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Issue #48/2024
28 November 2024
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CASE SPOTLIGHTS
SUTHAKAR SIVAKUMAR lwn. PP & RAYUAN YANG LAIN [2024] 10 CLJ 335 (i) Pengecaman di mahkamah adalah keterangan substantif manakala pengecaman semasa kawad cam adalah keterangan menyokong. Mahkamah boleh bergantung pada pengecaman yang dibuat di dalam mahkamah sebagai bukti utama, walaupun terdapat percanggahan dalam pengecaman semasa kawad cam; (ii) Kredibiliti saksi bukan semata-mata ditentukan oleh sama ada mereka adalah saksi berkepentingan. Mahkamah boleh menilai kredibiliti saksi berdasarkan pelbagai faktor, termasuk tingkah laku mereka, kekonsistenan keterangan dan sokongan oleh lain-lain keterangan; (iii) Pertuduhan untuk kesalahan membunuh adalah bawah s. 302 Kanun Keseksaan ('KK') dan bukan bawah mana-mana peruntukan s. 300(a) hingga (d) KK. Fokus sebenarnya adalah pada s. 302 KK dan untuk membuktikan kesalahan bunuh bawah s. 302 KK, elemen-elemen bawah s. 300 harus dilihat hanya untuk menjelaskan bagaimana elemen mens rea boleh dibuktikan terhadap tertuduh; (iv) Kelewatan dalam menulis alasan penghakiman tidak semestinya memudaratkan pihak-pihak khususnya apabila kes yang didengar melibatkan banyak pihak dan mengkehendaki mahkamah meneliti dengan rapi setiap keterangan UNDANG-UNDANG JENAYAH: Kesalahan - Membunuh - Niat bersama - Tertuduh-tertuduh dituduh membunuh - Pergaduhan antara geng - Si mati meninggal dunia akibat luka tetakan berganda di bahagian kepala - Sama ada elemen-elemen pertuduhan berjaya dibuktikan - Sama ada niat bersama terbukti - Sama ada penglibatan setiap tertuduh dibuktikan - Sama ada kegagalan mengemukakan notis alibi memprejudiskan tertuduh-tertuduh dan menjejaskan kes - Kanun Keseksaan, ss. 34 , 299 , 300 & 302 PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Rayuan - Rayuan terhadap sabitan dan hukuman - Tertuduh-tertuduh disabitkan atas kesalahan membunuh dan dijatuhkan hukuman mati - Pergaduhan antara geng - Si mati meninggal dunia akibat luka tetakan berganda di bahagian kepala - Sama ada sabitan dan hukuman wajar dikekalkan - Kanun Keseksaan, ss. 34 & 302 PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Pengecaman - Pengecaman dari kandang saksi - Kualiti pengecaman - Tertuduh-tertuduh dituduh membunuh - Pergaduhan antara geng - Si mati meninggal dunia akibat luka tetakan berganda di bahagian kepala - Pengecaman dibuat oleh saksi-saksi dari kandang saksi - Sama ada kawad cam di luar mahkamah mengatasi pengecaman di dalam mahkamah - Sama ada ketiadaan laporan kawad cam menjejaskan kes pendakwaan - Kanun Keseksaan, ss. 34 & 302 PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Penghakiman - Kelewatan - Tertuduh-tertuduh disabitkan atas kesalahan membunuh dan dijatuhkan hukuman mati - Pergaduhan antara geng - Dakwaan bahawa kelewatan mahkamah bicara menulis alasan penghakiman setelah selesai perbicaraan telah menyebabkan kegagalan mengambil kira 'demeanour' saksi-saksi - Jumlah tertuduh dan saksi yang terlibat dalam kes - Sama ada masa yang diambil oleh mahkamah bicara untuk menulis dan menyiapkan alasan penghakiman munasabah - Sama ada tertuduh-tertuduh terprejudis - Kanun Keseksaan, ss. 34 & 302 KETERANGAN: Saksi - Saksi mata - Kredibiliti saksi-saksi - Tertuduh-tertuduh dituduh membunuh - Pergaduhan antara geng - Si mati meninggal dunia akibat luka tetakan berganda di bahagian kepala - Sama ada terdapat percanggahan dalam keterangan saksi-saksi - Sama ada saksi-saksi adalah saksi-saksi berkepentingan - Sama ada mahkamah membuat penilaian maksimum terhadap kebolehpercayaan saksi-saksi - Kanun Keseksaan, ss. 34 & 302 KETERANGAN: Kebolehterimaan - Rakaman video - Tertuduh-tertuduh dituduh membunuh - Pergaduhan antara geng - Si mati meninggal dunia akibat luka tetakan berganda di bahagian kepala - Kejadian dirakam melalui rakaman video - Rakaman video tidak dihantar untuk analisis forensik demi penentuan keasilan dan ketulenan - Sama ada kemasukan rakaman video wajar ditolak - Kanun Keseksaan, ss. 34 & 302 JUDICIAL QUOTES“However, at the hearing of the leave application, it became clear that the crux of the applicant's submission in this application is that the said s. 36 notices are illegal and/or ultra vires primarily due to the fact that the information sought through the same date back to 1997 but that s. 36 of the MACC 2009 came into force only in 2009. As such, it is contended that the utilisation of the said s. 36 notices was in excess of jurisdiction as the said notices being a tool to investigate were non-existent prior to the enactment of the MACC 2009.” “In my view, since the investigation into the possible offences committed by Abdul Daim was only commenced after the coming into force of the MACC 2009, then, notwithstanding that the information so requested by the said notice may relate back to 1997, the said s. 36 notices are still valid and properly issued by the respondents. In my opinion, the very purpose of s. 36 of the MACC 2009 is to provide the respondents with the necessary tools to investigate possible offences where such investigations have only commenced after coming into force of the MACC 2009.” “In my further view, the possibility that the offence may have been committed prior to 2009 cannot and does not negate the legality of the said s. 36 notices herein. In my opinion, the respondents are certainly entitled to use the s. 36 notices as they have for any investigations that have commenced after the coming into force of the MACC 2009. In my opinion, just because the offence may possibly predate 2009, it is certainly cannot be expected of them to then rely on the Public Prosecutor or the court to issue summons under s. 51 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the production of documents when they have express powers given to them under the MACC 2009 to issue notices requesting for information.” “As such, under all the circumstances of the case, I find that the said s. 36 notices are valid and not illegal/ultra vires as contended.” – Per Anand Ponnudurai J in Josephine Premila Sivaretnam v. Ketua Pesuruhjaya Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia & Anor [2024] 10 CLJ 453 LATEST CASESLegal Network Series
CLJ 2024 Volume 10 (Part 2) The court's duty is limited to interpreting the provisions of statute and not to fill the gaps in the statute as that would amount to usurpation of the functions of Legislature. Hence, in interpreting whether the sentences of multiple whipping could be ordered concurrently or consecutively, where the statute is silent, the court has to look at the intention of Parliament. If Parliament had intended sentences of whipping could be ordered concurrently, it would have passed the legislation to that effect. The absence of such legislation indicates quite clearly that whipping should be meted out consecutively and not concurrently. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Sentencing - Principles - Multiple sentences of whipping - Whether could be ordered to run concurrently - Absence of provisions indicating whether sentences of whipping to be carried out concurrently or consecutively - Whether indicated Legislature had not intended whipping to be executed concurrently - Whether to be contrasted with imprisonment sentences - Whether sentences of whipping should be executed consecutively and not concurrently - Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 286, 287, 288, 290 & 291 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Construction of statutes - Intention of Parliament - Principles of sentencing - Multiple sentences of whipping - Whether could be ordered to run concurrently - Absence of provisions indicating whether sentences of whipping to be carried out concurrently or consecutively - Whether indicated Legislature had not intended whipping to be executed concurrently - Whether to be contrasted with imprisonment sentences - Whether sentences of whipping should be executed consecutively and not concurrently - Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 286, 287, 288, 290 & 291
Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ
(i) Section 451(2) of the Companies Act 2016 ('CA') is a mandatory provision that requires all claims against a company under liquidation to be recovered in the winding-up only, except with the leave of the court. This is to ensure that all actions and proceedings against the company are dealt with in one forum, minimising costs and preventing multiplicity of actions. Section 20(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 is a general provision that allows the Minister of Human Resources to refer representations of unfair dismissal to the Industrial Court. However, when a winding-up order has been made, s. 451(2) of the CA takes precedence. The Minister must then ensure that a claimant has obtained leave from the winding-up court before referring his claim to the Industrial Court; (ii) By lodging his proofs of debt with the liquidator, a claimant loses his right to go to the Industrial Court. His remedy, if he is dissatisfied with the decision of the liquidator, is to appeal against the liquidator's decision to the High Court. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | COMPANY LAW | INDUSTRIAL LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Appeal - Appeal against decision of High Court - Company in liquidation and ceased operations - Employees terminated - Terminated employees lodged representations to Director General of Industrial Relations ('DGIR') - DGIR referred matter to Minister of Human Resources ('Minister') - Minister referred representations to Industrial Court - Judicial review against decision of Minister - Whether Minister exercised discretion in accordance with law - Whether employees should have obtained prior leave of winding up court - Whether employees, having lodged proofs of debt with liquidator, barred from instituting proceedings in Industrial Court against company - Companies Act 2016, s. 451(2) - Industrial Relations Act 1967, s. 20(3) COMPANY LAW: Liquidation - Proceedings against company in liquidation - Company ceased operations and terminated employees - Terminated employees lodged representations to Director General of Industrial Relations ('DGIR') - DGIR referred matter to Minister of Human Resources ('Minister') - Minister referred representations to Industrial Court - Whether Minister acted in accordance with law - Whether employees should have obtained prior leave of winding up court - Whether employees, having lodged proofs of debt with liquidator, barred from instituting proceedings in Industrial Court against company - Companies Act 2016, s. 451(2 ) INDUSTRIAL LAW: Procedure - Representations - Company in liquidation and ceased operations - Employees terminated - Terminated employees lodged representations to Director General of Industrial Relations ('DGIR') - DGIR referred matter to Minister of Human Resources ('Minister') - Minister referred representations to Industrial Court - Whether Minister acted in accordance with law - Whether employees should have obtained prior leave of winding up court - Industrial Relations Act 1967, s. 20(3) Hanipah Farikullah JCA
(i) Under the doctrine of separability governing arbitration agreements, the arbitration agreement has a life of its own and survives the challenges made to the contract on grounds of fraud, duress and even illegality unless the matter is not arbitrable on the ground of public policy of the State. Therefore, even though a winding-up of a company has the effect of terminating agreements which the liquidator may not want to affirm and continue with, the arbitration agreement would survive such a termination; (ii) Liquidation does not change the mode of resolving a dispute, whether it is via a pre-agreed arbitration or absent that, litigation in court. Neither is liquidation opposed to arbitration for arbitration is nothing more than a way of determining if liability is established arising from a matter the subject of the arbitration agreement and if so, what is the quantum when damages are being assessed. ARBITRATION
ARBITRATION: Arbitration agreement - Arbitration clause - Operation of - Contractor company went into liquidation - Employer terminated employment of contractor - Contractor commenced suit to claim for payments due from employer - Employer applied under s. 10 of Arbitration Act 2005 for stay of court proceedings pending reference to arbitration - Whether arbitration agreement became inoperative with liquidation - Whether arbitration agreement remained intact and subsisting - Whether liquidation altered pre-agreed mode of resolving parties' disputes via arbitration - Whether issues that arose for arbitral tribunal to decide - Whether arbitration agreement valid and enforceable - Doctrine of separability - Applicability ARBITRATION: Stay of proceedings - Application for - Application for stay of court proceedings pending reference to arbitration under s. 10 of Arbitration Act 2005 - Contractor company went into liquidation - Employer terminated employment of contractor - Contractor commenced suit to claim for payments due from employer - Whether arbitration agreement became inoperative with liquidation - Whether arbitration agreement remained intact and subsisting - Whether liquidation altered pre-agreed mode of resolving parties' disputes via arbitration - Whether issues that arose for arbitral tribunal to decide - Whether arbitration agreement valid and enforceable - Whether court could intervene in matters covered by arbitration agreement - Doctrine of separability - Applicability
Lee Swee Seng JCA
The court should not allow a party to call fresh expert witnesses after the commencement of trial for the following reasons: (i) it would cause injustice to the opposing party; (ii) it runs counter to the objective of the Rules of Court 2012 which is to prevent trial by ambush and to ensure a just, expeditious and economical disposal of civil actions; (iii) it would delay the completion of the trial and escalate costs unnecessarily; and (iv) it would circumvent the court's pre-trial directions. In an application for leave of the court to call a fresh expert witness after the commencement of trial, the onus is on the applicant to show exceptional circumstances in the interest of justice and also that there is no prejudice to the opposing party. CIVIL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Trial - Witness - Expert witness - Application to call expert witness and adduce expert's statement and report after trial had commenced - Guiding principles - Whether would cause injustice and prejudice to opposing party - Whether runs counter to objective of preventing trial by ambush and to ensure just, expeditious and economical disposal of civil actions - Whether would delay completion of trial and escalate costs unnecessarily - Whether would circumvent court's pre-trial directions - Whether there were exceptional circumstances in interest to allow application - Rules of Court 2012, O. 34 & O. 40A
Anand Ponnudurai J
The existence of a subrogation clause in a contract between an insurer and an insured does not magically override the doctrine of privity of contract because there is no statutory force behind a subrogation clause, which is just a contractual clause that does not involve the third party who is to be sued. An absolute assignment of a chose in action, which is 'effectual in law' by virtue of s. 4(3) of the Civil Law Act 1956, is mandatory to cross the hurdle of privity of contract if the insurer wants to use its own name to sue the third party because an absolute assignment has statutory force which a subrogation clause lacks. INSURANCE | CONTRACT | CIVIL PROCEDURE
INSURANCE: Policy - Clauses - Subrogation clause - Insured signed discharge and subrogation form - Insurer subrogated with insured's rights to recover from any party liable for loss or damage that gave rise to insurance claim - Insurer and insured commenced action premised on tort against other party for breach of duty - Insurer used own name in action - Whether subrogation clause in insurance contract gives insurer right to use own name to sue other party - Whether absolute assignment necessary to clothe insurer with right to sue in own name - Civil Law Act 1956, s. 4(3) CONTRACT: Insurance - Privity - Insured signed discharge and subrogation form - Insurer subrogated with insured's rights to recover from any party liable for loss or damage that gave rise to insurance claim - Insurer and insured commenced action premised on tort against other party for breach of duty - Whether there was privity of contract between insurer and other party - Whether insurer had locus standi CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Application for - Insured signed discharge and subrogation form - Insurer subrogated with insured's rights to recover from any party liable for loss or damage that gave rise to insurance claim - Insurer and insured commenced action premised on tort against other party for breach of duty - Application by other party to strike out insurer's claim - Whether insurer had right to use own name to sue other party - Whether insurer had cause of action - Rules of Court 2012, O. 18 r. 19(1)(a), (b) & (d) Gan Techiong JC
Misconduct, inter alia, is conduct by an advocate and solicitor in a professional capacity or otherwise which amounts to grave impropriety and which conduct includes any one or more of the 15 instances listed in s. 94(3) of the Legal Profession Act 1976. The complainant in this case had submitted a written complaint supported by documents of the solicitor's misconduct, ie, that the solicitor had acted improperly, in an unprofessional manner and in conflict of his client's interest, which was misconduct that fell within the scope of s. 94(3). There was therefore no error of law by the Advocates and Solicitors Disciplinary Board in accepting the complaint by the complainant who had satisfied the criteria of a 'complainant' under the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Proceedings) (Investigating Tribunal and Disciplinary Committee) Rules 1994. Furthermore, when a solicitor has been sufficiently informed and supplied with the facts and particulars of misconduct complained of to enable him to explain away or exculpate himself, he has been given the right to be heard which is in conformity with natural justice. LEGAL PROFESSION | STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
LEGAL PROFESSION: Advocates and solicitors - Misconduct - Finding of - Appeal against affirmation of finding of misconduct by Advocates and Solicitors Disciplinary Board ('Board') - Whether complainant qualified as 'complainant' for purposes of disciplinary action against advocate and solicitor - Whether complainant satisfied criteria under Legal Profession (Disciplinary Proceedings) (Investigating Tribunal and Disciplinary Committee) Rules 1994 - Whether misconduct fell within scope of s. 94(3) of Legal Profession Act 1976 - Whether solicitor sufficiently informed and supplied with facts and particulars of misconduct complained of - Whether solicitor given right to be heard - Whether punishment of fine lighter punishment and not adverse to solicitor STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 'complainant' - Definition of - Legal Profession Act 1976 ('LPA') - Legal Profession (Disciplinary Proceedings) (Investigating Tribunal and Disciplinary Committee) Rules 1994 ('Rules') - Word 'complaint' defined as 'a written complaint concerning the misconduct of an advocate and solicitor or a pupil' - Whether misconduct complained of fell within scope of s. 94(3) of LPA - Whether complainant fell within definition of 'complainant'
Amarjeet Singh Serjit Singh J
(i) Order 14A of the Rules of Court 2012 ('ROC') should only be invoked if the facts needed to answer the questions of law or construction of a document are not in dispute. If there are disputed facts, then the O. 14A procedure is not suitable and should not be used to determine a suit; (ii) Similar to O. 14A, O. 33 of the ROC should only be invoked where there are no disputed facts. An order under O. 33 should only be granted if: (a) answering the questions of law or fact would result in a substantial saving of time and expenditure; (b) there are no other issues of law or fact that ought to be decided at the trial of the suit; and (c) if the questions are carefully and precisely framed, such that there is no ambiguity as to what exactly is the real question that is to be answered. Order 33 should also not be utilised when there are issues in the suit that require extrinsic evidence to prove. CIVIL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Disposal on point of law - Determination of questions of law - Landlord-tenant suit arising from tenancy agreement - Questions of law and/or fact posed for determination - Whether questions suitable for determination without full trial of action - Whether would determine entire case or matter or any claim or issue - Whether action ought to be dismissed - Rules of Court 2012, O. 14A & O. 33
Kenneth St James JC
In an application for protective and sealing order to shield commercially sensitive information from being disclosed to the public due to an assessment of damages, balance must be struck between two competing public interests. These public interests are the defendant's right to access all relevant documents for the assessment of damages and the plaintiff's right to protect its confidential information. The application can be allowed if through the said order, both competing public interests can be promoted. CIVIL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments and orders - Protective and sealing order - Application to safeguard commercially sensitive information - Proprietor of product sought to produce documents containing commercially sensitive information for assessment of damages - Whether protective and sealing order necessary - Whether benefits of protective and sealing order outweighed harm - Whether granting of application consistent with court's commitment to balancing transparency and confidentiality
Yusrin Faidz Yusoff JC
Terdapat perbezaan antara perkataan 'tanggungjawab' dan 'tanggungan'. Peruntukan bawah s. 75 Akta Cukai Pendapatan 1967 ('Akta') hanya meletakkan tanggungjawab pada pengarah syarikat untuk memastikan penyata pendapatan dalam Borang C syarikat dikemukakan bagi mana-mana tahun taksiran, dan bukan tanggungan. Oleh itu, jika terdapat kesalahan bawah s. 112(1A) Akta dilakukan oleh mana-mana syarikat, tanggungan adalah pada syarikat itu dan bukan pada pengarah syarikat. PROSEDUR JENAYAH
PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Rayuan - Rayuan terhadap sabitan dan hukuman - Pengarah syarikat disabitkan atas pertuduhan bawah s. 112(1A) Akta Cukai Pendapatan 1967 ('Akta') - Mahkamah Majistret menjatuhkan hukuman denda dan bayaran penalti khas - Sama ada keputusan Mahkamah Majistret wajar diakas - Sama ada pengarah syarikat faham akan sifat dan akibat pengakuan salah - Sama ada pengarah syarikat diterangkan tentang hukuman dan pilihan selepas pertuduhan dibacakan - Sama ada terdapat 'a reverse onus clause' pada s. 75 Akta - Sama ada kesalahan bawah ss. 77A(1) dan 112(1A) Akta adalah kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh syarikat dan bukan individu
Abu Bakar Katar H
ARTICLESLNS Article(s)
LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTSPrincipal Acts
Amending Acts
PU(A)
PU(B)
Legislation Alert Updated
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