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Issue #36/2026
03 September 2026
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CASE SPOTLIGHTS
PP v. SYED SADDIQ SYED ABDUL RAHMAN [2026] 8 CLJ 165 (i) A procedural bank withdrawal cannot be equated to an 'expenditure'. Expanding the constitutional/contractual definition of 'expenses', to include a mere 'withdrawal', rewrites the language of the governing instrument without legal basis. Consequently, a failure to obtain prior approval for a bank withdrawal does not, by itself, satisfy the elements or constitute an act of criminal breach of trust; (ii) An accused cannot be convicted of abetment, under s. 109 of the Penal Code ('PC'), if the act of the alleged principal offender is not proven to be criminally wrong or unlawful in the first place. Where the prosecution fails to establish that the primary actor committed the underlying offence, the charge of abetment against the secondary actor must fail; (iii) Funds donated or raised specifically for a designated candidate's political campaign transfer beneficial ownership to that candidate upon collection. Because the candidate is the beneficial owner of those funds, transferring or utilising them for that campaign does not constitute dishonest misappropriation of third-party property, even if held or transited through an intermediary's account; (iv) Where the predicate offence under s. 403 of the PC fails due to a lack of proof of unlawful origin or criminal property, the consequential money laundering charges under s. 4(1)(b) of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 cannot stand, as the funds transferred do not constitute 'proceeds of unlawful activities'. CRIMINAL LAW: Offences - Abetment - Criminal breach of trust - Withdrawal of funds from political party's account without prior approval of Supreme Council - Whether 'withdrawal' can be equated with 'expenses' under political party's constitution - Whether failure to obtain prior approval for withdrawal constituted criminal breach of trust - Whether conviction for abetment could stand when principal offender's act not proven to be criminally wrong - Penal Code, ss. 109 & 406 CRIMINAL LAW: Offences - Dishonest misappropriation of property - Political campaign funds raised for candidate deposited into transit account - Transfer of funds from transit account into candidate's personal account - Whether ownership and beneficial ownership proven - Whether actus reus established - Whether money belonged to transit account owner or candidate - Whether candidate misappropriated funds belonging to another - Penal Code, s. 403 CRIMINAL LAW: Offences - Money laundering - Transfer of funds from personal bank account into unit trust account - Alleged proceeds of unlawful activity stemming from predicate offence under s. 403 of Penal Code - Predicate offence failed for lack of proof - Whether money laundering charges proven - Whether funds constituted proceeds of unlawful activities - Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001, s. 4(1)(b) WORDS & PHRASES: 'Expenses' - Article in political party's constitution - Whether there is difference between making procedural bank withdrawal and incurring expenditure - Whether 'expenses' synonymous with or inclusive of 'withdrawal' - Whether 'expenses' could be expanded to cover 'withdrawal' APPEAL UPDATES
LATEST CASESLegal Network Series
CLJ 2026 Volume 8 (Part 1) Where two parties execute separate wills in substantially similar terms pursuant to an agreement to create irrevocable interests for a third-party beneficiary, the surviving party is bound by equity to that arrangement upon the death of the first party. The survivor cannot unilaterally resile from the agreement or dispose of the assets through a subsequent will. Instead, equity imposes a constructive trust on the disputed assets during the survivor's lifetime, compelling him/her to hold the property as a constructive trustee for the intended beneficiary. SUCCESSION: | TRUSTS
SUCCESSION: Will - Mutual wills - Separate wills executed by husband and wife in substantially similar terms - Property bequeathed to niece as intended beneficiary - Death of wife followed by remarriage of husband - Subsequent will executed by husband bequeathing same property to second wife - Whether wills executed by husband and first wife constituted mutual wills - Whether common intention to create irrevocable interests established - Whether husband free to resile from arrangement unilaterally - Wills Act 1959, ss. 12 & 18 TRUSTS: Constructive trusts - Mutual wills - Separate wills executed by husband and wife in substantially similar terms - Property bequeathed to niece as intended beneficiary - Death of wife followed by remarriage of husband - Subsequent will executed by husband bequeathing same property to second wife - Whether common intention to create irrevocable interests established - Whether equity bound surviving husband to arrangement upon first wife's death - Whether constructive trust imposed on property during surviving husband's lifetime - Whether husband became constructive trustee of property for intended beneficiary - Whether husband free to unilaterally resile from obligations undertaken under mutual wills
Mohamed Zaini Mazlan JCA
(i) As the issuance of a certificate of birth is only provided for under the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1957 ('BDRA') and nowhere else, not even within the Federal Constitution, it is the duty of the Superintendent-Registrar and Registrar of Births and Deaths to keep and maintain an accurate register of births and to issue birth certificates with correct information. In a case where an informant provides false information on a birth certificate, the BDRA, under s. 27(3), outlines the process for correcting the birth register, stipulating that an amendment can be made in the event of any factual or substantive error; (ii) Any person seeking to rely on art. 14(1)(b) read with s. 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution to establish citizenship by operation of law would have to establish the requirements of both jus soli and jus sanguinis. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW | STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Citizenship - Citizenship status - Initial birth certificate ('BC') registered child as Malaysian citizen - Registration based on false information by adopted parents declaring as parents of child - Identity of biological parents unknown - Adopted parents Malaysian citizen - Whether child qualified for citizenship by operation of law - Subsequent amendment of citizenship status from 'warganegara' to 'bukan warganegara' - Whether original BC tainted with error of law - Whether Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara acted pursuant to express statutory powers - Whether amendment to register of birth tantamount to revocation of citizenship - Whether child recognised as Malaysian citizen - Births and Deaths Registration Act 1957, ss. 14, 27(3) & 28 - Federal Constitution, Second Schedule, Part II, ss. 1(e) & 2(3) STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 'parent' - Application for citizenship - Initial birth certificate ('BC') registered child as Malaysian citizen - Registration based on false information by adopted parents declaring as parents of child - Identity of biological parents unknown - Adopted parents Malaysian citizens - Whether child qualified for citizenship by operation of law - Births and Deaths Registration Act 1957, ss. 14, 27(3) & 28 - Federal Constitution, art. 14(1)(b), Second Schedule, Part II, ss. 1(e) & 2(3)
Azhahari Kamal Ramli JCA
(i) The constitutional protection against double jeopardy and the statutory plea of autrefois acquit, enshrined in art. 7(2) of the Federal Constitution and s. 302 of the Criminal Procedure Code, do not create a blanket immunity against subsequent prosecutions merely because the new charges stem from the same historical investigation or a broadly related factual background. The prohibition applies strictly to a second prosecution for the same offence; (ii) For the doctrine of issue estoppel to apply in a criminal matter, the precise factual or legal issue raised in the subsequent proceeding must have been distinctly raised, adjudicated, and necessarily determined by the trial court in the earlier proceeding. A discharge and acquittal resulting purely from the prosecution's withdrawal of charges prior to the close of its case, without any judicial adjudication or findings on the specific factual allegations of the subsequent charges, does not satisfy this requirement. Consequently, neither issue estoppel nor res judicata can operate to bar the fresh charges in the absence of a prior determination of those specific issues. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Charge - Double jeopardy and autrefois acquit - Accused persons discharged and acquitted in first proceeding following withdrawal of charges by prosecution - Fresh charges preferred in second proceeding arising from same historical investigations - Whether subsequent charges for same offence - Whether fresh charges stemmed from identical facts and transactions - Whether prosecution barred by doctrine of autrefois acquit and constitutional protection against double jeopardy - Federal Constitution, art. 7(2) - Criminal Procedure Code, s. 302(1) CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Charge - Proceedings - Issue estoppel and res judicata - Accused persons acquitted in first proceeding after prosecution withdrew charges before close of case - Fresh charges preferred in second proceeding arising from same historical investigations - Whether precise factual or legal issues in second proceeding raised and determined in first proceeding - Whether there was prior judicial adjudication on fresh factual issues - Whether doctrines of issue estoppel and res judicata operated to bar subsequent prosecution
Azman Abdullah JCA (Criminal Appeal No: P-05-221-05-2024)
In an application for judicial review, it is imperative for the applicant to correctly identify and specify the impugned decision, along with its exact date. Failure to observe this mandatory requirement may prove fatal to the application, as strict compliance is essential for the court to ascertain timeline compliance. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Time limit - Whether impugned decision sought to be challenged specifically identified - Whether date of decision specified in cause papers - Whether requirement to state specific date of decision sought to be challenged mandatory - Whether failure could be fatal ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Application for leave - Time limit - Whether impugned decision sought to be challenged specifically identified - Whether three months period required under O. 53 r. 3(6) of Rules of Court 2012 expired - Whether applicant ought to have filed for fresh proceedings or extension of time - Whether application out of time - Rules of Court 2012, O. 53 r. 3(7)
Hashim Hamzah JCA
A home purchaser's locus standi to enforce a collateral commercial guarantee remains intact despite executing an assignment of the underlying sale and purchase agreement to a financier. When a contemporaneous construction of financing instruments reveals that an assignment was intended as an equitable security rather than an absolute divestment of rights, statutory consumer protections prevent breaching third parties from exploiting procedural notice requirements to escape liability. Consequently, once uncontradicted evidence proves that a contractually provided buy-back option was validly exercised, the guarantor is strictly bound to its bargain. Upon breach, the measure of damages under s. 74 of the Contracts Act 1950 is quantified by the pre-determined, guaranteed profit margins rather than mere property value diminution. These margins constitute certain, non-speculative economic losses directly arising from the deprivation of expected liquidity and commercial returns. CONTRACT | DAMAGES
CONTRACT: Breach - Buy-back guarantees - Locus standi - Deeds of assignment over rights under sale and purchase agreements ('SPAs') executed by homebuyers in favour of financier banks as security for housing loans - Homebuyers brought action against guarantor under separate, collateral buy-back guarantees - Whether absolute assignment divested homebuyers of locus standi to sue - Whether notice requirement under s. 22C of Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 aimed at protecting financier's interests as equitable mortgagee - Whether procedural or substantive - Effect of financier banks' silence or lack of objection - Whether homebuyers maintained full proprietary rights to enforce independent cause of action against guarantor - Whether homebuyers possessed requisite locus standi to bring action CONTRACT: Guarantees - Buy-back guarantees - Validity period - Allegation that buy-back guarantees lapsed or expired before exercise of option - Whether contemporaneous documentary evidence consisting of emails, draft sale and purchase agreements, invoices for professional fees, official receipts, and text messages stood uncontested and uncontradicted - Whether options validly exercised within validity period DAMAGES: Breach of contract - Buy-back guarantees - Assessment of damages - Whether damages compensatory for dispossession or represented loss of profit naturally arising from breach - Loss of liquidity and economic benefit of which purchasers were deprived - Whether loss speculative or certain - Whether purchasers entitled to hold guarantor to bargain - Whether abandonment of specific performance claimed at trial fatal to claim for damages - Contracts Act 1950, s. 74 - Specific Relief Act 1950
Mohamed Zaini Mazlan JCA
The pendency of an appeal against a first-instance judgment does not operate as an automatic stay of execution, nor does it constitute the special or exceptional circumstance required to stay a winding up proceeding. A stay granted prior to a trial because facts were disputed loses its rationale once those disputes are resolved at first instance. Consequently, extending a stay indefinitely pending appeal is an abuse of process that improperly delays a creditor's right to wind up. COMPANY LAW
COMPANY LAW: Winding-up - Petition - Stay of winding-up proceedings - Application for stay pending disposal of appeal against High Court decision in related suit - Whether pendency of appeal constituted special or exceptional circumstances - Companies Act 2016, s. 466 COMPANY LAW: Winding-up - Petition - Inability to pay debts - Non-compliance with statutory notice under s. 466(1)(a) of Companies Act 2016 - Debtor company alleged that debt was bona fide disputed - Whether allegations already dismissed in related suit could be raised - Whether assertion of bona fide dispute supported by credible evidence - Whether issues raised were mere collateral attack on final judgment COMPANY LAW: Winding-up - Petition - Breakdown of relationship between equal shareholders - Minority oppression proceedings resulted in buy-out order - Long-outstanding debts remained unpaid for over seven years - Whether outstanding buy-out order deprived petitioners of independent right to wind up company for unpaid debts - Whether just and equitable to wind up - Companies Act 2016, s. 466
Yusrin Faidz Yusoff J
(i) Once a notice of appeal is filed, the trial court becomes functus officio; (ii) Statutory entitlements for advocacy and litigation costs are separate items; the court must partition them explicitly instead of imposing a single discretionary cap; (iii) The 'global award' approach for multiple, distinct personal injuries is judicially discouraged. Courts must assess and award damages for separate heads of injury individually to ensure adequate and appropriate compensation. CIVIL PROCEDURE | TORT
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments and orders - Amendment - Sealed and perfected judgment - Sessions Court Deputy Registrar ('Deputy Registrar') amended sealed and perfected judgment after notice of appeal filed - Whether Deputy Registrar possessed jurisdiction to amend perfected order - Whether Sessions Court functus officio - Whether actions of Deputy Registrar ultra vires - Rules of Court 2012, O. 32 rr. 9 & 10 - Subordinate Courts Act 1948, s. 19 CIVIL PROCEDURE: Costs - Award - Fixed costs - Distinct allocations for legal costs and professional fees - Whether distinct allocations could be collapsed into single global cost item - Rules of Court 2012, O. 59 r. 23 TORT: Damages - Personal injuries - Quantum - Motor vehicle collision - Traumatic brain injury and neurocognitive disorder - Sessions Court adopted 'global award' approach in lieu of separate heads of damages - Whether approach correct
Johan Lee Kien How J
Seksyen 80 Akta Pengangkutan Awam Darat 2010 ('APAD') dan s. 413 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah ('KTJ') hendaklah dibaca secara harmoni. Seksyen 80(2) APAD mengawal selia pelepasan sementara oleh pegawai penguat kuasa sebelum pertuduhan difailkan, manakala s. 413 KTJ memberi kuasa budi bicara kepada mahkamah untuk menguruskan status sementara ekshibit/harta yang menjadi hal perkara prosiding selepas pendakwaan dimulakan hinggalah perintah muktamad dibuat bawah s. 80(3) APAD. Perintah pelepasan sementara yang bersyarat ketat oleh mahkamah bukan satu keputusan muktamad yang menamatkan hak substantif mana-mana pihak. Perintah sedemikian sekadar arahan pengurusan barang kes yang bertujuan memastikan kenderaan tersebut kekal tersedia untuk pelaksanaan perintah muktamad mahkamah kelak. LALU LINTAS JALAN | PROSEDUR JENAYAH
LALU LINTAS JALAN: Lebih muatan - Kenderaan membawa muatan secara berlebihan - Kesalahan bawah s. 57(1)(b)(vi) Akta Pengangkutan Awam Darat 2010 - Pelepasan sementara kenderaan sementara menunggu perbicaraan tertakluk pada syarat-syarat ketat - Fungsi dan sifat perintah pelepasan sementara - Sama ada menamatkan hak substantif mana-mana pihak - Sama ada sekadar arahan pengurusan barang kes PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Pelucuthakan - Kenderaan - Rayuan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Majistret - Tertuduh dituduh membawa kenderaan dengan muatan berlebihan - Permohonan pelucuthakan kenderaan oleh pihak pendakwaan - Penolakan oleh Mahkamah Majistret dan perintah pelepasan kenderaan pada pemilik - Faktor-faktor dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah Majistret dalam memerintahkan pelepasan kenderaan pada pemilik - Sama ada Mahkamah Majistret terkhilaf dalam melaksanakan budi bicara - Akta Pengangkutan Awam Darat 2010, ss. 57(1)(b)(vi) & 80 PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Hukuman - Rayuan terhadap - Rayuan pihak pendakwaan terhadap hukuman - Rayuan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Majistret - Tertuduh dituduh membawa kenderaan dengan muatan berlebihan - Tertuduh mengaku bersalah, disabitkan atas pertuduhan dan didenda RM15,000, gagal bayar 12 bulan penjara - Sama ada hukuman yang dijatuhkan memadai - Akta Pengangkutan Awam Darat 2010, s. 57(1)(b)(vi)
Samry Masri PH
(i) Section 80 of the Land Public Transport Act 2010 does not make the forfeiture of a commercial vehicle automatic upon conviction. When ss. 80(3) and 80(4) are read harmoniously, the court retains the discretion to order either the forfeiture or the release of the vehicle, and the word 'shall' in s. 80(4) does not impose a mandatory obligation to order forfeiture in every case; (ii) In exercising that discretion, the court must balance the need for deterrence and public safety against the principle of proportionality and the commercial impact of forfeiture on the offender. A forfeiture order should not be made where it would be manifestly excessive or disproportionate to the gravity of the offence and the circumstances of the case. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Forfeiture - Order of forfeiture - Appeal against - Company charged under s. 57(1)(b)(vi) of the Land Public Transport Act 2010 for permitting its semitrailer to carry excessive load - Magistrates' Court imposed fine of RM35,000 and ordered forfeiture of semitrailer - Whether forfeiture order manifestly excessive and disproportionate to gravity of offence - Whether combined punishment of fine and forfeiture would have crushing effect on company's business - Whether forfeiture order ought to be set aside STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Construction of statute - Land Public Transport Act 2010, s. 80(3) & (4) - Power of court to order forfeiture or release of commercial vehicle - Whether forfeiture mandatory upon conviction - Whether word 'shall' in s. 80(4) must be read harmoniously with discretionary language in s. 80(3) - Whether court retained discretion to order release of commercial vehicle
Moses Susayan J
ARTICLESLNS Article(s)
LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTSPrincipal Acts
Amending Acts
PU(A)
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Legislation Alert Updated
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