in column (2) of the First Schedule; Revocation - Specified in column (2) of the Second Schedule ACT 44

Legislation Alert

Updated

Act/Principal No. Title Amended by In force from Section amended
PU(A) 220/2022 Copyright (Authorized Entity) Order 2022 PU(A) 249/2026 3 July 2026 Schedule
PU(A) 220/2022 Perintah Hak Cipta (Entiti Yang Diberi Kuasa) 2022 PU(A) 249/2026 3 Julai 2026 Jadual
PU(A) 128/2000 Peraturan-Peraturan Komunikasi Dan Multimedia (Spektrum) 2000 PU(A) 238/2026 1 Julai 2026 Jadual Pertama dan Jadual Kedua
AKTA 133 Akta Jalan, Parit Dan Bangunan 1974 AKTA A1773 1 Julai 2026 [PU(B) 222/2026] - Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Putrajaya dan Wilayah Persekutuan Labuan Seksyen 47, 48 dan 125A
ACT 133 Street, Drainage and Building Act 1974 ACT A1773 1 July 2026 [PU(B) 222/2026] - Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, Federal Territory of Putrajaya and Federal Territory of Labuan Sections 47, 48 and 125A

Revoked

Act/Principal No. Title Revoked by In force from
PU(A) 93/2026 Perintah Mesin Cetak Dan Penerbitan (Kawalan Hasil Penerbitan Tidak Diingini) (No. 12) 2026 [Dibatalkan Oleh PU(A) 266/2026] PU(A) 266/2026 17 July 2026
PU(A) 93/2026 Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) (No. 12) Order 2026 [Revoked By PU(A) 266/2026] PU(A) 266/2026 17 July 2026
PU(A) 69/2026 Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) Order 2026 [Revoked By PU(A) 265/2026] PU(A) 265/2026 17 July 2026
PU(A) 69/2026 Perintah Mesin Cetak Dan Penerbitan (Kawalan Hasil Penerbitan Tidak Diingini) 2026 [Dibatalkan Oleh PU(A) 265/2026] PU(A) 265/2026 17 Julai 2026
PU(A) 283/2023 Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) (No. 4) Order 2023 [Revoked By PU(A) 264/2026] PU(A) 264/2026 16 July 2026

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