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Issue #37/2026
10 September 2026
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CASE SPOTLIGHTS
JASON JONATHAN LO v. STAR MEDIA GROUP BHD & ORS AND ANOTHER APPEAL [2026] 8 CLJ 354 (i) The failure to provide a Bahasa Malaysia translation of verbatim English defamatory words in a statement of claim does not constitute an automatic or incurable nullity. While pleadings should strictly be in the national language, the proviso to s. 8 of the National Language Acts 1963/67 preserves judicial discretion. Non-compliance is curable where the words are understood, fully contested, and cause no prejudice to the opposing party, thereby prioritising the interests of justice over mere procedural technicalities; (ii) While a court cannot compel an unwilling defendant to issue an apology - as true contrition must be voluntary - it possesses the equitable discretion to order a mandatory retraction of defamatory statements to correct the public record and vindicate the plaintiff's reputation. TORT: Defamation - Libel - Newspaper publications and social media post - Allegations of criminal conduct, domestic abuse, and child molestation - Claimant person of public profile and former Chief Executive Officer - Police investigations resulted in 'no further action' classification - Whether impugned articles bore defamatory meanings and referred to claimant - Whether tortfeasors' defences of justification and responsible journalism established - Whether social media republication amplified defamatory sting - Whether damages awarded adequate - Whether court could order corrective reliefs in form of apology and retraction CIVIL PROCEDURE: Pleadings - Language requirement - Defamation action premised on newspaper publications and social media post - Failure to provide Bahasa Malaysia translation of verbatim English defamatory words in statement of claim - Whether claim incurable nullity - Whether there was prejudice - Principles in Rekha Munisamy v. Ortus Expert White Sdn Bhd & Anor - Federal Constitution, art. 152 - National Language Acts 1963/67, s. 8 - Rules of Court 2012, O. 92 r. 1 JUDICIAL QUOTES“In light of the above analysis, it is therefore strictly incorrect to state that a director can hold a “dual capacity” or wear “two hats” - in the sense of acting as a director under company law while at the same time being an employee (workman) under a contract of service. It is in our view more accurate as well as helpful if focus is made on the individual concerned, who can be described as wearing two hats when he is both a company director and also an employee of the company at the same time. It is the individual - not the position of director - who can double hat and perform both roles. It cannot be emphasised enough that a distinction must be drawn and properly understood between the position and the person holding it. This is key.” “In other words, the inherent status of a directorship does not admit that of an employee (or workman), and vice versa. The two do not mix. Nevertheless, again we say that an individual can under the law be both, but the performance of the two roles we reiterate is subject to different sets of legal considerations.” - Per Mohd Nazlan Ghazali FCJ in Acexide Technology Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Chang Heng Keong & Another Appeal [2026] 7 CLJ 687 LATEST CASESLegal Network Series
CLJ 2026 Volume 8 (Part 2) (i) A procedural bank withdrawal cannot be equated to an 'expenditure'. Expanding the constitutional/contractual definition of 'expenses', to include a mere 'withdrawal', rewrites the language of the governing instrument without legal basis. Consequently, a failure to obtain prior approval for a bank withdrawal does not, by itself, satisfy the elements or constitute an act of criminal breach of trust; (ii) An accused cannot be convicted of abetment, under s. 109 of the Penal Code, if the act of the alleged principal offender is not proven to be criminally wrong or unlawful in the first place. Where the prosecution fails to establish that the primary actor committed the underlying offence, the charge of abetment against the secondary actor must fail; (iii) Funds donated or raised specifically for a designated candidate's political campaign transfer beneficial ownership to that candidate upon collection. Because the candidate is the beneficial owner of those funds, transferring or utilising them for that campaign does not constitute dishonest misappropriation of third-party property, even if held or transited through an intermediary's account; (iv) Where the predicate offence under s. 403 of the PC fails due to a lack of proof of unlawful origin or criminal property, the consequential money laundering charges under s. 4(1)(b) of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 cannot stand, as the funds transferred do not constitute 'proceeds of unlawful activities'. CRIMINAL LAW | WORDS & PHRASES
CRIMINAL LAW: Offences - Abetment - Criminal breach of trust - Withdrawal of funds from political party's account without prior approval of Supreme Council - Whether 'withdrawal' can be equated with 'expenses' under political party's constitution - Whether failure to obtain prior approval for withdrawal constituted criminal breach of trust - Whether conviction for abetment could stand when principal offender's act not proven to be criminally wrong - Penal Code, ss. 109 & 406 CRIMINAL LAW: Offences - Dishonest misappropriation of property - Political campaign funds raised for candidate deposited into transit account - Transfer of funds from transit account into candidate's personal account - Whether ownership and beneficial ownership proven - Whether actus reus established - Whether money belonged to transit account owner or candidate - Whether candidate misappropriated funds belonging to another - Penal Code, s. 403 CRIMINAL LAW: Offences - Money laundering - Transfer of funds from personal bank account into unit trust account - Alleged proceeds of unlawful activity stemming from predicate offence under s. 403 of Penal Code - Predicate offence failed for lack of proof - Whether money laundering charges proven - Whether funds constituted proceeds of unlawful activities - Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001, s. 4(1)(b) WORDS & PHRASES: 'Expenses' - Article in political party's constitution - Whether there is difference between making procedural bank withdrawal and incurring expenditure - Whether 'expenses' synonymous with or inclusive of 'withdrawal' - Whether 'expenses' could be expanded to cover 'withdrawal'
Abu Bakar Jais PCA
In exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under s. 366 of the Companies Act 2016, the court must actively scrutinise the commercial feasibility and statutory prerequisites of a proposal rather than acting as a passive rubber stamp. A restructuring scheme promoted by a long-standing, insolvent entity that provides a nominal payout for the primary, undisclosed purpose of absolutely releasing third-party corporate and personal guarantees violates the strict requirement of full and frank disclosure, constituting a bad-faith collateral attack and an absolute abuse of process designed to shield an insider from separate bankruptcy proceedings. Consequently, before sanctioning any scheme, the court must rigorously ensure regulatory compliance, fair class representation, majority good faith, and commercial reasonableness. Votes stemming from unscrutinised related-party debts admitted in breach of a convening order must be excluded, and the votes of an interested insider or guarantor escaping personal bankruptcy via a nominal payout must be heavily discounted to reflect a genuine, uncoerced majority; if the remaining valid, independent votes fall below the mandatory 75% statutory approval threshold, the scheme must fail and be set aside. COMPANY LAW
COMPANY LAW: Scheme of arrangement - Setting aside - Application to set aside ex parte order granting leave to convene scheme creditors' meeting - Whether there was lack of genuine attempt to rehabilitate insolvent company - Whether there were serious allegations of conflict of interest involving specific creditors and underlying personal guarantor - Whether there was abuse of process - Whether there was misdirection in law - Whether application made in good faith - Companies Act 2016, s. 366(1) COMPANY LAW: Scheme of arrangement - Sanction of scheme - Proposal contemplating release of all guarantees and discharge of personal guarantor's liability to judgment creditors - Omission to consider statutory compliance, fair class representation, bona fides of majority voting block, and objective commercial reasonableness of proposal - Failure to secure mandatory 75% approval threshold under s. 366(3) of Companies Act 2016 - Whether there was duty to disregard or discount votes of conflicted or interested voting blocks - Whether there was abuse of voting mechanism - Whether there was failure to make full and frank disclosure of true objective of scheme of arrangement - Whether creditors deprived of opportunity to assess whether scheme of arrangement genuinely served their interests
Ravinthran Paramaguru JCA
(i) Where a main contractor has been wound up, the winding-up and insolvency provisions of the Companies Act 2016 ('CA'), being specific law, override and prevail over the direct payment mechanism under s. 30 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ('CIPAA'), which constitutes general law. Under the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, the specific statutory safeguards of the insolvency regime exclude the operation of general construction payment dispute mechanisms; (ii) A direct payment request, under s. 30 of the CIPAA, does not elevate the underlying adjudicated sum into a secured debt, nor does it grant the subcontractor priority over the general pool of unsecured creditors of a wound-up main contractor. Any debts owed by a principal to a wound-up main contractor constitute assets of the liquidated estate to be distributed pari passu under s. 527 of the CA; allowing direct payment to a subcontractor outside this mechanism would disrupt due process and conflict with the statutory regime against undue preference. CONSTRUCTION LAW | COMPANY LAW | CIVIL PROCEDURE
CONSTRUCTION LAW: Adjudication - Payment - Claim for direct payment from principal under s. 30(1) of Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ('CIPAA') - Main contractor wound up - Adjudicated sum awarded to subcontractor against main contractor - Whether statutory insolvency regime under Companies Act 2016 overrides general provisions of CIPAA - Whether s. 30 of CIPAA dislodges statutory distribution of assets in liquidation - Whether direct payment creates secured debt or grants priority over unsecured creditors - Whether direct payment constitutes undue preference COMPANY LAW: Winding up - Insolvency - Assets of wound-up company - Debts owed to wound-up main contractor - Subcontractor sought direct payment from principal under s. 30(1) of Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 - Whether debts owed to wound-up company formed part of assets to be distributed to general body of creditors under s. 527 of Companies Act 2016 - Whether statutory safeguards of insolvency regime can be displaced by adjudication legislation CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments and orders - Stare decisis - Binding precedent - Claim for direct payment from principal - Prior Court of Appeal decision established that no sums were due or payable by principal to main contractor on same project - Subsequent High Court suit involving similar facts - Whether High Court bound by prior factual and findings of Court of Appeal - Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012, s. 30(1) Lim Chong Fong JCA
(i) Under the Rules of Court 2012 and the Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994, a 'judgment' pronounced in open court constitutes the operative decision rather than its fully reasoned text. Consequently, a trial judge is not functus officio upon delivering brief oral grounds, and the common practice of providing broad oral outlines before a comprehensive written judgment is regular and valid. A subsequently issued detailed text does not constitute an unauthorised substitution or an impermissible filling of gaps. Mere omissions or minor, non-contradictory divergences between preliminary oral remarks and the final written judgment do not amount to a miscarriage of justice under s. 71 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964; therefore, a minute dissection of oral grounds to impugn a final reasoned decision is impermissible; (ii) A statement of claim must be read holistically; not in isolation. Distinct causes of action are sufficiently pleaded if the broad factual matrix provides the defendant with reasonable and sufficient notice of the case to be met. Where the core claim is fraud premised on non-disclosure, introducing closely related evidentiary facts at trial does not constitute a radical departure that warrants the exclusion of evidence. Furthermore, where the context of fraud and inducement is clear from a holistic reading of the pleadings, the omission of explicit language stating that the plaintiff would not have entered into the transaction but for the non-disclosure is of no legal consequence. CIVIL PROCEDURE | EVIDENCE
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgment - Grounds of judgment - Delivery of full written grounds subsequent to brief oral grounds - Trial judge delivered 11-page brief oral grounds followed by comprehensive 196-page written judgment two months later - Distinction between pronouncement of decision and reasoned judgment - Whether there were discrepancies or contradictions between oral and written grounds - Whether mere omission to address issue in brief oral grounds amounted to divergence - Whether brief oral grounds constituted 'operative' or 'full' judgment - Whether subsequent detailed judgment amounted to unauthorised substitution - Whether court functus officio - Whether appropriate to engage in minute dissection of brief oral grounds to impugn final decision - Whether breach of natural justice or miscarriage of justice warranting retrial - Rules of Court 2012, O. 42 & O. 55 - Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994, rr. 24 & 25 - Courts of Judicature Act 1964, s. 71 CIVIL PROCEDURE: Pleadings - Statement of claim - Sufficiency - Distinct causes of action pleaded including breach of fiduciary duty, breach of s. 132E of Companies Act 1965, fraud, and conspiracy - Core allegation of fraud premised on non-disclosure of material beneficial ownership and control - Whether assertion of forgery or treatment of evidence constituted radical departure or expansion from pleaded case - Whether broad facts supporting elements of fraud, deception, inducement, non-disclosure of interest, and shadow directorship adequately pleaded - Whether pleadings gave sufficient notice of case to be met - Whether trial judge correctly directed herself on law governing sufficiency of particulars and departure from pleaded case EVIDENCE: Admissibility - Privileged evidence - Statements recorded under s. 112 of Criminal Procedure Code - Statements exhibited in affidavit in support of Mareva injunction - Use of criminal investigation statements in civil proceedings - Whether affidavit subsequently expunged by consent order - Whether consent order permitted evidence obtained via discovery or other lawful means - Whether consent order completely barred admission of statements - Whether absolute prohibition exists where police investigations completed or no criminal proceedings afoot - Whether there was failure to raise issue of privilege at trial court
Ravinthran Paramaguru JCA
ARTICLESCLJ Article(s)
LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTSPrincipal Acts
Amending Acts
PU(A)
PU(B)
Legislation Alert Updated
Revoked
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