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Issue #22/2026
28 May 2026

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CASE SPOTLIGHTS

MOHAMMAD NAJIB TUN HJ ABDUL RAZAK v. THOMAS THOMAS K THOMAS [2026] 5 CLJ 220
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
RAVINTHRAN PARAMAGURU JCA
WONG KIAN KHEONG JCA
NADZARIN WOK NORDIN JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: W-01(IM)(NCVC)-907-12-2022]
13 JANUARY 2026

(i) The Attorney General does not enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability for actions taken in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under art. 145(3) of the Federal Constitution. Consequently, the exercise of prosecutorial power is justiciable in a civil court if it is proven that such power was abused or exercised in bad faith; (ii) A civil claim for misfeasance in public office or malicious prosecution arising from the decision to prosecute is premature and unsustainable if the underlying criminal proceedings have not yet concluded. For a cause of action to be ripe, there must be a final determination establishing whether the prosecution was initiated without reasonable and probable cause or in bad faith.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Attorney General - Prosecutorial discretion - Attorney General authorised prosecution of claimant for various offences - Claim by claimant against Attorney General for torts of misfeasance in public office, malicious process, negligence and breach of art. 8 of Federal Constitution - Whether Attorney General immune from civil liability - Whether discretion unfettered - Whether exercise of power immunised from civil actions if abused or exercised in bad faith - Federal Constitution, art. 145(3)

TORT: Misfeasance in public office - Claim against former Attorney General - Attorney General authorised prosecution of claimant for various offences - Claimant filed civil suit while criminal proceedings still pending - Whether claim founded on decision to prosecute premature - Whether particulars sufficiently particularised

TORT: Malicious process - Claim against former Attorney General - Attorney General authorised prosecution of claimant for various offences - Whether malicious process recognised cause of action in Malaysian law - Whether proper cause of action

TORT: Negligence - Duty of care - Statements made by former Attorney General against accused after leaving office - Whether duty of care owed in capacity as private citizen - Whether remedy lay in negligence

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Writ and statement of claim - Claim against former Attorney General for misfeasance in public office, malicious process, and negligence - Whether claim premature and unsustainable - Whether plain and obvious case for striking out - Rules of Court 2012, O. 18 r. 19


APPEAL UPDATES

  1. Capital City Property Sdn Bhd v. Teh Swee Neo & Anor [2026] CLJU 402 overruling the High Court case of Teh Swee Neo & Anor v. CCRM Management Sdn Bhd & Anor [Civil Suit No.: JA-22NCvC-160-10/2019]

  2. Cosmopolitan Avenue Sdn Bhd v. Dickson Woo Boon Siew & Ors [2026] CLJU 420 overruling in part the High Court case of Dickson Woo Boon Siew & Ors v. Cosmopolitan Avenue Sdn Bhd [2024] CLJU 1477

LATEST CASES

Legal Network Series

[2026] CLJU 30

CHANG KOK VENG v. YAP THAI CHING & ORS

When legal issues are inextricably intertwined with contested factual circumstances, then any attempt to determine the questions posed under O. 14A of the Rules of Court 2012 would be premature. The resolution of the questions cannot be divorced from these factual disputes, and therefore cannot finally dispose of the action without a full trial to resolve the underlying factual disputes. The highly fact-intensive nature of the claims and counterclaims demonstrates that the action is unsuitable for summary determination under the said O. 14A.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Summary judgment - Summary disposal of suit - Action for removal of director - Disputed questions of fact - Whether application merely seeks substantive reliefs that mirror reliefs prayed in statement of claim - Whether full trial required to resolve intertwined factual and legal issues - Whether any attempt to determine questions posed would be premature - Whether application fall outside scope and purpose of O. 14A and O. 33 r. 2 of Rules of Court 2012

  • For the plaintiff - Chris Lai; M/s Chris Lai, Yap & Partners
  • For the defendant - Lin Chia Yin; M/s Jk Lim

[2026] CLJU 32

CHONG SHI WEI v. PROCTER & GAMBLE (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD

1. The Court must carefully assess whether the employer's acts, though carried out as legitimate management decisions, were in truth designed to drive the employee out. This can only be determined by carefully evaluating the evidence in light of the express terms of the employment contract and the implied obligation of mutual trust and confidence. It follows, the reduction in scope, authority, and strategic importance undermined the implied term of mutual trust and confidence and altered the very foundation of the employment relationship. The fact that salary and band remained unchanged does not cure the breach.

2. Where an employee resigned as a result of a transfer instruction by the company, the proper inquiry is whether the transfer instruction, viewed in substance, fundamentally altered the employee's role.

LABOUR LAW: Dismissal - Constructive dismissal - Transfer - Material change to employment terms - Employee was called back from overseas assignment and as part of transfer offered significantly smaller role - Employee consistently rejected transfer instruction - Whether employer's act was carried out as legitimate management decisions or designed to drive employee out - Whether transfer instruction in substance fundamentally altered employee's role - Whether there was a substantive diminution of employee's role and responsibilities - Whether employee had waived her rights in transfer instruction

  • For the appellant - Vijaya Kumar Raj K. Durai Raj; M/s A. Rajadurai P. Kuppusamy & Co
  • For the respondent - John Rolan, Leong Teen Yue & Fathin Sapawi; M/s Christopher & Lee Ong

[2026] CLJU 39

KOAY KIM HOE v. WONG CHENG NUN

Plaintiff bear the burden to prove that Malaysian Court is a more appropriate forum to hear and determine the plaintiff's claim which arose outside Malaysia. Domicile of the defendant alone is not the sole determining factor when the cause of action arose wholly outside Malaysia and the connecting factors are overwhelmingly shown to occur in outside Malaysia together with all relevant documents and witnesses being based outside Malaysia. It follows, where an accident occurred in Singapore and the investigations were conducted by the Singapore police, then the applicable law is Singapore traffic law. In such circumstances, Singapore Court is the more suitable and the appropriate forum to decide the matter.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Jurisdiction - Courts - Civil jurisdiction - Forum non-convenience - Action premised on tort of negligence arising from road traffic accident - Accident occurred in Singapore - Claim filed in Johor Bahru High Court - Police reports were lodged with Singapore Police Force - Defendant residing in Perak - Whether Malaysian Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine claim - Whether High Court is an appropriate forum to hear and determine claim - Whether defendant's domicile alone was sufficient to confer jurisdiction to Malaysian Court to hear matter

  • For the plaintiff - Ong Chee Yong; M/s C Y Ong & Co
  • For the defendant - Gayathiry; M/s Athi & Seelan

[2026] CLJU 31

DAVID LEE KHET LEONG lwn. JOANNE MAH WAI YEE

1. Pindaan kepada pliding tidak sewajarnya dijadikan alat untuk memperbetulkan fakta-fakta atau mengemaskini dan memperbaiki ketidakpatuhan prosedur oleh pihak-pihak setelah menyedari kesilapan tersebut. Ini adalah disebabkan pihak-pihak adalah dikehendaki mendapatkan fakta-fakta yang mencukupi sebelum memfailkan sesuatu tindakan. Ini dapat mengelakkan pihak-pihak perlu memfailkan permohonan pindaan apabila memperolehi fakta yang baru. Ini akan memprejudiskan pihak lawan dan menghalang penyelesaian kes dalam tempoh yang sewajarnya.

2. Apabila pindaan dibuat kepada saman pemula dari remedi di bawah s. 55 kepada s. 52 Akta Kesihatan Mental 2001, maka ia telah menyebabkan prosedur dan remedi yang dipohon adalah berbeza. Pindaan sedemikian telah menukarkan sifat tindakan daripada suatu sifat kepada suatu sifat yang lain.

PROSEDUR SIVIL: Pliding - Pindaan - Kebenaran untuk meminda saman pemula - Pindaan kepada relif yang dipohon - Permohonan asal di bawah s. 55 Akta Kesihatan Mental 2001 dipinda kepada permohonan di bawah s. 55 dan 52 - Sama ada pindaan yang dipohon boleh menukar sifat permohonan asal plaintif kepada permohonan yang lain - Sama ada remedi yang dipohon mempunyai kesan yang berbeza dan melibatkan prosedur yang tertentu

  • Bagi pihak peguam plaintif - Trevor Padasian @ Mark Jason Wan Nabil Ikram Wan Zamri; T/n Skrine
  • Bagi pihak peguam defendan - Jagjit Singh & Cassandra Lee; T/n Cassandra Lee Chambers

[2026] CLJU 33

GEONEX (M) SDN BHD lwn. VENTURE SKL SDN BHD

1. Sesuatu pengiktirafan perjanjian boleh menjadi satu kontrak. Ini boleh berlaku sekiranya terdapat elemen-elemen yang diperlukan bagi satu pembentukan kontrak iaitu terdapatnya tawaran, penerimaan dan balasan.

2. Apabila kesemua terma-terma dan tanggungjawab pihak-pihak kepada suatu perjanjian serta remedi-remedi yang sepatutnya telah diputuskan dengan sewajarnya dalam prosiding terdahulu, maka tuntutan dan tuntutan balas berasaskan terma-terma perjanjian tersebut serta remedi-remedi yang sama adalah tidak wajar diulang lagi dalam tindakan yang baru.

KONTRAK: Terma-terma - Kemungkiran - Perjanjian pembekalan biji besi - Kemungkiran perjanjian oleh defendan menyebabkan perjanjian plaintif dengan pihak lain terjejas - Kewujudan prosiding terdahulu melibatkan kontrak antara plaintif dan defendan - Gantirugi - Res judicata - Estoppel - Sama ada terdapat kontrak antara plaintif dan defendan yang telah memutuskan segala liabiliti dan tanggungjawab di bawah kontrak - Sama ada kesemua terma dan tanggungjawab plaintif dan defendan telah diputuskan dengan sewajarnya dalam prosiding terdahulu

  • Bagi pihak plaintif - S. Ravichandran & A. Kanesrau; T/n Seah Balan Ravi & Co
  • Bagi pihak defendan - Kamalanathan & Vinod Kamalanatahan; T/n Vinod Kamalanathan & Associates

CLJ 2026 Volume 5 (Part 1)

(i) Under s. 13 of the National Forestry Act 1984, a State Authority may issue a Gazette notification that specifies an effective date for the excision of forest reserves that precedes the date of the Gazette publication itself. The cessation of a forest reserve status takes effect from the date stipulated in the notification, rather than the date the Gazette was printed or published; (ii) To have the standing to initiate judicial review, an applicant must demonstrate that their rights or interests were affected at the time the decision was made. If an organisation was incorporated years after a land-use decision was finalised, it cannot retrospectively claim an interest to protect or assert that its rights were infringed by that original decision; (iii) The three-month time limit for filing a judicial review application begins from the date the decision was made or first communicated. In environmental and land matters, knowledge of a decision can be inferred from, among other factors , massive physical development on the land. Parties cannot bypass limitation periods by claiming ignorance of a formal Gazette if the physical reality of the land's alienation was notorious and observable for decades.
Damien Thaman Divean & Anor v. Majlis Eksekutif Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (EXCO) & Ors [2026] 5 CLJ 1 [FC]

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Leave - Application to challenge degazettement of forest reserve - Decision to de-gazette made in 2000 but formal Gazette notification published in 2022 - Gazette notification stated excision effective from 2000 - Whether retrospective effective date valid - Whether cessation of forest reserve status only effective upon date of publication - Whether permissible to validate past decision via subsequent Gazette - National Forestry Act 1984, s. 13

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Locus standi - Application by environmental organisations to challenge degazettement of forest reserve - Organisations incorporated years after decision to de-gazette was made - Whether organisations had rights or interests to protect at material time - Whether decision affected rights of entities not yet in existence

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Time limit - Application for leave filed in 2022 to challenge decision made in 2000 - Whether application filed out of time - Whether massive physical development on land constituted constructive notice of degazettement - Whether appellants could claim ignorance of decision until formal Gazette publication - Rules of Court 2012, O. 53 r. 3(6)

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Retrospective effect - Amendment to National Forestry Act (Adoption) Enactment 1985 - Requirement for public inquiry introduced in 2011 - Decision to de-gazette made in 2000 - Whether 2011 amendment applied retrospectively to 2000 decision - Whether failure to hold public inquiry rendered degazettement invalid

 

Abu Bakar Jais PCA
Rhodzariah Bujang FCJ
Lee Swee Seng FCJ

  • For the appellants - Gurdial Singh Nijar, Rajesh Nagarajan, Sachpreetraj Singh, Abraham Au, Ambbi Balakrishnan & Amanda Sonia Mathew; M/s Raj & Sach
  • For the 1st to 4th respondents - Hani Aziza Ismail & Mary Phoon Keat Mee; State Legal Advisor, Selangor
  • For the 5th respondent - Ng Ka Choon & Sarah Low Jiah Yee; M/s Tengku Maria Lim & Ong
  • For the 6th respondent - R Ganapathi, Al-Sabri Ahmad Kabri & Marlia Mohd Azrin; M/s Al-Sabri & Co
  • For the 7th respondent - John Wong Yok Hon & Sarah Low Wan Qi; M/s Shui Tai
  • Amicus Curiae for the Malaysian Bar - New Sin Yew & Abhilaash Subramaniam; M/s Abhilaash Subramaniam & Co
  • Amicus Curiae for the World Wide Fund for Nature Malaysia - Malik Imtiaz Sarwar; M/s Kelviin Manuel Pillay

Where a depositor provides evidence of fund transfers into a financial institution's accounts, documents recording the receipt and internal tracking of those funds are inherently relevant and discoverable. Given the heavily regulated nature of the financial services industry, it is a legal and regulatory necessity for institutions to identify depositors and account for funds received. Consequently, discovery of such documents is essential for the saving of time and costs under O. 24 r. 8 of the Rules of Court 2012.
PG Doraisamy P Gopal v. Amlnvestment Bank Bhd & Other Appeals [2026] 5 CLJ 55 [CA]

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CIVIL PROCEDURE: CIVIL PROCEDURE: Discovery - Application for - Pre-trial discovery - Depositor deposited substantial sums into accounts of investment banks and stockbroking firm for purpose of acquiring shares - Deposits not returned and no share trading accounts opened in depositor's name - Application for documents evidencing transfers, mandates/instructions and utilisation of funds - Whether documents relevant and necessary - Rules of Court 2012, O. 24 r. 8

BANKING: Banks and banking institutions - Duties - Depositor deposited substantial sums into accounts of investment banks and stockbroking firm for purpose of acquiring shares - Deposits not returned and no share trading accounts opened in depositor's name - Duty of banks to identify depositor and account for deposits - Whether secrecy provisions in Financial Services Act 2013 and Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 1991 applicable to records of deposits made by depositor

 

Mohd Nazlan Ghazali JCA
Alwi Abdul Wahab JCA
Ahmad Kamal Md Shahid JCA

(Civil Appeal No: W-02(IM)(NCC)-134-01-2025)
  • For the appellant - Ambiga Sreenevasan, Selvaratnam & Gokul Radhakrishnan; M/s Sreenevasan
  • For the respondent - Muhammad Izzat Zainal; M/s Shook Lin & Bok
(Civil Appeal No: W-02(IM)(NCC)-135-01-2025)
  • For the appellant - Ambiga Sreenevasan, Selvaratnam & Gokul Radhakrishnan; M/s Sreenevasan
  • For the respondent - Teh Meng Teck, Dianne Ng & Cliff Tan Ze Yin; M/s Cheah Teh Su
(Civil Appeal No: W-02(IM)(NCC)-136-01-2025)
  • For the appellant - Ambiga Sreenevasan, Selvaratnam & Gokul Radhakrishnan; M/s Sreenevasan
  • For the respondent - Marianne Loh & Megan Phang; M/s Shook Lin & Bok
(Civil Appeal No: W-02(IM)(NCC)-137-01-2025)
  • For the appellant - Ambiga Sreenevasan, Selvaratnam & Gokul Radhakrishnan; M/s Sreenevasan
  • For the respondent - Bobby Chew Chin Guan & Lee Bee Hsia; M/s Chris Koh & Chew

Where a contract contains a termination clause expressed to operate 'notwithstanding anything contained herein', such a clause must be interpreted according to its plain and ordinary meaning as an independent right of termination. A termination for convenience clause, providing for notice without requiring reasons, operates independently of termination for default clauses. The presence of one does not restrict the exercise of the other unless explicitly stated.
UEM Land Bhd v. Mohd Khalid Mohd Noor [2026] 5 CLJ 79 [CA]

CONTRACT: Agreement - Tenancy agreement - Clause on termination of agreement - Clause provided for termination by three months' notice - Clause contained words 'Notwithstanding anything contained herein' - Whether clause to be read independently of termination for default clause - Whether terminating party required to provide reasons for termination - Whether consent of other party required - Whether termination valid upon compliance with notice period

 

 

Mohd Nazlan Ghazali JCA
Mohd Firuz Jaffril JCA
Lim Hock Leng JCA

  • For the appellant - Harjinder Kaur Ajaib Singh, Ainnur Annisa Abdul Razak & Toh Xin Yi; M/s Shahrizat Rashid & Lee
  • For the respondent - Ng Yih Miin & Felyna Mustafa Kamal; M/s TS Ong & Ng

(i) The legislative purpose of s. 30 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ('CIPAA') is to protect subcontractors from the cascading effects of the main contractor's default. The section provides a statutory mechanism for subcontractors to obtain direct payment from the principal (employer) when the main contractor fails to pay an adjudicated amount; (ii) A retention sum is a 'present and existing debt', not a contingent debt. The obligation to pay the retention sum exists currently; only the timing of payment is deferred until a future event. Because the obligation to pay exists, the sum is 'payable' within the meaning of s. 30(5) of the CIPAA
BP Engineering Sdn Bhd v. Jabatan Kerja Raya Malaysia & Ors [2026] 5 CLJ 94 [HC]

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CONSTRUCTION LAW: Adjudication decisions - Enforcement of - Application under s. 30 of Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 - Failure by main contractor to pay adjudicated sum to subcontractor - Claim by subcontractor against principal for direct payment of adjudicated sum - Whether all preconditions satisfied - Whether adjudication decision formal and binding determination of liability - Whether separate demand required - Whether written request served on principal - Whether principal made direct payment to subcontractor - Whether sums due and payable

CONSTRUCTION LAW: Adjudication decisions - Enforcement of - Application under s. 30 of Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ('CIPAA') - Retention sum - Whether represents present and existing debt - Whether contingent debt - Whether obligation to pay exists - Whether payable under s. 30(5) of CIPAA

 

Rajes Raghavji JC

  • For the plaintiff - Yap Chean Hong; M/s Azmi & Assocs
  • For the 3rd defendant - Farah Shuhada Ramli; SFC

Under s. 506 of the Penal Code, imprisonment is established as the primary sentencing option for criminal intimidation, reflecting the Legislature's view of the offence as a serious threat to public order. While the court retains the discretion to impose a fine, imprisonment, or both, the statutory language prioritises custodial terms, particularly in cases involving threats of death or grievous harm. Any judicial decision to deviate from this 'imprisonment-first' principle by imposing a fine alone must be supported by clear and cogent reasons to justify why a non-custodial sentence is sufficient.
PP v. Imang Swak [2026] 5 CLJ 121 [HC]

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CRIMINAL LAW: Penal Code - Section 506 - Criminal intimidation - Sentencing - Threat to kill - Use of machete - Gravity and barbarity of intimidation - Impact on victim's sense of personal safety - Public interest - Legislative intent - Whether imposing custodial sentence ought to be primary consequence for offence - Whether there was failure to give 'speaking judgment' on sentence imposed - Whether sentence imposed manifestly inadequate - Whether appellate intervention warranted

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Sentencing - Appeal against - Criminal intimidation - Threat to kill - Use of machete - Gravity and barbarity of intimidation - Impact on victim's sense of personal safety - Public interest - Legislative intent - Whether imposing custodial sentence ought to be primary consequence for offence - Whether there was failure to give 'speaking judgment' on sentence imposed - Whether sentence imposed manifestly inadequate - Whether appellate intervention warranted

 

Wong Siong Tung J

  • For the appellant/prosecution - Mark Kenneth Netto; DPP
  • For the respondent/accused - Ralph Lee & Christopher Bada; M/s Ralph Advocs

A contractor's obligation to rectify defects persists post-completion, regardless of whether such defects are latent or apparent, as corrective works performed to remedy non-conformity are executed pursuant to a subsisting contractual duty and cannot be classified as voluntary or extra-contractual acts. This obligation to make good any defect or deviation is continuing, mandatory, and unconditional, leaving no room for contractual ambiguity. Consequently, a claim for quantum meruit or restitutionary relief is unsustainable where the works are corrective in nature, because the equitable basis for such relief requires 'clean hands'; a party cannot invoke equity to profit from its own non-performance or seek restitution for remedial works necessitated by its own breach of contract.
Regal Elite Letrik Sdn Bhd v. Country Garden Danga Bay Sdn Bhd; Iskandar Waterfront Sdn Bhd & Ors (Third Parties) [2026] 5 CLJ 136 [HC]

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CONSTRUCTION LAW: Liability - Contract - Letter of Award (LOA) - Installation of 33kV underground cables - Deviation from approved alignment - Cable damaged by third-party pipe-jacking works due to improper positioning - Whether contractor bore primary duty to ensure compliance with approved drawings - Effect of clause in LOA on contractor's liability

CONSTRUCTION LAW: Contractor's obligations - Defect liability period (DLP) - Latent defects - Misalignment discovered only upon excavation following cable failure - Distinction between patent and latent defects - Whether energisation and practical completion constituted waiver of compliance - Continuing, mandatory and unconditional duty to make good defects or deviations - Whether contractor liable to rectify latent defects discovered during DLP at own cost - Whether failure to ensure alignment compliance and subsequent claim for payment constituted breach of contract

CONSTRUCTION LAW: Damages - Quantum - Pricing mechanism - Unilateral mark-up of costs beyond contractual rates - Whether contractor entitled to profit from urgency created by its own breach - Right of set-off - Employer's right to retain and set off sums to cover costs arising from contractor's deviation

CONTRACT: Quantum meruit - Rectification and diversion works - Claim for - Whether works performed voluntary or gratuitous - Works carried out to remedy non-conformity discovered during defects liability period - Whether works corrective in nature to restore compliance - Whether statutory elements of s. 71 of Contracts Act 1950 met

 

Noradura Hamzah JC

  • For the plaintiff - Jonathan Puthucheary; M/s Nadzarin Kuok, Puthucheary & Tan
  • For the defendant - Kho Sze Jia, Ho Chan Chon & Lee Xin Yi; M/s Izad Kazran & Co
  • For the 1st, 2nd & 3rd parties - TC Ling; M/s Dennis Nik & Wong
  • For the 3rd parties - Justin Leong & Lm Looi; M/s Lee & Koh
  • For the 4th parties - M/s Henry, Soong & Chang

(i) Order 28 r. 8 of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘ROC’) does not apply automatically to interpleader proceedings. Order 17 of the ROC is a self-contained code, with r. 3(1) prescribing an originating summons as the sole mode of commencement, unless the interpleader arises in a pending action. Order 17 makes no provision for conversion to a writ. Applying O. 28 r. 8 to O. 17 would therefore amount to impermissible judicial legislation; (ii) An interpleader is a neutral, non-adversarial process to protect a stakeholder facing competing claims. Its purpose is limited to determining entitlement to the disputed sum or property and does not extend to broader contractual, statutory, or constitutional disputes.
Shell MDS (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v. Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) & Ors [2026] 5 CLJ 162 [HC]

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Interpleader - Stakeholder's interpleader - Application to convert interpleader originating summons ('interpleader OS') into writ action - Applicability of O. 28 r. 8 of Rules of Court 2012 ('ROC') to O. 17 of ROC proceedings - Whether proposed conversion would expand dispute into questions of distinct and collateral to limited purpose of interpleader OS - Whether conversion would multiply proceedings, pleadings, costs, and delay resolution - Whether affidavits sufficient to determine interpleader OS - Rules of Court 2012, O. 17 r. 3(1) & O. 28 r. 8

 

 

Mahazan Mat Taib J

  • For the plaintiff - Christopher Leong Sau Foo & Janet Chai Pei Ying; M/s Chooi & Co
  • For the 1st defendant - Khoo Guan Huat, Azian Mohd Aziz, Grace Teoh, Ahmad Faiz & Khoo Yuan Ping; M/s Mohamad Hanafiah Zakaria
  • For the 2nd defendant - Foo Joon Liang & Kho Jia Yuan; M/s Gan Partnership
  • For the 3th defendant - Muhammad Muhairi; FC
  • For the 4th defendant - JC Fong, Mohd Adzrul Adzlan & Khairul Kabir Abdul Kabir; FC

(i) A breach of the Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Rules 1959, or the use of a vehicle in an unlawful manner does not automatically discharge an insurer's statutory liability; (ii) The phrase 'by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment', under s. 91(1)(bb) of the Road Transport Act 1987 is not restricted to a contract of employment with the insured. Provided a person is on the vehicle due to a contract of employment, even if with a third party, they fall within the statutory exception. The insurer remains liable for bodily injuries sustained by such a person, as they are considered a passenger protected under the compulsory insurance scheme.
Zurich General Insurance Malaysia Bhd v. Ng Kok Soon & Ors [2026] 5 CLJ 171 [HC]

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INSURANCE: Accident insurance - Compulsory third-party policy - Liability - Effect of illegal or unsafe use of vehicle on policy enforceability - Road accident involving trailer - Porter riding on trailer to wave warning flag injured when cargo struck overhead wires - Whether porter 'passenger' within meaning of s. 2 of Road Transport Act 1987 ('Act') - Whether covered under s. 91(1) of Act - Whether 'contract of employment' under s. 91(1)(bb) of Act must be with insured - Whether breach of r. 93 of Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Rules 1959 absolved insurer of statutory liability

ROAD TRAFFIC: Statutory liability - Insurer - Road accident involving trailer - Porter riding on trailer to wave warning flag injured when cargo struck overhead wires - Whether insurer liable to indemnify - Whether passenger carried 'by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment' included employment by third party - Interpretation of s. 91(1)(bb) of Road Transport Act 1987

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Road Transport Act 1987 - Section 91(1)(bb) - Protection of third-party victims - Porter riding on trailer to wave warning flag injured when cargo struck overhead wires - Whether passenger carried 'by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment' included employment by third party

Choong Yeow Choy J

  • For the plaintiff - Thiiban Raaj Parthiban & Sunil Singh Khera; M/s Gan Ho & Razlan Hadri
  • For the defendants - Tiong Hou Yuen; M/s N M Tiong & Co

 


ARTICLES

CLJ Article(s)

  1. WHETHER AGREEMENT ON THE CONTENTS OF A DOCUMENT IMPORTS AGREEMENT AS TO THEIR TRUTH: AN ANALYSIS OF CONFLICTING MALAYSIAN APPELLATE DECISIONS [Read excerpt]
    by Ranjan N Chandran* [2026] 5 CLJ(A) i

  2. [2026] 5 CLJ(A) i
    MALAYSIA

    WHETHER AGREEMENT ON THE CONTENTS OF A DOCUMENT IMPORTS AGREEMENT AS TO THEIR TRUTH:
    AN ANALYSIS OF CONFLICTING MALAYSIAN APPELLATE DECISIONS


    by
    Ranjan N Chandran*

    Introduction

    The Rules of Court 2012 ('ROC') was introduced with the objective of streamlining civil litigation and expediting the disposal of cases.

    Central to this procedural framework is the categorisation of documents into agreed bundles for trial management.

    However, differing views have arisen over a critical question: whether an agreement on the contents of documents included in Part A of a common bundle also constitutes an agreement as to the truth of those contents.

    This divergence has created uncertainty for litigants and practitioners alike. Given the centrality of documentary evidence in civil litigation, clarification of this issue is of pressing importance.

    It is therefore necessary to examine the source of the problem, particularly the rule provision governing the conduct of litigation before the High Courts of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak, as well as the division of jurisdiction between them.

    Order 34 r. 2 of the ROC sets out the categorisation of documents that will be relied upon or referred to during the course of a trial. These documents are to be compiled into a bundle of documents, in accordance with directions given by the court at the pre-trial case management stage.

    . . .

    * Consultant, Hakem Arabi & Associates

LNS Article(s)

  1. ALGORITHMIC EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS AND THE LIMITS OF MALAYSIAN LAW: IMPLIED TRUST, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION, AND THE BURDEN OF JUST CAUSE IN THE AGE OF AI-ASSISTED HR [Read excerpt]
    by Dr Tahirah Manesah binti Abu Bakar* [2026] CLJU(A) l

  2. [2026] CLJU(A) l
    MALAYSIA

    ALGORITHMIC EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS AND THE LIMITS OF MALAYSIAN LAW:
    IMPLIED TRUST, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION, AND THE BURDEN OF JUST CAUSE IN THE AGE OF AI-ASSISTED HR


    by
    Dr Tahirah Manesah binti Abu Bakar*

    INTRODUCTION

    Artificial intelligence ('AI') has entered the Malaysian workplace. Performance management systems generate scores without human deliberation. Redundancy selection tools rank employees against weighted criteria drawn from datasets whose composition neither the employee nor the employer's own HR Department can fully explain. Predictive attrition models flag workers identified as flight risks before they have formed any conscious intention of leaving.[1]

    The Industrial Relations Act 1967 and the body of Industrial Court jurisprudence built upon it were designed for a world in which consequential employment decisions were made by identifiable human beings whose reasoning could be tested through cross-examination and documentary disclosure. When the decision-maker is an algorithm, that machinery struggles. The employer can produce the output, but it cannot always produce the reasoning. Yet, it is the reasoning that the law requires.

    This article examines three established doctrinal frameworks in Malaysian employment law, each independently capable of generating significant legal exposure where AI-assisted HR decisions are deployed without adequate transparency and explainability safeguards. The first is the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. The second is the doctrine of legitimate expectation, applied in the employment context. The third is the employer's burden of demonstrating just cause and excuse. The article argues that their convergence creates a compounding legal exposure that existing legislation does not address.

    . . .

    *PhD (Business Administration), Asia e University. Industrial Relations Consultant; former Industrial Court Panel Member (2019–2022); External Advisor, City University Malaysia and University of Malaya (UMCCED).

  3. AI-ASSISTED SENTENCING IN MALAYSIAN COURTS: A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED ANALYSIS [Read excerpt]
    by Dr Haezreena Begum binti Abdul Hamid* [2026] CLJU(A) li

  4. [2026] CLJU(A) li
    MALAYSIA

    AI-ASSISTED SENTENCING IN MALAYSIAN COURTS: A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED ANALYSIS

    by
    Dr Haezreena Begum binti Abdul Hamid*

    INTRODUCTION

    The deployment of artificial intelligence ('AI') within Malaysia's judicial system has expanded gradually and with evident caution, reflecting an awareness of the significant human rights implications that arise when technology is introduced into adjudicative processes. From a human rights perspective, the central issue is not whether AI can enhance administrative efficiency or consistency, but whether its integration preserves core legal guarantees, including judicial independence, procedural fairness, transparency, and equality before the law.

    To date, the use of AI in Malaysia's courts has been confined primarily to limited and controlled functions, most notably within the courts of Sabah and Sarawak. One of the earliest and most prominent initiatives is the Artificial Intelligence in Court Sentencing ('AiCOS') system, launched in early 2020 by Sarawak Information Systems Sdn Bhd ('SAINS'). AiCOS functions as a non-binding sentencing recommendation tool designed to promote consistency in sentencing outcomes, reduce case backlogs, and expedite judicial processes. Crucially, it is framed as an assistive mechanism rather than a determinative one, signalling an explicit effort to safeguard judicial discretion and independence.

    Against this backdrop, this paper examines the introduction of AI into sentencing practices in Malaysia through a human rights-based framework. It interrogates the increasingly influential claim that algorithmic tools can neutralise bias and enhance objectivity in sentencing decisions. While sentencing is often portrayed as particularly amenable to automation due to its reliance on established legal principles and structured discretion, this paper argues that the incorporation of AI into judicial decision-making raises fundamental concerns relating to the right to a fair trial, equality before the law, transparency, and public confidence in the administration of justice.

    . . .

    *Faculty of Law, Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur.

  5. 'THE EFFECT OF ILLEGALITY ON PRIVATE LAW CLAIMS'
    LECTURE GIVEN AT THE 35TH SINGAPORE LAW REVIEW+
    [Read excerpt]
    by Justice Goh Yihan* [2026] CLJU(A) lii

  6. [2026] CLJU(A) lii
    SINGAPORE

    'THE EFFECT OF ILLEGALITY ON PRIVATE LAW CLAIMS'

    LECTURE GIVEN AT THE 35TH SINGAPORE LAW REVIEW+


    by
    Justice Goh Yihan*

    Introduction

    1. Thank you for the kind introduction and the immense privilege of delivering the Singapore Law Review Lecture 2024. I return to this venue with fond memories of my time as an academic at NUS Law exactly a decade ago. Indeed, it was in 2014 that I delivered one of my last lectures here.

    2. The topic of my lecture today is "The Effect of Illegality on Private Law Claims". When I suggested it, I was mildly excited by the prospect of going through this notoriously difficult area of law. When I started preparing for this lecture, I began to regret the prospect of going through this very difficult area of law. Indeed, it is challenging to reconcile the various cases, and this is understandable since the entire law is premised upon the rather nebulous concept of public policy.[1] Be that as it may, I will try to provide some food for thought on this topic this evening.

    3. To begin with – and this will disappoint Dean Andrew Simester, who advised me as a junior academic that every good paper should have just one core question – I will go through a number of questions occasioned by the illegality defence without necessarily providing a definitive answer. I know you will understand that it may not be appropriate for me to advocate for a particular point of view, especially if that point of view has not been judicially determined in Singapore. I hope nonetheless that you will leave today's lecture with a better understanding of this area of law.

    . . .

    +Reproduced with permission of the Singapore Courts: https://www.judiciary.gov.sg/news-and-resources/news/news-details/justice-goh-yihan--lecture-at-35th-singapore-law-review-annual-lecture.

    *Judge of the High Court, Supreme Court of Singapore. This paper was delivered at the Singapore Law Review Lecture held at the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore on 19 January 2024. I would like to thank my law clerk, Mr Adam Goh, for all his excellent assistance in the preparation of this lecture. All views expressed are my own and do not represent those of the Supreme Court of Singapore.

LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTS

Principal Acts

Number Title In force from Repealed Superseded
ACT 880 Capitation Grant Act 2026 1 April 2026 - -
ACT 879 Auctioneers Act 1914 (Revised–2026) 25 March 2026 revised edition pursuant to paragraph 6(1)(xxiii) of the Revision of Laws Act 1968 [Act 1]; Revised up to 20 March 2026; First enacted in 1914 as Sabah Ordinance No 1 of 1914; First Revision - 1936 (No 1 of 1914 wef 31 December 1936); Second Revision - 1953 (Cap 9 wef 30 June 1953) - -
ACT 878 Legal Aid and Public Defence Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -
ACT 877 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -
ACT 876 Anti-Bully Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -

Amending Acts

Number Title In force from Principal/Amending Act No
ACT A1793 Environmental Quality (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 127
ACT A1792 Supplementary Supply (2025) Act 2026 1 May 2026  
ACT A1791 Passports (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 150
ACT A1790 Immigration (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 155
ACT A1789 Rukun Tetangga (Amendment) Act 2026 1 April 2026 [PU(B) 90/2026] ACT 751

PU(A)

Number Title Date of Publication In force from Principal/ Amending Act No
PU(A) 180/2026 Entertainments Duty (Exemption) (No. 20) Order 2026 29 April 2026 30 April 2026 ACT 103
PU(A) 179/2026 Entertainments Duty (Exemption) (No. 19) Order 2026 29 April 2026 30 April 2026 ACT 103
PU(A) 178/2026 Lembaga Kemajuan Ikan Malaysia (Fisheries Complexes, Fisheries Harbours and Fisheries Landing Jetties) (Amendment) Rules 2026 28 April 2026 29 April 2026 PU(A) 103/2010
PU(A) 177/2026 Entertainments Duty (Exemption) (No. 18) Order 2026 3 April 2026 4 April 2026 ACT 103
PU(A) 176/2026 Fees (Digital Advertisement) (Department of Broadcasting Malaysia) Order 2026 14 April 2026 20 April 2026 ACT 209

PU(B)

Number Title Date of Publication In force from Principal/ Amending Act No
PU(B) 176/2026 Notification of Value of Crude Petroleum Oil Under Section 12 14 May 2026 15 May 2026 to 28 May 2026 ACT 235
PU(B) 175/2026 Notice Under Section 70 14 May 2026 15 May 2026 ACT 333
PU(B) 174/2026 Notice To Third Parties 13 May 2026 14 May 2026 ACT 613
PU(B) 173/2026 Notice To Third Parties 13 May 2026 14 May 2026 ACT 613
PU(B) 172/2026 Notice To Third Parties 12 May 2026 13 May 2026 ACT 613

Legislation Alert

Updated

Act/Principal No. Title Amended by In force from Section amended
AKTA 27 Akta Agensi Persendirian 1971 AKTA A1782 28 April 2026 [PU(B) 147/2026] Seksyen 3, 5, 9, 13 and 18A
ACT 27 Private Agencies Act 1971 ACT A1782 28 April 2026 [PU(B) 147/2026] Sections 3, 5, 9, 13 and 18A
ACT 206 Arms Act 1960 (Revised 1978) PU(A) 94/2026 21 February 2026 Second Schedule
ACT 751 Rukun Tetangga Act 2012 ACT A1789 1 April 2026 [PU(B) 90/2026] Sections 2, 3, 7, 9, 15, 17 and 23
AKTA 751 Akta Rukun Tetangga 2012 AKTA A1789 1 April 2026 [PU(B) 90/2026] Seksyen 2, 3, 7, 9, 15, 17 dan 23

Revoked

Act/Principal No. Title Revoked by In force from
PU(A) 173/2022 Perintah Duti Eksais (Kenderaan Bermotor) (Bayaran) 2022 PU(A) 44/2026 1 Februari 2026
PU(A) 173/2022 Excise Duties (Motor Vehicles) (Payment) Order 2022 PU(A) 44/2026 1 February 2026
PU(A) 317/2025 Federal Roads (East Klang Valley Expressway) Order 2025 PU(A) 32/2026 26 January 2026
PU(A) 384/2021 Customs (Anti-Dumping Duties) (Administrative Review) (No. 3) Order 2021 PU(A) 24/2026 15 January 2026 to 8 October 2026
PU(A) 312/2021 Customs (Anti-Dumping Duties) (Administrative Review) (No. 2) Order 2021 PU(A) 23/2026 15 January 2026 to 19 July 2026

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