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Issue #24/2026
11 June 2026

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CASE SPOTLIGHTS

DATUK DR YUNUS GUL ALIF GUL v. SIM KUAN YEE & ANOR [2026] 5 CLJ 760
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
AZHAHARI KAMAL RAMLI JCA; AHMAD KAMAL MD SHAHID JCA; NADZARIN WOK NORDIN JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: J-02(A)-125-01-2022]
10 APRIL 2026

Under ss. 100 and 103A of the Legal Profession Act 1976, once the Advocates and Solicitors Disciplinary Board ('DB') determines that a complaint against an advocate and solicitor has merit and decides to appoint a Disciplinary Committee for a formal inquiry, it becomes functus officio regarding that preliminary determination. Consequently, the DB cannot subsequently reverse its decision to summarily dismiss the complaint, as doing so constitutes a breach of statutory mandatory requirements, natural justice, and the complainant's legitimate expectation. Furthermore, any exercise of the DB's power to dismiss a complaint summarily, under s. 100(15) must be read in conjunction with s. 100(4), which mandates the issuance of a written notice to the advocate and solicitor to obtain their agreement for the matter to be dealt with summarily; failure to comply with this procedural requirement renders the dismissal void.

LEGAL PROFESSION: Disciplinary proceedings - Complaint against legal firm - Advocates and Solicitors Disciplinary Board ('DB') - Complaint by complainant against firm on misconduct in performing duties in relation to purchase of property - DB found merit in complaint and decided to appoint Disciplinary Committee ('DC') - DB summarily dismissed complaint - Whether DB could subsequently reverse decision and dismiss complaint without appointing DC - Whether DB functus officio - Whether breach of natural justice and legitimate expectation -Legal Profession Act 1976, ss. 100(3)(b), 100(4) & 103A(1)(a)


JUDICIAL QUOTES

“The appellants argue that because this case involves a “novel point of law” never before considered in Malaysia, they could not have known their claim lacked merit, and therefore cannot be found to have abused the court process. We reject this argument entirely.”

“First, novelty does not equal merit. The fact that an issue has not been litigated before does not mean a claim based on that issue is justiciable or has any legal foundation. Second, the issue is not truly novel. The English courts have dealt with identical issues since at least 2008 (Pankajkumar Patel). The legal principles are clear and settled. Third, the novelty argument proves too much. We agree with the respondent that if parties could circumvent jurisdictional requirements simply by claiming their case is “novel”, it would open the floodgates to frivolous litigation. Jurisdiction either exists or it does not, regardless of whether the underlying issue is novel.” - Per Ahmad Fairuz Zainol Abidin JCA in Junzhi Wang & Anor v. TC Pharmaceutical Industries Co Ltd [2026] 6 CLJ 1

APPEAL UPDATES

  1. Asia Pacific Education Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2026] CLJU 107 overruling the High Court case of Asia Pacific Education Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2023] 10 CLJ 549

  2. Kasi K.L Palaniappan v. Gamelan Rentak Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2026] CLJU 331 affirming the High Court case of Kasi K.L Palaniappan v. Gamelan Rentak Sdn Bhd [Civil Suit No. BA-22NCVC-200-04/2018]

LATEST CASES

Legal Network Series

[2026] CLJU 38

DR FAIZ AZRAAI ABDUL AZIZ v. PEGAWAI MEMERINTAH MARKAS 11 BRIGED INFANTRI & ORS

Where an arrest and detention of a military personnel was made after the completion of the investigation and pending trial by court-martial for an offence under s. 51 of the Armed Forces Act 1972 ('Act 1972'), then the arrest and detention were lawfully made under s. 96(3) of the Act 1972. The said s. 96(3) empowers the commanding officer to detain the military personnel at a stage when he has completed his investigation against the personnel and that the said personnel is to be tried before the court-martial.

TORT: False imprisonment - Claim - Damages - Detention pursuant to s. 96(3) of Armed Forces Act 1972 ('Act 1972') - Arrest of military personnel by military police on ground of absence without leave - Arrest for purpose of prosecution for offence under s. 51 of Act 1972 - Arrest upon completion of investigation - Close arrest - Whether arrest and remand lawful, valid and carried out in accordance with Act 1972 - Whether detention mala fide and without any reasonable justification

  • For the appellant - Mohammed Nasser Yusof; M/s The Law Chambers Of Fauzi & Nasser
  • For the respondents - Noor Fadzila Ishak; Peguam Kanan Persekutuan; Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor

[2026] CLJU 42

ANG EE MOOI & ANOR v. CHAN HOOI BOON

A resulting trust is created when a mother entrusted her children to manage monies solely inherited from her deceased husband, whereby the beneficial interest remains with her. A subsequent management of the monies, including reinvestment, renewal, and mixing with a small portion of the trustee's own funds for higher interest, did not disturb the chain of source when the monies remained identifiable and intact.

TRUSTS: Breach of trust - Breach of fiduciary duties - Resulting trust - Monies under bank fixed deposit - Action by mother against children - First plaintiff solely received proceeds from husband's estate and entrusted her children to manage monies - Defendant instructed bank to freeze account - Defendant attempted to withdraw and transfer funds into his personal account - Whether trust existed - Whether money belonged to first plaintiff alone or formed part of a family fund - Whether first plaintiff beneficial owner of deposit

  • For the plaintiffs - Ng Siew Hoon; M/s Xian & Co
  • For the defendant - Ler Lian Heng; M/s Loo, Ler & Partners

[2026] CLJU 43

KANNATHASAN RAMAN & ORS v. RAVICHANDREN RAMAN & ORS

Section 60 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 ('Act 1959') confers on an administrator the authority to manage estate property, including the sale of such property, subject to the court's supervision. It follows, where the administrator failed to secure unanimous agreement of all beneficiaries regarding distribution of a property, he is entitled to apply to the court seeking for the court's approval in respect of the sale of the said property. The intended disposal of said property by way of a sale and purchase agreement, followed by recourse to the court for the requisite sanction, is precisely the procedure contemplated by s. 60 of Act 1959.

SUCCESSION: Administration - Sale of properties - Application by administrator -Administrator's failed to secure unanimous agreement of all beneficiaries regarding distribution of estate - Competing interests among beneficiaries - Whether administrator empowered to sell estate property under s. 60 of Probate and Administration Act 1959 - Whether administrator could sell property by recourse to court for requisite sanction - Whether allegation of forgery and fraud substantiated - Whether equitable principles of fairness and beneficiary interest applicable - Whether administrator acted prudently in dealing with property - Whether administrator's actions were consistent with fiduciary duties

  • For the plaintiff - Thiyagarajen Krishnan; M/s Azlan Meena & Partners
  • For the defendant - Siti Azura Ghulamrasul; M/s Azura Mokhtar & Low

[2026] CLJU 46

AL SAKB CAPITAL BERHAD v. RAHMAN BROTHERS AUTOMOTIVE SDN BHD & ANOR

1. An action initiated before a deadline and at the time when the obligation to repay the principal had not yet fallen due is regarded as a premature claim and not maintainable.

2. The burden of proving a debt lies squarely on the claimant. The claimant's claim must be legally coherent and mathematically substantiated with calculation of debt conform to the fundamental machinery of the agreement that created the obligation.

CONTRACT: Agreement - Breach - Musharakah agreement - Failure to adhere to payment schedule - Variation - Extension of payment term vide letter Whether parties agreed for new fixed date for return of principal capital - Whether cause of action accrued after filing of action - Whether action filed premature - Whether plaintiff proved loss according to terms of Musharakah agreement - Whether plaintiff's claim legally incoherent and mathematically unsubstantiated - Whether Musharakah agreement an illegal moneylending contract and void ab initio

  • For the plaintiff - Muhammad Syahmi Akif Jamili & Nur Adam Syahmi Samril; M/s Wan Sarimah & Co
  • For the defendants - Damian Kiethan Anthony Jeyakumar & Justin Lee Soong Jun; M/s Raj, Ong & Yudistra

[2026] CLJU 40

MOHD IRWAN MOHAMAD ILIAS v. PP

Apabila tertuduh ditangkap sejurus selepas dadah dihantar ke bilik tertuduh oleh pusher dadah dan tanpa keterangan lain yang boleh mengaitkan pemilikan dadah tersebut oleh mana-mana orang lain, maka tidak ada keraguan bahawa dadah yang dibeli oleh tertuduh berada dalam kawalan, jagaan dan pengetahuan tertuduh. Dalam keadaan sedemikian, tertuduh tidak boleh menafikan tidak mempunyai milikan dan jagaan dadah tersebut.

PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Rayuan - Rayuan terhadap hukuman dan sabitan - Pertuduhan memiliki dadah berbahaya dan racun - Perayu seorang tenaga pendidik di universiti yang terkemuka - Barang kes dijumpai di dalam bilik tertuduh - Pemilikan dadah di kawasan universiti - Kepentingan awam - Sama ada pembelaan tertuduh berjaya menimbulkan keraguan munasabah terhadap kes prima facie - Sama ada pembelaan tertuduh merupakan penafian semata-mata dan pemikiran terkemudian - Sama ada pembelaan penafian dan tertuduh diperangkap boleh diterima - Sama ada hukuman yang dijatuhkan adalah bersesuaian dengan kesalahan

  • Bagi pihak perayu - Suresh A Balakrishnan; T/n Suresh Balakrishnan & Co
  • Bagi pihak responden - Mohd Nazri Omran; Timbalan Pendakwa Raya

CLJ 2026 Volume 5 (Part 3)

A petition for minority oppression, under s. 181 of the Companies Act 1965 (now s. 346 of the Companies Act 2016), cannot be sustained if the complaints do not relate to the 'affairs of the company'. Breaches of a shareholders' agreement that are purely private in nature and do not affect the conduct or management of the company do not constitute 'affairs of the company' and are not actionable under the oppression provisions.
ISM Sdn Bhd v. Queensway Nominees (Asing) Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Appeal [2026] 5 CLJ 343 [FC]

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COMPANY LAW: Oppression - Minority shareholder - Petition under s. 181 of Companies Act 1965 (now s. 346 of the Companies Act 2016) - Joint venture agreement for property development project - Dispute over contribution of acquisition costs and rights issues - Allegations of breach of private contractual terms - Distinction between private rights of shareholders and company affairs - Whether complaints related to affairs of company' - Whether breach of shareholders' agreement per se actionable under s. 181 (now s. 346)- Whether relationship between parties quasi-partnership or commercial arm's length transaction - Whether elements of mutual trust and confidence established - Companies Act 1965, s. 181 (now s. 346 of the Companies Act 2016)

WORDS & PHRASES: 'Affairs of the company' - Companies Act 1965, s. 181 (now s. 346 of the Companies Act 2016) - Scope and ambit - Distinction between acts relating to management and conduct of company versus private enforcement of shareholders' agreement - Whether encompassing private matters or contractual disputes between shareholders - Whether refusal to remove directors or disputes over shell entities with no business activity constitute 'affairs of the company'

 

Nordin Hassan FCJ
Lee Swee Seng FCJ
Collin Lawrence Sequerah FCJ

  • For the appellant - Cecil Abraham, Sunil Abraham, Mohd Irwan Ismail & Nicole Lee Sin Yee; M/s Cecil Abraham & Partners
  • For the respondents - Gopal Sreenevasan, Celine Chelladurai, Michelle Chew, Kelviin Manuel Pillay, Melody Tan Kar Yen & Woon Yu Jian; M/s Celline & Oommen

In passing a sentence where the mandatory punishment of whipping is barred by the operation of s. 289 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the correct approach to be adopted by the courts is: (i) the trial court shall pass a sentence of imprisonment on the offender as it would in any other case involving a similar offence where there is no such bar; (ii) a decision to enhance a sentence of imprisonment in lieu of whipping must be based on the proper exercise of judicial discretion and not as a rule; (iii) a decision to enhance the term of an imprisonment term must be considered based on the facts and relevant aggravating factors of the case and not driven merely by the need to compensate for the exempted punishment; and (iv) the trial court should take a two-step process in making that decision: (a) whether an enhanced term of imprisonment is appropriate after considering all aggravating and mitigating factors; and (b) if an enhanced term of imprisonment is found to be appropriate, what would then be a just and adequate enhanced term of imprisonment commensurate with the offence.
Ng Kian Teik v. PP [2026] 5 CLJ 375 [CA]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Sentencing - Principles - Enhancement of sentence to compensate for exemption of whipping - Exemption from whipping for male convicts of more than 50 years of age under s. 289 of Criminal Procedure Code - Whether enhancement of sentence to be based on aggravating factors - Whether driven by need to compensate for exempted punishment - Whether trial judge adequately considered all mitigating factors - Whether enhancement of sentence caused prejudice to accused person

 

 

Azmi Ariffin JCA
Hayatul Akmal Abdul Aziz JCA
Mohd Radzi Abdul Hamid JCA

  • For the appellant - Ramkarpal Singh Karpal Singh & Balqis Qisteena Mohd Zedreen; M/s Karpal Singh & Co
  • For the respondent - Hafizah Johor Ariff Johor; DPP

(i) Where an accused raises a specific defence in a drug-related case, ie, being an innocent carrier for a named third party, and that third party is subsequently arrested or known to the police, the prosecution has a legal obligation to either call that person as a witness or offer them to the defence. Failure to do so creates a gap in the prosecution's case, triggering an adverse inference under s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950; (ii) In drug trafficking cases involving statutory presumptions, specifically s. 37(d) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, for possession and s. 37(da) for trafficking, a trial judge must make explicit findings on whether the defence has successfully rebutted these presumptions.
Satyamoorthy Sundramoorthy v. PP [2026] 5 CLJ 393 [CA]

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Accused found guilty of trafficking in dangerous drugs - Drugs found in motorcycle carrier - Accused sentenced to life imprisonment of 30 years and 12 strokes of rotan - Whether failure to call or offer witness to defence created gap in prosecution's case - Whether lack of investigation weakened prosecution case - Whether conviction for trafficking safe - Whether charge ought to be reduced to possession - Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, ss. 39A(2) & 39B(1)(a)

CRIMINAL LAW: Offence - Trafficking in dangerous drugs - Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, s. 39B(1)(a) - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Drugs found in motorcycle carrier - Defence of innocent carrier - Whether defence bare denial, recent invention or afterthought

EVIDENCE: Adverse inference - Failure to call material witness - Accused found guilty of trafficking in dangerous drugs - Drugs found in motorcycle carrier - Accused sentenced to life imprisonment of 30 years and 12 strokes of rotan - Defence of innocent carrier - Accused identified third party immediately upon arrest - Third party who allegedly handed drugs to accused arrested but not called as prosecution witness - Whether failure to call or offer witness to defence created gap in prosecution's case - Whether adverse inference applied - Evidence Act 1950, s. 114(g)

Mohamed Zaini Mazlan JCA
Hayatul Akmal Abdul Aziz JCA
Meor Hashimi Abdul Hamid JCA

  • For the appellant - Afifuddin Ahmad Hafifi & Aina Melina Johan Ariff Lim; M/s Salehuddin Saidin & Assocs
  • For the respondent - Shamala Jaganathan; DPP

A renunciation of an entitlement to an estate by a beneficiary before the completion of full administration is not a 'gift', as the beneficiary does not possess a beneficial and legal right or interest in the estate. Therefore, the transfer instrument in Form 14A giving effect to such a renunciation should be subject to a nominal stamp duty of RM10 under item 32(i) of the First Schedule of the Stamp Act 1949. The imposition of ad valorem stamp duty on the transfer instrument was held to be invalid.
Tan Nyok Chin v. Pemungut Duti Setem [2026] 5 CLJ 418 [CA]

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CIVIL PROCEDURE: Case management - Purpose - Ensure 'just, expeditious and economical' disposal of suit/application by giving directions to parties - Whether court allowed to decide appeal in case management - Whether judge erred in law in deciding appeal in case management - Whether injustice occasioned by error - Whether error curable

REVENUE LAW: Stamp duty - Ad valorem stamp duty - Deceased bequeathed 80% undivided share in land to children and 20% to wife - Renunciation of 80% undivided share in land by children to mother - Mother became sole beneficiary of land - Imposition of ad valorem stamp duty on transfer of 80% undivided share - Whether valid - Whether estate vested in children - Whether Collector ought to refund amount paid - Whether Form 14A only to be imposed with nominal stamp duty - Stamp Act 1949, ss. 16(1), 36(1), 38A(1), items 32(a) & (i) of First Schedule

 

Azimah Omar JCA
Wong Kian Kheong JCA
Ismail Brahim JCA

  • For the appellant - Lum Man Chan, Desmond Liew Zhi Hong & Chew Jin Heng; M/s Halim Hong & Quek
  • For the respondent - Mohammad Hafidz Ahmad; SRC & Muhammad Danial Izzat Zulbahari; RC

While the 12-year limitation period under s. 21(1) of the Limitation Act 1953 generally commences from the date of default, a chargee's active enforcement of its security within the preceding years, coupled with the statutory mechanism under s. 265(3)(b) of the National Land Code (NLC), characterises an application for fresh directions following failed auctions as one for consequential relief rather than a fresh foreclosure action. As such, an application for an auction date, reserve price, and vacant possession constitutes a procedural step to give effect to a judicially determined right, meaning limitation runs from the date of the order for sale rather than the original cause of action. Furthermore, once the Land Office finds that statutory requirements are satisfied via a valid Form 16D notice, disputes over quantum do not constitute 'cause to the contrary', as remedies for accounting errors lie in post-sale proceedings. Ultimately, permitting a chargor to resist a sale by raising general equitable pleas would undermine the statutory scheme of the NLC, which is designed to provide chargees with an efficient and effective means of realising their security.
CIMB Bank Bhd v. Sharifah Khairani Syed Ahmad [2026] 5 CLJ 441 [HC]

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LAND LAW: Charge - Order for sale - Application for fresh directions for sale - Abortive and failed auctions - Whether application time-barred under Limitation Act 1953 - Whether time starts to run from date of default or date of Form 16D notice - Characterisation of application for fresh directions as ancillary and procedural - Finality of orders - Whether defendant precluded from raising limitation or challenging breach in subsequent proceedings - Whether estopped from relitigating issues through inadvertence or tactical reserve - Whether there was proof of breach - Whether conditions precedent for obtaining order for sale satisfied - Whether 'cause to the contrary' established - Whether inequitable to grant order for sale - National Land Code, s. 265(3)(b)

LAND LAW: Charge - Order for sale - Application for fresh directions under s. 265(3)(b) of National Land Code - 'cause to the contrary' - Whether established - Whether discrepancy in amount demanded or disputes over quantum constitute cause to the contrary - Certificate of indebtedness - Whether accounting disputes could resist enforcement of security - Whether inequitable or contrary to justice to grant order

LIMITATION: Actions - Land - Charge - Application for judicial sale following abortive administrative auctions - 12-year limitation period under s. 21(1) of Limitation Act 1953 - Enforcement of existing order for sale - Whether limitation for enforcement runs from date of order rather than original date of default - Whether delay in enforcement defeated plaintiff's right to security - Whether delay unreasonable or prejudicial

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Originating Summons - Order for sale - National Land Code, s. 265(3)(b) - Application for fresh public auction and vacant possession - Consequential directions following failed auctions - Finality of orders - Whether defendant estopped from relitigating issues through inadvertence or tactical reserve - Whether there was proof of breach - Whether conditions precedent for obtaining order for sale satisfied - Whether 'cause to the contrary' established - Whether inequitable to grant order for sale

Yusrin Faidz Yusoff JC

  • For the plaintiff - Rebecca Lim En Tzi; M/s H S Lim & Malik
  • For the defendant - Abdul Aziz Hasan; M/s Nordin Kassim & Aziz

(i) The validity of a final decision, under s. 40 of the Competition Act 2010 ('Act'), is not strictly confined to the initial notice of investigation under s. 18(1)(a) of the Act. Provided that the proposed decision clearly details the specific findings and allows the enterprise to make representations, the requirements of procedural fairness and natural justice are satisfied; (ii) There is no automatic right to cross-examine witnesses in competition proceedings. Under s. 38 of the Act and reg. 13 of the Competition (Appeal Tribunal) Regulations 2017, both the Competition Commission and the Competition Appeal Tribunal ('CAT') possess the discretion to determine the manner in which evidence is heard. A denial of cross-examination does not, by itself, constitute a breach of natural justice, as the CAT is the master of its own proceedings.
Dagang Net Technologies Sdn Bhd v. Tribunal Rayuan Persaingan & Anor [2026] 5 CLJ 466 [HC]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Application to quash decision of Competition Appeal Tribunal affirming Competition Commission's ('MyCC') finding of infringement - Whether MyCC's final decision exceeded scope of investigation notice - Whether there was breach of natural justice - Whether applicant afforded right to respond - Whether right to cross-examine witnesses absolute - Competition Act 2010, ss. 10(1), 18(1)(a), 36, 38 & 40 - Competition (Appeal Tribunal) Regulations 2017, reg. 13

 

 

Alice Loke Yee Ching J

  • For the applicant - Brian Foong Mun Loong & Muhammad Hiqmar Danial Hidzir; M/s Cheang & Ariff
  • For the 2nd respondent - Kwan Will Sen & Chiang Jia Yin; M/s Lim Chee Wee Partnership

A corporatised utility provider exercising a statutory monopoly, such as the sole electricity licensee in a State, performs a public function. Its decisions - specifically the power to disconnect supply - are subject to judicial review under public law principles. Even in the absence of a direct contract, the provider must exercise its statutory powers in a manner that is rational, procedurally fair, and within the limits of its governing legislation.
Lau Yee Cheong & Ors v. Syarikat Sesco Bhd [2026] 5 CLJ 492 [HC]

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Application for - Challenge against decision of corporate entity to disconnect electricity supply - Corporate entity as sole licensed electricity supplier in Sarawak - Electricity meter remained under name of deceased consumer - Applicants bought property and sought new supply - Corporate entity demanded payment of arrears and disconnected electricity supply - Whether corporate entity performing public functions under statutory authority - Whether public authority - Whether actions of corporate entity amenable to judicial review - Whether applicants adversely affected by decision to disconnect electricity supply - Rules of Court 2012, O. 53 r. 2(4)

PUBLIC UTILITIES: Electricity - Licensee - Statutory monopoly - Duty to supply electricity - Disconnection of supply - Corporate entity as sole licensed electricity supplier in Sarawak - Electricity meter remained under name of deceased consumer - Applicants bought property and sought new supply - Corporate entity demanded payment of arrears and disconnected electricity supply - Whether disconnection lawful - Electricity Ordinance, ss. 27, 27A or 28

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Application for - Application to strike out judicial review - Corporate entity as sole licensed electricity supplier in Sarawak - Electricity meter remained under name of deceased consumer - Applicants bought property and sought new supply - Corporate entity demanded payment of arrears and disconnected electricity supply - Applicants commenced judicial review against corporate entity - Whether frivolous, vexatious or abuse of process - Whether judicial review proper avenue - Rules of Court 2012, O. 53

Amelati Parnell J

  • For the applicants - Henry Ling Kuong Meng; M/s Ling & Wong Advocs
  • For the respondent - Suzie Telen Gau; M/s Teo, Telen & Ting Advocs

The appointment of an administrator pendente lite is a critical judicial function that requires the selection of an impartial fiduciary to preserve estate assets and maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. This process obligates the court to scrutinise a nominee's independence and detachment from competing factions. Consequently, any credible, non-speculative evidence suggesting a familial or professional connection between a nominee and a party's legal counsel is highly material; the court should favour the admission of such evidence, even if discovered after initial filings, provided the application is prompt and well-founded. However, this scrutiny must operate within established procedural boundaries, as the court's discretion to permit amendments under O. 20 r. 8 of the Rules of Court 2012 is strictly limited to resolving issues within the case as originally framed. By refusing amendments that introduce new elements or shift the proceedings onto a materially different footing, the court preserves the integrity of the original application while ensuring the suitability of the proposed fiduciary.
Vasantha K Sockalingam Chettiar v. Raja Alagappan Annamalai & Ors [2026] 5 CLJ 513 [HC]

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CIVIL PROCEDURE: Affidavits - Further affidavit - Leave to file - Application for appointment of administrator pendente lite - Discovery of wedding invitation card allegedly showing familial relationship between proposed administrator and solicitor - Whether evidence newly discovered, important and apparently credible - Whether leave should be granted to admit fresh evidence - Rules of Court 2012, O. 32 r. 13(2) & O. 92 r. 4

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Amendment - Notice of application - Application for appointment of administrator pendente lite - Amendment to include alternative nominee - Whether amendment bona fide - Whether caused injustice or prejudice to plaintiff - Whether altering character of original application - Rules of Court 2012, O. 20 r. 8(1) & O. 92 r. 4

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Preliminary objection - Affidavits - Authority to affirm - First defendant affirmed affidavits on behalf of other defendants without exhibiting formal letters of authority - Whether first defendant as co-party required documentary proof of authority - Whether affidavits should be rejected or disregarded

SUCCESSION: Administration of estates - Administrator pendente lite - Appointment of - Disputes over estate validity and will - Whether there was conflict of interest regarding proposed nominee - Defendants nominating alternative nominee via amendment - Whether original application for further affidavit rendered academic by proposal of new nominee

 

Raja Segaran S Krishnan JC

  • For the plaintiff - Nahdan Rengganathan Abdullah & Ow Su Wan; M/s A Rengganathan & Co
  • For the 1st to 4th defendant - Vijayamohan Mohan Ghandi; M/s Vijay

 


CLJ 2026 Volume 5 (Part 4)

(i) The detention of a child offender 'at the pleasure' of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Ruler, or Yang di-Pertua Negeri under s. 97(2) of the Child Act 2001 ('CA') is constitutional and does not violate art. 5(1) of the Federal Constitution ('FC'). Since the detention is prescribed by validly enacted law and follows due process of trial, it satisfies the constitutional requirement that no person shall be deprived of personal liberty save 'in accordance with law'; (ii) The exclusion of child offenders from the review mechanisms provided under the Abolition of Mandatory Death Penalty Act 2023 and the Revision of Sentence of Death and Imprisonment for Natural Life (Temporary Jurisdiction of the Federal Court) Act 2023, which allow adults to commute death sentences to determinate prison terms, does not violate art. 8 of the FC; (iii) Child offenders have exclusive statutory avenues for release not available to adults. Specifically, s. 97(4) and (5) of the CA and the Prison Regulations 2000 provide for yearly reviews by the Board of Visiting Justices.
Nomalan Ramayah v. PP & Other Applications [2026] 5 CLJ 531 [FC]

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Sentence - Review - Application to review sentence under r. 137 of Rules of the Federal Court 1995 - Child offenders convicted of murder, drug trafficking and kidnapping - Sentenced to detention at pleasure of Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Ruler or Yang di-Pertua Negeri under s. 97(2) of Child Act 2001 - Whether detention indefinite and without remedy - Whether introduction of Abolition of Mandatory Death Penalty Act 2023 and Revision of Sentence of Death and Imprisonment for Natural Life (Temporary Jurisdiction of the Federal Court) Act 2023 created 'special circumstances' - Whether there was violation of arts. 5(1) and 8 of Federal Constitution - Whether alternative remedies available to applicants

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Fundamental liberties - Right to life and personal liberty - Detention of child offenders at pleasure of Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Ruler or Yang di-Pertua Negeri - Whether s. 97(2) of Child Act 2001 violated art. 5(1) of Federal Constitution - Whether sentence passed in accordance with laws - Whether deprivation of liberty lawful

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Fundamental liberties - Equality - Equal protection of law - Discrimination - Detention of child offenders at pleasure of Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Ruler or Yang di-Pertua Negeri - Comparison between child offenders and adult offenders - Whether exclusion of child offenders from Abolition of Mandatory Death Penalty Act 2023 and Revision of Sentence of Death and Imprisonment for Natural Life (Temporary Jurisdiction of the Federal Court) Act 2023 discriminatory - Whether based on reasonable classification and intelligible differentia - Whether rational relation to object of rehabilitation and re-assimilation - Federal Constitution, art. 8

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Power of pardon - Prerogative of Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Ruler or Yang di-Pertua Negeri - Whether decisions on pardon and duration of detention under s. 97(2) of Child Act 2001 justiciable - Federal Constitution, art. 42

Wan Ahmad Farid Salleh CJ
Azizah Nawawi CJ (Sabah & Sarawak)
Rhodzariah Bujang FCJ
Che Mohd Ruzima Ghazali FCJ
Collin Lawrence Sequerah FCJ

  • For the appellant - Abdul Rashid Ismail, Khaizan Sharizad Ab Razak, Siti Nurani Zahidi & Jacqueline Hannah Albert; M/s Rashid Zulkifli
  • For the respondent - Saiful Edris Zainuddin, Afzainizam Abdul Aziz, Noor Farhana Adham & Mohamad Arif Aizuddin Masrom; DPPs

Upon a careful construction of s. 40 of the Societies Act 1966, a member is not legally mandated to exhaust domestic remedies via the Registrar of Societies before seeking judicial relief unless the society's constitution expressly requires it or all parties provide prior consent. In the absence of such a mandate, any forced reference to the Registrar is considered artificial and farcical. Furthermore, the actions of an Executive Committee or General Council (GC) are ultra vires and unlawful if they disregard a report from the Disciplinary Committee (DC) recommending the dismissal of charges and instead unilaterally impose a suspension based on sentiment rather than evidence. Such conduct, characterised by dismissing a member's appeal in his absence and implementing a preemptive suspension to bar him from an Extraordinary General Meeting, constitutes a systematic denial of natural justice and an act of bad faith.
Datuk Dr Tang Chai Yoong v. Foo Wah Chek & Ors [2026] 5 CLJ 578 [CA]

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UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS: Societies - Expulsion of member - Disciplinary proceedings - Dispute resolution - Reference to Registrar - Whether mandatory to refer dispute to Registrar of Societies before invoking court's jurisdiction - Societies Act 1966, s. 40(1), (2) & (3)

UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS: Societies - Disciplinary proceedings - Expulsion of member - Powers of Executive Committee and General Council ('GC') - Disciplinary Committee ('DC') cleared member of all charges - GC unilaterally reversed DC findings and imposed five-year suspension - Whether actions ultra vires the Constitution of the Association

UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS: Societies - Disciplinary proceedings - Expulsion of member - Right to be heard - Appeal considered and dismissed in absence of member and without prior notice of hearing - Pre-emptive suspension effectively disqualifying member from attending Extraordinary General Meeting - Deprivation of right to defend against expulsion motions - Whether acts of bad faith - Whether denial of natural justice

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 'consent' - Societies Act 1966, s. 40(3) - Whether consent ought to be obtained from all parties prior to reference of dispute to Registrar - Whether mandatory obligation to refer dispute to Registrar

WORDS & PHRASES: 'consent' - Societies Act 1966, s. 40(3) - Whether consent ought to be obtained from all parties prior to reference of dispute to Registrar - Whether mandatory obligation to refer dispute to Registrar

Lim Chong Fong JCA
Faizah Jamaludin JCA
Evrol Mariette Peters JCA

  • For the appellant - Karen Lee Foong Voon & Kwan Wei Chian; M/s Karen Lee
  • For the respondents - Joshua Kevin, Leng Wie Mun & Reuben Ong Shen Rayn; M/s Kevin & Co

(i) To establish Malaysian citizenship by operation of law under art. 14(1)(b) of the Federal Constitution, an applicant must satisfy both jus soli and jus sanguinis by providing positive evidence of their biological lineage to prove they were not born a citizen of any country; (ii) The term 'parents' in s. 1(a) of the Second Schedule refers exclusively to biological parents, and because the Adoption Act 1952 is a subsidiary legislation, it cannot be used to override constitutional provisions or confer citizenship upon an adopted child. Furthermore, the presumption of citizenship for foundlings under s. 19B is only triggered by clear evidence of abandonment; a material break in the chain of events between birth and being found renders the presumption inapplicable; (iii) Section 2(3), Part II, Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution relates only to the timing of citizenship acquisition and does not serve as a deeming provision for statelessness under s. 1(e); therefore, without proof of the biological parents' citizenship and marital status at the time of birth, the burden of proving statelessness remains unsatisfied, and the claim for citizenship by operation of law must fail.
Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara & Ors v. Tan Jun Yan & Another Appeal [2026] 5 CLJ 602 [CA]

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Citizenship - Operation of law - Federal Constitution, art. 14(1)(b), Second Schedule, Part II, s. 1(a) - Presumption as to birth and parentage - Federal Constitution, Second Schedule, Part III, s. 19B - Prerequisites for presumption - Requirement to prove child 'found exposed' - Whether there was failure to identify person who brought child to temple - Whether there was material break in chain of events between birth and presence at temple

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Citizenship - Operation of law - Federal Constitution, art. 14(1)(b), Second Schedule, Part II, s. 1(e) - Requirements for citizenship - Birth within Federation - Statelessness - Onus of proof - Whether applicant must prove he was 'not born a citizen of any country' - Whether statelessness could be inferred by deduction or speculation

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Citizenship - Jus soli and jus sanguinis - Significance of biological parentage - Proof of lineage - Whether birth within Federation alone satisfies criteria for citizenship - Importance of biological parents' citizenship and marital status at time of birth - Failure to adduce evidence of biological lineage - Effect on claim of citizenship by operation of law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Citizenship - Operation of law - Federal Constitution, art. 14(1)(b), Second Schedule, Part II, s. 1(e) - Whether applicant 'not born a citizen of any country' - Interpretation of s. 2(3), Second Schedule, Part II - Whether s. 2(3) creates deeming provision for statelessness - Whether failure to acquire citizenship within one year of birth satisfies s. 1(e)

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Federal Constitution - Second Schedule, Part II, s. 1(a) - Meaning of word 'parents' - Whether included adoptive parents - Reference to 'at the time of birth' - Whether limited to biological parentage - Whether Adoption Act 1952 could confer citizenship status by operation of law - Adoption Act 1952, ss. 9 & 25A

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Federal Constitution - Second Schedule, Part II, s. 2(3) - Purpose and scope - Whether provision limited to timing of acquisition of citizenship - Whether s. 2(3) applicable where no citizenship was acquired

 

Azizah Nawawi CJ (Sabah & Sarawak)
Mohd Nazlan Ghazali JCA
Azhahari Kamal Ramli JCA

(Civil Appeal No: W-01(A)-251-05-2023)
  • For the appellants - Mohammad Sallehuddin Md Ali; DPP
  • For the respondent - Raymond Mah Mun Kitt, Agalya Munusamy, Alyssa Dalila Badli Esham; M/s Mah Weng Kwai & Assocs
Civil Appeal No: W-01(A)-254-05-2023)
  • For the appellant - Raymond Mah Mun Kitt, Agalya Munusamy, Alyssa Dalila Badli Esham; M/s Mah Weng Kwai & Assocs
  • For the respondents - Mohammad Sallehuddin Md Ali; DPP

(i) The failure to provide the written opinions of assessors to the parties does not automatically invalidate a High Court decision or necessitate a rehearing if: (i) the land reference was concluded prior to the Federal Court's judgment in Tegas Sejati Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Dan Daerah Hulu Langat & Anor And Another Appeal; (ii) the appellant failed to specifically apply for a copy of the opinions at the High Court or appellate level; and (iii) the High Court Judge clearly referenced and considered the opinions in the judgment, ensuring no injustice was occasioned to the appellant.
Sin Hee Yang Property Management Sdn Bhd v. Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia & Anor [2026] 5 CLJ 620 [CA]

LAND LAW: Acquisition of land - Compensation - Award by Land Administrator - Objection to award - Land reference to High Court - Failure to appeal against dismissal of striking out application - Effect of non-objection to consolidation of land references - Whether land reference filed within time - Whether estoppel operated in estopping challenge against validity of reference - Land Acquisition Act 1960, s. 38(3)(a)

LAND LAW: Acquisition of land - Compensation - Assessment - Opinion of assessors - Role of assessors in aiding judge - Whether mandatory for court to provide written opinions of assessors to parties - Whether non-disclosure of assessors' opinions to parties constituted breach of s. 40C of Land Acquisition Act 1960 - Whether principles in Tegas Sejati Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Dan Daerah Hulu Langat & Anor And Another Appeal applied

 

 

Azimah Omar FCJ
Wong Kian Kheong JCA
Ismail Brahim JCA

  • For the appellant - Cheah Sin Chin & Gan Yu Lin; M/s Azwar & Assocs
  • For the 1st respondent - Koh Yew Chong, Justin Leong Chee C'Jun & Amila Huda Ahmad; M/s Lee & Koh
  • For the 2nd respondent - Etty Eliany Tesno & Norfariza Ridzuan; SLAs, Selangor

(i) A judicial review application challenging the validity of a planning permission granted by a Local Authority for construction and development must be dismissed in limine for failure to act 'promptly' under O. 53 of the Rules of Court 2012, as the requirement of promptness is a mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite independent of the three-month outer filing limit. Constructive knowledge of the grounds for challenge, derived from an applicant's conduct, participation in prior regulatory proceedings, or awareness of physical construction, triggers the obligation to act with requisite speed, failing which the application becomes statutorily fatal. Furthermore, such applications constitute improper collateral attacks when they attempt to relitigate issues already determined by specialist tribunals or circumvent established regulatory frameworks; (ii) In matters concerning the Town and Country Planning Act 1976, courts adopt a contextual approach to statutory definitions; site-specific private facilities do not automatically qualify as 'major national infrastructure', and 'toxic waste' is legally distinguished from 'radioactive waste'; (iii) Ultimately, where a project is operational and supported by multiple lawful approvals, the court will prioritise regulatory certainty and public interest over procedural omissions, especially in the absence of substantive evidence of harm or risk.
Tan Bun Teet v. Jawatankuasa Perancang Negeri Pahang & Ors; Lynas Malaysia Sdn Bhd (Intervener) [2026] 5 CLJ 657 [CA]

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Application for - Challenge against grant of planning permission for permanent disposal facility - Construction of facility for water leach purification waste from rare earth processing plant - Whether local planning authority under mandatory obligation to seek advice of National Physical Planning Council - Whether project fell within definition of 'major infrastructure' or 'national infrastructure' - Town and Country Planning Act 1976, ss. 20B, 21(6), 22(2A)(b) & 22(2B)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Procedure - Application to challenge planning permission - Time limit - Requirement to file application 'promptly' - Whether 'promptness' independent and mandatory requirement - Whether failure to act promptly fatal to application - Whether court seized of jurisdiction to hear matter - Effect of delay on judicial review proceedings - Whether mandatory requirements of O. 53 r. 3(6), (7) & (8) of Rules of Court 2012 complied with

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Locus standi - Judicial review - Application to challenge planning permission for waste disposal site - Whether appellant an 'aggrieved person' - Whether appellant had necessary locus standi to object to planning permission - Whether right to be heard existed under s. 21(6) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1976

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Remedies - Extension of time - Delay and acquiescence - Construction of facility completed and operational during proceedings - Potential risks to public and waste management systems resulting from disruption - Whether court should exercise discretion to grant relief or extend time

LOCAL GOVERNMENT: Planning and development - Validity - Compliance with statutory requirements - Whether complied with s. 22(4)(a) of Town and Country Planning Act 1976 - Whether permanent disposal facility for radioactive waste permissible within industrial zone - Exercise of planning judgment by local planning authority - Whether planning approval in contravention of replacement local plan

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: Waste management - Water leach purification ('WLP') residue - Radioactive material - Construction of permanent disposal facility - Regulatory framework - Whether WLP residue classified as 'radioactive waste' or 'toxic waste' - Interplay between Atomic Energy Licensing Act 1984 and Environmental Quality Act 1974 - Whether planning permission consistent with directives of State Planning Committee

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Town and Country Planning Act 1976 - Sections 20B(1)(b)(ii) and 22(2A)(b) - Requirement to consult National Physical Planning Council - Construction of terms 'major national infrastructure' and 'a major infrastructure or utility' - Whether applicable to private projects involving private entities - Whether permanent disposal facility site for radioactive residue on private land fell within definitions - Whether statutory presumption existed for radioactive-related facilities - Contextual and purposive approach to interpretation - Caution against over-extending definitions to constrain Local Authority decision-making or displace local planning authority

Che Mohd Ruzima Ghazali FCJ
Mohd Firuz Jaffril JCA
Ong Chee Kwan JCA

  • For the appellant - M Thayalan, Meenakshi Raman, Theivanai Amarthalingam & A Lalith Kumar; M/s Theiva Lingam
  • For the 1st respondent - Munirah Shamsudin & Siti Sarah Samsuddin Shah; SLOs, Pahang
  • For the 2nd respondent - Rosnah Faisal; M/s Rosnah Faisal & Assocs
  • Fort the 3rd respondent - Thangaraj Balasundram & Nadeem Rafiq; M/s Thangaraj & Assocs
  • For the 4th respondent/interverner - Cecil Abraham, Sunil Abraham, Noor Muzalifah Shabudin, Mohd Irwan Ismail & Nur Fathin Farrisya Md Noor; M/s Cecil Abraham & Partners

An unlawful administrative decision is capable of producing legal consequences until it is set aside; thus, subsequent actions taken by a second authority in reliance on that decision are valid, particularly to protect the interests of bona fide third parties.
Yeong Oon Kong v. Lau Teck Poh & Ors [2026] 5 CLJ 683 [CA]

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Certiorari - Second actor theory - Cancellation of vehicle registration numbers - Whether cancellation valid and subsisting until set aside by court - Whether subsequent assignment of registration number to third party valid - Whether undue weight erroneously given to retroactive effect of certiorari - Whether remedy lay in damages - Whether public reliance on official register should be preserved - Road Transport Act 1987

ROAD TRANSPORT: Registration of vehicles - Registration numbers - Competing claims - Cancellation of registration number subsequently found to be unlawful - Re-assignment of number to bona fide purchaser while judicial review pending - Application of second actor theory - Whether third party remained rightful owner - Whether official register of Jabatan Pengangkutan Jalan reliable and valid for subsequent administrative actions

 

Choo Kah Sing JCA
Lim Hock Leng JCA
Latifah Mohd Tahar J

  • For the appellant - Malik Imtiaz Sarwar, Loo Hsien Yang & Wong Ming Yen; M/s YK Loo & Co
  • For the 1st & 2nd respondents - Muhammad Shafee Abdullah & Magdalene Wong Sui Hua; M/s Shafee & Co
  • For the 3rd & 4th respondents - Syahriah Shapiee; SFC

 


ARTICLES

LNS Article(s)

  1. AN ANALYSIS OF THE EXTENT OF POWER VESTED IN THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD PURSUANT TO SECTION 103D OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 1976 [Read excerpt]
    by Wan Nur Addibah binti Adnan[i] Jessica Sinnappan[ii] Goh Pei Qian[iii] [2026] CLJU(A) lv

  2. [2026] CLJU(A) lv
    MALAYSIA

    AN ANALYSIS OF THE EXTENT OF POWER VESTED IN THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD PURSUANT TO SECTION 103D OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 1976

    by
    Wan Nur Addibah binti Adnan[i]
    Jessica Sinnappan[ii]
    Goh Pei Qian[iii]

    GENERAL INTRODUCTION

    The power of the Disciplinary Board originates from section 94 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 ('LPA 1976'), which gives the authority to the Disciplinary Board to manage the affairs of all advocates and solicitors. This is especially for matters pertaining to the professional conduct of the advocates and solicitors, and to safeguard the integrity of the profession. The Disciplinary Board ('DB') has the liberty of punishing any advocate and solicitor who has been guilty of any misconduct with one or more of the following penalties or punishments:

    (1) To be struck off the Roll;

    (2) To be suspended from practice for any period not exceeding five years;

    (3) To be ordered to pay a fine not exceeding RM50,000; or

    (4) To be reprimanded or censured.[1]

    . . .

    [i] Lecturer, Centre for Law & Technology, Faculty of Law, Multimedia University.

    [ii] Faculty of Law, Multimedia University.

    [iii] Faculty of Law, Multimedia University.

  3. THE DEVELOPMENT, FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY MALAYSIA ('CAAM')* [Read excerpt]
    by Kenny Lam Kian Yip[i] Anice Wong Hui Xin[ii] [2026] CLJU(A) lvi

  4. [2026] CLJU(A) lvi
    MALAYSIA

    THE DEVELOPMENT, FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY MALAYSIA ('CAAM')*

    by
    Kenny Lam Kian Yip[i]
    Anice Wong Hui Xin[ii]

    Following the end of the COVID-19 pandemic, air transport services have gradually rebounded. As one of humanity's greatest technological inventions, air transport services make it possible to move people and goods between continents within hours. However, civil aviation carries inherent risks and therefore requires careful and comprehensive regulation to ensure its safety and security. Apart from that, economic regulation is also required to ensure that the aviation industry remains competitive and financially sustainable. Recently, there was a significant development in Malaysia's aviation industry, as the Malaysian Aviation Commission (MAVCOM) was dissolved, and its functions were transferred to the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia ('CAAM'). As a result, CAAM now serves as the sole regulatory authority for civil aviation in Malaysia. In light of this merger, it is timely to revisit the development, functions and powers of CAAM.

    . . .

    *Copyright © 2026 Messrs Rosli Dahlan Saravana Partnership.

    [i] Partner at Messrs Rosli Dahlan Saravana Partnership.

    [i] Pupil-in-chambers at Messrs Rosli Dahlan Saravana Partnership.

LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTS

Principal Acts

Number Title In force from Repealed Superseded
ACT 882 Government Procurement Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -
ACT 881 International Settlement Agreements Resulting From Mediation Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -
ACT 880 Capitation Grant Act 2026 1 April 2026 - -
ACT 879 Auctioneers Act 1914 (Revised–2026) 25 March 2026 revised edition pursuant to paragraph 6(1)(xxiii) of the Revision of Laws Act 1968 [Act 1]; Revised up to 20 March 2026; First enacted in 1914 as Sabah Ordinance No 1 of 1914; First Revision - 1936 (No 1 of 1914 wef 31 December 1936); Second Revision - 1953 (Cap 9 wef 30 June 1953) - -
ACT 878 Legal Aid and Public Defence Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -

Amending Acts

Number Title In force from Principal/Amending Act No
ACT A1793 Environmental Quality (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 127
ACT A1792 Supplementary Supply (2025) Act 2026 1 May 2026  
ACT A1791 Passports (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 150
ACT A1790 Immigration (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 155
ACT A1789 Rukun Tetangga (Amendment) Act 2026 1 April 2026 [PU(B) 90/2026] ACT 751

PU(A)

Number Title Date of Publication In force from Principal/ Amending Act No
PU(A) 196/2026 Road Transport (Prohibition of Use of Road) (Federal Roads) (Revocation) (No. 2) Order 2026 21 May 2026 22 May 2026 ACT 333
PU(A) 195/2026 Entertainments Duty (Exemption) (No. 23) Order 2026 21 May 2026 22 May 2026 ACT 103
PU(A) 194/2026 Entertainments Duty (Exemption) (No. 22) Order 2026 21 May 2026 22 May 2026 ACT 103
PU(A) 193/2026 Customs Duties (Goods Under The Agreement Establishing The Asean-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area) (Amendment) Order 2026 19 May 2026 1 June 2026 PU(A) 182/2025
PU(A) 192/2026 Housing Development (Control and Licensing) (Exemption) (No. 2) Order 2026 18 May 2026 19 May 2026 ACT 118

PU(B)

Number Title Date of Publication In force from Principal/ Amending Act No
PU(B) 195/2026 Prescription Under Section 6 29 May 2026 30 May 2026 ACT 32
PU(B) 194/2026 Notice To Third Parties 26 Mei 2026 27 Mei 2026 ACT 613
PU(B) 193/2026 Authorization and Revocation of Authorization Under Paragraph 120(1)(e) 25 May 2026 26 May 2026 ACT 333
PU(B) 192/2026 Authorization and Revocation of Authorization Under Paragraph 120(1)(e) 25 May 2026 26 May 2026 ACT 333
PU(B) 191/2026 Authorization and Revocation of Authorization Under Paragraph 120(1)(e) 25 May 2026 26 May 2026 ACT 333

Legislation Alert

Updated

Act/Principal No. Title Amended by In force from Section amended
AKTA 27 Akta Agensi Persendirian 1971 AKTA A1782 28 April 2026 [PU(B) 147/2026] Seksyen 3, 5, 9, 13 and 18A
ACT 27 Private Agencies Act 1971 ACT A1782 28 April 2026 [PU(B) 147/2026] Sections 3, 5, 9, 13 and 18A
ACT 206 Arms Act 1960 (Revised 1978) PU(A) 94/2026 21 February 2026 Second Schedule
ACT 751 Rukun Tetangga Act 2012 ACT A1789 1 April 2026 [PU(B) 90/2026] Sections 2, 3, 7, 9, 15, 17 and 23
AKTA 751 Akta Rukun Tetangga 2012 AKTA A1789 1 April 2026 [PU(B) 90/2026] Seksyen 2, 3, 7, 9, 15, 17 dan 23

Revoked

Act/Principal No. Title Revoked by In force from
PU(A) 173/2022 Perintah Duti Eksais (Kenderaan Bermotor) (Bayaran) 2022 PU(A) 44/2026 1 Februari 2026
PU(A) 173/2022 Excise Duties (Motor Vehicles) (Payment) Order 2022 PU(A) 44/2026 1 February 2026
PU(A) 317/2025 Federal Roads (East Klang Valley Expressway) Order 2025 PU(A) 32/2026 26 January 2026
PU(A) 384/2021 Customs (Anti-Dumping Duties) (Administrative Review) (No. 3) Order 2021 PU(A) 24/2026 15 January 2026 to 8 October 2026
PU(A) 312/2021 Customs (Anti-Dumping Duties) (Administrative Review) (No. 2) Order 2021 PU(A) 23/2026 15 January 2026 to 19 July 2026

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