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Issue #51/2025
18 December 2025
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CASE SPOTLIGHTS
SITI ZABEDAH KASIM v. AKMAL NADZIM ABDULLAH & ORS [2025] 10 CLJ 1000 (i) Enforcement agencies must strictly adhere to all statutory and constitutional requirements before exercising powers of raid, search or arrest. Failure to comply with the mandatory procedures render the entire action unlawful; (ii) An advocate and solicitor should be able to question any searches, raids or seizures which are illegal and ultra vires the powers under which an enforcement agency seeks to act. Questioning authority in this capacity does not constitute 'obstruction of a public officer' under s. 186 of the Penal Code if the enforcement officers were not lawfully discharging their duties. TORT: False imprisonment - Claim - Claimant attended event in capacity as advocate and solicitor - Fund-raising dinner held by trans women with theme 'Miss World' - Event raided by religious enforcement officers - Claimant detained, arrested and charged at Magistrates' Court - Offence of obstructing public officer under s. 186 of Penal Code - Whether there was false imprisonment by religious enforcement officers TORT: Misfeasance in public office - Claim - Claimant attended event in capacity as advocate and solicitor - Fund-raising dinner held by trans women with theme 'Miss World' - Event raided by religious enforcement officers - Claimant detained, arrested and charged at Magistrates' Court - Offence of obstructing public officer under s. 186 of Penal Code - Whether there was misfeasance in public office by religious enforcement officers TORT: Malicious prosecution - Claim - Claimant attended event in capacity as advocate and solicitor - Fund-raising dinner held by trans women with theme 'Miss World' - Event raided by religious enforcement officers - Claimant detained, arrested and charged at Magistrates' Court - Offence of obstructing public officer under s. 186 of Penal Code - Whether there was malicious prosecution in prosecuting claimant - Whether defence of good faith provided by Government Proceedings Act 1956 available to tortfeasors TORT: Vicarious liability - Claim - Claim for false imprisonment, misfeasance in public office and malicious prosecution - Claimant attended event in capacity as advocate and solicitor - Fund-raising dinner held by trans women with theme 'Miss World' - Event raided by religious enforcement officers - Claimant detained, arrested and charged at Magistrates' Court - Offence of obstructing public officer under s. 186 of Penal Code - Whether there was vicarious liability by Government of Malaysia and superior officers for tortious acts committed by subordinates CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Fundamental liberties - Personal liberty - Claimant attended event in capacity as advocate and solicitor - Fund-raising dinner held by trans women with theme 'Miss World' - Event raided by religious enforcement officers - Claimant detained, arrested and charged at Magistrates' Court - Offence of obstructing public officer under s. 186 of Penal Code - Whether there was breach of personal liberty - Federal Constitution, art. 5(1) APPEAL UPDATES
LATEST CASESLegal Network Series
CLJ 2025 Volume 10 (Part 5) (i) When interpreting s. 69(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ('CJA') and r. 7(2) and (3A) of the Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 ('RCA'), the court should depart from a strict and literal interpretation and instead adopt a purposive approach to avoid an impractical, undesirable, and absurd consequence that would negate the true spirit and purpose of the RCA and the appellate role of the Court of Appeal, as entrenched by s. 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967; (ii) A purposive interpretation of the relevant provisions means that the special conditions of Ladd v. Marshall, as codified under r. 7(3A) of the RCA, must be cumulatively and conjunctively applied against all applications to admit further evidence on appeal, regardless of the type or class of new evidence. The applicant must therefore satisfy the court that the evidence: (a) could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial; (b) would likely influence the decision of the court; and (c) must be presumably credible. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION | EVIDENCE
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Construction of statutes - Leave of court to adduce new evidence at appellate stage - Purposive approach and literal interpretation - Whether court ought to depart from strict and literal interpretation of s. 69(2) of Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and r. 7(2) and (3A) of Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 - Whether purposive approach ought to be adopted to avoid impractical, undesirable and absurd consequence - Krishnasamy Kuppusamy & Anor v. Pengarah Hospital Sultanah Aminah & Ors And Other Appeals - Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, s. 17A EVIDENCE: Fresh or further evidence - New evidence - Leave of court to adduce new evidence at appellate stage - Whether court should follow strict and literal interpretation of s. 69(2) of Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and r. 7(2) and (3A) of the Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 - Whether ought to adopt purposive approach of interpretation to ascertain mischief the provisions practically seek to remedy - Whether requisites or threshold of admitting further evidence at appeal satisfied - Krishnasamy Kuppusamy & Anor v. Pengarah Hospital Sultanah Aminah & Ors And Other Appeals
Hanipah Farikullah JCA
(i) Moneylending agreements can be void, without effect and unenforceable due to non-compliance of the Moneylenders Act 1951 ('MLA'). However, such non-compliance of the MLA does not render the moneylending agreements or transactions illegal. While all illegal agreements are void, not all void agreements are illegal. Moneylending agreements are not illegal either under the MLA or s. 24 of the Contracts Act 1950 ('CA') if they are entered by a licensed moneylender, does not impose extortionate interest rates on the borrower, and neither their consideration nor object is immoral or against public policy; (ii) Where the moneylender's act of lending the monies and disbursing the loans has been carried out, an agreement has been performed. In such scenario, the application of proportionality to the matrix of facts supports granting the moneylender restitution under s. 66 of the CA. Refusing a s. 66 remedy would not constitute a proportionate response, particularly given that the moneylending agreements, though void, are not illegal. CONTRACT
CONTRACT: Illegality - Agreement - Moneylending agreements - Whether agreements complied with prescribed form required for secured loans - Whether there was non-compliance of Moneylenders Act 1951 - Whether agreements void and unenforceable - Whether agreements and transactions illegal under s. 24 of Contracts Act 1950 CONTRACT: Restitution - Applicability - Moneylending agreements - Agreements discovered to be void and unenforceable - Whether moneylender entitled to recover restitution - Guidelines in case of Detik Ria Sdn Bhd v. Prudential Corporation Holdings Ltd And Anor - Evaluation of centrality of illegality - Whether agreements illegal under Moneylenders Act 1951 and s. 24 of Contracts Act 1950 - Whether application of proportionality to matrix of facts supported granting of s. 66 remedy
Ravinthran Paramaguru JCA
Despite its equitable mandate under s. 30(5) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 ('Act'), the Industrial Court cannot override or ignore the fundamental company law principle of separate legal personality to impose liability on a non-employer company. The Industrial Court's power to add/substitute parties, under s. 29(a) of the Act, must be exercised in line with the said principle. To allow joinder or substitution of a non-employer corporate entity, there must be a reasonable factual or legal nexus between the proposed joinee and the dispute pending before the Industrial Court. The proposed joinee must also be among the parties who is liable in law for the termination of employment. Piercing the corporate veil is only justified in special cases, and requires clear and compelling grounds. COURTS | LABOUR LAW | COMPANY LAW | ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
COURTS: Industrial Court - Powers - Power to add/substitute parties - Application to bring in or replace non-employer corporate entity in proceedings - Overlap in directors, registered address, company secretaries or managerial personnel - Whether Industrial Court, guided by equitable mandate, can override/ignore separate legal personality doctrine under company law and impose liability on non-employer company - Industrial Relations Act 1967, ss. 29(a) & 30(5) LABOUR LAW: Procedure - Substitution/joinder - Application to bring in or replace non-employer corporate entity in proceedings - Overlap in directors, registered address, company secretaries or managerial personnel - Criterion and required test - Whether proposed additional party played any role in dispute - Whether there was reasonable factual/legal nexus to dispute - Whether proposed party liable in law for termination -Whether parties to proceedings before Industrial Court may use s. 29(a) of Industrial Relations Act 1967 to bring in/replace non-employer corporate entity in proceedings - Whether more expansive reading of joinder and substitution, adopted in case laws, stretched statutory interpretation and core principles of corporate law beyond statutorily authorised - Industrial Relations Act 1967, s. 29(a) COMPANY LAW: Separate legal entity - Piercing of corporate veil - Power of Industrial Court to add or substitute parties - Application to bring in or replace non-employer corporate entity in proceedings - Overlap in directors, registered address, company secretaries or managerial personnel - Whether parties to proceedings before Industrial Court may use s. 29(a) of Industrial Relations Act 1967 to bring in/replace non-employer corporate entity in proceedings - Whether Industrial Court can override/ignore separate legal personality doctrine under company law - Salomon v. A Salomon & Co Ltd ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Certiorari - Appeal - Challenge against awards of Industrial Court - Application to bring in or replace non-employer corporate entity in proceedings - Overlap in directors, registered address, company secretaries or managerial personnel - Industrial Court ordered substitution and joinder - High Court dismissed applications for judicial review - Whether Industrial Court erred in allowing substitution and joinder - Whether awards ought to be quashed S Nantha Balan JCA (Civil Appeal No: W-01(A)-128-03-2021)
(i) An insurance policy that is purchased after an accident occurred is not enforceable under s. 96 of the Road Transport Act 1987 ('RTA'); there is no insurance coverage at the material time of the accident. Section 96(3) of the RTA allows an insurer to void a policy by seeking a declaration to that effect before the date of liability which is the date of the running down judgment; (ii) The s. 96(3) avenue applies to all litigants in the same class as the insurer, the insured and the third-party victim. There is nothing discriminatory in it against a third party victim. INSURANCE | ROAD TRAFFIC | CIVIL PROCEDURE
INSURANCE: Motor insurance - Policy - Enforceability of - Road accident between car and motorcycle - Whether car insured at time of incident - Cover note of policy issued on same day as accident - Whether policy purchased and issued after accident occurred - Whether there was assumption of risk with regard to accident - Whether policy extended to accident in question - Whether there was insurance coverage at material time of accident - Road Transport Act 1987, s. 96(3) ROAD TRAFFIC: Insurance - Third party claims - Road accident between car and motorcycle - Enforceability of policy - Whether car insured at time of incident - Cover note of policy issued on same day as accident - Whether policy purchased and issued after accident occurred - Whether there was assumption of risk with regard to accident - Whether policy extended to accident in question - Whether there was insurance coverage at material time of accident - Road Transport Act 1987, s. 96(3) CIVIL PROCEDURE: Proceedings - Mode of commencement - Application under s. 96(3) of Road Transport Act 1987 for declaration that insurance policy purchased and issued after accident occurred void and not enforceable - Whether originating summons proper mode of commencement of proceedings - Whether triable issues arose that merit matter to be decided at trial - Doctrine of waiver - Whether applicable - Whether there was infringement of constitutional right under art. 8 of Federal Constitution Ravinthran Paramagurug JCA
A novation does not transfer property, but completely extinguishes an existing contract, creating in its place an entirely new agreement among the parties. Novation requires the consent of all parties involved including the original contracting parties and the incoming party. Hence, novation is distinct from a transfer and an assignment. Consideration for novation does not need to be monetary. It can validly consist of parties' mutual promises, such as the agreement to release one party from prior obligation. As such, a novation agreement does not fall within s. 16(1) of the Stamp Act 1949 and is not subject to a duty under Item 32(a) of the First Schedule of the Stamp Act 1949. CONTRACT | REVENUE LAW
CONTRACT: Agreement - Novation agreement - Effect of - Whether extinguishes existing contractual relationship and creates entirely new and independent agreement by consent - Whether extinguishes rights and obligations under old contract - Whether parties substituted - Whether there was transfer or conveyance of property - Whether mutual discharge and assumption of obligation constituted valid consideration - Stamp Act 1949, s. 16(1) REVENUE LAW: Stamp duty - Assessment - Challenge against assessment - Novation agreement - Whether true novation - Whether original loan agreement extinguished - Whether created entirely new and independent agreement by consent - Whether novation agreement fell under s. 16(1) and Item 32(a) of First Schedule of Stamp Act 1949 ('Act') - Whether novation agreement ought to be stamped under Item 4 of First Schedule of Act
Ravinthran Paramaguru JCA
(i) A spouse who is the breadwinner during the subsistence of marriage, has a duty to provide complete and candid disclosure of their true earnings and financial state. It is insufficient to merely rely on salary vouchers, particularly when the lifestyle of the family suggests an income higher than disclosed. The court will consider the lack of frankness and may draw adverse inferences, compelling a re-evaluation of the appropriate rate of maintenance; (ii) Assets transferred hastily and without monetary consideration, ie, for love and affection, to a third party, such as a parent, shortly before or during divorce proceedings are likely to be characterised as matrimonial assets that were dissipated to frustrate the division, not as legitimate business assets, especially if the spouse fails to prove otherwise. FAMILY LAW
FAMILY LAW: Divorce - Matrimonial assets - Division - Spouse's earnings - Wife homemaker while husband breadwinner - Husband hastily transferred assets to his mother out of love and affection - Lifestyle of family suggested income higher than disclosed - Whether there was dissipation of assets - Whether transfers designed to frustrate division of matrimonial assets - Whether assets were business assets - Whether there was full and frank disclosure of financial state FAMILY LAW: Divorce - Children - Maintenance for children - Spouse's earnings - Wife homemaker while husband breadwinner - Husband dissipated assets and hastily transferred assets to his mother out of love and affection - Lifestyle of family suggested income higher than disclosed - Whether maintenance for children made based on untrue financial state - Appropriate rate of maintenance for children
Azizah Nawawi CJ (Sabah & Sarawak)
(i) An administrator of an estate has a legal duty to administer and distribute the assets to the beneficiaries within a reasonable time. A prolonged and unreasonable delay, particularly one spanning decades without a valid justification or a lack of transparency, constitutes a breach of this duty; (ii) In cases where a clear injustice or inordinate delay is apparent, the court may exercise its inherent powers under the Rules of Court 2012 to intervene and order the distribution of the assets of the estate to prevent further harm to the beneficiaries. SUCCESSION
SUCCESSION: Estate - Administration - Incomplete administration of estate - Distribution of compensation sum in respect of land acquired by Government - Administrator refused to distribute monies - Unexplained prolonged and inordinate delay - Application to court to order distribution - Rules of Court 2012, O. 80 r. 3(e) & O. 92 r. 4
Noor Ruwena Md Nurdin J
ARTICLESLNS Article(s)
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