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Issue #37/2024
12 September 2024
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CASE(S) OF THE WEEK
OBATA-AMBAK HOLDINGS SDN BHD v. PREMA BONANZA SDN BHD & OTHER APPEALS [2024] 8 CLJ 519 (i) In Ang Ming Lee & Ors v. Menteri Kesejahteraan Bandar, Perumahan Dan Kerajaan Tempatan & Anor And Other Appeals ('Ang Ming Lee'), the Federal Court had declared that reg. 11(3) of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 was ultra vires the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966. The decision, however, does not have a retrospective effect on extensions granted by the Controller of Housing before Ang Ming Lee. Extensions granted before Ang Ming Lee are valid. If Ang Ming Lee is to have a retrospective effect, there would be serious ramifications and repercussions to the housing developers that had placed reliance on the existing laws and had diligently complied with the said laws which were, at that time, valid; (ii) Where an innocent party had relied on an earlier decision made by a public authority that was subsequently declared ultra vires, the second actor theory applies and should be the perfect and preferred antidote; (iii) Parties to a sale and purchase agreement ('SPA'), who had agreed to extended completion periods in the SPA and have, in fact, received liquidated ascertained damages, cannot subsequently claim additional damages, even if the original extension is later found to be illegal. CONTRACT: Agreement - Sale and purchase agreement - Completion period of development project - Extension of time ('EOT') - Developer applied for modification of sale and purchase agreement ('SPA') to vary prescribed completion period of development project - 36 months to 54 months pursuant to reg. 11(3) of Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 ('HDR') - EOT granted by Controller of Housing two years before execution of SPA with purchasers of project - Purchasers commenced proceedings against developer after Federal Court's decision in Ang Ming Lee & Ors v. Menteri Kesejahteraan Bandar, Perumahan Dan Kerajaan Tempatan & Anor And Other Appeals ('Ang Ming Lee') - Purchasers sought declaration that any EOT pursuant to reg. 11(3) of HDR inconsistent with decision of Ang Ming Lee - Whether developer required to comply with and was bound to Schedule H of HDR to deliver vacant possession and complete common facilities in 36 months, calculated from dates of SPAs - Whether developer ought to pay liquidated ascertained damages - Whether SPA which provides for period of completion of housing accommodation extended illegally under ultra vires reg. 11(3) of HDR should be reverted to three-year period as provided in standard Schedule H agreement LIMITATION: Cause of action - Accrual - Sale and purchase agreement - Completion period of development project - Developer applied for modification of sale and purchase agreement ('SPA') to vary prescribed completion period of development project - 36 months to 54 months pursuant to reg. 11(3) of Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 ('HDR') - Extension of time ('EOT') granted by Controller of Housing two years before execution of SPA with purchasers of project - Purchasers commenced proceedings against developer after Federal Court's decision in Ang Ming Lee & Ors v. Menteri Kesejahteraan Bandar, Perumahan Dan Kerajaan Tempatan & Anor And Other Appeals - Whether developer ought to pay liquidated ascertained damages ('LAD') for vacant possession of property and common facilities - Whether cause of action for late delivery LAD shall accrue to purchaser upon expiry of three-year period as provided in standard Schedule H agreement - Whether limitation period of claim for late delivery LAD shall commence only upon expiry of three-year period - When time for purchaser's claim for LAD start to run - Limitation Act 1953, s. 6(1)(a) LAND LAW: Vacant possession - Extension of time - Sale and purchase agreement - Completion period of development project - Developer applied for modification of sale and purchase agreement ('SPA') to vary prescribed completion period of development project - 36 months to 54 months pursuant to reg. 11(3) of Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 ('HDR') - Extension of time ('EOT') granted by Controller of Housing ('Controller') two years before execution of SPA with purchasers of project - Purchasers commenced proceedings against developer after Federal Court's decision in Ang Ming Lee & Ors v. Menteri Kesejahteraan Bandar, Perumahan Dan Kerajaan Tempatan & Anor And Other Appeals ('Ang Ming Lee') - Purchasers sought declaration that any EOT pursuant to reg. 11(3) of HDR inconsistent with decision of Ang Ming Lee - Whether Ang Ming Lee had retrospective effect on extensions granted by Controller before Ang Ming Lee - Whether extensions granted before Ang Ming Lee valid APPEAL UPDATES
LATEST CASESLegal Network Series
CLJ 2024 Volume 8 (Part 3) Being the biological father of a child does not automatically mean that one is the father recognised in law. The presumption under s. 112 of the Evidence Act 1950 provides a cloak that presumes that a father in a lawful marriage is both the biological and legal father of the child. That cloak ought not to be shared with a third party as of right, regardless of whether the third party is the biological father of the child, much less when the third party is unsure and unable to prove his purported paternity. In this light, a forced paternity test on a child is an extreme measure that would invade the personal autonomy of a child, more so, when the child is not seeking to know her paternity. The court's jurisdiction under s. 24(d) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, is only over the person and property of an infant; the section does not provide with any enabling power to the courts to order DNA testing. CIVIL PROCEDURE | EVIDENCE | FAMILY LAW
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Jurisdiction - Inherent jurisdiction - Child born during subsistence of valid marriage of parents - Application for deoxyribonucleic acid ('DNA') test to determine paternity of child by third party - Whether DNA test allowed in civil proceedings - Whether written statutory provision or common law provide power for DNA test against adult of child in civil proceedings - Whether inherent jurisdiction under O. 92 r. 4 of Rules of Court 2012 exercised only to prevent procedural injustice - Whether could be invoked to facilitate substantive right EVIDENCE: Presumption - Presumption of fact - Section 112 of Evidence Act 1950 - Birth during marriage conclusive proof of legitimacy - Child born during subsistence of valid marriage of parents - Application for deoxyribonucleic acid ('DNA') test to determine paternity of child by third party - Whether paternity and legitimacy two different concepts - Whether legitimacy of child fact in issue - Whether evidence could be admitted to rebut presumption - Whether 'conclusive proof' in s. 112 bars admissibility of scientific evidence to prove paternity of child born out of wedlock - Evidence Act 1950, s. 4(3) FAMILY LAW: Children - Legitimacy - Child born during subsistence of valid marriage of parents - Application for deoxyribonucleic acid ('DNA') test to determine paternity of child by third party - Whether paternity and legitimacy two different concepts - Whether legitimacy of child fact in issue - Whether evidence could be admitted to rebut presumption - Whether 'conclusive proof' in s. 112 bars admissibility of scientific evidence to prove paternity of child born out of wedlock - Whether DNA test allowed in civil proceedings - Evidence Act 1950, s. 4(3) FAMILY LAW: Children - Paternity - Child born during subsistence of valid marriage of parents - Application for deoxyribonucleic acid ('DNA') test to determine paternity of child by third party - Whether paternity and legitimacy two different concepts - Whether legitimacy of child fact in issue - Whether evidence could be admitted to rebut presumption - Whether 'conclusive proof' in s. 112 bars admissibility of scientific evidence to prove paternity of child born out of wedlock - Whether DNA test allowed in civil proceedings - Whether protective jurisdiction of parens patriae successful - Whether best interest and welfare of child outweighs 'right to know' - Whether DNA test would be damaging and disrupting to child's status quo - Rules of Court 2012, O. 92 r. 4 - Evidence Act 1950, s. 4(3) ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ
(i) In a scenario where the High Court's written judgment/grounds of decision is only available after the expiry of the 90 days' period (filing of record of appeal), r. 18(7) of the Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 ('RCA') does not mandatorily require an appellant to file a record of appeal which contains a memorandum of appeal before the lapse of the 90 days' period. Rule 18(7) of the RCA is subject to r. 18(7A) of the RCA due to the use of the word 'Notwithstanding' in r. 18(7A) of the RCA. Rule 18(7A) has expressly provided that, in the mentioned scenario, an appellant 'shall' file the memorandum of appeal within three weeks after being notified of the availability of the High Court's written judgment/grounds of decision. The use of the opening words 'Notwithstanding subrule (7)' in sub-r. 7A makes it abundantly clear that r. 18(7A) is to prevail over r. 18(7); (ii) Whether or not the broad grounds of judgment of a court may contain binding ratio decidendi must depend on a proper reading of the broad grounds issued in each case. The broad grounds of a case may contain a complete analysis of the issues at hand but may omit a complete narration of the background facts. This should not relegate the grounds so issued into some lesser category of judgment. Thus, the ratio decidendi of a case in respect of which only broad grounds were issued would still operate as binding precedent for the purposes of the principle of stare decisis. Where, however, the Court of Appeal is presented with two conflicting prior decisions of the Court of Appeal, the court would be well entitled to prefer the decision containing the full grounds of judgment of the court, over the decision delivered only with broad grounds. CIVIL PROCEDURE | STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Record of appeal - Whether there was mandatory requirement under r. 18(7) of Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 ('RCA') to file record of appeal containing memorandum of appeal within 90 days of High Court's decision - High Court's written judgment only available after expiry of 90 days period - Whether r. 18(7A) of RCA provides plaintiff 'shall' file memorandum of appeal within three weeks after being notified of availability of High Court's written judgment - Whether r. 18(7A) should prevail over r. 18(7) of RCA - Whether intervention of r. 18(1), (7) and (7A) in consonance with justice as mandated by r. 1A of RCA - Delay in filing supplemental record of appeal containing High Court's written judgment and memorandum of appeal - Whether due solely to non-availability of High Court's written judgment CIVIL PROCEDURE: Notice of motion - Extension of time - Application for - Application for extension of time to file memorandum of appeal - Whether there was mandatory requirement under r. 18(7) of Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 ('RCA') to file record of appeal containing memorandum of appeal within 90 days of High Court's decision - High Court's written judgment only available after expiry of 90 days period - Whether r. 18(7A) of RCA provides plaintiff 'shall' file memorandum of appeal within three weeks after being notified of availability of High Court's written judgment - Whether r. 18(7A) should prevail over r. 18(7) of RCA - Whether intervention of r. 18(1), (7) and (7A) in consonance with justice as mandated by r. 1A of RCA - Delay in filing supplemental record of appeal containing High Court's written judgment and memorandum of appeal - Whether due solely to non-availability of High Court's written judgment CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgment - Grounds of judgment - Broad grounds - Whether binding - Whether per incuriam r. 18(7A) of Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 - Principle of stare decisis STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 - Rules 18(7) & (7A) - Whether there was mandatory requirement under r. 18(7) of Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 ('RCA') to file record of appeal containing memorandum of appeal within 90 days of High Court's decision - Whether r. 18(7A) provides plaintiff 'shall' file memorandum of appeal within three weeks after being notified of availability of High Court's written judgment - Words employed in provision - 'Notwithstanding sub-r. (7)' - Whether r. 18(7A) should prevail over r. 18(7) of RCA
RAVINTHRAN PARAMAGURU JCA
(i) Niat bersama untuk melakukan jenayah masih boleh dibuktikan walaupun tanpa keterangan perancangan terdahulu, persepakatan awal atau konspirasi terancang. Niat bersama boleh terbentuk pada saat tertuduh-tertuduh berkumpul untuk melakukan satu jenayah. Kehadiran tertuduh-tertuduh di tempat kejadian, ditambah dengan penyertaan aktif mereka dalam perbuatan jenayah tersebut, sudah memadai untuk mewujudkan niat bersama. Tindakan kolektif tertuduh-tertuduh, walaupun tanpa perancangan terdahulu, adalah mencukupi untuk membuat kesimpulan wujud niat bersama untuk melakukan jenayah; (ii) Membantu dalam satu-satu jenayah, dalam kes ini pembunuhan, melalui persubahatan adalah sama dengan melakukan jenayah itu sendiri secara langsung; (iii) Hal-hal keadaan dan fakta kes jenayah yang mencerminkan kekejaman melampau, tidak berperikemanusiaan dan tiada penyesalan oleh tertuduh-tertuduh adalah faktor-faktor yang memberatkan lagi justifikasi penjatuhan hukuman mati. Faktor-faktor ini lebih diberatkan berbanding faktor-faktor mitigasi tertuduh-tertuduh. PROSEDUR JENAYAH | UNDANG-UNDANG JENAYAH
PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Rayuan - Rayuan terhadap hukuman dan sabitan - Rayuan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi - Rayuan oleh tertuduh-tertuduh dan pihak pendakwaan - Pertuduhan atas kesalahan dengan sengaja menyebabkan kecederaan si mati bagi maksud mendapatkan pengakuan bersalah daripada si mati - Si mati pelajar universiti - Si mati dituduh mencuri laptop - Si mati dipukul, ditumbuk dan disepak oleh pelajar-pelajar lain sebelum ditekap dengan seterika wap panas ketika soal siasat pemerasan pengakuan - Si mati meninggal dunia akibat kecederaan luka lecur hampir 80% pada tubuh - Terdapat 90 kesan lecur bakar pada darjah pertama hingga ketiga - Setiap tertuduh dijatuhkan hukuman tiga tahun penjara - Sama ada sabitan selamat dan wajar dikekalkan - Hukuman yang wajar dijatuhkan - Kanun Keseksaan, ss. 34 & 330 PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Rayuan - Rayuan terhadap hukuman dan sabitan - Rayuan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi - Rayuan oleh tertuduh-tertuduh dan pihak pendakwaan - Pertuduhan bawah s. 302 Kanun Keseksaan kerana menyebabkan kematian si mati - Si mati pelajar universiti - Si mati dituduh mencuri laptop - Si mati dipukul, ditumbuk dan disepak oleh pelajar-pelajar lain sebelum ditekap dengan seterika wap panas ketika soal siasat pemerasan pengakuan - Si mati meninggal dunia akibat kecederaan luka lecur hampir 80% pada tubuh - Terdapat 90 kesan lecur bakar pada darjah pertama hingga ketiga - Mahkamah Tinggi mensabitkan tertuduh-tertuduh bersalah menyebabkan kematian si mati tanpa niat membunuh, bawah s. 304(a) Kanun Keseksaan - Setiap tertuduh dijatuhkan hukuman 18 tahun penjara - Sama ada sabitan selamat dan wajar dikekalkan - Hukuman yang wajar dijatuhkan UNDANG-UNDANG JENAYAH: Kesalahan - Dengan sengaja menyebabkan kecederaan pada si mati bagi maksud mendapatkan pengakuan bersalah daripada si mati - Si mati pelajar universiti - Si mati dituduh mencuri laptop - Si mati dipukul, ditumbuk dan disepak oleh pelajar-pelajar lain sebelum ditekap dengan seterika wap panas ketika soal siasat pemerasan pengakuan - Si mati meninggal dunia akibat kecederaan luka lecur hampir 80% pada tubuh - Terdapat 90 kesan lecur bakar pada darjah pertama hingga ketiga - Sama ada elemen-elemen kesalahan dipenuhi - Sama ada terdapat niat bersama - Kanun Keseksaan, ss. 34 & 330 UNDANG-UNDANG JENAYAH: Kesalahan - Membunuh - Si mati pelajar universiti - Si mati dituduh mencuri laptop - Si mati dipukul, ditumbuk dan disepak oleh pelajar-pelajar lain sebelum ditekap dengan seterika wap panas ketika soal siasat pemerasan pengakuan - Si mati meninggal dunia akibat kecederaan luka lecur hampir 80% pada tubuh - Terdapat 90 kesan lecur bakar pada darjah pertama hingga ketiga - Sama ada elemen-elemen kesalahan dipenuhi - Sama ada terdapat niat bersama - Kanun Keseksaan, ss. 34, 109, 300 & 302
HADHARIAH SYED ISMAIL HMR
The word 'may', in s. 45C(1) of the Road Transport Act 1987, does not confer a discretion but, rather, imposes a mandatory obligation on police officers investigating alleged drunk driving offences to require a suspect to provide breath, blood or urine specimens for analysis. Section 45C(1) aims at ensuring a fair and accurate determination of alcohol levels and a strict adherence to s. 45C(1) is essential for a valid conviction under s. 45A(1) of the same Act. By failing to comply with s. 45C(1), an accused is deprived of essential procedural safeguards and the integrity of the evidence is compromised. ROAD TRAFFIC | WORDS & PHRASES
ROAD TRAFFIC: Dangerous driving - Drunk driving - Substantive procedure to be followed by police officer in carrying out investigation - Duty to require suspect to provide two specimens of breath for analysis or specimen of blood or urine for laboratory test - Whether substantive procedure complied with - Whether s. 45C(1)(a) of Road Transport Act 1987 mandatory - Whether must be read together with s. 45B(1) to prove offence under s. 45A(1) WORDS & PHRASES: Interpretation - Section 45C(1) of Road Transport Act 1987 - 'may' - Language and usage - Whether directory and used in permissive sense that is not obligatory - Whether confers discretion - Whether 'may' in s. 45C(1) creates obligation or duty - Whether has mandatory force - Whether s. 45C(1) mandatory - Intention, object and scheme of provisions
BHUPINDAR SINGH J
A foreign judgment, although from a country which is not listed under the First Schedule to the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958, can still be enforced here in Malaysia via common law. However, it must be shown that in respect of the foreign judgment: (i) it was decided by a court of competent jurisdiction; (ii) its enforcement will not be contrary to the Malaysian public policy; (iii) its attainment was not due to a breach of the rules of natural justice; and (iv) if only the copied and translated versions of the foreign judgment were produced, the said documents had satisfied the requirements under ss. 78 or 86 of the Evidence Act 1950. CIVIL PROCEDURE | EVIDENCE
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments and orders - Foreign judgment - Enforcement of - Judgments decided by courts in China - China not listed under First Schedule of Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 - Whether judgments could be enforced via common law - Whether courts in China courts of competent jurisdiction - Whether enforcement of judgments contrary to Malaysian public policy - Whether judgments attained by breach of rules of natural justice - Whether in satisfied requirements under ss. 78 or 86 of Evidence Act 1950 EVIDENCE: Documentary evidence - Foreign judgment - Requirement to produce original copy of foreign judgment - Only copies and translations of foreign judgments produced before court - Whether copies and translations of foreign judgments could be admitted as evidence - Whether requirements under ss. 78 or 86 of Evidence Act 1950 satisfied
ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN JC
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