Print this page
CLJ Pulse Header
Issue #40/2026
01 October 2026

Subscribe now to make the most of this legal bulletin and have full access to judgments and other documents.

New This Week

CASE SPOTLIGHTS

YEO GEOK BENG v. GOLDSAND JV SDN BHD & ANOR [2026] 8 CLJ 939
HIGH COURT MALAYA, MELAKA
RAJA SEGARAN S KRISHNAN JC
[CIVIL SUIT NO: MA-22NCVC-3-01-2022]
16 JUNE 2026

(i) An order striking out or expunging an affidavit, under O. 41 r. 6 and O. 92 r. 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 ('ROC'), in interlocutory proceedings is strictly confined to the propriety of that specific filed document, and it does not constitute a substantive pre-trial ruling on the admissibility of the underlying facts, conversations, or separate exhibits contained in other parts of the court record; (ii) Disputed documents, audio recordings and transcriptions whose authenticity or contents are contested should not be summarily excluded prior to trial; instead, they must be placed in the appropriate pre-trial case management bundle under O. 34 r. 2(2)(e) of the ROC for their admissibility, authentication, compliance with s. 90A of the Evidence Act 1950, relevance, and weight to be fully heard and determined by the trial court.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments and orders - Interlocutory orders - Order expunging affidavit - Whether order expunging affidavit in interlocutory proceedings operates as bar to adducing related audio recordings and transcriptions at trial - Rules of Court 2012, O. 41 r. 6 & O. 92 r. 4

EVIDENCE: Admissibility - Audio recordings and transcriptions - Covertly made recordings - Objection to adducing evidence prior to trial on grounds of want of consent, unpleaded contents, and prior expungement of separate affidavit - Whether questions of admissibility, authentication, compliance with s. 90A of Evidence Act 1950, and relevance should be determined in advance of trial or reserved for trial court - Rules of Court 2012, O. 34 r. 2(2)(e)


APPEAL UPDATES

  1. Manogaran Singraveloo & Ors v. Amanah Raya Berhad & Anor [2026] CLJU 2189 overruling the High Court case of Manogaran Singraveloo & Ors v. Amanah Raya Berhad & Anor [2024] CLJU 826

  2. Nobri Ramli lwn. PP [2026] CLJU 1479 menolak sebahagian kes PP lwn. Nobri Ramli [2025] CLJU 357

LATEST CASES

Legal Network Series

[2026] CLJU 85

SKN LAND & DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD v. CREST WORLDWIDE RESOURCES SDN BHD; MUDAJAYA CORPORATION BHD & ORS (INTERVENERS) & ANOTHER APPEAL

1. A winding up Court has a discretion to dispense with oral submission if parties are given the right to adduce evidence and present written submission. Written submission saves precious judicial time and ensures an optimal disposal of cases as well as saves parties' time, costs and effort. Absence of oral submission per se does not amount to a breach of second rule of natural justice when parties had already filed their written submissions.

2. By virtues of ss. 492(1) and 493(1) of the Companies Act 2016, a winding up Court has wide discretion to decide applications for stay and termination of the winding up of a company. In exercising such discretion, the winding up Court should consider public interest as the primary consideration. An applicant in a stay or termination applications, has the legal and evidential burden to persuade the winding up Court to exercise its discretionary power to allow the stay or termination application.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Hearing - Submissions - Rule of natural justice - Oral hearing - Winding up proceedings - Whether Court is mandatorily required to give parties an oral hearing after written submissions had already been filed - Whether there was breach of second rule of natural justice

COMPANY LAW: Winding up - Stay - Power of Court to stay winding up proceedings - Stay of all proceedings in relation to winding up - Whether Court has discretion to stay winding up proceedings - Whether granting of stay contrary to public interest - Companies Act 2016 - ss. 492 , 493

COMPANY LAW: Winding up - Costs - Post winding up applications - Whether Court has discretion to award costs for post winding up applications - Courts of Judicature Act 1964, ss. 25(2)

  • For the appellant - Lim Chee Wee, Saritha Devi Kirupalani, Kwan Will Sen, Abhi Laash Subramaniam, Nur Nabila Roslee & Carolyn Chiang Jin Yin; M/s Firoz Julian
  • For the respondent's liquidator - Mong Chung Seng & Chew Sue Peng; M/s Lee Hishamuddin Allen & Gledhill
  • For 1st intervener - Ashok Kumar, Loshini Ramarmuty, Kalaiarasan Rasadurai & Lim Chin Lun; M/s Skrine
  • For 2nd & 3rd interveners - Ganesh Perumal & Shasha Aquliah Aziz; M/s Ganesh & Co
  • For 4th intervener - Puthan Perumal; M/s Perumal Brothers
  • For 5th to 29th interveners - Jeremy Tan; M/s Tan Ah Lak & Co
  • For 30th to 33rd interveners - Nur Syamimi Amalina Mohd Munir; M/s Teoh Pek Wei
  • For 34th and 35th interveners - Koh Pei Siah; M/s Azim, Tunku Farik & Wong
  • For 36th intervener - Srividhiya Ganapathy & Eisyarmily Akhtar; M/s Muhendaran Sri
  • For 37th to 44th, 48th & 49th interveners - Loke Yuen Hong & Chong Bei Lin, Nilesh Nathwani & Panna Nathwani; M/s HL Foo & Co
  • For 46th intervener - Prissilla Ann John Luke; M/s Mohanadass Partnership
  • For 47th intervener - Putri Alyra Narisha Abdul Hadi; M/s Wong Lu Peen & Tunku Alina
  • For 48th & 49th interveners - Loke Yuen Hung, Chong Bei Lin, Nilesh Nathwani & Panna Nathwani; M/s HL Foo & Co
  • For 45th intervener - Acting in person (not represented)
  • As amicus curiae - Al-Humidallah Idrus (SRC) on behalf of the DGIR

[2026] CLJU 101

CASA KLANG TOWER SDN BHD v. TROPICANA PROPERTIES (KLANG) SDN BHD & ORS

1. A letter of offer to purchase a property which underscores the necessity of executing a formal sale and purchase agreement does not create a binding agreement, as it is merely a document intended for the parties to negotiate and finalise a sale and purchase agreement based on mutually agreed terms and conditions. Conditions precedent stated in the letter of offer constitute a prerequisite to any formal sale and purchase agreement and when the conditions precedents are not satisfied, then parties are entitled to terminate the letter of offer.

2. An earnest deposit is a pre-contract deposit. It does not bind a vendor and a purchaser to a purported sale of a property, which means the vendor can speak to potential purchasers interested in the said property before the refund of the earnest deposit.

CONTRACT: Specific performance - Sale and purchase of property - Action by purchaser - Earnest deposit paid was subsequently refunded - Termination of letter of offer - Property sold to third parties - Dispute on draft sale and purchase agreement ('SPA') - Whether there was a concluded SPA - Whether letter of offer established a binding contract for sale or was merely an agreement to negotiate - Whether conditions precedent in letter of offer were satisfied - Whether time could be considered at large for parties to negotiate terms of SPA

TORT: Conspiracy - Conspiracy to injure - Sale and purchase of property - Land was sold to third parties - Conspiracy to victimize - Whether vendor entitled to speak to potential purchasers interested before refund of earnest deposit - Whether claim for conspiracy proven

  • For the plaintiff - Ling Hua Keong, Chong Yue Thong & Sim Qi Wei; M/s Ling & Mok
  • For the defendant 1 - Yee Mei Ken, Mattheus Goon Kin Zhi & Lai Xuan Chi; M/s Shearn Delamore & Co
  • For the defendant 2 - 6 - Kumaradevan Rajadevan & Uma Gunaseelan Gunaseelan & Associates

[2026] CLJU 136

V JAYARAMAN VA VELLASAMY v. INASIATIC (M) SDN BHD & ORS

1. A consent judgment recorded between parties in an action was to finalize the issues and put an end to all the disputes between the parties relating to the said action and the parties. Therefore, the consent judgment amounts to an estoppel against the parties for any further relitigation.

2. Committal proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, where the liberty of the subject is at stake. Therefore a strict compliance with procedural requirements is mandatory. It is a fundamental principle that no man's liberty shall be taken away unless every requirement of the law has been strictly complied with. Since the Court's contempt jurisdiction is exceptional and must be exercised with restraint, it should not be used as a substitute for ordinary enforcement mechanisms or to resolve commercial disputes between parties.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Committal proceedings - Application for - Order for committal - Allegation of breach of consent judgment - Parties agreed to depart from agreed terms of consent judgment - Inordinate delay - Procedural deficiencies - Whether respondents had breached terms of consent judgment - Whether there was an unreasonable and inordinate delay in executing consent judgment - Whether consent judgment is enforceable without penal notice - Whether failure to endorse penal clause in consent judgment was fatal to application for committal - Whether there was willful disobedience by respondents

  • For the applicant - Nur Fateha Roslan; M/s Chee Siah Le Kee & Partners
  • For the respondent - T S Chang; M/s Henry Soong & Chang

[2026] CLJU 99

WAK NGAH PILI BAH ADIM lwn. PERAK HYDRO RENEWABLE ENERGY CORPORATION SDN BHD & YANG LAIN

Prinsip common law berkaitan dengan hak tanah adat orang asli di telah diiktiraf sebagai undang-undang substantif yang mempunyai kuat kuasa dan kesan yang sama seperti undang-undang bertulis. Suatu pendudukan berterusan tanah adat oleh orang asli yang mempunyai kawalan yang mencukupi terhadap tanah adat tersebut serta dapat menghalang orang asing daripada memasuki atau menggangu tanah adat itu merupakan bukti yang mengiktiraf hak tanah adat orang asli yang mewajarkan tanah adat tersebut diwartakan sebagai tanah rizab orang asli. Kegagalan mewartakan tanah adat sebagai tanah rizab orang asli terjumlah kepada kemungkiran kewajipan fidusiari oleh Kerajaan Negeri, Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Kamajuan Orang Asli, Ketua Tanah dan Galian Negeri serta Kerajaan Malaysia dalam melaksanakan tanggungjawab menjaga hak dan kepentingan orang asli.

UNDANG-UNDANG TANAH: Tanah adat - Hak - Tuntutan oleh orang asli -Pendudukan berterusan - Deklarasi pemilikan berdasarkan adat - Sama ada tanah yang dipertikaikan wajar diisytiharkan sebagai tanah adat orang asli - Sama ada prinsip common law mengiktiraf hakmilik tanah adat orang asli - Sama ada orang asli mempunyai kawalan yang mencukupi terhadap tanah adat - Sama ada tanah adat orang asli wajar diwartakan sebagai tanah rizab orang asli

UNDANG-UNDANG TANAH: Pencerobohan - Pencerobohan ke atas tanah - Tanah adat - Sama ada telah berlaku pencerobohan tanah adat yang mengakibatkan kerosakan kepada tanah - Sama ada Kerajaan Negeri, Kerajaan Malaysia, Pengarah Tanah dan Galian serta Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Kemajuan Orang Asli mempunyai kewajipan fidusiari untuk melindungi tanah adat - Sama ada wujud perlanggaran kewajipan fidusiari apabila gagal mewartakan tanah adat orang asli sebagai tanah rizab orang asli - Sama ada Kerajaan Negeri dan Pengarah Tanah dan Galian gagal melindungi hak tanah adat dan menghalang pencerobohan tanah adat

  • Bagi pihak plaintif-plaintif - Vinu Kamalananthan, Conrad Lopez & Sarah Tiong; T/n Vinu & Lopez
  • Bagi pihak defendan pertama dan kedua - Giok Kenzin, Ramesh Sivakumar & Calvin Lim Sin Guan; T/n Goik, Ramesh & Loo
  • Bagi pihak defendan ketiga dan kelima - Peguam Kanan Persekutuan Sharifah Izura Syed Mashor & Ainul Wardah Shahidan; Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Perak
  • Bagi pihak defendan keempat dan keenam - Peguam Persekutuan Siti Norashikin Hassanor; Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Perak

[2026] CLJU 128

PP lwn. LEAN KIM TAT

Elemen milikan, jagaan dan kawalan telah dibuktikan secara prima facie terhadap tertuduh apabila barang-barang kes dadah telah dijumpai secara langsung oleh pegawai serbuan di dalam kereta milik tertuduh dan tertuduh mempunyai kuasa dan keupayaan untuk menguruskan dan melupuskan barang-barang kes tersebut. Keadaan sedemikian juga membangkitkan inferens yang kuat mengenai mens rea tertuduh berkenaan dengan pemilikan dan pengetahuan tertuduh tentang barang-barang kes dadah tersebut.

UNDANG-UNDANG JENAYAH: Dadah berbahaya - Pengedaran - Dadah jenis methamphetamine seberat 145.15g - Dadah dijumpai dalam bonet hadapan kenderaan yang dibawa tertuduh - Sama ada barang kes telah dijumpai secara langsung - Sama ada tertuduh mempunyai kuasa dan keupayaan untuk menguruskan dan melupuskan barang kes - Sama ada kes prima facie telah dibuktikan - Sama ada anggapan statutori pengedaran dadah di bawah s. 37(da)(xvi) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 telah dibuktikan

PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Pembelaan - Penafian - Pertuduhan pengedaran dadah berbahaya - Hanya tertuduh seorang memberikan keterangan - Tertuduh tidak memanggil watak yang didakwa dalam kes pembelaan - Sama ada pembelaan bersifat rekaan dan penafian kosong semata-mata - Sama ada pembelaan menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah - Sama ada anggapan inferens bertentangan wajar dibangkitkan terhadap pembelaan atas kegagalan memanggil saksi

  • Bagi pihak pendakwaan - Mohd Izham Ali; Timbalan Pendakwa Raya; Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Perlis
  • Bagi pihak tertuduh - P Ravee; T/n P Ravee & Co

CLJ 2026 Volume 8 (Part 5)

Keengganan saksi terlindung untuk menjawab soalan-soalan tertentu semasa pemeriksaan balas, atas alasan melindungi identitinya menurut s. 265C(d) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, tidak menafikan hak tertuduh terhadap perbicaraan yang adil. Keadaan ini terpakai sekiranya pihak pembelaan diberi peluang menjalankan pemeriksaan balas secara meluas, berkesan, dan mencabar kredibiliti saksi secara menyeluruh tanpa menimbulkan prejudis. Hak perlembagaan tertuduh untuk memeriksa balas adalah setara dengan hak saksi dan mangsa untuk mendapat perlindungan keselamatan di bawah undang-undang.
Aizz Amidie Aziz & Yang Lain lwn. PP & Satu Lagi Rayuan [2026] 8 CLJ 633 [CA]

| |

UNDANG-UNDANG JENAYAH: Kesalahan - Membunuh - Niat bersama - Tertuduh-tertuduh masing-masing didapati bersalah, disabitkan seperti pertuduhan dan dijatuhkan hukuman penjara 36 tahun dan 12 sebatan - Rayuan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi - Sama ada tertuduh-tertuduh dinafikan hak perbicaraan adil - Sama ada hakim bicara terkhilaf dalam menilai pembelaan tertuduh-tertuduh - Kanun Keseksaan, ss. 34 & 302

KETERANGAN: Saksi - Saksi terlindung - Tertuduh-tertuduh dituduh membunuh - Pihak pendakwaan memanggil saksi terlindung - Keengganan saksi terlindung menjawab soalan-soalan tertentu demi melindungi identiti - Imbangan antara hak perlembagaan tertuduh dan hak perlindungan keselamatan saksi - Sama ada keengganan saksi terlindung menjawab soalan-soalan menafikan hak tertuduh-tertuduh terhadap perbicaraan adil - Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, s. 265A - Akta Perlindungan Saksi 2009

PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Rayuan - Rayuan terhadap sabitan dan hukuman - Tertuduh-tertuduh dituduh membunuh - Tertuduh-tertuduh masing-masing didapati bersalah, disabitkan seperti pertuduhan, dan dijatuhkan hukuman penjara 36 tahun dan 12 sebatan - Penilaian keterangan pembelaan - Sama ada pembelaan berbentuk penafian kosong, fikiran kemudian dan rekaan - Sama ada hakim bicara mengarahkan minda kehakiman dengan betul - Sama ada pembelaan menimbulkan keraguan munasabah - Sama ada sabitan dan hukuman selamat - Kanun Keseksaan, ss. 34 & 302

Azman Abdullah HMR
Hayatul Akmal Abdul Aziz HMR
Mohd Radzi Abdul Hamid HMR

  • Bagi pihak perayu - Hisyam Teh Poh Teik, Kee Wei Lon & Siti Summaiyah Ahmad Jaafar; T/n Hisyam Teh
  • Bagi pihak responden - Mohd Zain Ibrahim & Solehah Noratikah Ismail; TPR

Citizenship claims under art. 14(1)(b) of the Federal Constitution (‘FC’) necessitate strict adherence to the explicit textual requirements of the Second Schedule, as a purposive interpretation cannot override clear statutory limitations. Crucially, the evidentiary presumption of citizenship under s. 19B of Part III of the Second Schedule of the FC applies exclusively to a 'newborn child' and cannot be extended to older abandoned children, rendering the provision inapplicable when a child's estimated age contradicts the underlying deeming mechanism of the statute. Consequently, in the absence of s. 19B, the inability to identify or establish the biological parents' citizenship or permanent residency status at the time of birth completely precludes a claim under s. 1(a) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the FC, a defect that cannot be cured retrospectively by a subsequent adoption order or post-adoption birth certificate. Furthermore, to successfully assert citizenship under s. 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule, an applicant bears the burden of proving that no foreign citizenship was acquired at birth, a threshold that is not satisfied merely by an absence of evidence resulting from unknown biological parentage.
Glorya Kuppa v. Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara & Ors [2026] 8 CLJ 658 [CA]

|

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Citizenship - Citizenship by operation of law - Abandoned child - Appellant found abandoned at bus station - Identity and citizenship status of biological parents unknown - Late registration of birth recording citizenship status as 'belum ditentukan' and subsequent post-adoption birth certificate recording status as 'bukan warganegara' - Whether appellant entitled to declaratory relief of citizenship - Federal Constitution, art. 14(1)(b), Second Schedule, Part II, ss. 1(a), 1(e), 2(3), Part III, s. 19B

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Citizenship - Citizenship by operation of law - Presumption as to newborn child - Meaning of 'newborn child' under s. 19B of Part III of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution - Appellant estimated to be between one and one and a half years old when found abandoned - Whether fell under definition of 'newly born' - Whether s. 19B applicable to appellant - Federal Constitution, Second Schedule, Part III, s. 19B

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Citizenship - Citizenship by operation of law - Birth within Federation - Status of parents - Whether appellant established that at least one parent was citizen or permanent resident at time of birth - Whether burden of proof discharged when biological parents' particulars unknown - Federal Constitution, Second Schedule, Part II, s. 1(a)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Citizenship - Citizenship by operation of law - Statelessness - Whether appellant born within Federation and not born a citizen of any other country - Interpretation of s. 1(e) read together with s. 2(3) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution - Whether unknown parental citizenship automatically satisfies requirement of statelessness

FAMILY LAW: Adoption - Adoption order - Citizenship of adopted child - Appellant adopted by Malaysian citizens pursuant to adoption order under Adoption Act 1952 - Whether adoption order and Malaysian citizenship of adoptive parents confer citizenship by operation of law on adopted child - Whether adoptive parents fall within definition of 'parents' under Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution

 

Azhahari Kamal Ramli JCA
Faizah Jamaludin JCA
Hayatul Akmal Abdul Aziz JCA

  • For the appellant - Mohd Haijan Omar & Asyraaf Abu Bakar Hamzah; M/s Haijan Omar & Co
  • For the respondents - Safiyyah Omar; FC

(i) In the absence of rules promulgated under the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980 pursuant to s. 56 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 ('LRA'), pre-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements cannot be regarded as valid, admissible, or enforceable in matrimonial proceedings under the LRA, as there is no statutory framework governing their recognition and approval; (ii) The word 'may' in s. 56 of the LRA carries a mandatory effect. The provision does not permit parties or the court to disregard the procedural framework contemplated by the Legislature. Accordingly, where reliance is placed on agreements under s. 56, such agreements are subject to the prescribed procedural framework, without which the statutory mechanism remains incomplete and incapable of operating.
HCL v. PTL & Anor [2026] 8 CLJ 675 [CA]

|

FAMILY LAW: Matrimonial proceedings - Documents - Post-nuptial agreement ('agreement') - Agreement permitting husband to maintain mistress during subsistence of marriage - Validity and enforceability of agreement - Whether agreement admissible in matrimonial proceedings in absence of rules prescribed under s. 56 of Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 - Whether court could give effect to agreement in absence of legislative framework - Whether agreement invalid

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Construction of statute - Interpretation - Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, s. 56 - 'may' - Whether 'may' conferred mere discretion or to be construed as imposing mandatory requirement to comply with statutory framework - Whether absence of rules contemplated under s. 56 rendered statutory mechanism incomplete and incapable of operation - Whether pre-nuptial or post-nuptial agreement could be admitted and enforced in matrimonial proceedings

 

Supang Lian JCA
Lim Chong Fong JCA
Alwi Abdul Wahab JCA

  • For the appellant - Dennis Micheal Pereira, Mahendren Naidu Rama Santaram & Aida Serina Mohd Tazaai; M/s Dennis Mahen R & Aida
  • For the respondents - Lee Sok Wah, Tey Zi Xin & Letchumanan Anbalagan; M/s Lee Sok Wah & Co

(i) The application of the Distribution Act 1958 ('DA') is determined by the religion of the deceased rather than that of the beneficiary. A legitimate child, regardless of his/her religious status, remains entitled to inherit under the DA where the estate is that of a non-Muslim deceased, as the DA contains no provision excluding a Muslim child from inheriting a non-Muslim parent's estate; (ii) Uncodified religious principles, including hadiths and fatwas, cannot override clear statutory provisions enacted by Parliament or the State Legislatures. In matters concerning the distribution of a non-Muslim deceased's estate, the civil courts are bound to apply the relevant written law, namely the DA, as the subject matter falls within civil succession and not Islamic personal law.
Wee Ku Wing v. Amira Umaira Teng Abdullah [2026] 8 CLJ 687 [CA]

|

SUCCESSION: Distribution of estate - Entitlement - Intestate estate of non-Muslim deceased - Muslim child, being legitimate child of deceased, excluded as beneficiary of deceased's estate - Whether Distribution Act 1958 ('DA') precluded Muslim child from inheriting non-Muslim deceased parent's estate - Whether applicability of DA determined by religion of deceased or beneficiary - Whether exclusion of beneficiary from small estate proceedings rendered distribution order liable to be set aside - Whether other beneficiaries entitled to be heard in application to set aside distribution order

ISLAMIC LAW: Legislation - Validity - Hadith and fatwa - Hadith and fatwa issued by Mufti of Federal Territories stating Muslims could not inherit from non-Muslims and vice versa - Whether hadith and fatwa codified into Malaysian law - Whether uncodified religious principles could override clear statutory provisions enacted by Parliament - Whether such principles applicable in civil proceedings concerning distribution of non-Muslim deceased's estate

 

Supang Lian JCA
Shahnaz Sulaiman JCA
Amarjeet Singh Serjit Singh JCA

  • For the appellant - Lua Kok Hiyong & Ummi Salhah Mohamad; M/s Lua & Mansor
  • For the respondent - Muhamad Adib Mohamed Saat; M/s Adib & Zulhafiz

(i) A registered land proprietor cannot be held strictly liable for the unlawful abstraction of utility services on their property, as mere ownership does not automatically shift the burden of proof or transform a landlord into an insurer against illegal acts committed by unknown third parties. Where the premises is occupied by a tenant, a utility provider cannot rely solely on the land title to establish liability. Instead, to succeed in common law claims such as conversion or unjust enrichment, the utility provider must affirmatively prove that the landlord directly possessed, authorised, ratified, or benefited from the stolen electricity; (ii) An owner who has never applied for an electricity connection does not meet the definition of a 'consumer' under s. 2 of the Electricity Supply Act 1990. Because such a claim falls outside the scope of s. 38, the statutory mechanisms - such as the certificate of loss serving as prima facie evidence under s. 38(4) - cannot be triggered. The utility provider bears the standard burden to prove liability and damages (iii) Procedurally, a judgment delivered by a successor judge who did not preside over the trial is legally valid and does not violate the rules of natural justice under O. 35 r. 11(1) of the Rules of Court 2012, provided the successor judge has fully reviewed the recorded notes of evidence and written submissions before rendering the decision.
Lim Keem Kok & Sons Realty Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2026] 8 CLJ 710 [HC]

| |

UTILITIES: Electricity - Unlawful abstraction - Claim for loss of revenue - Whether there was tampering with incoming supply and feeder - Liability of registered owner of premises - Whether owner occupied premises or applied for electricity supply - Whether premises let out to third-party tenants - Whether owner liable for illegal abstraction of electricity - Whether common law claims in conversion or unjust enrichment sustainable against non-occupying owner - Electricity Supply Act 1990

EVIDENCE: Statutory presumption - Prima facie evidence - Notice of demand - Allegation of unlawful abstraction of electricity - Claim for loss of revenue - Calculation derived from Energy Commission Guidelines ('Guidelines') - Whether owner of premises 'consumer' within meaning of s. 2 of Electricity Supply Act 1990 - Whether claim brought outside statutory framework of ss. 38(3) to (5) - Whether attracted statutory evidential presumption under s. 38(4) - Whether notice of demand and Guidelines have statutory weight if adopted as matter of 'good practice' - Burden of proof on liability and quantum

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Trial - Judgment - Coram - Transfer of trial judge before delivery of judgment - Original judge ceasing to hold office as Sessions Court Judge - Decision delivered by successor judge - Whether successor judge read notes of evidence and written submissions before arriving at decision - Whether judgment a nullity for want of coram - Scope and interpretation of 'other cause' - Rules of Court 2012, O. 35 r. 11(1)

Raja Segaran S Krishnan JC

  • For the appellant - Lua Ai Siew; M/s Soo Thien Ming & Nashrah
  • For the respondent - Izatunlina Jamaludin & Anis Natasha Ahmad Ridwan; M/s Othman Hashim & Co

(i) Successive employment contracts do not transmute into disguised permanent employment if they lack an automatic renewal clause, stipulate clear termination dates, and are executed with the mutual understanding that the engagements constitute fresh, fixed-term contracts; and (ii) An employer's contractual power to transfer an employee is not absolute. A transfer constitutes a repudiatory breach of contract if it effectively strips the employee of their substantive role and relegates them to a materially different, lesser, and undefined position outside the organisation's core operational structure.
Mohd Sofian Amirudin v. Bank Simpanan Nasional [2026] 8 CLJ 737 [HC]

|

LABOUR LAW: Employment - Constructive dismissal - Transfer - Claimant transferred to newly established unit - Change in reporting line - Whether transfer fell outside scope of contractual transfer provision - Whether transfer stripped claimant of substantive role and relegated to materially different and lower position - Whether transfer valid and lawful - Whether amounted to repudiatory breach of contract

CONTRACT: Employment contract - Fixed-term contract - Claimant engaged on seven successive contracts without automatic renewal clause - Whether permanent employment - Whether arrangement disguised permanent employment - Whether genuine fixed-term contract

 

Anand Ponnudurai J

  • For the plaintiff - Srividhya Ganapathy & Eisyarmily Akhtar; M/s Muhendaran Sri
  • For the defendant - S Ravichandaran & P Tharuny; M/s S Ravichandaran & Anuar

(i) Under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 ('REJA'), Malaysian registration courts cannot examine or enquire into the merits of the underlying foreign claim, as such determination lies exclusively within the foreign court's jurisdiction; (ii) The public policy exception under s. 5(1)(a)(v) of the REJA must be applied restrictively and narrowly in rare, exceptional cases, guided by the overarching principles of international comity and reciprocity; domestic public policy concepts do not control the recognition or enforcement of a validly registered foreign judgment.
Resorts World At Sentosa Pte Ltd v. Lee Fook Kheun & Another Case [2026] 8 CLJ 759 [HC]

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments and orders - Foreign judgments - Registration - Setting aside - Judgment creditor in Singapore obtained judgment against Malaysian judgment debtor to recover monies due under credit facility agreements and credit markers - Application to set aside registration of Singapore judgment for second time - Whether foreign gaming debt contrary to public policy - Whether Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 allows re-litigation of merits - Whether application barred by res judicata and abuse of process - Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958, s. 5(1)(a)(v)

 

 

Aliza Sulaiman J

  • For the judgment debtor - Muhammad Farhan Sapian Sauri, Leong Cheok Keng & Jason Tiew Boon Kean; M/s Leong & Tan
  • For the judgment creditor - Aufa Radzi & Natasha Neena Yau; M/s Skrine

(i) Section 145 of the National Land Code ('NLC') empowers the court to order the termination of a co-proprietorship through a forced sale or a direct buy-out when commercial deadlock, an absence of mutual trust, and a lack of realistic prospects for cooperation render partition or the continuation of the co-proprietorship impracticable; (ii) A judicial order for sale under the statutory mechanism of s. 145 of the NLC does not infringe upon the indefeasibility of title under s. 340 of the NLC or constitutional property rights under art. 13 of the Federal Constitution, as such an order represents a lawful liquidation of property for fair market value rather than an uncompensated deprivation of property.
Unique Luxury Sdn Bhd v. Bigtown Development Sdn Bhd [2026] 8 CLJ 779 [HC]

|

LAND LAW: Co-proprietors - Termination of co-proprietorship - Application for termination of co-proprietorship and direct buy-out of minority share - Deadlock and absence of mutual trust - Whether statutory preconditions satisfied - Whether physical partition of minority undivided share permissible - National Land Code, ss. 136 & 145

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Fundamental liberties - Right to property - Order for sale of co-proprietorship land - Whether infringed indefeasibility of title and constitutional right to property - Federal Constitution, art. 13 - National Land Code, ss. 145 & 340

 

Johan Lee Kien How J

  • For the plaintiff - Ronald Lee Chun Lung; M/s Lee Law Chambers
  • For the defendant - Wong Yi Wen & Low Siew Chen; M/s Wong & Low Law Chambers

 


ARTICLES

LNS Article(s)

  1. FROM HICKMAN TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE BINDING OF DIRECTORS BEYOND CONTRACT [Read excerpt]
    by Chong Wai Kuan* [2026] CLJU(A) xcii

  2. [2026] CLJU(A) xcii
    MALAYSIA

    FROM HICKMAN TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE BINDING OF DIRECTORS BEYOND CONTRACT

    by
    Chong Wai Kuan*

    ABSTRACT

    The company constitution has traditionally been understood in Commonwealth company law as a statutory contract binding the company and its members. That orthodoxy remains doctrinally important, but it does not fully explain the position of directors. Directors derive authority from the constitution, act within powers structured by it, and may see their decisions invalidated for non-compliance with it, yet they are not necessarily parties to the statutory contract merely by holding office.

    This article argues that the modern company constitution performs a function broader than contract. It operates as an internal governance instrument through which corporate authority is created, limited and legitimised. Recent Malaysian authorities demonstrate a judicial movement towards constitutional proceduralism: courts have insisted upon strict compliance with statutory and constitutional procedures in director removal, board control and shareholder participation disputes. At the same time, courts have resisted converting every constitutional provision into a personal contractual right for directors.

    This article evaluates whether courts have faithfully applied statutory structure or subtly shaped the practical operation of the statutory scheme. It concludes that the courts have developed a principled middle position: directors are not generally bound by the constitution as contractual counterparties, but they are institutionally constrained by it because their authority exists only within the company's constitutional framework.

    . . .

    *LLB (University of London); CLP (University of Malaya); LLM (University of Warwick); Advocate and Solicitor, Member of the Malaysian Association of Company Secretaries; Member of Chartered Management Institute, UK; Member of the Inns of Court; Senior Lecturer at Tunku Abdul Rahman University of Management and Technology (TAR UMT).

  3. RESIGNING BY SERVING NOTICE PERIOD – FATAL TO A CLAIM OF CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL? [Read excerpt]
    by Arun Kumar* [2026] CLJU(A) xciii

  4. [2026] CLJU(A) xciii
    MALAYSIA

    RESIGNING BY SERVING NOTICE PERIOD – FATAL TO A CLAIM OF CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL?

    by
    Arun Kumar*

    In a very recent case decided by the Industrial Court,[1] it was held that a claim for constructive dismissal would be defeated if the employee serves and works till the end of the notice period of three months.

    In that case, an employee who had served 22 years with the company had rejected a promotion given by the company, as that would mean she would have to relocate from Kuantan to Kuala Lumpur. At that time, the employee was suffering from a medical condition resulting from an accident and wanted to remain in Kuantan to attend her follow-up treatment. Her request was rejected, and she then tendered her resignation letter on the grounds that her request to remain in Kuantan was rejected. She served the full three months' notice period.

    During the proceedings at the Industrial Court, the employee claimed that her resignation was in reality constructive dismissal, as the employer had breached express and implied terms of her contract of employment. The Industrial Court dismissed her claim. The Industrial Court held, as one of its grounds, that by giving and serving the full notice period, it would be inconsistent with the principles of constructive dismissal.

    In this article, the writer examines whether it would be fatal for an employee to make a constructive dismissal claim by resigning after working the full notice period.

    . . .

    *Advocate & Solicitor of the High Court of Malaya, Lecturer in Law for Equity and Trusts at Brickfields Asia College; former Chairman of the Industrial Court of Malaysia.

LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTS

Principal Acts

Number Title In force from Repealed Superseded
ACT 885 National Trust Fund Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -
ACT 884 Johor Bahru-Singapore Rapid Transit System Link Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -
ACT 883 Records (Disposal) (Sarawak) Act 1955 (Revised—2026) 15 June 2026 revised edition pursuant to paragraph 6(1)(xxiii) of the Revision of Laws Act 1968 [Act 1]; Revised up to 5 June 2026; First enacted in 1955 as Sarawak Ordinance No 14 of 1955; First Revision - 1958; First Reprint - 1966 - -
ACT 882 Government Procurement Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -
ACT 881 International Settlement Agreements Resulting From Mediation Act 2026 Not Yet In Force - -

Amending Acts

Number Title In force from Principal/Amending Act No
ACT A1797 Witness Protection (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 696
ACT A1796 Employment Insurance System (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 800
ACT A1795 Sexual Offences Against Children (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 792
ACT A1794 Road Transport (Amendment) Act 2026 Not Yet In Force ACT 333
ACT A1793 Environmental Quality (Amendment) Act 2026 31 July 2026 [PU(B) 258/2026] ACT 127

PU(A)

Number Title Date of Publication In force from Principal/ Amending Act No
PU(A) 339/2026 Entertainments Duty (Exemption) (No. 30) Order 2026 23 September 2026 24 September 2026 ACT 103
PU(A) 338/2026 Customs (Prohibition of Imports) (Amendment) (No. 4) Order 2026 25 September 2026 11 May 2026 PU(A) 117/2023
PU(A) 337/2026 Service Tax (Imposition of Tax For Taxable Service In Respect of Designated Areas Excluding Pulau 1 and Special Areas) (Amendment) Order 2026 24 September 2026 25 September 2026 PU(A) 212/2018
PU(A) 336/2026 Statutory Declarations (Fees) Order 1968 (Revised 2026) 24 September 2026 25 September 2026 (revised edition);Revised up to 21 September 2026 ACT 783
PU(A) 335/2026 Arms (Manufacture of Arms and Ammunition) (Licensing) Regulations 1989 (Revised 2026) 24 September 2026 25 September 2026 (revised edition);Revised up to 21 September 2026 ACT 206

PU(B)

Number Title Date of Publication In force from Principal/ Amending Act No
PU(B) 385/2026 Notice To Third Parties 28 September 2026 29 September 2026 ACT 613
PU(B) 384/2026 Appointment of Pesticides Licensing Officers 28 September 2026 30 September 2026 ACT 149
PU(B) 383/2026 Notification of Application For Registration of New Plant Variety and Grant of Breeder's Right 28 September 2026 29 September 2026 ACT 634
PU(B) 382/2026 Designation of Authorized Officers 28 September 2026 30 September 2026 ACT 149
PU(B) 381/2026 Notice of Initiation of Expiry Review of Anti-Dump Ing Duties With Regard To Imp Orts of Cold Rolled Coils of Alloy and Non-Alloy Steel Originating Or Exported From The People's Republic of China 25 September 2026 26 September 2026 ACT 504

Legislation Alert

Updated

Act/Principal No. Title Amended by In force from Section amended
AKTA 613 Akta Pencegahan Pengubahan Wang Haram, Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan, Pencegahan Pembiayaan Aktiviti Terhad Dan Hasil Daripada Aktiviti Haram 2001 PU(A) 320/2026 9 September 2026 Jadual Kedua
ACT 613 Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 PU(A) 320/2026 9 September 2026 Second Schedule
PU(A) 397/2019 Peraturan-Peraturan Kastam 2019 PU(A) 310/2026 31 Ogos 2026 Peraturan 26
PU(A) 397/2019 Customs Regulations 2019 PU(A) 310/2026 31 August 2026 Regulation 26
ACT 422 Ports (Privatization) Act 1990 PU(A) 301/2026 1 September 2026 Schedule

Revoked

Act/Principal No. Title Revoked by In force from
PU(A) 93/2026 Perintah Mesin Cetak Dan Penerbitan (Kawalan Hasil Penerbitan Tidak Diingini) (No. 12) 2026 [Dibatalkan Oleh PU(A) 266/2026] PU(A) 266/2026 17 July 2026
PU(A) 93/2026 Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) (No. 12) Order 2026 [Revoked By PU(A) 266/2026] PU(A) 266/2026 17 July 2026
PU(A) 69/2026 Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) Order 2026 [Revoked By PU(A) 265/2026] PU(A) 265/2026 17 July 2026
PU(A) 69/2026 Perintah Mesin Cetak Dan Penerbitan (Kawalan Hasil Penerbitan Tidak Diingini) 2026 [Dibatalkan Oleh PU(A) 265/2026] PU(A) 265/2026 17 Julai 2026
PU(A) 283/2023 Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) (No. 4) Order 2023 [Revoked By PU(A) 264/2026] PU(A) 264/2026 16 July 2026

Copyright © CLJ Legal Network Sdn Bhd To unsubscribe click here