CASE SPOTLIGHTS
PP v. ONG SU PING SERENE [2026] 7 CLJ 996
HIGH COURT MALAYA, SHAH ALAM
ADLIN ABDUL MAJID J
[CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: BA-42LB-2-08-2024]
14 MAY 2026
(i) Section 173(h)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Code ('CPC') does not impose an inflexible, mandatory duty on a trial judge to reformulate the prosecution's case when the original charge fails. While the court retains discretion to amend a charge to a lesser or alternative offence if a prima facie case is made out, the primary responsibility for framing and pursuing the appropriate charge rests firmly with the prosecution; (ii) In an appeal against an order of acquittal, an appellate court acting under s. 316(a) of the CPC does not possess the power to amend a charge at the appellate stage. The power to alter a finding of a lower court is strictly reserved for appeals against a conviction or sentence; for appeals against an acquittal, the court is limited to reversing the order, directing further inquiry, ordering a retrial or finding the accused guilty on the existing framework according to law.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Charge - Amendment - Accused charged under s. 326 of Penal Code ('PC') for voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons - Prosecution failed to prove use or recovery of weapon at close of prosecution case - Accused acquitted without defence being called - Whether trial judge had inflexible duty under s. 173(h)(ii) of Criminal Procedure Code to amend charge to s. 325 of PC - Whether responsibility for framing and pursuing appropriate charge rested with prosecution
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal by prosecution against acquittal of accused - Powers of appellate court - Accused charged under s. 326 of Penal Code ('PC') for voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons - Prosecution failed to prove use or recovery of weapon at close of prosecution case - Accused acquitted without defence being called - Prosecution urged appellate court to invoke s. 167 read with s. 316 of Criminal Procedure Code to amend charge and convict accused under s. 325 of PC - Whether appellate court had power to amend charge at appellate stage in appeal against acquittal
APPEAL UPDATES
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Silvery Dragon Prestressed Materials Co. Ltd. Tianjin v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2026] CLJU 474 overruling the High Court case of Silvery Dragon Prestressed Materials Co Ltd v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2025] CLJU 766
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Irewan Effandy Ismail lwn. PP [2026] CLJU 619 mengesahkan kes PP lwn. Irewan Effandy Ismail [Perbicaraan Jenayah No.: KA-45A-44-06/2018]
LATEST CASES
Legal Network Series
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[2026] CLJU 86
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MOHAMED ARIFIN SHAH NAZEER ALI v. TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PENGGUNA MALAYSIA PUTRAJAYA & ANOR
1. The Attorney General's role at the leave stage of judicial review is not to defend an impugned decision but rather to ensure that the threshold criteria for judicial review are met. The Attorney General's involvement does not create an obligation to contest or verify evidence; it merely grants the Attorney General a procedural right to be heard in determining whether the threshold for leave has been met.
2. The timeline in O. 53 r. 3(6) of the Rules of Court 2012 must be strictly adhered to. The court may, upon an application, extend the time if it considers that there is a good reason for doing so. The importance of the requirement for an applicant to show the court a good reason to justify the granting of an extension of time is to prevent parties in breach of the limitation rules from having the unfettered right to extension of time which would defeat the purpose and object of the rules of limitation of period.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judicial review - Leave - Proceedings - Objections - Leave filed out of time - Proper entity not named as party in proceedings - Cause papers not in order - Intitulement failed to state impugned decision being challenged - Whether threshold for leave met - Whether there were good reasons to justify extension of time - Whether granting of extension of time amounted to abuse of court's process - Whether application irregular - Whether non-compliance or irregularities with O. 53 r. 3(2) of Rules of Court 2012 curable
- For the applicant - In person
- For the respondents - Ahmad Ilham Haridz Mohd Padli, Federal Counsel; Attorney General's Chambers
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[2026] CLJU 123
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NOORMAH ABD RAHMAN & ORS v. ASFARANI ARSHAD
1. Once the Syariah Court has determined on faraid shares, the subsequent administration and contractual arrangements entered between the administrator and the beneficiaries are civil matters; particularly where all parties are legally represented, a settlement agreement is freely negotiated and executed, then the dispute concerns the interpretation of that civil contract, and no new determination on Islamic law is required. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Civil Courts lacked jurisdiction to hear issues concerning the settlement agreement concerning Muslims' properties after the Syariah Court has made its ruling on the faraid shares in the said properties.
2. Where parties have entered into a settlement agreement and have acted on the basis that certain matters are resolved, they may be estopped from later denying the settlement or claiming it did not cover those matters. The requirements for estoppel include a common assumption shared by both parties, communication between the parties creating that assumption, and one party acting on that assumption to their detriment. It would be unjust or unconscionable to allow the other party to resile from that assumption. It follows that filing of a claim in an attempt to escape a settlement agreement, which was freely entered into with legal advice, is clearly an abuse of process. Allowing such claim would undermine the finality of settlements and encourage parties to repudiate agreements after receiving their benefits.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Jurisdiction - Estate dispute - Action against appointed administrator of Muslim estate - Administrator entered settlement agreement with beneficiaries - Issue relating to interpretation and enforcement of settlement agreement - Whether court had jurisdiction to hear and determine claim
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Abuse of process - Vexatious claim - Estate dispute - Action against administrator of Muslim estate - Claim for entitlement of shares in properties - Settlement agreement entered between administrator and beneficiaries - Comprehensive settlement - Whether plaintiffs received full and final payment according to lawful faraid entitlement for all properties - Whether claim amounted to double entitlement and an afterthought - Whether claim premised on mere conjecture - Whether plaintiffs estopped from pursuing claim against defendant - Whether claim sustainable
- For the plaintiff's - Clinton Gomez; M/s Rajindar Singh Veriah & Co
- For the defendant's - Hussin Mohd Razak & Nurul Izyani Mudzafar; M/s Mohd Irwan Mohd Mubarak
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[2026] CLJU 96
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PP lwn. MOHD FURQAN MD YUSUF
Walaupun menjadi tanggungjawab mahkamah untuk menentukan hukuman yang sesuai dan munasabah terhadap seseorang tertuduh berdasarkan keseluruhan fakta kes yang dikemukakan, namun begitu, pihak pendakwaan sendiri juga perlu mengemukakan hujahan pemberatan yang bersungguh-sungguh dengan nas undang-undang yang bersesuaian, sekiranya pihak pendakwaan menghendaki mahkamah memberikan suatu hukuman yang lebih berat terhadap tertuduh. Hujahan agar hukuman yang setimpal diberikan terhadap tertuduh dengan mengambilkira berat dan jenis dadah yang terlibat semata-mata adalah tidak mencukupi untuk menyokong pemberatan hukuman.
PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Hukuman - Pengakuan salah - Mitigasi - Pengakuan bersalah dibuat terhadap tawaran pertuduhan pilihan - Pertuduhan di bawah s. 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 - Pesalah kali pertama - Sama ada pengakuan salah tertuduh menjimatkan kos dan masa - Sama ada hukuman berbentuk deteren wajar dijatuhkan - Sama ada faktor kepentingan awam diambil kira - Sama ada hukuman terlalu ringan
- Bagi pihak pendakwa raya - Tohirah Mohd Fauzi, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya; Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang, Negeri Kedah
- Bagi pihak tertuduh - Mohd Fadhly Yaacob; T/n Fadhly Yaacob & Co
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[2026] CLJU 97
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ONG MUI SIA lwn. PP
1. Suatu pertuduhan tidak akan menjadi cacat semata-mata kerana peruntukan seksyen definisi dimasukkan dalam pertuduhan dan tiada satu tarikh kejadian yang tepat dimasukkan dalam pertuduhan tersebut. Tidak akan berlaku sebarang ketidakadilan jika pihak pembelaan tidak pernah terkeliru dengan kesalahan yang dipertuduhkan terhadap seseorang tertuduh.
2. Hukuman yang berat wajar dijatuhkan terhadap tertuduh yang telah melakukan kesalahan rogol dengan mengambil kesempatan ke atas seorang kanak-kanak kecil yang diletakkan di bawah jagaannya.
PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Rayuan - Rayuan terhadap sabitan dan hukuman - Pertuduhan rogol berkanun - Hukuman penjara 15 tahun dan lima sebatan - Tertuduh merupakan bapa tiri kepada mangsa - Sama ada tertuduh mengambil kesempatan ke atas kanak-kanak yang diletakkan di bawah jagaannya - Sama ada percanggahan keterangan saksi pendakwaan material - Sama ada keputusan hakim bicara adalah selamat - Sama ada hukuman yang diperintahkan wajar dikekalkan
PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Pertuduhan - Butiran - Pertuduhan rogol - Ketiadaan tarikh kejadian yang tepat dalam pertuduhan - Seksyen definisi turut dimasukkan dalam pertuduhan - Kewujudan lebih daripada satu perlakuan rogol tetapi pertuduhan mengemukakan hanya satu insiden - Sama ada berlaku kecacatan pada pertuduhan - Sama ada pihak pembelaan terkeliru dengan kesalahan yang dipertuduhkan - Sama ada berlaku ketidakadilan kepada tertuduh - Sama ada kesilapan pada pertuduhan boleh dibaiki - Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, s. 422
- Bagi pihak perayu - Abdul Halim Harun; T/n Padmanathan, Abdul Halim & Co
- Bagi pihak responden - Fatin Farahiyah Nadzri, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya; Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Kedah
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[2026] CLJU 124
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ICON CITY JMB lwn. MAH SING UTILITIES SDN BHD & YANG LAIN
Adalah sesuatu yang tidak wajar setelah penyelesaian proses pengantaraan atau mediasi yang gagal dicapai, pihak-pihak boleh menggunakan fakta-fakta yang diperolehi semasa proses pengantaraan tersebut untuk membuat pindaan kepada pliding. Permohonan pindaan kepada pliding yang dibuat hasil daripada prosiding pengantaraan tersebut bukan suatu yang bona fide. Pengantaraan tidak sewajarnya dijadikan wahana untuk memancing fakta-fakta bagi meminda pliding.
PROSEDUR SIVIL: Pliding - Pindaan - Writ saman dan pernyataan tuntutan - Pindaan kepada relif yang dipohon - Permohonan dibuat selepas sesi mediasi - Sama ada pindaan mengubah bentuk tindakan yang difailkan kepada satu tindakan lain - Sama ada pindaan dibuat dengan niat baik - Sama ada permohonan terjumlah kepada memancing fakta-fakta bagi meminda pliding
- Bagi pihak peguam plaintif - Harwinder Kaur & Keshwinder Kaur; T/n AJ Ariffin Yeo & Harpal
- Bagi pihak peguam defendan-defendan - Angeline Ang Mei Fong & Vignesh Selvam; T/n Chee Hoe & Associates
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CLJ 2026 Volume 7(Part 5)
(i) There is no legal impediment to an individual holding a dual capacity within a company, simultaneously serving as a member of the Board of Directors under the Companies Act 2016 and as an employee or 'workman' under s. 2 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 ('IRA'). The corporate status and the employment relationship are governed by distinct legal frameworks and independent processes; consequently: (a) the removal of a person from their directorship does not automatically terminate their contract of service or employment; and (b) the termination of an employment contract does not automatically result in the vacation of a directorship; (ii) To determine whether a director qualifies as a 'workman' under the IRA, the following key indicators of an employer-employee relationship must be examined: (a) the consistent remittance of statutory deductions and contributions by the company; (b) the issuance of internal payroll/salary slips denoting regular wages rather than directors' fees, coupled with EA Tax Forms classifying the income under salary instead of business income; and (c) the formal inclusion of the individual within the company's internal register of employees and its operational reporting hierarchies.
Acexide Technology Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Chang Heng Keong & Another Appeal [2026] 7 CLJ 687 [FC]
CIVIL PROCEDURE | COMPANY LAW | LABOUR LAW
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Pleadings - Judicial review - Adequacy of grounds - Industrial law matters - Dismissal - Judicial review against awards handed down by Industrial Court - Whether applicants sufficiently pleaded grounds of judicial review relied on - Whether statement provided fair notice of material facts to opposing party - Whether opposing party taken by surprise - Whether statement legally adequate - Rules of Court 2012, O. 53
COMPANY LAW: Directors - Status - Dual capacity - Company directors holding status as 'workman' - Removal of directors from Board of Directors - Whether company directors can simultaneously be employee or 'workman' - Whether directors prevented from being party to contract of employment - Whether removal of directors automatically terminated contract of employment - Companies Act 2016 - Industrial Relations Act 1967
LABOUR LAW: Employment - Dismissal - Dual capacity - Individuals wearing hats of company directors and workmen - Company made statutory Employment Provident Fund and Social Security Organisation contributions - Payroll records indicating regular monthly salary instead of director's fees - Income tax EA Forms classifying income as salary rather than business income - Name listed in company's internal register of employees - Whether company directors 'workman' - Whether conduct of company sufficient to clothe directors with status of 'workman' - Industrial Relations Act 1967, s. 2
LABOUR LAW: Employment - Dismissal - Remedies - Backwages and compensation in lieu of reinstatement - Deductions for post-dismissal earnings and contributory misconduct - Whether court correct in making award without deductions or scaling down - Industrial Relations Act 1967
Vazeer Alam Mydin Meera FCJ
Ahmad Terrirudin Mohd Salleh FCJ
Mohd Nazlan Ghazali FCJ
- For the appellant (Acexide Technology Sdn Bhd) - Steven Thiru, Khoo Wai Tuck, Janice Anne Leo, Adrienne Sena, Athanasia Yolanda Bartolome & Ameer Imran; M/s Hariati & Khoo
- For the respondents - Gavin Jay Anand Jayapal, Merissa Ann Augustin, Sivanandini Sreegantham, Goh Yee Huey, Fang Huey Yiing & Parveena Kaur Baldeb Singh; M/s Gavin Jayapal
(i) Members of an Orang Asli community possess the requisite locus standi to maintain an action in trespass for the desecration of ancestral burial grounds on customary lands without needing to be appointed as legal personal representatives or administrators of the deceased persons' estates. In proving kinship and a connection to ancestral graves, strict compliance with urban regulatory or statutory documentation, such as death certificates or burial permits under the Local Government Act 1976, is not mandatory. The court must take judicial notice of the socio-economic, geographical, and literacy limitations of indigenous communities. Lineage and connection to desecrated sites can be validly established through oral history, generational narratives, contemporaneous police reports, and the physical identification of traditional burial artefacts or practices; (ii) The State cannot bypass the constitutional requirement of adequate compensation, nor can private entities rely on the Torrens system's principle of indefeasibility of title under the National Land Code, to summarily cancel or override existing unwritten native customary tenures.
Rosli Jendut & Ors v. Agrobest (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2026] 7 CLJ 746 [FC]
NATIVE LAW AND CUSTOM | LAND LAW | EVIDENCE | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
NATIVE LAW AND CUSTOM: Customary land - Orang Asli - Ancestral burial grounds - Relocation of Orang Asli community and alienation of land by State to third party for large-scale aquaculture project - Whether native customary rights automatically extinguished - Whether extinguishment requires formal acquisition and adequate compensation under Land Acquisition Act 1960 and Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954 - National Land Code, ss. 11 & 12
LAND LAW: Native customary rights - Customary land - Trespass - Relocation of Orang Asli community and alienation of land by State to third party for large-scale aquaculture project - Claim by Orang Asli for damages for desecration and destruction of ancestral graves and tombstones - Whether Orang Asli community retained lawful possession of land to maintain action against lawful leaseholder - Whether private leaseholder takes title subject to pre-existing unwritten native customary title - Whether Orang Asli had locus standi to commence action - Whether must be appointed as legal personal representatives or administrators of deceased persons' estates to maintain action
EVIDENCE: Admissibility - Native customary rights - Relocation of Orang Asli community and alienation of land by State to third party for large-scale aquaculture project - Claim by Orang Asli for damages for desecration and destruction of ancestral graves and tombstones - Proof of kinship and connection to ancestral graves - Lack of official registration of deaths, death certificates, or letters of administration - Whether court could take judicial notice of Orang Asli's socio-economic limitations - Whether connection could be established via oral history, generational narratives, and physical identification of traditional burial artefacts - Evidence Act 1950, s. 32(1)(d), (e)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Fundamental liberties - Right to life - Relocation of community and alienation of land by State to third party for large-scale aquaculture project - Claim by Orang Asli for damages for desecration and destruction of ancestral graves and tombstones - Whether constituted violation of right to life and cultural autonomy - Federal Constitution, art. 5(1)
Nordin Hassan FCJ
Vazeer Alam Mydin Meera FCJ
Lee Swee Seng FCJ
- For the appellants - Steven Thiruneelakandan, Yogeswaran Subramaniam, Hon Kai Ping & Ananthan Nithya Moorthi; M/s H Y Lee & Hee
- For the respondents - Wong Hok Mun, Henry Ngok Heng Hui & Vernise Ng Si Hui; M/s Loh Ivan & Lee Hui
Order 53 r. 3(5) of the Rules of Court 2012 does not empower the High Court to grant a stay of the 'proceedings in question', such as a development order, on an ex parte basis. Because the Rules Committee deliberately omitted the words 'ex parte' from this specific rule, unlike r. 3(2), and given that a stay can severely impact an affected party, the principles of natural justice dictate that the affected party be given the right to be heard inter partes before a stay may be granted.
Kaisar Maxim Sdn Bhd v. Ong Hock Tek [2026] 7 CLJ 786 [CA]
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Stay of proceedings - Development order ('DO') - High Court granted ex parte stay, ad interim stay, and subsequent inter partes stay of DO pending disposal of judicial review application - Right of affected party to be heard - Whether stay orders void ab initio and nullity - Whether High Court empowered to grant stay of 'proceedings in question' on ex parte basis under O. 53 r. 3(5) of Rules of Court 2012 - Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994, r. 105
Supang Lian JCA
Wong Kian Kheong JCA
Alwi Abdul Wahab JCA
- For the appellant - Abdul Shukor Ahmad, Selvarajah Sivalingam, Selwyn Vijayarajan Das & Daniel Bock Jr Wei; M/s Shukor Baljit & Partners
- For the respondent - Alliff Benjamin Suhaimi & See Hau Tsien; M/s Thomas Philip
A conviction for murder under s. 300(c) of the Penal Code is sustained through an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence, where severe, intentional injuries are coupled with the accused's conduct in leading the police to hidden, blood-stained items containing the deceased's DNA. The admissibility of such discovery under s. 27 and conduct under s. 8 of the Evidence Act 1950, alongside credible eyewitness identification and the failure of an alibi unsupported by continuous, objective proof, forms a complete and cogent case against the accused. While life imprisonment remains the standard sentence, the 'rarest of rare' doctrine permits the death penalty in exceptional cases characterised by extreme culpability, premeditation, and exceptional brutality. When a judicial balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors reveals a minimal potential for reform and a total disregard for human life, the cumulative circumstances outrage the collective conscience of society, leaving the ultimate penalty of death as the only appropriate legal recourse.
Mohd Nur Hussein Mohd Salleh v. PP & Another Appeal [2026] 7 CLJ 807 [CA]
CRIMINAL LAW | EVIDENCE | CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL LAW: Offences - Murder - Conviction and sentence - Appeal against - Deceased discovered in bedroom with multiple stab wounds to neck and back - Accused led investigating team to discovery of items belonging to deceased and blood stained exhibits containing deceased's DNA- Positive identification of accused near scene of crime during early hours of morning - Cumulative chain of events - Whether circumstantial evidence adduced satisfied legal threshold of conviction - Whether defence of alibi raised reasonable doubt - Whether requirements under s. 300(c) of Penal Code satisfied - Prima facie case - Whether established - Penal Code, s. 302
EVIDENCE: Information leading to discovery - Recovery of incriminating items - Accused led investigating team to discovery of items belonging to deceased and blood stained exhibits containing deceased's DNA - Whether evidence demonstrated special knowledge and possession of items connected to offence - Whether unexplained possession permitted inference of involvement in serious offence - Whether evidence formed unbroken, complete, and cogent chain of circumstantial evidence - Evidence Act 1950, ss. 8, 27, 114
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Sentence - Adequacy of sentence - Appeal against - Murder - Whether there were exceptional circumstances disclosing extreme degree of culpability - Whether severity of injuries on deceased established sustained, vicious and intentional attack - Whether there was premeditation and proper planning - Whether accused orchestrated false alibi by manipulating records to create illusion of presence elsewhere - Whether there was subsequent conduct in disposing incriminating items to evade justice - Whether there were mitigating factors of sufficient weight to counterbalance overwhelming aggravating circumstances - Whether case fell within category of 'rarest of rare' - Whether sentence of life imprisonment wholly inadequate - Whether imposition of death penalty warranted
Azmi Ariffin JCA
Noorin Badaruddin JCA
Meor Hashimi Abdul Hamid JCA
(Criminal Appeal No: A-05(SH)-382-09-2023)
- For the appellant - Mohamad Hafiz Jalaludin & Aliff Aiman Rusli; M/s Alif, Hafiz & Partners; Mohd Izhar Ahmad Azmi; M/s Izhar & Yusri
- For the respondent - Mohd Amril Johari; AG's Chamber
(Criminal Appeal No: A-05(H)-403-09-2023
- For the appellant - Mohd Amril Johari; AG's Chamber
- For the respondent - Mohamad Hafiz Jalaludin & Aliff Aiman Rusli; M/s Alif, Hafiz & Partners; Mohd Izhar Ahmad Azmi; M/s Izhar & Yusri
(i) A registered society has no standing to enforce its members' property rights unless it establishes its own proprietary or beneficial interest in the disputed property; (ii) Actions to recover waqf land remain subject to the Limitation Act 1953 ('LA'). Section 341 of the National Land Code protects only registered proprietors against adverse possession and cannot be invoked by unregistered proprietors to defeat the statutory limitation period prescribed under the LA; (iii) The State Islamic Religious Council is the sole statutory trustee of all waqf property, with exclusive authority to administer wakaf ahli (wakaf zuriat) and identify their beneficiaries. Any dispute concerning the validity of a waqf, trusteeship or the beneficiary status falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Syariah Court.
Pertubuhan Dansanak Awang Chik v. Kerajaan Negeri Terengganu Darul Iman & Anor [2026] 7 CLJ 835 [HC]
LAND LAW | COURTS | WAKAF | CIVIL PROCEDURE | LIMITATION
LAND LAW: Acquisition by State Authority - Compulsory acquisition of waqf land - Whether acquisition for public purpose under s. 3(c) of Land Acquisition Act 1960 - Whether declaration under s. 8 conclusive absent judicial review - Whether acquisition formed part of lawful State policy
COURTS: Civil courts - Jurisdiction - Whether validity of waqf and appointment of State Islamic Religious Council as sole trustee fell within exclusive jurisdiction of Syariah High Court - Whether registered title under s. 89 of National Land Code could be impugned in civil proceedings
WAKAF: Trustee - State Islamic Religious Council ('Council') - Sole statutory trustee of waqf property - Trusteeship by operation of law - Administration of wakaf ahli - Whether compulsory acquisition and istibdal lawfully undertaken - Whether compensation properly applied to acquire replacement waqf property - Whether challenge to Council's trusteeship sustainable
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Locus standi - Standing to sue - Registered society - Action challenging compulsory acquisition of waqf land - Whether society without proprietary interest could sue on behalf of its members - Whether alleged descendants had standing absent grant of representation - Whether special circumstances permitting beneficiaries to sue applied
LIMITATION: Accrual of cause of action - Challenge to compulsory acquisition of waqf land - Whether action barred under ss. 9 and 10 of Limitation Act 1953 - Whether cause of action accrued upon dispossession - Whether s. 341 of National Land Code displaced limitation period
- For the plaintiff - Horley Isaacs; M/s Horley Isaacs & Assocs
- For the 1st defendant - Zulfazliah Mahmud; State Legal Advisor, Terengganu
- For the 2nd defendant - Hazri Haris; M/s Zamani Mohammad & Co
ARTICLES
LNS Article(s)
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TOWARDS A LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON CHILDREN'S GADGET OVEREXPOSURE IN MALAYSIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY WITH CHINA
[Read excerpt]
By Dr. Ira Rozana binti Mohd Asri[i] Aleif Iman bin Zafrul Shastri[ii] Amysha Afrina binti Zulkefle[iii] Farhana binti Mohd Fahami[iv] Nurin Deana binti Nordin[v] [2026] CLJU(A) lxxviii
[2026] CLJU(A) lxxviii
MALAYSIA
TOWARDS A LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON CHILDREN'S GADGET OVEREXPOSURE IN MALAYSIA:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY WITH CHINA
By
Dr. Ira Rozana binti Mohd Asri[i]
Aleif Iman bin Zafrul Shastri[ii]
Amysha Afrina binti Zulkefle[iii]
Farhana binti Mohd Fahami[iv]
Nurin Deana binti Nordin[v]
ABSTRACT
The rapid expansion of digital technology has significantly transformed the daily lives of children, particularly through the increasing use of smartphones, tablets and other electronic devices. On the positive side, digital technology provides educational and social benefits; however, on the negative side, excessive and unsupervised gadget usage among children has become a rising concern due to its harmful impacts on physical health, mental well-being, sleep quality, language development and social behaviour. Malaysia is not exempt from this issue, where there are a number of studies showing that a significant percentage of children exceed the screen-time limits recommended by the World Health Organization ('WHO') and medical experts. Despite these concerns, Malaysia currently lacks a comprehensive legal framework specifically regulating excessive gadget exposure among children. Existing laws such as the Child Act 2001, the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 and the Online Safety Act 2025 provide general protection against harm and unsafe online content but remain inadequate in addressing the specific risks associated with extended gadget exposure.
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'TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN-DAY LEX MERCATORIA'
LECTURE TO THE NATIONAL JUDGES COLLEGE, BEIJING+
[Read excerpt]
by Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon* [2026] CLJU(A) lxxix
[2026] CLJU(A) lxxix
SINGAPORE
'TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN-DAY LEX MERCATORIA'
LECTURE TO THE NATIONAL JUDGES COLLEGE, BEIJING+
by
Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon*
Justice Liu Guixiang, Standing Member of the Adjudication Committee of the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China (or "SPC")
Dr Li Chengyu, President of the National Judges College and President of the Judicial Case Academy of the SPC
My fellow Judges, colleagues, and distinguished guests
I. Introduction
1. Good morning. It is a great honour for me to be addressing you this morning, and I am delighted to be back at the National Judges College. I am also extremely pleased to hear that the tree that I planted when I first visited the College in 2017 is flourishing – it continues to serve as a symbol of the strong and enduring friendship between Singapore and China's judiciaries.
2. I last spoke at the College in 2019, and at that time, few could have predicted that the world would soon be gripped by the COVID-19 pandemic, which shocked our economic and healthcare systems and laid bare the costs of global interconnectedness.[1] But even before the pandemic, various crises and disruptions had already placed globalisation and our broader rules-based multilateral order under considerable strain. Given that these have been the bedrock of the peace and prosperity that the international community had enjoyed since the Second World War,[2] these realities are deeply troubling. In the aftermath of the pandemic, I suggest that it is more important than ever for us to carefully consider the future of international commerce, because international trade and commerce is a cornerstone of the multilateral order. In particular, my focus this morning is to consider how we can ensure that the legal frameworks that support and govern international commerce continue to be fit for purpose in tomorrow's world, as we encounter new and changing realities.
. . .
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DOES ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIRE ARTIFICIAL LAW?
[Read excerpt]
by John Julian van Huizen[i] Danial Muhamad[i] [2026] CLJU(A) lxxx
[2026] CLJU(A) lxxx
MALAYSIA
DOES ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIRE ARTIFICIAL LAW?
by
John Julian van Huizen[i]
Danial Muhamad[i]
ABSTRACT
Artificial Intelligence ('AI') has rapidly transformed the delivery of professional services, commercial decision-making, and everyday human interactions. While policymakers across the world have devoted considerable attention to regulating the development and deployment of AI through governance frameworks and sector-specific legislation, comparatively less attention has been paid to a more fundamental private law question: who should bear legal responsibility when AI causes harm?
The publication of the UK Jurisdiction Taskforce's Legal Statement on Liability for AI Harms ('UKJT Legal Statement') represents one of the first comprehensive attempts by a common law body to address this issue. Rather than advocating for an entirely new liability regime, the UKJT concludes that existing principles of English private law, including contract, negligence, causation, product liability and defamation, are generally capable of responding to disputes involving AI. Its significance therefore lies not merely in its conclusions, but in its reaffirmation of the adaptability of the common law.
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JUSTICE LOST IN TRANSLATION AND FOUND AGAIN: A TURNING POINT IN MALAYSIAN DEFAMATION LAW
[Read excerpt]
by Mavin Rajah[i] Mabel S Muttiah[ii] [2026] CLJU(A) lxxxi
[2026] CLJU(A) lxxxi
MALAYSIA
JUSTICE LOST IN TRANSLATION AND FOUND AGAIN: A TURNING POINT IN MALAYSIAN DEFAMATION LAW
by
Mavin Rajah[i]
Mabel S Muttiah[ii]
Few procedural issues have generated as much uncertainty in Malaysian defamation law in recent years as the question of translation. What began as a constitutional requirement governing the language of court proceedings gradually evolved into a rigid procedural rule capable of defeating otherwise meritorious defamation claims.
The Court of Appeal's decision in Jason Jonathan Lo v. Star Media Group Berhad & Ors has rejected automatic nullity over untranslated English words. Its significance cannot be fully understood without examining the injustice revealed in Mabel Sheela Muttiah's case.
THE UNIQUE NATURE OF DEFAMATION PROCEEDINGS
Unlike many other civil actions, defamation claims are founded upon the precise words complained of. The words themselves constitute the very cause of action. It has long been recognised that the actual words used are material facts which must be pleaded accurately and reproduced in their original form so that the court may properly assess their natural and ordinary meaning, context and defamatory sting.
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LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTS
Principal Acts
Amending Acts
PU(A)
PU(B)
Legislation Alert
Updated
| Act/Principal No. |
Title |
Amended by |
In force from |
Section amended |
| AKTA 166 |
Akta Profesion Undang-Undang 1976 |
AKTA A1784 |
3 Ogos 2026 [PU(B) 259/2026] |
Seksyen 4, 7, 7A, 7B, 7C, 8, 9, 9B, 9C dan 9D |
| ACT 166 |
Legal Profession Act 1976 |
ACT A1784 |
3 August 2026 [PU(B) 259/2026] |
Sections 4, 7, 7A, 7B, 7C, 8, 9, 9B, 9C and 9D |
| ACT 127 |
Environmental Quality Act 1974 |
ACT A1793 |
31 July 2026 [PU(B) 258/2026] |
Section 1 |
| PU(A) 220/2022 |
Copyright (Authorized Entity) Order 2022 |
PU(A) 249/2026 |
3 July 2026 |
Schedule |
| PU(A) 220/2022 |
Perintah Hak Cipta (Entiti Yang Diberi Kuasa) 2022 |
PU(A) 249/2026 |
3 Julai 2026 |
Jadual |
Revoked
| Act/Principal No. |
Title |
Revoked by |
In force from |
| PU(A) 93/2026 |
Perintah Mesin Cetak Dan Penerbitan (Kawalan Hasil Penerbitan Tidak Diingini) (No. 12) 2026 [Dibatalkan Oleh PU(A) 266/2026] |
PU(A) 266/2026 |
17 July 2026 |
| PU(A) 93/2026 |
Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) (No. 12) Order 2026 [Revoked By PU(A) 266/2026] |
PU(A) 266/2026 |
17 July 2026 |
| PU(A) 69/2026 |
Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) Order 2026 [Revoked By PU(A) 265/2026] |
PU(A) 265/2026 |
17 July 2026 |
| PU(A) 69/2026 |
Perintah Mesin Cetak Dan Penerbitan (Kawalan Hasil Penerbitan Tidak Diingini) 2026 [Dibatalkan Oleh PU(A) 265/2026] |
PU(A) 265/2026 |
17 Julai 2026 |
| PU(A) 283/2023 |
Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) (No. 4) Order 2023 [Revoked By PU(A) 264/2026] |
PU(A) 264/2026 |
16 July 2026 |
|
