CASE SPOTLIGHTS
UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE (R&D) SDN BHD v. RAMLI MD SALEH & ORS [2026] 9 CLJ 1
FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA HASHIM HAMZAH CJ MOHD NAZLAN GHAZALI FCJ COLLIN LAWRENCE SEQUERAH FCJ [CIVIL APPEAL NO: 02(f)-50-11-2024(W)] 29 JULY 2026
(i) Under a sukuk al-ijarah structure where the originator transfers its entire beneficial interest in an asset to a special purpose vehicle (and subsequently to a sukuk trustee for the benefit of sukuk holders) while retaining legal title strictly as a bare trustee, any subsequent sale proceeds generated from the pre-sale of that asset belong exclusively to the sukuk holders as the beneficial owners. The bare trustee acquires no legal or beneficial right to the proceeds. Consequently, such proceeds cannot be treated as funds originating from or belonging to the bare trustee, nor can their application toward group debt redemption constitute advances or enforceable debts owing to the bare trustee; (ii) Financial statements are prepared based on the principle of economic substance over legal form in accordance with applicable accounting standards, where assets and transactions may not be derecognised if economic risks and rewards are retained. A 'true sale' for accounting purposes is distinct from a 'true sale' under strict law or Shariah principles. Accordingly, mere accounting entries reflecting inter-company advances or the retention of an asset on a company's balance sheet do not, by themselves, create, establish, or prove the existence of legally enforceable debts in the absence of an underlying legal entitlement or contractual obligation.
COMPANY LAW: Fraudulent trading - Application under s. 304 of Companies Act 1965 - Allegation of write-off or waiver of inter-company debts to defraud judgment creditor - Whether entries in financial statements created enforceable legal debts - Whether proceeds of pre-sale belonged to bare trustee or sukuk holders
BANKING: Islamic banking - Sukuk al-ijarah - Beneficial interest - Concept of true sale - Transfer of beneficial ownership via assets purchase agreement - Rights of sukuk holders - Application of pre-sale proceeds under supplemental trust deed and Securities Commission approval - Whether entries in financial statements created enforceable legal debts - Whether proceeds of pre-sale belonged to bare trustee or sukuk holders - Whether accounting entries per se constitute legal and enforceable debts
JUDICIAL QUOTES
“Although inter-company loans between or amongst companies with common directors are not, in themselves, prohibited under the Companies Act, such transactions necessarily attract closer scrutiny owing to the inherent risk of conflicts of interest and the potential misuse of corporate funds for collateral purposes. It was, therefore, entirely appropriate for the learned High Court Judge to subject the transfers of a total sum of RM9,397,057.40 from Ga Yee to Encony and Eramas, facilitated by Khor and Chin, to careful examination in order to determine whether those transfers were tainted by fraud or formed part of a conspiracy to injure Ga Yee.”
“The learned High Court Judge further observed that the transfers of money from Ga Yee to Encony and Eramas had lacked the hallmarks of a bona fide commercial loan transaction and were devoid of any commercial substance indicative of a genuine lending arrangement. This, in turn, rendered the transfers inherently questionable. In our judgment, His Lordship was fully justified in reaching that conclusion for the following reasons.”
“Nature of transaction - a genuine loan or advance would be documented with clear terms regarding consideration, purpose, and, most importantly, repayment. The evidence adduced in the present case showed that these essential elements were completely absent.” – Per Evrol Mariette Peters JCA in Eramas Konsortium Sdn Bhd v. Ga Yee Furniture Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2026] 9 CLJ 705
LATEST CASES
Legal Network Series
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[2026] CLJU 103
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THONG YUET SHENG & ORS v. MYVILLA DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD
1. Where a sale and purchase agreement allows for a period of two years after the delivery of vacant possession for the purchasers to file a complaint on any defects that were apparent during the defects liability period, then the dates of accrual of the cause of action is not from the date of the delivery of vacant possession but from the date where the defects could have been reasonably discovered. In a circumstances, where a vacant possession was delivered without supply of water and electricity, then defects could not have been reasonably discovered without the presence of water and electricity. In absence of supply of electricity and water during a handover, the defects were not apparent to the purchasers during the handover. Any defects reported during the handover was only based on the aesthetics of their housing parcels.
2. The defect liability period clause does not take away the right to sue in respect of defects that were not discoverable during the defect liability period and do not afford any ground for the developer to evade its liability towards the purchasers.
3. A developer is in breach of duty of care for its failure to exercise all reasonable care, skill and diligence in constructing housing parcels when the developer had violated the standards set under the Electricity Regulations 1994 which may cause and/or have caused danger and severe damage to the purchasers and/or their family and their housing parcels and belongings.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Pleadings - Failure to plead - Claim premised on negligence - Words 'duty of care' and 'breach of duty of care' were not pleaded in statement of claim - Whether claims unsustainable - Whether relationship between parties and material facts of allegations of breach clearly identified - Whether defendant understood plaintiff's claim and cause of action
LIMITATION: Cause of action - Accrual of - Negligence - Claim against developer for damages to property - Developer alleged defects were not latent defects - Allegation that exact date of accrual of cause of action not pleaded - Whether defects could be reasonably discovered upon delivery of vacant possession - Whether claims barred by limitation and doctrine of laches - Limitation Act 1953, s. 6A
TORT: Negligence - Duty of care - Breach - Claim against developer for damages to property - Failure to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence in constructing housing parcels - Faulty installation of electrical cables or wires - Violation of standards causing danger and severe damage - Whether developer owed tortious duty of care to purchasers to ensure that housing parcels safe for human habitation and fit for purpose as exclusive property - Whether developer breached duty of care - Whether rectification works carried out on parcels amounted to independent acts which broke chain of causation
CONTRACT: Sale and purchase of property - Defects - Claim against developer for damages to property - Failure to install safe electrical cables or wires - Violation of standards causing danger and severe damage - Whether certificate of completion and compliance null and void - Whether defects reported during handover based on aesthetics of housing parcel
- For the plaintiffs - Viola Lettice Decruz & Nur Atiqah Ahmad Ariff; M/s V.L. Decruz & Co
- For the defendant - Dawn Wong Keng Jade & Adrienne Sena; M/s Steven Thiru & Sudhar Partnership
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[2026] CLJU 133
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NOR ASHIMAH RAMLI lwn. SYED MOHD BAKRI SYED ISHAK
Dalam tindakan fitnah, adalah prinsip asas bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan sebagai fitnah merupakan fakta material yang mesti diplidkan dengan jelas dan spesifik. Kegagalan untuk berbuat demikian akan menyebabkan pliding tersebut menjadi kabur, memalukan dan tidak boleh dipertahankan. Plaintif mempunyai kewajipan untuk memilih dan mengenal pasti perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan dan Mahkamah tidak boleh diletakkan dalam kedudukan untuk membuat spekulasi atau andaian bagi pihak plaintif. Kegagalan plaintif untuk memplidkan perkataan fitnah secara khusus bukanlah suatu kecacatan teknikal yang boleh diperbetulkan melalui perbicaraan, tetapi merupakan suatu kegagalan asas yang menjejaskan keseluruhan tuntutan.
PROSEDUR SIVIL: Pembatalan - Pernyataan tuntutan - Tindakan fitnah - Kegagalan memplidkan dengan jelas perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan sebagai fitnah gagal diplidkan dengan jelas - Permohonan di bawah A. 18 k. 19(1)(a) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 - Sama ada mahkamah mempunyai tugas untuk memilih, menapis dan menentukan perkataan yang diadukan fitnah bagi pihak plaintif - Sama ada tuntutan fitnah mendedahkan sebarang kausa tindakan yang munasabah - Sama ada tindakan plaintif boleh dipertahankan
- Bagi pihak plaintif - Muhammad Noor Azfar NoorAzmi; T/n Azfar Azmi & Co
- Bagi pihak defendan - Syahidah Hanum Mohd Ghazali; T/n Syahidah Sharul & Marsyara
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[2026] CLJU 137
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DEVAN KENKARGARO & SATU LAGI lwn. MOHAMMAD NASHAFIQ NASARUDIN & YANG LAIN
1. Kelewatan pemfailkan suatu notis rayuan balas bukanlah isu penentu, kerana terdapat isu yang lebih serius iaitu ketidakkompetenan substantif rayuan balas itu sendiri yang perlu dipertimbangkan. Fokus perlu diberikan kepada isu kompetensi rayuan balas kerana jika rayuan balas itu didapati tidak kompeten, maka isu masa menjadi akademik.
2. Suatu rayuan balas tidak boleh digunakan untuk membuka semula keseluruhan penghakiman. Rayuan balas responden hanya sah jika ia menyentuh isu yang telah dibuka oleh perayu dalam notis rayuannya. Notis rayuan balas responden yang membawa isu yang bukan sebahagian daripada isu yang dibuka oleh perayu dalam rayuannya adalah tidak kompeten dan salah prosedur. Rayuan balas yang digunakan bukan bertujuan untuk menentang isu perayu tetapi untuk memasukkan kembali tuntutan yang telah ditolak semasa bicara tanpa memfailkan rayuan tersendiri adalah wajar diketepikan dan dibatalkan.
PROSEDUR SIVIL: Pembatalan - Notis permohonan - Notis permohonan lanjutan masa bagi pemfailan notis rayuan balas - Rayuan balas membawa tuntutan kuantum yang telah ditolak oleh hakim bicara - Kegagalan menentang isu notis rayuan dalam rayuan balas Rayuan balas tidak menentang isu notis rayuan - Sama ada notis rayuan balas mempunyai asas undang-undang untuk wujud - Sama ada kekeliruan dan kesilapan pentadbiran merupakan alasan yang mencukupi untuk mempertimbangkan kelewatan - Sama ada responden cuba menghidupkan semula tuntutan yang telah ditolak tanpa memfailkan rayuan tersendiri - Sama ada mahkamah wajar menggunakan kuasa di bawah A. 18 k. 19(1) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 untuk mengetepikan notis rayuan balas
- Bagi pihak perayu - Khutubul Zaman & Christina; T/n Syahrizad Zaman Seah
- Bagi pihak responden 1 & 2 - Hidayah; T/n Gan Ho & Razlan Hadri
- Bagi pihak responden 3 & 4 - T/n YP Tan & Ong
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[2026] CLJU 139
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TEY CHIN HUI & SATU LAGI lwn. TETUAN ARISSA TAN, CHIEN & CO
1. Dalam tuntutan terhadap peguam, kewajipan profesional lazimnya berakar pada hubungan peguam-klien melalui kontrak pelantikan atau retainer, sama ada secara nyata atau tersirat, atau melalui keadaan khusus yang membenarkan undang-undang mengenakan kewajipan kepada pihak yang bukan klien. Tanpa kontrak atau retainer atau hubungan guaman yang boleh dibuktikan, tuntutan kecuaian profesional terhadap peguam oleh bukan klien berhadapan kekangan asas dari segi kewajipan. Prima facie kewajipan guaman tidak dapat ditimbulkan tanpa elemen pelantikan, penerimaan arahan, nasihat dan tanggungjawab profesional terhadap peguam. Mana-mana dakwaan kecuaian atau pelanggaran tanggungjawab tidak akan dapat dibuktikan tanpa asas hubungan undang-undang yang sah.
2. Dalam tindakan berasaskan perlanggaran kewajipan profesional, liabiliti undang-undang tidak lahir semata-mata daripada pengakuan kesilapan dalam erti pentadbiran atau teknikal. Liabiliti masih tertakluk kepada kerangka undang-undang yang menuntut pembuktian kewajipan, pelanggaran, kausaliti dan kerugian.
PROSEDUR SIVIL: Tindakan - Saman pemula - Kesesuaian kaedah prosiding - Tindakan terhadap firma guaman berasaskan kecuaian profesional - Sama ada hubungan fidusiari boleh ditentukan secara selamat melalui afidavit yang bercanggah - Sama ada wujud pertikaian fakta material yang ketara - Sama ada plaintif telah gagal menunjukkan asas yang mencukupi bagi kewajipan, liabiliti, kerugian dan kausaliti
TORT: Kecuaian - Kecuaian profesional - Tindakan terhadap firma guaman - Salah laku - Pengurusan harta pusaka - Surat kuasa mentadbir dan perintah pembahagian diperoleh tanpa melibatkan waris pusaka - Sama ada wujud hubungan guaman antara firma guaman dan waris yang menimbulkan kewajipan profesional dan tanggungjawab fidusiari - Sama ada firma guaman telah melanggar tanggungjawab profesional dan fidusiari terhadap waris - Sama ada pengakuan kesilapan teknikal atau ungkapan rasa kesal boleh disamakan secara automatik dengan pengakuan liabiliti undang-undang
- Bagi pihak plaintif - Rajagunaseelan; T/n G.K Sritharan
- Bagi pihak defendan - Chris Lee & George Neo; T/n Yeo Chambers
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[2026] CLJU 149
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MUGUNTHAN MANICKAM lwn. PP & RAYUAN YANG LAIN
Sabitan ke atas tertuduh atas pertuduhan pengedaran dadah berbahaya adalah selamat berpandukan keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan walaupun dengan ketiadaan keterangan sokongan lain seperti keterangan cap jari. Ketiadaan keterangan cap cari tidak cukup untuk membangkitkan keraguan munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan terutama apabila dadah-dadah dijumpai di dalam beg yang dibawa bersama oleh tertuduh dan di tempat yang dipandu arah oleh tertuduh itu sendiri.
UNDANG-UNDANG JENAYAH: Dadah berbahaya - Pengedaran - Dadah dijumpai di dalam beg yang dipegang oleh tertuduh dan di dalam kereta - Sama ada tertuduh mempunyai kawalan, milikan, jagaan dan pengetahuan terhadap dadah - Sama ada anggapan di bawah s. 37(d) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 berjaya dipatahkan - Sama ada pihak pendakwaan gagal memanggil saksi material yang membangkitkan inferens bertentangan - Sama ada ketiadaan keterangan cap jari cukup untuk membangkitkan keraguan munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan
- Bagi pihak perayu - Ashrul Haikal & Swinder Singh; T/n Salehuddin Saidin & Assoc
- Bagi pihak responden - TPR Noor Farhana Adham; Jabatan Peguam Negara
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CLJ 2026 Volume 8 (Part 6)
At the close of the prosecution's case, there is no statutory or legal requirement for a trial judge to make a formal or spoken declaration specifying whether the accused is called upon to answer a case of actual trafficking or presumed trafficking under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ('DDA'). An omission by the trial judge to expressly state or record whether a case of direct or presumed trafficking has been established does not render the order calling for the defence defective nor does it cause a miscarriage of justice, provided that: (i) the prosecution's reliance on actual possession to trigger the statutory presumption of trafficking under s. 37(da) of the DDA is clearly communicated and understood by all parties throughout the proceedings; and (ii) no prejudice is occasioned to the accused in framing or presenting their defence.
PP v. Julasiri Akilmara [2026] 8 CLJ 795 [FC]
CRIMINAL LAW | CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL LAW: Offences - Trafficking in dangerous drugs - Presumption of trafficking - Duty of trial judge at close of prosecution's case - Trial judge omitted to state whether accused called upon to answer direct or presumed trafficking - Whether statutory or legal requirement under Criminal Procedure Code to make formal declaration - Whether omission fatal or caused miscarriage of justice - Whether accused fully aware of prosecution's case throughout proceedings - Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, ss. 39B(1)(a) & 37(da)(xvi)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Prima facie - Call for defence - Accused charged for trafficking in dangerous drugs - Presumption of trafficking - Duty of trial court at close of prosecution's case - Trial judge omitted to state whether accused called upon to answer direct or presumed trafficking - Whether statutory or legal requirement to make formal declaration - Whether omission fatal or caused miscarriage of justice - Whether accused fully aware of prosecution's case throughout proceedings - Criminal Procedure Code, s. 180
Rhodzariah Bujang FCJ
Nordin Hassan FCJ
Azmi Ariffin FCJ
- For the appellant - Mohd Amril Johari; DPP
- For the respondent - Kamarudin Mohmad Chinki; M/s Chang & Kamarudin
Factual possession and knowledge under s. 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 are established by the cumulative weight of objective, circumstantial, and conduct evidence showing actual custody, control, and dominion over the illicit items at the material time. Criminal liability is determined by reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the proved facts - such as an accused having sole physical control over a vehicle containing contraband within immediate reach, or directly leading police to the precise location of hidden drugs. Such compelling evidence of immediate physical dominion is not negated by speculative third-party access, nor does the omission to call nominal witnesses create a fatal gap or trigger an adverse inference under s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950.
Mohd Jafri Hussain v. PP & Another Appeal [2026] 8 CLJ 823 [CA]
CRIMINAL LAW | CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | WORDS & PHRASES
CRIMINAL LAW: Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 - Section 39B(1)(a) - Trafficking - Conviction and sentence - Appeal against - Arrest of accused while driving motor vehicle - Discovery of drugs on driver's side floorboard - Accused subsequently led police to house - Discovery of drugs inside wardrobe in master bedroom - Whether prosecution established possession and knowledge of dangerous drugs - Whether prosecution failed to exclude possibility of access by other persons - Whether combination of direct evidence, admissible conduct evidence, and circumstantial evidence pointed irresistibly to accused's custody, control and knowledge of drugs - Whether essential ingredients of charges proved - Evidence Act 1950, s. 8
CRIMINAL LAW: Dangerous Drugs - Possession - Custody and control - Knowledge - Definition and concept of possession under Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 - Whether possession confined to physical ownership or required exclusive occupation of premises or vehicle - Mental element - Intention to exercise dominion over prohibited articles - Whether prosecution under obligation to eliminate every speculative possibility of access by other persons
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Sentence - Appeal against - Trafficking in dangerous drugs - Arrest of accused while driving motor vehicle - Discovery of drugs on driver's side floorboard - Accused subsequently led police to house - Discovery of drugs inside wardrobe in master bedroom - Whether prosecution established possession and knowledge of dangerous drugs - Whether prosecution failed to exclude possibility of access by other persons - Whether combination of direct evidence, admissible conduct evidence, and circumstantial evidence pointed irresistibly to accused's custody, control and knowledge of drugs - Whether essential ingredients of charges proved - Whether conviction and sentence affirmed
WORDS & PHRASES: 'Possession' - Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 - Definition and concept - Whether confined to physical ownership or exclusive occupation of premises or vehicle - Physical element of custody or control - Mental element of knowledge and intention to exercise dominion - Non-exclusivity of possession - Scope of prosecution's duty to eliminate speculative third-party access
Noorin Badaruddin JCA
Mohd Radzi Abdul Hamid JCA
Dean Wayne Daly JCA
- For the appellant - Nik Mohamed Ikhwan Nik Mahamud & Nik Ikhwan & Co
- For the respondent - Shamala Jaganathan; DPP
An aggrieved party must strictly exhaust the internal statutory appeal machinery provided under s. 141W of the Customs Act 1967 before resorting to judicial review. Where the statutory route empowers the High Court to determine questions of law and mixed law and fact - including evaluating whether a Tribunal misdirected itself on the evidence - bypassing this machinery to file a judicial review constitutes an impermissible attempt to pursue an appeal under the guise of a review, thereby rendering the Act of Parliament redundant. Furthermore, if a litigant chooses to submit to a Tribunal's jurisdiction and loses, subsequently seeking judicial review to challenge the underlying regulator's decision constitutes an abusive, backdoor collateral attack designed to get a 'second bite of the cherry'. Such an afterthought is inherently frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the court process.
Winepak Corporation (M) Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Kastam Diraja Malaysia [2026] 8 CLJ 846 [CA]
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Application for leave - Appeal against decision of Customs Appeal Tribunal - Applicant filed application for judicial review to quash decision of Tribunal - Whether applicant ought to have appealed against Tribunal's decision to High Court under s. 141W of Customs Act 1967 - Whether application for judicial review amounted to attempt to pursue appeal under guise of judicial review - Whether applicant must first exhaust internal remedy by appealing to High Court on questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact - Whether exceptional circumstances arose - Whether application frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of court process - Courts of Judicature Act 1964
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Interpretation of statutes - Legislative intent - Customs Act 1967, s. 141W - Rules of construction - Whether court must interpret statute as written without rewriting, adding, or omitting words - Whether statutory language must be read in full context and not in isolation - Whether s. 141W clear and unambiguous - Whether any person aggrieved by decision of Tribunal may appeal to High Court on questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact
Azhahari Kamal Ramli JCA
Ahmad Kamal Md Shahid JCA
Nadzarin Wok Nordin JCA
- For the appellant - Jacob Rabindranath & Christopher Joseph; M/s Jacob Rabindranath & Co
- For the respondent - Noor Fadzila Ishak; SFC & Loh Xian Yee; FC
Where a housing developer relies on an extension of time granted under a regulation subsequently declared ultra vires, only the extended completion terms in the sale and purchase agreement are void and unenforceable, leaving the remaining statutory contract valid and reverting the completion period to its original statutory timeline. Because the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 is social legislation designed to protect consumers, a purchaser's right to statutory remedies is not defeated by a lack of positive proof concerning their ignorance of the underlying illegality at the time of contracting. Crucially, the cause of action for a late delivery claim accrues, and the six-year limitation period under the Limitation Act 1953 begins to run, from the expiry of the original statutorily prescribed completion period, rather than at the date of execution or actual delivery. Furthermore, while s. 22C of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 enables homebuyers to maintain actions in their own names despite an absolute assignment to a financier, a failure to serve the requisite written notice within the statutory 14-day window constitutes a minor procedural irregularity that can be cured retroactively without stripping the plaintiff of locus standi
Ahmad Farid Mohd Fadzuli & Anor v. AQRS The Building Company Sdn Bhd [2026] 8 CLJ 861 [HC]
CONTRACT | LIMITATION
CONTRACT: Sale and purchase agreement - Housing development project - Breach - Failure to deliver vacant possession - Plaintiffs sought declaration of rescission, refund of monies paid, legal fees, assessment of damages, interest, and costs - Whether plaintiffs lacked locus standi by reason of deed of assignment in favour of bank and notification requirements - Extension of time - Whether court could lend aid to enforce contractual completion period resting on ultra vires regulation between defaulting developer and purchasers - Whether contract void or unenforceable - Whether defaulting party bound under s. 66 of Contracts Act 1950 to restore any advantage received - Whether plaintiffs entitled to restitution - Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966, s. 22C
CONTRACT: Illegality - Statutory protection - Restitution - Agreement discovered to be void - Whether purchasers procurers of illegality - Protective period prescribed for benefit of purchasers - Standard form presented to lay foreign purchasers by developer - Whether matters peculiarly within developer's knowledge - Absence of positive proof of purchasers' awareness of statutory period at time of contracting - Whether restitution under s. 66 of Contracts Act 1950 conditioned on proof of ignorance of illegality - Whether lack of evidence on purchasers' awareness defeated claim for restitution
CONTRACT: Restitution - Void agreement - Recovery of advantages received - Agreement discovered to be unenforceable in its protective-period terms - Progress payments received by developer - Whether developer bound to restore advantages under s. 66 of Contracts Act 1950 - Whether purchasers procurers of illegality - Protective period prescribed for benefit of purchasers - Standard form presented to lay foreign purchasers by developer - Whether matters peculiarly within developer's knowledge - Absence of positive proof of purchasers' awareness of statutory period at time of contracting - Whether restitution conditioned on proof of ignorance of illegality - Whether lack of evidence on purchasers' awareness defeated claim for restitution
LIMITATION: Accrual of cause of action - Restitution - Sale and purchase agreement - Housing development project - Whether extension of time granted under ultra vires regulation - Whether extended-period terms unenforceable - Claim for refund of progress payments - When agreement 'discovered to be void' - Whether cause of action accrued on execution of agreement or contractual delivery date - Limitation Act 1953, s. 6(1)(a) - Writ filed within six years from date of discovery - Whether action time-barred - Limitation Act 1953, s. 6(1)(a)
- For the plaintiffs - Lim Kim Siong & Hor Khai Qian; M/s S K Song
- For the defendant - Vincent Ong & Carmene Tan; M/s Tan Norizan & Assocs
(i) For the purposes of s. 311(3) of the Companies Act 2016 ('CA 2016'), read alongside s. 2(1) of the CA 2016 and s. 35 of the Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 1991, a company does not take cognisance of trusts; the statutory 10% threshold is determined strictly by reference to the registered shareholding of the member at the date of the requisition notice, and shares beneficially held through nominees without their consent cannot be aggregated. However, an initial shortfall in the registered threshold constitutes a procedural irregularity within the scope of s. 582 of the CA 2016, which is curable where the shareholding is regularised prior to the transaction of substantive business and no substantial injustice is caused; (ii) The requirement in s. 313 of the CA 2016 that requisitionists convene an extraordinary general meeting 'as nearly as possible, as that in which meetings are to be convened by directors' governs solely the procedural envelope of the meeting, such as notice, agenda, quorum, and conduct. It does not silently import onto shareholder requisitionists the substantive listing and disclosure obligations under chapter 10 of the main market listing requirements which are explicitly imposed on the listed issuer and its subsidiaries.
Bursa Malaysia Securities Bhd v. MAA Group Bhd & Ors [2026] 8 CLJ 883 [HC]
COMPANY LAW
COMPANY LAW: Meetings - Extraordinary general meeting - Requisition by members - Requisitionist holding less than 10% registered shares at date of requisition notice but holding beneficial ownership through nominees without consent - Whether requisition valid - Whether non-compliance with statutory threshold curable - Whether shortfall regularised prior to transaction of substantive business - Whether failure to comply caused substantial injustice - Companies Act 2016, ss. 311(3) & 528
COMPANY LAW: Meetings - Extraordinary general meeting - Requisition by members - Exercise of default power by requisitionist to convene meeting - Scope of 'as nearly as possible, as that in which meetings are to be convened by directors' - Whether requisitionist bound to comply with obligations under chapter 10 main market listing requirements falling upon listed issuer - Companies Act 2016, s. 313
- For the plaintiff - Loh Siew Cheang, Nigel William Kraal, Chai Pei Xian & Yong Li Zen; M/s Cheang & Ariff
- For the 1st defendant - Jacqueline Hannah Albert; M/s Rashid Zulkifli
- For the 2nd defendant - Richard Jerome Peter Selestine; M/s Rahmat Lim & Partners
- For the 3rd & 4th defendants - Anucia Yong Devendran; M/s Deol & Gill
A lessor cannot enforce lease covenants, demand rental arrears or terminate a lease agreement for non-performance where the lessor's own antecedent failures, specifically, the failure to deliver meaningful vacant possession with lawful access and to enable lease registration, disable the lessee from utilising the land. Furthermore, a lessor is legally precluded from asserting a breach based on: (i) antecedent or abandoned conduct. Acts or changes occurring prior to the execution of the contract cannot operate retrospectively to constitute a breach of later-introduced contractual terms, nor can an unapproved, unimplemented, and withdrawn proposal constitute a repudiatory breach; and (ii) waived or abandoned complaints. Where a party, with full knowledge of alleged prior breaches, elects to execute a fresh formal agreement rather than enforce its rights, it is treated as having made a final election and cannot subsequently resurrect the abandoned default.
Perbadanan Setiausaha Kerajaan Pahang v. Green Lion Sdn Bhd [2026] 8 CLJ 912 [HC]
LAND LAW | CONTRACT
LAND LAW: Lease - Breach - Termination - Landlocked land - Failure to deliver vacant possession with lawful access - Lessor failed to provide original issue document of title for lease registration - Whether lessor could enforce rent payment, claim arrears, or forfeit lease when disabling lessee's performance - Whether 'vacant possession' in commercial lease context required lawful access to land
CONTRACT: Agreement - Lease agreement - Breach - Retrospective application - Alleged breaches predating execution of formal lease agreement - Substitution of crop proposed and withdrawn prior to contract execution - Corporate name change predating agreement - Whether antecedent or unapproved proposals constituted repudiatory breach - Whether contractual covenants applied retrospectively
- For the plaintiff - Ravi Moorthi, Nurshuhaida Bahrin & Yeoh Hui Xian; M/s Ravi Moorthi, Noriza, Mala & Partners
- For the defendant - Habizan Rahman, Thevini Nayagam & Faiz Idris; M/s Rahman Rohaida
(i) An order striking out or expunging an affidavit, under O. 41 r. 6 and O. 92 r. 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 ('ROC'), in interlocutory proceedings is strictly confined to the propriety of that specific filed document, and it does not constitute a substantive pre-trial ruling on the admissibility of the underlying facts, conversations, or separate exhibits contained in other parts of the court record; (ii) Disputed documents, audio recordings and transcriptions whose authenticity or contents are contested should not be summarily excluded prior to trial; instead, they must be placed in the appropriate pre-trial case management bundle under O. 34 r. 2(2)(e) of the ROC for their admissibility, authentication, compliance with s. 90A of the Evidence Act 1950, relevance, and weight to be fully heard and determined by the trial court.
Yeo Geok Beng v. Goldsand JV Sdn Bhd & Anor [2026] 8 CLJ 939 [HC]
CIVIL PROCEDURE | EVIDENCE
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments and orders - Interlocutory orders - Order expunging affidavit - Whether order expunging affidavit in interlocutory proceedings operates as bar to adducing related audio recordings and transcriptions at trial - Rules of Court 2012, O. 41 r. 6 & O. 92 r. 4
EVIDENCE: Admissibility - Audio recordings and transcriptions - Covertly made recordings - Objection to adducing evidence prior to trial on grounds of want of consent, unpleaded contents, and prior expungement of separate affidavit - Whether questions of admissibility, authentication, compliance with s. 90A of Evidence Act 1950, and relevance should be determined in advance of trial or reserved for trial court - Rules of Court 2012, O. 34 r. 2(2)(e)
- For the plaintiff - Nurul Nasyira Mohd Haliemy & Akmal Hakim Ahmad Zaharim; M/s Adillah A Nordin
- For the defendant - Desmond Ho Chee Cheong; M/s Richard Wee Chambers
An employer holds the prerogative to reorganise or restructure its business for valid financial reasons or operational efficiency, provided the exercise is conducted in good faith. To justify a retrenchment, an employer is not required to prove that a position's duties have become entirely non-existent; establishing that the business is facing genuine financial challenges or significant project scaling down suffices to prove surplus/redundancy.
Kanna Dasan Narayanasamy v. MRCB George Kent Sdn Bhd & Anor [2026] 3 ILR 399 [HC]
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | LABOUR LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Challenge against decision of Industrial Court - Employer restructured and downsized due to financial challenges - Claimant's position abolished and declared surplus - Claimant retrenched from employment - Claimant commenced claim for unfair dismissal at Industrial Court - Claim dismissed by Industrial Court - Whether decision of Industrial Court tainted with irrationality
LABOUR LAW: Employment - Dismissal - Retrenchment - Redundancy - Employer restructured and downsized due to financial challenges - Claimant's position abolished and declared surplus - Claimant retrenched from employment - Whether exercise of management prerogative undertaken in good faith - Whether employer required to show duties became non-existent - Industrial Relations Act 1967, s. 20(3)
LABOUR LAW: Employment - Dismissal - Retrenchment - Selection for retrenchment - Employer restructured and downsized due to financial challenges - Claimant's position abolished and declared surplus - Claimant retrenched from employment - Whether employer failed to comply with last-in, first-out ('LIFO') principle - Whether LIFO principle applicable
- For the applicant - R Kengadharan; M/s R Kengadharan & Co
- For the first respondent - Rutheran Sivagnanam & Chong Yi Zhen; T/n R Sivagnanam & Assoc
In determining whether an employment contract is a genuine fixed-term contract or a permanent contract, the court must look beyond the separate legal personalities of corporate entities. Where companies within a group are so intertwined that they operate as a single unit, the doctrine of 'essential unity of group enterprise' or 'common employer' applies. Courts may pierce the corporate veil to establish the true labour relationship. A series of successive extensions without a break, coupled with representations of long-term employment within the group, transforms what is nominally a fixed-term agreement into a permanent contract of service.
Sean Su Wei Jiang v. PM Link Sdn Bhd & Anor [2026] 3 ILR 407 [HC]
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | LABOUR LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Certiorari - Application to quash Industrial Court award - Employment originally with Singapore entity before novation to Malaysian subsidiary - Multiple extensions of contract without break - Representations made of permanent employment within corporate group - Termination on grounds of expiry of fixed term - Industrial Court found contract to be genuine fixed-term contract - Whether finding of fact irrational or based on irrelevant considerations - Whether there was failure to consider evidence of imminent transfer to another group entity - Rules of Court 2012, O. 53 r. 3(6)
LABOUR LAW: Employment - Contract of service - Fixed-term contract - Employment originally with Singapore entity before novation to Malaysian subsidiary - Multiple extensions of contract without break - Representations made of permanent employment within corporate group - Termination on grounds of expiry of fixed term - Whether claimant permanent employee - Whether on genuine fixed-term contract - Whether contract dressed up as fixed-term - Whether dismissal without just cause or excuse - Industrial Relations Act 1967, s. 20(3)
- For the applicant - Lim Yin Faye & Chong Yuk Meng; M/s Justin Faye & Partners
- For the 1st respondent - Alison Goh Poi Sze; M/s Shook Lin & Bok
(i) The action of an employer to replace an employee, which does not impact the overall structure and administration of the company, as it forms part of the restructuring of the leadership structure, is not considered substantive restructuring, as is normally the case in situations involving financial difficulties or constraints. Thus, the employer does not necessarily need to show a comprehensive restructuring plan; (ii) Any decision made by an employer does not amount to a fait accompli decision unless the employee expresses disagreement and the employer remains firm in such decision; (iii) A change in the position of employment is not considered a demotion if there is a mutual variation of the contract.
Nandy Marlina Saar v. Sidma College Sarawak [2026] 3 ILR 425
LABOUR LAW
LABOUR LAW: Employment - Dismissal - Termination of employee - Employee CEO of company - Meeting with Board of Directors convened to appoint new CEO - Employee offered new position as Coordinator - Employee refused new position - Employer terminated employee's CEO position - Whether with just cause or excuse - Industrial Relations Act 1967, s. 20
LABOUR LAW: Employment - Dismissal - Termination of employee - Employee CEO of company - Meeting with Board of Directors convened to appoint new CEO - Employee offered new position as Coordinator - Employee refused new position - Employee did not report to work - Show cause letter issued - Employee had not signed acceptance letter for new position - Second show cause letter issued due to prolonged absence - Whether failure to respond constituted to voluntary resignation - Whether employee's actions constituted voluntary resignation
LABOUR LAW: Employment - Demotion - Employee CEO of company - New CEO appointed - Employee gave impression would voluntarily leave current position upon hearing reasons by employer - Employee offered new position as coordinator - Employee refused new position - Remuneration remained same except for CEO allowance - Whether constituted demotion
LABOUR LAW: Employment - Termination of employee - Fait accompli decision - Employee did not object decision by employee - Whether absence of evidence showing disagreement over employer's decision amounted to fait accompli decision
- For the claimant - Imran Halip; Harizan Hamzah & Co
- For the respondent - Dayang Jamillah Tun Abg Muhd Salahuddin; Malaysian Employers Federation
A probationer enjoys the same basic protections against unfair dismissal as a confirmed employee. Termination of a probationer made by the employer must be for just cause or excuse and conducted via a fair process. The rigid test applicable to the dismissal of a confirmed employee for poor performance ought not to be applied to a probationer, particularly with regard to the requirement for warnings. As long as the probationer receives sufficient training and guidance during his probationary period, if the employer then decided that the probationer is not suitable for the position as assessed upon his actual performance, the employer thus had terminated the probationer with just cause or excuse.
Tan Wu Huei v. Smart Touch Technology Sdn Bhd [2026] 3 ILR 442
LABOUR LAW
LABOUR LAW: Employment - Dismissal - Probation - Termination after probationary period - Probationer subjected to three months' probationary period _Probationer performed poorly during probationary period - Employer terminated probationer's employment upon completion of probationary period - Whether rigid test to be applied to termination of probationer - Whether probationer given full benefit of probationary period - Whether employer had just cause or excuse - Industrial Relations Act 1967, s. 20
- For the claimant - In person
- For the company - Kenny Choy Tian Fook & Moke Cher Peng
Issuing a notice of domestic inquiry simultaneously with a show cause letter, without awaiting the employee's response, signals pre-judgment, undermines procedural fairness, and indicates an improper haste to dismiss.
Sree Vidya Paramasivam v. Foundever Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2026] 3 ILR 455
LABOUR LAW
LABOUR LAW: Employment - Dismissal - Unfair dismissal - Probationer - Allegations of misconduct - Show cause letter issued simultaneously with notice of domestic inquiry - Failure to await employee's written explanation - Whether showed improper haste and pre-judgment - Whether domestic inquiry conducted with procedural impropriety - Whether misconducts proven - Whether dismissal without just cause or excuse - Industrial Relations Act 1967, s. 20(3)
LABOUR LAW: Remedies - Backwages - Probationer - Assessment - Contributory misconduct - Derogatory remarks made against co-worker - Deduction of 20% applied to awarded backwages - Industrial Relations Act 1967, s. 30(5)
- For the claimant - Anthony Gomez; M/s Gomez & Assocs
- For the company - Esther Yong Zhen Ying; M/s Ho-Yong Partnership
An employee holding a senior executive position owes a high fiduciary duty to the company and must strictly adhere to established limits of authority and corporate governance rules. Approving substantial advance payments or extending financial commitments, indemnities, and guarantees to third parties without express authority or prior Board approval constitutes gross misconduct and a fundamental breach of trust, which justifies summary dismissal regardless of claims of acting in good faith or emergency project needs.
Anuar Yusoff v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2026] 3 ILR 480
LABOUR LAW | COMPANY LAW
LABOUR LAW: Employment - Dismissal - Unfair dismissal - Managing Director dismissed for gross misconduct - Managing Director approved advance payments to consortium partner without prior Board approval or enabling provision under agreement - Diversion of Board-approved working capital to partner's separate obligations - Managing Director exceeded financial threshold under limits of authority - Issued unauthorised letters of indemnity and financial commitments to third parties - Unauthorised use of company letterhead - Whether Managing Director acted in excess of authority - Whether misconduct established - Whether summary dismissal proportionate and with just cause or excuse - Industrial Relations Act 1967, s. 20(3)
COMPANY LAW: Directors - Fiduciary duties - Managing Director - Scope of authority - Approval of working capital strictly confined to company's designated scope of works - Unilateral extension of advances and issuance of contingent financial liabilities to third parties - Failure to obtain express Board authorisation - Exposure of company to grave legal, financial, and reputational risks - Whether breach of fiduciary duty and trust established
- For the claimant - Shanker Subbramaniam & Juanita Chua; M/s Shanker, Arjunan & Chua
- For the company - Wong Keat Ching & Teoh Alvare; M/s Zul Rafique & Partners
A dismissal for poor performance is with just cause or excuse where (i) the employee was sufficiently warned and informed of performance shortcomings, whether through appraisal ratings, formal performance improvement plan ('PIP') documentation, or supervisory emails highlighting deficiencies and requesting rectification; (ii) the employee was accorded adequate time, reasonable opportunities, structured monitoring, and sufficient supervisory guidance to improve, including extensions of a PIP to accommodate changes in work duties or environments; and (iii) the employee failed to reach the required standards or achieve key performance milestones despite the support and opportunity provided. An employee who willingly participates in a PIP, acknowledges its terms without contemporaneous objection, and fails to raise documentary protest cannot subsequently claim a lack of warning or inadequate guidance to invalidate the termination.
Zulmajdi Mohamad Anor v. Petrofac (Malaysia-PM304) Limited [2026] 3 ILR 534
LABOUR LAW
LABOUR LAW: Employment - Dismissal - Poor performance - Performance improvement plan ('PIP') - Employee placed under three-month PIP due to unsatisfactory work performance and low appraisal ratings - Initial PIP extended to allow further opportunity to demonstrate progress in offshore environment - Employee failed to achieve key deliverables despite continuous supervisory guidance, structured reviews, and extension of PIP - Employee displayed lackadaisical attitude and failed to object to performance ratings or PIP placement contemporaneously - Whether employer satisfied three-tier test stipulated in Ireka Construction Bhd v. Chantiravathan Subramaniam James - Whether poor performance established - Industrial Relations Act 1967, s. 20(3)
- For the claimant - Chong Wan Loo & Rehuel Noble Eno' Ilam Roland Engan (Pupil In Chambers); M/s Muhendaran Sri
- For the company - Tham Li Vyen & Chew Yin Huan; M/s Raja Darryl & Loh
An employer is justified in summarily dismissing an employee where the employee exhibits persistent recalcitrance, deliberate disobedience of management instructions and disruptive behaviour that impairs operations and destroys the fundamental relationship of trust and confidence. The lack of a formal show cause letter or domestic inquiry does not invalidate the dismissal if the employer successfully proves the employee's misconduct on a balance of probabilities.
Chong Kam Peng v. Oung Million Hardware (M) Sdn Bhd [2026] 3 ILR 557
LABOUR LAW
LABOUR LAW: Employment - Dismissal - Misconduct - Employee persistently disobeyed management instructions - Employee performed duties outside job scope by making unauthorised edits in internal system - Employee spread rumours, causing operational disruption - Employee left premises during working hours upon confrontation - Whether cumulative misconduct destroyed mutual trust and confidence between employer and employee - Whether dismissal with just cause or excuse - Industrial Relations Act 1967, s. 20(3)
LABOUR LAW: Domestic inquiry - Procedure - Lack of show cause letter or domestic inquiry prior to dismissal - Whether fatal to employer's case - Whether failure to hold domestic inquiry procedural irregularity curable by full hearing before Industrial Court - Whether employer proved misconduct on balance of probabilities
- For the claimant - Mohd Radzuan Zakaria; Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja Malay-Sino
- For the company - Khong Jia Luo; M/s HL Lee & Co
ARTICLES
LNS Article(s)
-
EVOLUTION OF THE BRICK WALL DOCTRINE OF CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL IN MALAYSIAN SUPERIOR COURTS A DOCTRINAL NOTE
[Read excerpt]
by Dr Tahirah Manesah Abu Bakar* [2026] CLJU(A) xciv
[2026] CLJU(A) xciv
MALAYSIA
EVOLUTION OF THE BRICK WALL DOCTRINE OF CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL IN MALAYSIAN SUPERIOR COURTS A DOCTRINAL NOTE
by Dr Tahirah Manesah Abu Bakar*
Constructive dismissal jurisprudence has long recognised that an employer may repudiate a contract of employment by its actions. It has, however, been slower to articulate the position where an employer repudiates by its inactions, that is, by simply not answering when an employee raises a grievance, seeks clarification of her status, or objects to a unilateral change.
In Ismail Othman v. Seacera Properties Sdn Bhd,[1] the Industrial Court described the employer's failure to respond to four letters as a 'deafening silence' and held that it evinced an intention no longer to be bound by the employment contract.
The phrase described a recurring pattern already identified in empirical research into constructive dismissal claims by senior management employees, which found that the decisive trigger for resignation was the employer's silence when the employee sought to have their grievance addressed. That pattern has been termed the Doctrine of the Brick Wall.[2] Its distinguishing feature is that the employer's silence need not itself be a breach of an identified term, but it is conduct capable of evidencing repudiation.
This note traces how the proposition has evolved in the superior courts to date.
. . .
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MEDICAL KILLING – A RIGHT TO DIE IN MALAYSIA*
[Read excerpt]
by Dr Ambikai Thuraisingam** [2026] CLJU(A) xcv
[2026] CLJU(A) xcv
MALAYSIA
MEDICAL KILLING – A RIGHT TO DIE IN MALAYSIA*
by Dr Ambikai Thuraisingam**
ABSTRACT
This is a conceptual paper to address the ethical and legal perspective of euthanasia in Malaysia. The paper analyses the development, types and the legal and ethical debates concerning both types of euthanasia. While deciding on formulating a law prescribing these exceptional situations and enforcing the law, all aspects of euthanasia – medical, social, economic, ethical and legal – have to be taken into consideration. Although there is a strong debate in modern societies over the legalisation of physician-assisted suicide, many ethicists of different philosophical backgrounds are comfortable with voluntary euthanasia and the right to die with dignity.
This study reviews literature on common-law developments and the current Malaysian position regarding euthanasia and end-of-life decisions involving medical practitioners, patients and families. The subject of euthanasia has generated many controversial debates, particularly on its legality, among legal and medical scholars. This has been primarily due to the doctrine of sanctity of life, which is a predominant principle in many religions and is embedded in moral values. The underlying precept is that human life is sacred and demands respect, as all life comes from God and life can only be taken away intentionally through due process of law. Thus, ending a person's life, even upon his or her request, is considered in many jurisdictions as a criminal offence and in some jurisdictions would be tantamount to infringement of human rights. Irrespective of humanitarian motives, a doctor who aids a patient in this act will be in breach of his unequivocal duty as a doctor and considered to have committed an unlawful act, which will subject him to legal sanctions.
. . .
LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTS
Principal Acts
Amending Acts
PU(A)
PU(B)
Legislation Alert
Updated
| Act/Principal No. |
Title |
Amended by |
In force from |
Section amended |
| AKTA 640 |
Akta Tabung Pembangunan Kemahiran 2004 |
AKTA A1785 |
1 Oktober 2026 [PU(B) 392/2026] |
Seksyen 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 ,10, 11, 14, 16, 24, 25A, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 65A, 65B, 71A - 71J, 72, 74, 75, 76, 88A, 91A, 92 dan Jadual |
| ACT 640 |
Skills Development Fund Act 2004 |
ACT A1785 |
1 October 2026 [PU(B) 392/2026] |
Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 ,10, 11, 14, 16, 24, 25A, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 65A, 65B, 71A - 71J, 72, 74, 75, 76, 88A, 91A, 92 and Schedule |
| AKTA 800 |
Akta Sistem Insurans Pekerjaan Dan Perkhidmatan Pekerjaan 2017 |
AKTA A1796 |
1 Oktober 2026 kecuali seksyen 11; 2 Januari 2027 - seksyen 11 [PU(B) 391/2026] |
Tajuk panjang; Seksyen 1,3, 8, 20, 36, 37A, 44, 45, 45A - 45H, 47, 59, 67, 81A dan 81B; Jadual Ketiga |
| ACT 800 |
Employment Insurance System and Employment Services Act 2017 |
ACT A1796 |
1 October 2026 except section 11; 2 January 2027 - section 11 [PU(B) 391/2026] |
Long title; Section 1, 3, 8, 20, 36, 37A, 44, 45, 45A - 45H, 47, 59, 67, 81A and 81B; Third Schedule |
| AKTA 652 |
Akta Pembangunan Kemahiran Kebangsaan 2006 |
AKTA A1786 |
1 Oktober 2026 [PU(B) 390/2026] |
Seksyen 2, 5, 17, 24, 25, 27, 29, 34, 36A, 52, 54, 55, 57 dan72 |
Revoked
| Act/Principal No. |
Title |
Revoked by |
In force from |
| PU(A) 93/2026 |
Perintah Mesin Cetak Dan Penerbitan (Kawalan Hasil Penerbitan Tidak Diingini) (No. 12) 2026 [Dibatalkan Oleh PU(A) 266/2026] |
PU(A) 266/2026 |
17 July 2026 |
| PU(A) 93/2026 |
Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) (No. 12) Order 2026 [Revoked By PU(A) 266/2026] |
PU(A) 266/2026 |
17 July 2026 |
| PU(A) 69/2026 |
Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) Order 2026 [Revoked By PU(A) 265/2026] |
PU(A) 265/2026 |
17 July 2026 |
| PU(A) 69/2026 |
Perintah Mesin Cetak Dan Penerbitan (Kawalan Hasil Penerbitan Tidak Diingini) 2026 [Dibatalkan Oleh PU(A) 265/2026] |
PU(A) 265/2026 |
17 Julai 2026 |
| PU(A) 283/2023 |
Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) (No. 4) Order 2023 [Revoked By PU(A) 264/2026] |
PU(A) 264/2026 |
16 July 2026 |
|